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“Aff soon as men are in society, they lose their feeling o f weakness; 
the equality that was among them ceases, and the state o f war begins” 
(Montesquieu, The Spirit o f Laws, Part I, Book 1, Chapter 3: On positive laws, 1748)

I . INTRODUCTION
1. Preliminary remarks
European law is an extremely confusing phenomenon1. This is so even though the discourse in 
legal theory, in international law, and in different national systems all seem to reflect the 
traditional concept of modem positive law.
European law - consisting of internal and external relations and the discourses o f 
all legal institutions in Europe - seems to exceed the limits of predictability and understandable 
explanation2. Furthermore, if we assert that the relative legitimacy of these institutions is 
connected to this explanation, we recognize that we are looking at a phenomenon which requires 
clarification. One has to “get to the bottom** of European law.
On the other hand, it is not difficult to notice that the discursive and democratic 
idea of law is in crisis, and that institutional corporate instrumentalism is coming to the fore.3
Comparative law comprises a part o f this obscure phenomenon o f European law4. 
Indeed, the main argument of this thesis is that comparative law seems to be at the heart of the 
European law - or even its brainchild. Furthermore, the idea here is that by studying it - in theory 
and in practice - one may bring to light certain key questions relevant to the present analysis o f 
European law.
A preliminary issue for consideration is what is meant by comparative law? Why 
does the problem of comparative law arise?
The machinery which is put in place to guarantee the smooth functioning of social 
cooperation can be called legal order. In a more systematized form, it is a legal system3. It may
1 European la w ' may be defined as a phenomenon consisting of the law of European countries and the law of the 
European Union and the European Human Rights System. European institutions are the institutions o f national and 
European level legal systems (orders). European level legal institutions are the courts o f European Community (Union) 
and the European System of Human Rights.
2 The question is about traditional legal structures and dynamics within them. In Europe, states are legislating as 
they always have, but at the same time, the basis o f their legal and political existence is changing rapidly. This type of 
phenomenon will obviously generate certain changes in conceptualization; both during and after the transitional period.
3 Unger, R.M., 1976, pp. 200-203.
4 One of the interests of the study springs from the fact that "internationalization" and the "Europeanization" of law - 
also in its nationally implemented form - underline the role o f  (innovatory) judicial interpretation. This is connected to 
the role o f comparative law. Comparative law functions in these situations as a "reason of innovation".
3 Brusiin, O., 1938, p.195. By 'legal system’ one can understand a system based on the cognitive - legal scientific - 
process o f  knowing. ’Legal order’, on the other hand, can be defined as a  volitative system related to power 
relationships.
Raz, J. (1971, p.795 ff.) has considered the problem, w hy we need the “systems” o f  law (as unity and 
identity). He maintains that the term “a  legal system” is not a technical term. It is basically an ideal term (used in 
thinking about law). The unity of municipal legal systems can be divided to  materia] and formal unity. This distinction
O J A l i È J
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be said that the main aim of contemporary comparative law is the systematization o f different 
legal orders and legal systems.
These legal orders and legal systems - manifested in institutional forms* 6, and having 
their own particular geographical, linguistic, and "cultural" outlooks * have a close and practical 
inpact upon our lives. Legal norms of these orders play a part in guaranteeing different freedoms 
and possibilities. What seems to be natural predictability in social cooperation depends - in the 
end - on the possibilities for systematized legal orders to intervene in cases of the 
"malfunctioning" of societal interaction through positive laws7 On the other hand, the use o f force 
and restrictions upon our freedom of movement and action do not usually occur, in a visible way, 
in a society, which is functioning well, and seems to satisfy individual demands o f equality.
The idea that different people think differently seems to be the rudimentary idea 
behind comparative law. Why is this so? Do all social systems have their own "ethos”? Are they 
“worlds apart”? What is “another” social system, legal order, or legal system”? Why are they 
“compared” and “studied” - and even used as the basis for different types o f justifications for 
acting? Moreover, how is it possible that, even if comparative law seems to be a somewhat 
haphazard account of individual experiences, there have been attempts to formalize and 
systematize comparative legal research and practice?8
It may be observed that, at one time, at least the distinctions between different 
social systems and their processes (and, consequently, distinctions between laws) appeared 
clearer. People were attached to their physical and intellectual-historical environments, and 
information derived from elsewhere did not seem to appear so relevant for the daily life - at least 
for traditionally-oriented peoples. At the same time, influences, both received and given, were 
more visible.
In this day and age the world seems to be full o f coexisting and overlapping social 
and legal orders and systems. The nature of these rules and legal systems does not show itself 
clearly or distinctively - to a not specialist. One thus has to be more careful in speaking of about
relates to the problem  of the identity o f legal systems (ibid., p.796).
The answer to the question o f  identity can be found when posing the question of what is “criterion or 
sets o f criteria that provides a method fo r  determining whether any set o f  normative statements is, i f  true, a complete 
description o f  a legal system" (ibid., p .797). According to Raz, the three main issues, in this respect, are 1. T he 
relationship between the existence and efficacy o f law, 2. The distinction between making (a new) and applying (an old) 
law, 3. T he relation between law and the state (ibid., p.801). W e may call them  the questions of legal science and the 
identity o f legal systems.
6 O n legal institutions, MacCormick, N ., W einberger, 0 .,  1986.
"What we call necessary institutions are no often more than institutions we have grown accustomed* 
(Alexis de Tocqueville, 1970, p.76).
7 “By the attraction o f pleasure as they preserve their species. They have natural laws because they are united by  
feeling; they have no positive laws they are not united by knowledge. Still, they do not invariably follow their natural 
laws; plants, in which we observe neither knowledge nor feeling, better follow their natural laws” (M ontesquieu, T h e  
Spirit o f  Laws, 1.1.1.)
1 Different exam ples can be found in the classification of legal systems, as will be discussed below .
3particular or general features. This may be related to the value and instrumental rationality 
prevailing in post-industrial (information-based) societies.
On the other hand, nor does it appear easy any longer take to notice the traces o f 
these constant influences. Adaptations, influences, imitations, and copying are the basic canons 
of the modernist world9. In this sense, traditional identities, for example, do not appear clear. 
People seem to identify themselves more with the information channels hitting the headlines. 
Discussions concerning nations, legal orders and systems - discussions on ideal identities - do not 
seem to be particularly important, or even attractive. They appear, instead, as self-evident 
notions.
At the same time, the traditional (meta-)classifications o f legal systems within 
comparative law do not seem to be plausible any longer. Cultural, political, and institutional 
structures have changed • and are changing - so dramatically that no basic and acceptable 
classification can be proposed. It seems that a grouping based on one idea can be outdated 
rapidly after the passage of time. In an "information society", the interpretational value of these 
distinctions is not self-evident. All that seems to be permanent is the dynamics and the change 
itself.
Nevertheless, we may claim, in our contemporary society, that the differences o f 
“systems" could be found in the interpretations of these seemingly similar systems and their rules. 
This idea is based on the observation that as and when experiences accumulate in daily life - or, 
when following the decision-making o f legal institutions - these differences strike us. We may
9 Generally speaking, "modem” is seen as a contradistinction to the traditional (Lash, S .t 1987, p.355). Yet, 
modernity can be seen as renaissance 16th and 17th century rationalism, whereas modernism is a 19th century arts’ 
paradigm. The logic o f modernity could be seen as a form o f an ideal possibility. In its concrete form it is a process. 
(Modernity in law, see Weber, M., 1969, pp. 284-321. For recent discussion of this, Unger, R.M., 1976, pp.192-222.)
Contemporary social practices can be seen in terms o f  modernism, as a transformation of modernity 
into instrumental and substantive rationality (Lash, S., 1987, p.356, and 364, Weber, M., 1969, pp.304-305). For 
modernism as anti-rationality, see ibid., p.357 ff,). This is so  especially in its institutionalized form.
For imitation in law, see Sacco, pp.394-395. Imitation is a form of social learning (see for example, 
Miller, N .E., Dollard, J.,1941).
B y imitating, one creates a subject-matter, becomes topical, i.e. situational in a discursive sense. 
Imitation leads to relatively ''local" practical considerations. However, it "locates” the discourse within the premises 
o f the user of the topical arguments. All the same, imitative discourse seems to close the discourse. It is the end o f 
communication, and forces the parties to the discourse toward other forms of communication. There is no escape from 
this type o f argument - in a logical sense - unless one starts a new discourse. This takes place in "self-referential" form.
This leads to a disparity of societal discourses. Furthermore, the modem perspective upon the evolution 
of the discourse and social form o f organization disappears.
The problem of "argumentative understanding” (i.e. the argumentative imitation) seems to induce non- 
discursive learning, which does not create any dynamic discourse and does not maintain a discourse, but - rather - forces 
one to find the dynamics within non-social forms. This seems to be the pathological problem o f the transfer from the 
modem society to postmodern discourses.
T he m odem  rationality may assume, nevertheless, a  hermeneutic approach, where the analogy 
(historical) is a practical instrument as such, without connections to the aesthetic or affective identity (identification). 
In communicative acting, analogy is only an analytical process.
In this sense, there does not seem to be, for example, any conceptual conflict between the post­
modernism vs. high modem. Some "postmodernists" may have understood rationality and pluralism  another way.
4notice that these differences are based on differences in day to day life and practical discourses. 
The differences within daily life - and in legal interpretations - appear in more careful 
observations o f  the acting o f various people and groups o f people. Observation o f the laws, 
institutions, and the behaviour of people is part of the hard core of contemporary comparative 
law. On the other hand, even if there are methodological and traditional forms of observation, the 
basic idea is that of individual inspection.
Why do we make and express these “comparative” observations?
As maintained, we make these observations because they strike us and because they 
are interesting. On the other hand, we try to avoid them if they seem to be too frustrating. 
Nevertheless, whenever we do face differences, it seems that, almost automatically, we start to 
use these observations as narratives in order to amaze or to  achieve some other purpose. By 
using these observations, we may try to alter our behaviour in order to adapt ourselves - or other 
people - to  changes - or to contrast behaviour so as to  make a statement regarding the 
correctness o f another form of behaviour10. We take them up, as arguments, within a social 
discourse.
Is there thus something special in the observation of legal behaviour?
“Our” form of "behaviour" - in general - seems to be the form of behaviour which 
we feel to be the binding and the correct one - except when we are told otherwise, and we tend 
to fall in with that. This seems to be based on the identity emanating from societal discourses. 
However, in the field of law, the binding character o f our form  of behaviour is categorical. This 
binding character is connected to the social and binding nature of law as a social discourse. W e 
cannot change law(s) solely based on our personal preferences. This applies also to those who 
interpret and apply the law. Courts, for example, must apply the rules as they are directed to  
apply them. Administrators and police, on the other hand, cannot deviate from the types o f  
behaviour which is binding upon them in terms of these social discourses.
I f  we already have categorically binding laws, what would be the purpose of ob­
serving the legal behaviour of others? Furthermore, why should this be done according to certain 
formal criteria? Moreover, why would this be a relevant factor within a discourse? Here we are 
no longer discussing the situation where we must adapt our behaviour to the laws of another 
country - for example, because of our physical or mental attachment to it. We have to examine 
the basis o f such reasoning.
This is the basic question of this thesis. One may say that by concentrating on these 
dynamic processes of comparative observation and reasoning in legal systems and legal orders 
one may begin to  recognize certain constant issues in contemporary legal discourse, and to see 
traces o f  the dynamics of the law. In this sense, one does not look into the changes o f some ideal 
legal rules as such, but instead gains an insight into normative ideologies o f legal institutions and
10 O n phenom enology and the role of comparative law, see M ossner, 1974, p.205.
5their actors in general11.
In conclusion, the preliminary and basic concrete questions of this study are: why 
(other) legal systems are observed, how they are observed, what is done with this information, 
why the information is used as it is used in legal institutions, and what seems to be the results o f 
these uses to the legal systems, institutions and individuals?
Our specific focus is European law12.
2. The subject: some problems and proposals
The thesis. The contextualization o f  comparative reasoning13 14, as described above, means its 
contextualization as a legal theoretical and practical phenomenon. This requires an examination 
of the consequences of the theoretically contextualized comparative legal reasoning in concrete 
decision-making, and an examination of its value for contemporary legal discourse (and in 
particular for European law).
The first argument o f this thesis is that comparative considerations play an 
important role on many levels of the European legal discourse, especially in so called "hard 
cases".,4On the other hand, the claim is that comparative law has become "institutionalized"!5
" This is in accordance with general neo-institutionalist theories o f law  and politics.
11 This thesis concerns the "free trade of legal ideas" (put forward, for example, by  Justice Holmes, Abrahams v
United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919).). It concerns the transfer of legal rules, concepts, and systematic parts o f one 
legal system to another. However, the question is also about the exchange o f legal ideas in a refined way. It relates to 
the processing of legal ideas in different legal systems. Consequently, in the end we may ask: who's free trade is it, and 
what are the limits, functions, and legal outcomes of this free trade?
13 The term "comparative reasoning" is used here because the intention o f  this study is to examine the argumentative, 
even "contextual", forms of the use o f comparative observations. These comparative observations are used for arguing 
in favour of certain legal interpretations, and this reasoning can be studied in legal theoretical term s, which are to be 
developed below.
T he term "harmonizing interpretation" - proposed by some - gives the im pression that the use o f 
comparative material has as its objective the harmonization o f laws in different legal systems (Against the use o f 
"comparative", see Kisch, 1961, p. 168). This applies also to an alternative conceptualization "unificatory interpretati­
on” (Idem.). To call this process comparative reasoning emphasises the idea of process rather than the idea of an aim  
or a result of an exercise. This is related to the theoretical emphasis o f  the study.
14 The “hard case" nature of comparative law related considerations has been explained by  O tto Brusiin (1962, 
pp.43-48). The idea is expressed as follows.
According Brusiin, comparative considerations and research are perhaps the most important a stimulus 
for the legal theorist to achieve intellectual liberation from the perspective o f one legal order. Unless such liberation 
takes place, the legal phenomena in “one's” system are - for the observer - only illustrations, exemplifications - useful 
for the development o f purely theoretical problem s. Brusiin refers, for exam ple, to the rem arks o f Hans Kelsen that one 
of the foundations o f his legal theory has been the comparative research.
Brusiin says, consequently, that for a legal theorist the comparative research is never an end in itself, 
but only valuable means. One may say that because valuable legal research is based on the theoretical perspective of 
a legal phenomenon under consideration, comparative research seem s to be a preliminary step in getting to this 
theoretical perspective. (On this point, see Stromholm, S., 1972, and Klami, H.T., 1981, p.123.)
Consequently, a study of legal theory is a study o f a legal phenomenon in the larger sense, concerning 
its psychological, logical, behavioral, and argumentative elements, beyond the norm in question.
W e m ay relate this observation to this study too. This study has been built upon comparative
a s s n n U JL U i
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Secondly, the argument in this thesis is that a step has to be taken towards the idea of com­
parative law as a category of "sources of law" in order to ensure that the conte mporary European 
legal discourse remains traditional and value-based, instead o f legally instrumental. One could 
assert that this réévaluation has importance for both legal science and legal practice, and an 
impact upon the development of the concept of European law and European socio-normative 
systems as a whole.
Related to the latter perspective, it is suggested that the relationship between diffe­
rent legal orders and "systems" is a "discursively reflexive" one. This idea o f "discursively 
reflexive European law” does not, however, exclude the discursive "opening up" of legal 
justifications in European legal orders and certain changes in the orientation of European legal 
research.
Theoretical focus. As mentioned above, the basic theme o f  this work is to  view law from the 
point o f view o f legal discourse theory. However, this evaluation is made within empirical 
context. This empirical survey establishes the background for the consideration of the 
functionality o f  European law. Hence, the study appears more "holistic" than traditionally
observations on the uses and non-uses of com parative law. This way we have gained a theoretical perspective, which 
tries to focus on the use of comparative law  from the “psychological” (or, rather “phenomenological”) logical, 
behavioural, and argumentative points o f view. Consequently, the analysis will include some considerations of the 
(quasi-) psychological, (quasi-)logical, behavioural, and argumentative aspects o f the uses o f com parative law - as the 
structure o f the w ork indicates. All this takes place in realm of the legal theory, as is explained below.
On the other hand - following the logic o f Brusiin • we m ay say that we are also, in fact, observing the 
behaviour of (legal) actors in their attempts to liberate themselves from the narrow perspective o f the one legal system. 
We, in fact, analyze the intellectual move to the theoretical perspective. A t the same time, w e also follow a  process, in  
which a person w ho has taken this theoretical perspective applies this analysis to a legal phenomenon in a legal 
decision. Indeed, it seems that we are analysing a genuine attem pt to make a complete legal analysis in  a  decision­
making process! M oreover, we also follow this reasoning process to the final normative conclusion, if possible. This 
seems to be an observation of a complete process o f legal consideration. W hat we may say, in other words, is that this 
study concentrates on the institutional solutions to legal theoretical questions.
However, as one may conclude later, we analyze and generalize, in many ways, our observations on 
these different stages of analysis. This is so because we need to make a theoretical analysis o f  the legal phenomenon o f  
comparative legal reasoning and not only look into the individual and particular process of comparative legal decision­
making.
The final synthesis at the end o f this thesis relates to the analysis of the relationship between discursive 
legal theory and the theory of the institutionalized law. This way we end up with an evaluation o f  the relationship 
between these two. This serves as a basis for a theoretical perspective on European law, which is made in the 
conclusions of the study. (Regarding the need for and importance o f  a final synthesis of the 'microsystem* and the 'to ta l 
preliminary system*, see Brusiin, O ., 1962, p.44).
15 A descrip tion  o f the characteristics o f legal institutionalization is given by W eber, M ., 1969, pp.299-300. H e 
maintains, for exam ple, that
“I f  the legal profession o f the present day manifests at all typical ideological affinities to various 
power groups, its members are inclined to stand on the side o f order. Which in practice means that 
they will take the side o f the legitimate authoritarian political power that happens to predominate 
at the given moment. In this respect, they differ from  the lawyers o f  the English and French 
revolutionary periods and o f  the period o f enlightenment in general’ (ibid., p.300). *
im u wumpuu
7dogmaticalI6. In the end, we are trying to focus on European law from the point of view of the 
theory o f comparative legal reasoning.
In this sense, the investigation is expected to tell something about the "evolutional" 
side of the law as a system rather than the evolution of a particular doctrine or interpretation o f 
a legal rule. Consequently, the results o f the inquiry must be understood in the context of a 
specific legal phenomenon, namely “European comparative law”17.
3. T he relevance of the study
General remarks. In European law, comparative reasoning has gained additional relevance, for 
example, because of the réintroduction of principles such as subsidiarity into legal terminology.18 
This type of "prudential" dimension - transplanted into the European legal system - are certainly 
unthinkable without the help of comparative aspects, though it is not guaranteed that even 
comparative law can extricate the European law in its contemporary "prudential" crisis19.
Comparative aspects are also related to the discussion on federalism. The discussion 
on federalism is becoming more and more attractive in European law due to the tendencies 
toward the increasing competencies o f  the European Union20.
Furthermore, it has been suggested - at the institutional level - that comparative law 
should "assist" in the construction o f the European system.
16 That is, it considers how the comparative argument was, and is, constituted. On the other hand, we may ask, what 
is its role in constituting legal norms and legal systems. The first idea refers to its quality as social science, and the 
second idea its quality as a legal discursive act.
17 The intention o f this study is not to provide any particular interpretation of a rule or a norm in the European law, 
but to interpret European law in general.
11 Some analysis, see Ward, I., 1995, pp.28-30.
19 Discussion, see Weiler, 1998.
20 One example o f the latter is seen in the Amsterdam Treaty from 1998, where the European Court of Justice was 
given a right to  interpret basic right instruments. This seems to  bring the European law  towards European 
constitutionalism.
M r. W ard has analyzed the relationship between federalism and integrity o f legal systems from the 
point o f view  of Kantian philosophy in a  following way (W ard, I., Kant and the Transnational Order: Towards a 
European Community Jurisprudence. A  draft o f the paper presented in European Law seminar in 1993 in Edinburg, 
Scotland):
“Kant’s identification o f economics and commerce as the ultimate impubes behind any such future 
order vww indeed prophetic. What Kant advocated therefore war a world order o f  the confederal 
type which exbts in the Community today. What he did not advocate, o f course, was the federal 
order which some perceive the ultimate ideal o f the Community, and which has abo been detected 
as the underlying trend o f  the Community judiciary. Kant's suspicion offully federal orders lay 
essentially in the pragmatic, because any such orders can challenge the integrity o f discrete 
communities, chiefly, by their tendency to institute politically sovereign bodies. However, if a federal 
order was once established, in the European Community or indeed in any political system, then Kant 
would have vigorously continued to stress the fundamental importance o f maintaining the integrity 
o f the normative order*.
In general, the similarity o f European aims and objectives - combined with the 
deviating traditions and interests - is the a notable contemporary phenomenon. This is why 
comparative law - or comparative reasoning - is a relevant subject. It seems to be a form o f 
justification for practical syntheses and choices, which are made at different levels o f different 
systems and orders in Europe.
On the other hand, by examining the contextual and justificatory uses o f 
comparative law, one may be able to glimpse the legal-discursive identity of European law. This 
may augment the idea of legal identity, which is determined only by a focus upon positive rules 
and institutions. The doctrinal approach to European law often represents only the facade of the 
phenomenon. By way of contextualization, one may commence looking into the selection o f 
"European essentials”which are, in many ways, the basis o f the European legal identity.21
Lack of a  study. Legal research on comparative law in this century has aimed at the examination 
of the role o f  comparative law in practice. Yet, a genuine and extensible discoursed analysis o f  
the uses of comparative law is yet to be produced. It seems that the nature o f  comparative 
reasoning in legal decision-making has not been authentically considered in contemporary legal 
literature. The relevance of the study is increasing because of the expansion o f use o f comparative 
law in legal drafting, reasoning and interpretation.
In fact, one could even claim that this has led to rather restricted idea o f 
comparative law.
Institutionalization. The history of comparative law enables us to understand contemporary 
forms of comparative reasoning22. On the other hand, at the heart of the history o f comparative 
law there seems to be a phenomenon o f legal institutionalization23. This forces legal research to  
take a more empirical approach to the comparative reasoning within legal institutions. One has 
to tum to analyses of particular aspects of the use of comparative law in different legal 
institutions so as to explain why it is attempting to use comparative reasoning in international and 
regional legal systems and orders. One has to find values embedded within the use o f comparative 
law in legal decision-making.
The m arginality and the centrality o f the subject. The fact that studies o f the phenomenon o f
8
21 O n the h istorical cultural identity, H aberle, P., 1994, p.26. Good analysis, see Legrand, P „ 1996, p.56 ff., on  
somewhat different basis.
22 "... our understanding o f an analogy will often be incomplete unless we take into consideration the earlier
analogies, which one amends or replaces" (Perelman, Ch., O lbrechts-Tyteca, L ,  1969, p.392).
a  The legal theoretical formulation o f  this concept can be found in W einberger, O., 1998. W einberger maintains tha t 
“neo-institutionalism is ... a synthesis based on a philosophical construction o f  a specific action theory with a theory 
of legal instimtions (p.2). Central to this theory is an idea of “institutional facts".
9comparative reasoning are lacking may be connected to the claim, made by many scholars, that 
comparative law is not an essential element in legal practice, or that it is a marginal phenomenon 
in the practice o f law. The argument is that comparative law aspects are seldom considered in 
legal interpretation (“cognitively”), and that their use is not explained explicitly 
(argumentatively)24. Consequently, the idea seems to be that comparative considerations are not 
phenomena of modem positive law. Furthermore, there is some support for the view that 
comparative law can hardly be classified as a source o f law and legal norms, as traditionally 
defined.25
These viewpoints regarding comparative law emphasize the "quantitative*’, 
dogmatic, and institutional dimensions of law.26
One could declare that all these non-contextualist approaches to law preserve this 
idea of the "marginality" of comparative legal considerations. This may be one o f the reasons why 
there have not been general studies on the role o f comparative legal considerations in several 
legal systems27.
However, the question o f marginality cannot be clearly resolved solely on the basis 
of quantitative and dogmatic observations. Quantitative marginality does not necessarily imply 
"material" marginality. In other words, there is a need for an alternative perspective to the
2* For example, Kamba, 1974, p.499. W e can call this "contextual comparative law".
15 See, Koopmans, T ., 1996, p.545, and de Gruz, P.,1993.
26 With regard to the "quantitative" approach in comparative law, see Yntem a, H.E., 1978, pp. 167-168. She stresses 
the point that there is no fundamental disparity between the quantitative and qualitative m ethod of inquiry (ibid., p.196). 
The differences between these approaches derive from the types o f data collected and the "mechanics" o f manipulation 
of the data (idem.). Quantitatively analyzed situation and some remarks on lack of use, Zimmermann, R., 1995, p.24 
(referring to Drobnig, 1986, p.610 ff.).
For quantitative and qualitative aspects in Comparative law, see M erryman, J.H., 1977, p.475. T he 
qualitative study refers to a study with a purpose o f identifying elements on which an unidentified substance in the law  
is composed. One does not understand substance a priori but attempts to  identify it w ith the help o f some elements.
The purpose of quantitative analysis is to examine how m uch of each elem ent a  "substance" contains. 
Here one starts from  a  particular rule or norm  of a system, and examines its extension. If  one starts from the legal 
substance (particular legal rules), one ends up with the quantitative approach to law. I f  one starts from an element in 
an unidentified normative rule, one has an alternative perspective to  the system using this e lem en t Here the legal 
interest is not a priori determined by the systematic connections.
Furthermore, a qualitative study may reveal something about tendencies and value judgments in the 
system, whereas the quantitative study only reproduces the hidden value decisions and tendencies.
O n the qualitative interest in comparative law, see Sacco, R., 1991, p .388.
A  study of comparative legal reasoning is a  qualitative study because it aims at revealing the context 
o f the comparative legal argument and at determining the aims of the comparative reasoning.
O n the general perspectives and comparative law, see Neumeier, K., 1973.
(Without qualitative research, orders would seem "natural", see Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L.,
1969, p.508.)
27 O ne could say that no comprehensive and compound study has been produced on the role o f comparative 
considerations in different legal systems. Considerations seem often to be based on "beliefs" on the general and factual 
situation (see, for example, Koopmans, 1996, p.555).
The fact that one can see comparative reasoning taking place mainly in the dissenting and concurring 
opinions is also part o f the "marginality" of the comparative argument. However, the role o f these dissenting opinions 
for legal evolution has not been really considered.
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phenomenon. This may break new ground in the field of comparative law. The alternative 
approach consists of empirical approaches to the quantitatively marginal legal conceptualizations, 
deviations, creations and confirmations in connection to comparative considerations.28
4. The philosophical nature of the subject
Comparison. One of the main problems of this examination is embedded in the very nature of the 
subject, namely, to the idea o f comparison itself. Comparison as a subject - the heart of every 
interpretive process * may easily involve the mixing up o f the methodology and the subject 
itself.29
As an intellectual process, comparison could be defined as a reference to something, 
comparison with (establishing relationship between) something, and adoption from or o f 
something (a "formation")30. It is a dynamic relationship. Comparison seems to be an intellectual 
move or a process between things, establishing a relationship between things. At the heart of this 
process is the subject (a person) her/himself - whether she/he is a person as a social construction
îs W hen speaking about analogy, Perelm an observes (Perelman, C h., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L ,  1969, p.372) - b y  
referring to H um e, D., A Treatise on Human Nature) - that
"It is true that some philosophies • notably those o f Plato, Plotinus, and St. Thomas Aquinas - have 
justified the use o f  analogy in argumentation because o f  their particular conceptions o f  reality, but 
in such cases the use o f analogy has been linked to the metaphysical conception, with which it stands 
o r falls. The empirists, on the other hand, fo r  the most part look on analogy as a resemblance o f  
quite minor importance because o f its weak and uncertain character. It is more or less explicitly 
accepted that analogy constitutes the least significant member o f the series identity-resemblance- 
analogy. Its sole value is that it makes it possible to formulate a hypothesis fo r  verification by  
induction
However,
"Any complete study o f argumentation must therefore give it a place as an element o fproof.
It looks, at first blush, like the closer we get to  concrete legal interpretations - interpretations, w hich 
are directly issued to the parties in a process - the more 'Tare" comparative considerations are. The "power of law" d o es 
not seem  to be based on comparative law. The pow er o f comparative law seem s to be in the legal discourse in general -  
in its connection to  dogmatic and scholarly works.
29 See, Jucquois, G ., Comparatisme 2: La m éthode comparative dans les sciences de l'homme, (Peelers, 1989), p .1 0 . 
The com parative m ethod can be claimed to b e  the essence o f human sciences (ibid., p.12). See, also, Piaget, J., La 
situation des sciences de  l'homme dans le systèm e des sciences. In: Tendencies principales de la recherche dans les 
sciences sociales e t humaines, (Paris, Ed. Havet, J ., 1971), p.9. O n the non-.existence of any specific comparative 
jurisprudence in  science, see Allen C . K., 1931, p.12.
In  the context of com parative "legal philosophy", Graveson, R.H., 1958, p.653. O n the idea of 
comparison being  a t the heart of every process o f interpretation, see Frankenberg, G., 1985, p.420.
Com parative method is defined as: "Any method that involves examination o f  similarities and 
differences between phenomena or classes o f  phenomena, with the aim o f  establishing classifications and topologies 
of social phenomena, and testing o f  hypotheses o f  causal relations by examining the empirical associations and 
temporal ordering o f  factors", Jary, D and J, Collins, Dictionary o f Sociology, 1991, p.103.
So  also, Roth, G„ 1978, p.xxxv.
M In  law, Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982, p.71.
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or an ideal subject.31
On the other hand, comparison seems to be a dynamic way of maintaining one’s 
identity as opposed to static identity. This is why comparison is a continuous process, whereby 
identities established are reconstructed and deconstructed continuously. This includes all the 
explicit "nonidentities" maintained.
The nature of the process of comparison and analogy. The dynamics embedded in comparison 
could be explained by the ontological "difference" existing in the idea(l)s (things) compared, 
which forces the comparison to be a "circular" or a "sylleptic " process. The way to stabilize this 
dynamism is the claim of analogy; that is, a relative similarity.32 This phenomenon may be 
illustrated could be explained by the ideas presented by Paul Ricoeur.33
According to this author history is a  reconstruction, because within it there are 
elements of both source critics and critics of the document itself. The past does not "show" itself 
to us in documents. Documents are historical "traces", which give us a place for the past in the 
historical discourse34 about the document. The document is a "lieu-tenance", a "place-
31 In this sense, it invites "reflection", w hich is - evidently - a form o f rationalization, alternative to  pure intuition. 
Reflection and intuition are necessarily in any conflict with each other (Graveson, R.H., 1958, p.652). (Also, Rawls.
J., Theory o f Justice, Cambridge, 1971).
A ccording to Immanuel Kant (1992, pp.592-593) comparison is part o f the logical actus o f  
understanding, through which concepts are generated. In this process, there is
"comparison ("comparation d.i. die Vergleichung") o f  representations among one another in the 
relation to the unity o f consciousness".
Note: "...By first comparing these objects with one another I note that they are different from one 
another in regards to the trunk, the branches the leaves etc; but next I  reflect on that which they 
have in common among themselves, trunk branches, and leaves themselves, and  /  abstract from the 
quantity, the figure, etc., o f  these; thus I acquire a concept o f a tree"... "abstraction is the negative 
condition under which universal representations can be generated, positive condition is the 
comparison and reflection. For no concept comes to be through abstraction; abstraction only 
perfects it and encloses it in its determinate limits ",
The logic of Kant, in this sense, seems to be constructive. However, obtaining a  concept (Questiones 
facti), and the judicial question (Questiones juris) which is a question o f  justifying with what right one possesses this 
concept and uses it (for this, see Kant, I., Gesammelte Schriften (Prussian Academy, ed. 18:267, No.5636. In: Arendt,
H., 1982, p.42).
For example of constructivism in comparative law, see Zweigert, K., K5tz, H„ 1977, pp. 37-40. 
C om parison may be related to the legal analogy. It has been claimed th a t "because reasoning by 
analogy presupposes a particular view to the rule application, namely, the rule application as a form o f acting, its 
topic is the rule application itself. Logically this means that rules figure in the object language as individuals, rather 
than as sentences" (Verheij, B., Hage, J., 1994, p.71).
For the view that comparative argument is ultimately an analogical argument, see Valladao, H., 1961,
p.109.
” "Social institutions are based on a n a lo g y Douglas, M ., How the institutions think (N.Y.) 1987, p.30.
33 Ricoeur, P., 1993 (1984, pp.436-452).
34 Foucault, M. (1977,1990(1976 ], p p .8 7 -8 9 )- for example - sees historical discourses as matters of social power 
in particular and special languages. According to him, there seems to be no phenomena outside these discourses. By 
studying the particular discourse, one can only find the structure o f that discourse, the "episteme".
The difference between Foucault and Habermas (1987) seems to be evidently in the way the discourse 
gets its meaning. For Foucault it is the power which determines the meaning of a discourse. For Habermas, the meaning
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keeper"35. The reference to the past is, in other words, "indirect". f
Ricoeur employs three concepts to explain, how this past "in" the document could 
be "seen". These concepts are the "other" ("l'autre"), the  "same" ("la même") and the 
"analogy" (l'analogie")36. In the historical intentionally37 *, the "same” is a rudimentary reproduc­
tion ("reenactment") in the present. It is not epistemological in nature, not "understanding 
through the lived" - to “live again" ("re-vivre") - but to think again ("re-penser"). Furthermore, 
it is only possible to rethink something which is rethinkable.
In the "rethinking" the "difference"3®, there is a dialectic turn. The "same" turns out 
to be the "other" - different variants of the negative ontology. In the "place-keeper", there is now 
the "difference". Nevertheless, it is not possible to understand the "other" and the "same", or to
is derived from  the relationship between discourse and communication.
These two aspects are present in the historical discourse. However, the discourse can  be claimed to  be  
an interplay betw een powers, which can be reduced to the subjective meanings the reproduced form s attain in the 
psychology o f minds. The power makes a text meaningful.
A  discourse can - a posteriori - be easily seen as a  reproduction of certain forms o f pow er. This should 
also take place, because it enables anyone to  establish genuine alternatives. O n the other hand, the discourse is, in its  
open form  - as a  non-instrumental expression o f values and feelings - a  communicative a c t
A  discourse seems to aim always at the reproduction of something, which is - on the other hand - used 
as a prem iss for an action. This way the discourse is not itself im portan t but what is instead im portant is how the  
reproduced form s o f power (Foucault) or the “common understandings”  (Habermas) are used. Law, as a reproduced 
form - having its traditional nature, and being the basis o f legitimation - is used in a certain way. In the end, it is not s o  
significant to look, what are the outcomes o f the discourses as social form s, but how is this communicative sociality 
used in everyday life. The factuality o f law, for example, determines the ultim ate meaning-creation o f  legal forms. T h e  
consequences o f  social actions determine the logic of social behaviour - despite the power and understanding 
dimensions o f discursive and communicative acting. Every discourse has - in the end - only the subjective meaning a s  
the basis of an action. In this sense, we should be aware of "meaningless" discourses, and look to the discourse and its  
environment at the same time.
While Foucault stresses the tracing of the mechanisms and technologies o f power, Habermas stresses 
the im portance o f  the possibility o f discursive criticism. The only distinctive feature seems to be the emphasis o f th e  
positive (H aberm as) and negative (Foucault) rationality embedded in the basic starting points of these approaches.
The idea of applying"episteme" to legal discourses seem s to be quite strange. The Foucaultian pro ject 
was about the archeology of knowing (and reproducing) in a highly critical manner, whereas the application of the id ea  
of episteme to law - as a social phenomenon - seem s to be related to the establishing of layers of knowledge, statisizing 
the project Fbulcault's idea was to study the pow er o f knowledge, w hereas the application o f the idea to law seems to  
imply an establishm ent of a law as a historical entity (for an exam ple o f this, see Tuori, K., 1998, pp.233-248).
Some analysis of Foucault's ideas in general is found in Kremer-Marietti, A .,1985, and on law H unt, 
A., Wickham, G ., Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance (London) 1994, and review essay an d  
independent article, Baxter, H., Bringing Foucault into Law and Law into Foucault In: Standford Law Review, 1996  
(499-479).
T here  are examples o f the application of the idea of "archeology" also in comparative law, see fo r  
instance Legrand, P., 1996, p.280.
35 "It is the form al frame in the cosmic time".
36 F or som e analysis, see Arendt, H .t 1982, p.79 ff.
37 By the concept o f "historical intentionality" one can grasp both "dimensions" embedded in the medieval Latin te rm  
"intentio", taken up by Brentano, F., (Psychology from Empirical S tandpoint, ed, Kraus, 0 . ,  1973 [1874]). T h is  
intentio does not necessarily involve only the "intention" to do something. (See also, Husserl, E., Logishe Untersuchun­
gen n .,  Tübingen, 1980).
“ W here the "re-" and “time” disappear.
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get information about it. Knowledge about the "same” and the "other" is not possible as such.3*
How is it possible for a "place-keeper” - which has, in it, the "difference" - to be a 
"place-keeper”? Ricoeur explains this by the idea of the analogy. When one describes - "sees” - 
something "as being something..." ("comme quoi”) - one also explains something "as something" 
("voir comme"). Here both the identity and the difference are in the description. The binaric 
explaining and thinking are replaced by tropologies such as synecdoche, metonyms and irony, 
metaphoric (and also "fictional") explaining.39 40
In this manner one can maintain that there is something that is simultaneously the 
"other" and the "same". It is in these descriptions where something is seen. The past does not 
come to us as transparent truth, but through rewriting and redescription we can see the past.41
Com paring "legal phenom ena". There are several possibilities for dealing with the above 
portrayed phenomenon in connection to law. Here the different general concepts of law are
39 Ricoeur explains, in this connection, how  the nature o f difference grows, if curiosity concerning the* difference’ 
wins the "good faith" (belief) regarding the ’sameness* (referring to, Veyne, P., L'Inventaire des Différences, Paris, 
1976), and furthermore, if one starts to understand the difference not as a  variable o f the constant, but rather as an 
exception from all adaptation to a model.
W e could claim that here the analogy may be interpreted as a value.
40 Comparative and analogical statements can be called this kind of explaining because "i f  at the time it was 
introduced it was allotted to a certain thing as its proper signifier, but as the time went by another thing came to be 
labeled by it owing to some affinity, no matter o f what kind, between it and the original (referent), though the word 
is not the appointed signifier o f  the second" ( Al-Farabi's Commentary and short treatise on Aristotle's D e 
interpretatione (trans. and notes Zimmermann, F.W ., Oxford, 1987, p .226). "Metaphors " are not used in any science, 
nor in disputation, but they are used in rhetoric and poetry” (Ibid., p .231).
A  “ transferred word" is a  term  "generally known to have been the signifier o f  a certain thing ever 
since it was first introduced [but which is] is later taken and used to signify a certain other thing, but remains the 
common name o f thefirst and the second this situation arises when discoveries are made by developing disciplines "... 
"transferred terms are used in sciences and other disciplines fo r  things whose knowledge is peculiar fo r  specialists, 
but when dealing scientifically with things generally known which have generally known names, scientist and other 
specialists should retain these terms and use them in their disciplines in the way the general public understands 
them." (idem.).
O n metaphor, see Austin, J., 1995, pp. 106-108, "Metaphorical and figurative application usually 
means one in which die analogy is faint., the alliance between the primitive and the derived signification was remote 
when the analogy is clear, strong and close, and the subject to which the term is deflected lay on the confines o f the 
class properly denoted by it...” (p .l 08).
41 See on this point, Ricoeur, P ., 1993,1984.
T h is  is where the understanding and the explanation come together, and w here the act becomes 
affective. W e could claim that in an ideal discourse, in the identification to  the expression one tries also to  reach that to 
whom one is speaking.
In the philosophical sense, an reasoning is comparative reasoning, and every argument is comparative. 
This means that in legal discourse, for example, an argument is generally compared with other arguments, and this w ay 
one comes to a solution by choosing the prevailing one. The best argument wins. This is the argument in the ideal legal 
discourse.
For example, Alexy makes the following statement (1989, p .l  02): "In order to distinguish truth from  
false statements I  refer to the judgments o f  others, indeed, to the judgments o f all others with whom I might ever 
engage in conversation. Here what I  encounter factually includes all speech partners, whom I  might encounter i f  my 
life-existence were coextensive with that o f  human kind. The condition fo r  the truth o f  statements is the potential 
agreement o f everyone else”. See also Habermas, 1973.
entering into the picture.
A question must be posed: what is our concept o f law? Do we perhaps define it as 
the transparent and understandable positive commands of the sovereign42, as a less crystallized 
spirit deriving from the environmental and cultural circumstances43, or perhaps as principles 
deriving from the "nature of law"? 44. On this stage, one enters into the philosophy o f normative 
legal premisses, and to the domain o f the philosophy of law.
One may say that none of the approaches to the conceptualization of law is 
necessarily "irrelevant" or "external". Namely, they may be seen as parts o f the general historical 
discourse regarding legal norms, and they each contribute something to this discourse. Law - in 
a universal discourse - is a construction and reconstruction of plurality o f standpoints. All 
approaches are within the "context o f  law", reproducing the form o f  law and assembling 
understanding of it by instituting different perspectives to be taken into consideration. This is why 
different approaches to law - even if controversial - may contribute conceptualization and 
viewpoints to a study of phenomena (phenomenon) of law - as well as to a review o f  comparative 
law and comparative legal reasoning. They can provide methodological measures which facilitate 
the explanation of the subject.45
Legal com parison. At the heart o f the “legal” is the basic distinction between norms and facts. 
The idea o f law can be claimed to be based on a  general comparison between factuality and 
normativity.46 The legal comparison (of these aspects) is at the heart of the construction of a legal
42 Austin, J., 1995, p.108. Positive comes from "human sources".
45 M ontesquieu (1716-1755) and L 'esprit des lois.
44 Aristotle, C icero, St. Thomas Aquinas, etc.
On this “identity” , see Raz, J ., 1977, p.796 ff  (a bit different formulation o f  the question).
4J As Graveson puts it, "...but their theories (jurists o f every school) appear to me like photographs o f a square 
house; no single picture can show more than two sides o f the building, but each one illustrates an aspect o f a house 
which is peculiar to itself and which seems important to that particular theory" (Graveson, R .H ., 1958, p. 658).
46 This is related  to the general tension betw een facticity and validity, Habermas, J., 1992, p .l  1-31.
K lam i, H.T. (for example, 1981, p.73) sees the ontological dualism o f  law  based  on distinctions 
between norm  and behaviour. However, it seem s problematic to speak about “facticity” as “behaviour”  because th e n  
one introduces som e evolutive aspects into the distinction. This seems to  be so • especially - if one speaks about th e  
reflective relationship between these two categories. W e can make a short analysis.
N orm  or “normativeness”  assum es -  traditionally - a  description of “ legal facts”  (tatbestanden) 
comprising a  behaviour, and a description o f a  consequence o f this behaviour. Behaviour in  “factuality”  - on the o th e r  
hand -  cannot be assumed, in my view, unless analysis o f the facts show that certain types o f behaviour have existed. 
Finalistic theory seem s to assume categories o f behaviour, which means - I think - too extensive concept of acting a  
priori. Unless an extensive analysis of the factuality is effected, no idea o f behaviour - in any rational sense - seem s 
possib le (in this respect, see some analysis by  Raz, J., 1971, p.802 ff.). In fact, in order to respect the integrity (a n d  
discursive integrity) of a person, one should be  able to analyze the factuality showing the intentions o f  a person w ithout 
assum ing any  “patterns” of teleological o r finalistic ideas a priori. The decision-maker or the o ther party - in th e  
adjudicative situation - has to “prove” the intentions of, for example, the losing party to the dispute - and also argue o n  
this basis. The assumption o f the behaviour's intention is based on law, not on general finalistic ideas about humans in  
general. On the other hand, explicit legal reasoning, which attempts to satisfy the demands arising from  the assum ption
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interpretation - the "making up of a complete phrase", a complete legal sentence.
The legal comparison - as a "comparative" interpretation - extends itself to both 
"spheres" - to nonnativity and to factuality. By extending the forms o f these categories, the 
process o f comparison becomes a three dimensional process of "system constructing".
This means that a system gets its meaning in the factual and normative spheres. At 
the moment of the practical (legal) statement and the drawing of legal-philosophical analogy, the 
"legal mind" or the legal "consciousness" - or the socio-philosophical mind of the actor - "orders 
words" to a system of similarity (word-order)47. It makes a choice by creating a form of life, a 
value - and the possibility for the language-consciousness -relationship. The normativity and the 
factuality are assimilated, and the legal (linguistic) act passes. The "legal" comparison appears in 
the form of interpretation of the legal-social system based on the (ideal) distinction of 
legal/illegal.
In the final analysis, legal comparison is merely a form of thinking and explaining 
of this process - and a process of rewriting. It does not differ from the general forms of social 
processes. What differs, perhaps, is the subjective "world picture". In legal comparison, this 
comprises the image of the "homo juridicus" and its connection to the world.
Nevertheless, some questions remain: who or what is the "homo juridicus"? Is he 
(it) connected to a particular system, determined by that system, or a free human being?48
Comparison o f socio-legal systems as "legal com parison". The question becomes more 
complicated if one has to define the systematic relationships in the context of this process, which 
are based, in turn, upon the ontology, relevance, and materiality of the systems being compared - 
on the dogmatics and structures of the socio-legal systems. The comparison o f “illegal/legal” is
of intention, treats the persons affected by the norms as persons who act intentionally. Outside that reasoning - in an 
integrative legal system - no assumptions o f  legally relevant intentionality can ex ist
This is related strongly to the distinction between the analytical and finalistic theories - and also to the 
“discussion on the “ normative theory” - which seems to be central also to K1 ami’s analysis (1981, p.89).
47 Deleuze, G., GuattariJ7., Postulates on linguistics, p. 79 ff. (In: A  Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, London, 1988.).
41 This question  is attached to our concept o f law. As seen before, our concept o f law is a  concept o f dynamic 
interaction between persons and social systems. Only in this social sense can the "homo juridicus" ex is t One could 
claim that it is a socio-legal-cultural construction. As to what kind depends on many things. All the same, its choices 
describe i t
T he conception o f a standard "Homo Juridicus" could be identified as a  conception o f the dogmatic
lawyer:
"Les juristes dogmatic pensent, sinon que tout est droit, du moins que le droit a vocation à être 
partout, à tout envelopper à soutenir, comme un idéal, tout runivers habité. Il régne, chez le juristes 
dogmatiques, à la fois un idéal et un postulat de panjurisme. Une théorie comme Vuniversalite du 
droit de punir (en droit pénal international) trahit naïvement ce panjurisme foncier". (Carbonnier, 
J., 1995, p.23.
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combined with the distinction between non-legal/legal.49
In this phase, we may speak of comparisons o f traditional socio-legal systems - 
examples o f positive constructions. These comparisons are effected according to  the paradigm 
or "phenotype" of system or norm concept, which corresponds to the concrete description of the 
system (state, regional or international legal systems, etc.).50
Here we can speak also of legal considerations, appearing either in heuristic o r 
argumentative form, referring to other socio-legal system and to the relationship between these 
systems. In this connection, we may consider, as well, the possibility for an adoption o f a socio- 
legal idea (analogy), or of a transfer o f  an idea from one system to another system.
Consequently, the legal comparison becomes a process o f social and systematic 
interpretation by the "homo juridicus traditionalis" - and approaches traditional comparative law, 
comparative legal considerations, and comparative legal reasoning.51
C om parative legal considerations an d  comparative legal argum ents (com parative legal 
reasoning). Legal comparison is not exclusively, as we have seen, a matter of a dynamic process 
of legal heuristics and legal thinking. It can also be a matter of an argument - an unveiling o f  a  
form of thinking in a legal historical discourse and in the positive reasoning of legal institutions52.
49 Carbonnier, J., 1995, p.23.
50 As Perelman maintains (Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. 1969, p .322) "in the field o f law; reasoning by true  
analogy appears to be restricted to comparison as to particular points o f  systems o f positive law separated by time, 
place or content. On the other hand, when resemblances between entire systems are sought, the systems are regarded 
as examples o f a universal system o f law".
O n the distinction between law and legal system see Yntem a, H.E., 1958, p.497.
Klami seems to speak, in this connection, about the “validity o f law", and in relation to  behaviour a b o u t  
“prognoses o f  behaviour” (Klami, H.T., 1981, p.74). However, one may say whether the behaviour is - in th is  
connection - nothing but legally relevant behaviour having a normative aspect as its prem iss (for a  discussion on th is , 
see Klami, H .T ., 1981, pp.74-75).
51 One could claim  that the role and identity o f comparative law depends on our conception o f  law. Namely, i f  th e  
legal thinking is stressing the "ontology" o f the legal system, com parative law seems to  be more like a socio-legal 
systematic study. On the other hand, the norm-ontological approach stresses the "non-contextual" nature o f  th e  
com parison, and in this way, comes closer to  a legal analogy. Traditional comparative law  is evidently based on  th e  
systematic identity thinking in the context o f law.
Frankenberg has seen the question of comparison and learning as the concepts o f  "distance" a n d  
"difference" (Frankenberg, G., 1985, pp .411-455). W hen speaking o f the distance, one makes (o r should m ake?) a  
distinction so  as to avoid confusing the content of a conclusion with universal truth and logic. This forces th e  
comparitivist to  criticize the neutral referent (the reflection?). This leads to a critical comparison and learning in s te a d  
of a return to "functional universals", "world-view" and "language", and "ethnocentrism" (idem.).
One might agree with this point o f view to a certain extend. However, it lacks a further developm ent, 
namely, that the process is a form of social learning, but in the form o f socially meaningful discourse. Here lies th e  
return to rationalism . One does not have to be a universalist o r rationalist in the sense o f ethnocentrisism, but one c a n  
attempt to explain the starting points for his comparative understanding in an auditory, whatever it  might be.
This question seems to go back  to the dichotomy between dialectics and rationalism  (idem.).
Klami has spoken about conceptual realism as one o f the starting points o f com parative law (K lam i,
H.T., 1981, p .76).
33 One can distinguish between two associated processes in individual processes of reasoning. T he first is the s e a rc h  
for the reasons, and the second is the connecting of them (Hobbes, J., Leviathan, 1968, p.96)
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If it is openly and visibly (i.e. positively) so, one is able to look into the comparative reasoning 
as a discursive phenomenon (that is, to view the legal comparison as a traditional phenomenon). 
This argument, by comparison, can be defined as an open and positive consideration of several 
objects, aiming at an evaluation of these objects through their relationship to each other.
Comparative legal considerations, however, do not necessarily relate to open and 
practical legal argumentation33 34. This may be connected to the basic idea of the “modem art o f 
rhetoric”, according to which the reasoning takes place by arguments, which support ones deci­
sions, and not by some controversial or alternative proofs and reasons embedded in the 
consideration processes. This seems to be a "natural" tendency of mind in the processes of 
constructing "word-orders", analogies, and similarities - in processes, where the question is about 
the maintenance of coherent consciousness. In this sense, the rewriting seems to become, in itself, 
an obstacle to an open explanation.
One could say that comparative legal considerations are ruled out from open legal 
reasoning so as to maintain the deductive rationality and internal coherence and the circular 
validity-check o f the legal decision-making. On this level, legal comparison becomes a strategic 
and instrumental legal comparison. This enables one to have a reasonable interpretation within a 
closed system of normative legal reasoning. Legal comparison appear in the contexts of discovery 
and justification.54
The laws of comparison, and  the rationalization of th e  com parative legal argument. This 
subject is paradoxical. In attempting to describe the nature o f  the subject, one ends up describing 
the structural laws of law itself, the laws of legal reasoning, and mentioning something about 
legal choice. This is due to the fact that comparative law is the very heart of the system of law, 
and that comparison is the basic normative idea o f law. Comparison o f law seems to be the law 
itself.
How could we delineate a systematic legal framework? What could be its basic 
premises? How could we relate comparative law to legal interpretation?53
33 See, for example, Bogdan, M ., 1990, p .33 , Kamba, E J .,  1974, p.23.
34 The idea of the sources o f law can, to a  certain extent, identified with the context o f justification. In this sense, 
com parative considerations may sometimes be in the realm o f the sources o f law. (For the context of discovery and 
justification, see A am io, A, 1987, pp.77-78.)
33 The legal interpretation can be defined here as "intellectual activity accompanying the law-creating process as 
it moves from a higher level of the hierarchical structure to the lower level governed by this higher lever . ... how, in 
applying a general norm... to a concrete material fact, one is to arrive at a corresponding to individual norm... There 
is, in short, interpretation of all norms in so fa r  as they are to be implemented, that is, in so fa r  a s  the process o f  
creating and implementing the law moves from one level o f the hierarchy to the next“ (Kelsen, H., 1990, p.127).
W e may say that the argumentation in law is a process o f selecting legal arguments in realm o f 
instrumental and communicative reason. Consequently, it is the part o f  the discursive reasoning-process, where both 
pro- and contra-arguments appear. Legal justification is communicative interpretation of a  legal norm. To be 
communicative, as we will see, it takes place in realm o f legal system, i.e., in realm  o f legal sources, and it is 
traditionally and value-based way rational.
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5. The concept of law, the  problem of gaps, the  concept of legal sources, and the
study of com parative law as a legal source of law
In troduction . The remarks, in this chapter, are based on observations upon situations where 
comparative reasoning has been used in filling in "legal gaps" or "lacunae”. Nevertheless, the 
analysis is relevant also from the general point of view.
It is clear that if law was universal and complete, no interpretation, argumentation, 
or reasoning would be needed, and hence, no discursive approach would be necessary. 
Nevertheless, we seem to need comparative reasoning - and legal reasoning - in law. 
Consequently, we may ask: Are there gaps in law? What could be a gap in the law? Is the 
interpretation of law complementary, creative, or affirmative?
In the ideal and “complete” theory, we prefer the idea of affirmative interpretation 
(in ideal sense), and maintain, as Kelsen did, that the notion of a gap in law is a fiction, i.e. that 
there are no gaps in the law56. Nevertheless, even if there are no gaps in law there is some degree *36
Legal reasoning can be defined as a general concept corresponding to an interpretative process based 
on practical reason including instrumental and communicative forms of reasoning, and aiming at interpretation of a legal 
norm.
36 It must be  stressed that this idea does not apply as such to the concrete legal order.
Kelsen’s theory is the “pure theory of law”. W e may see it as an attempt to  purify for example politics 
from  law (o r law from politics), and in this w ay to avoid ‘‘legal institutionalization". It leads usually towards such a  
practical attitude towards law, where positive legal rules have a value as such (Kelsen, H ., 1992, p .7 ). As Brusiin pu ts 
it regarding the institutional lawyer, Law appears to him predominantly as a conscious social technique for a solution 
o f special social tasks (legal problems). T h is idea may be related to legal eclecticism.
O tto Brusiin (1962, pp .47-48) recognizes that even in Kelsen’s theory (o r theoretical thinking) the  
elements o f human behavior and legal norm s seem  to be interwoven. However, his claim  that Kelsen “pretends” h is 
system to be “purely normative” can be contested. It is true that the epistemological structure o f law  is far from sim ple. 
However, in legal theory, we are still speaking about the normativeness o f  a  system. The legal phenom enon under study 
and “in one’s cognition" is to be understood as normatively legal, contrary to  ideas o f cognitivism about knowledge as 
such. Furtherm ore - as Brusiin him self recognizes, within legal phenomenon, there takes a  place an intellectual 
liberation. C ould this liberation be  som ehow  related to this “pure normativeness" in K elsen's theory ?
Regarding gaps, see Kelsen, H ., 1946, pp. 146-148. Fictions do not have any historical existence. O n 
the indispensability of legal fictions as instruments o f human thinking, see Fuller, L.L., Legal fictions (Standford, 1967). 
Furtherm ore, an extensive analysis o f interpretation and gap as a fiction is given by Kelsen, H ., 1990, pp.132-135. 
Commentary on this, see Paulson, S.L., 1990.
W e may say that Kelsen’s approach was traditional, bu t also “traditionalizing” . W e may say that his 
basic  ideas relate to necessity and possibility, which seem to correspond to his basic ideas on rights to property and 
personal liberty  in constitutional systems. Furthermore, the distinction between “ideality" and “reality” o f law  is  
recognized. The actual law seems to relate m ore to ideas of cultural possibility; *Theoretical commentaries supposedly 
assisting in implementing a statute are in fa c t thoroughly political, making suggestions fo r  the legislator to consider, 
attempting to influence the creative function o f  the courts and administrative agencies (Kelsen, H ., 1990, p. 131). T he  
ideality may relate more to the ideally formal tradition, which should recognize - but not apply and have as its prem isses 
- any “realistic”(instrumental and value based) approaches. This also seem s to indicate that any “w ill” and “intention" - 
as well as “sovereignty" and “community" based  categories - are excluded from form o f law (ibid., p.129). For K elsen 
the interpretation was a search for possible interpretation.
Kelsen maintains also that "Both familiar means o f  interpretation, argumentum a contrario and  
analogy, are worthless, if only because they lead to opposite results and there is no criterion fo r deciding when to use 
one or the other" (ibid., p. 131).
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of uncertainty in legal discourse and in the social conception of law. This feature can be explained 
in the following way.
The social concept and the discursive integrity57 of law. We can maintain that the concept of
It has been also stated that "Fictio, in old Roman law, is properly a term o f pleading, and signifies a 
false averment on the part o f the plaintiff which the defendant was not allowed to traverse; such fo r  example, as an 
averment that the p laintiff was a Roman citizen, when in truth he was a foreigner. The object o f these fictiones, was 
o f course, to give jurisdiction, and they therefore strongly resembled the allegations in the writs o f the English 
Queen's Bench... the fiction is that it (law) remains what it always was... they (fictions) satisfy the desire fo r  
improvement... a t the same time they do not offend the superstitious disrelish fo r change which is always present" 
(Maine, H., 1954, pp .l 6-17). However, M aine is not as skeptical regarding them as Hobbes, but sees their function in 
the evolution of law: "but it would be equally foolish to agree with those theorists, who. discerning that fictions have 
had their uses, argue that they ought to be stereotyped in our system ... legal fictions are the greatest obstacles to 
symmetrical classifications" (ibid., p.16). “Fictions, equity, and legislation a ll (Bentham would say), involve law­
making. They differ only in respect o f the machinery by which the new law was p r o d u c e d However, "Legislation 
and Equity are disjoined in the popular mind and in the minds o f most lawyers; and it will never do to neglect the 
distinction between them, however, conventional, when important practical consequences follow  from  it” (ibid., p .l 8).
37 W e have already spoken about the discursive integrity above. In relation to the idea, we could use also an 
expression of “integrative discourse” , which would also refer to the basic idea of the discourse as a respect o f the 
integrity o f the parties in the discourse as individuals, but also as a part o f a discursive community.
W e have to maintain that the term  is definable only in the course of the study. It has to be re-written 
by an analytical approach to the subject.
Ray F, Carroll speaks about the general idea of integrity related to the business and professional 
organization (internet pages, article Integrity: the organizing principle, last updated: June 22 ,1996 ):
“Integrity demands that recognition be given to valuing the ideas which others have to offer. For the 
accountant it means providing users with the information they need in order to make a fa ir  
assessment It also demands open-mindedness and an intense respect fo r  the truth. Integrity requires 
not only truth telling, as quite naturally comes to mind, but also truth finding. The very act o f 
participating in a discourse suggests that genuine consensus is possible and that it can be 
distinguished from  a consensus which is false. According to Habermas ((1984). The theory o f  
communicative action: Vot. I  Reason and rationalization o f society. Boston, and see McCarthy, 
McCarthy, T. (1978). The critical theory o f Jurgen Habermas Cambridge) rational decisions about 
truth claims requires a structure which is free from  constraints such as neurotic or ideological 
distortions. His thesis is that the structure is free from  constraint only when all participants have an 
equal opportunity to be heard. This means that each participant has the same chance to command, 
to oppose, to permit, to forbid, and to express his or her attitudes, feelings, and intentions". *
**It is die contention o f this paper that individual agents fo r a business or professional organization 
ought to act with integrity. It has been argued that this involves acquiring the disposition o f 
open-mindedness, engaging in serious discourse, and practising dialogic leadership. This engages 
the wholeness o f what it is to be human. As Alasdair MacIntyre (MacIntyre, A. (1981). After virtue 
- A study in moral theory. Notre Dame) has said, integrity cannot be specified a t all except with 
reference to the wholeness o f  human life
In  the context o f ethics, see M ark Mason (In Defence of a Dialectical Ethic Beyond Postmodern 
Morality. In: Philosophy of education 1997, internet pages):
"To summarize, the ethics o f  integrity which I  have postulated is constituted by a respect fo r the 
dignity o f being and by responsibility fo r  the moral choices we make. Respect fo r  the dignity o f  
being is associated with a Kantian deontological ethics which I have located at the objective or 
foundational pole o f the dialectical morality posited here. Responsibility fo r  moral choices is 
associated with Hume's visceral morality which I have located at the pole o f the dialectic identified 
by Rorty’s notion o f solidarity, by Levinas’s  face to face situationally responsible morality, and by 
Bauman's moral responsibility to the other. To repeat by way o f conclusion, moral action is wrought
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law is connected to a social concept of law, which is based, in turn, upon the communicative 
rationality o f  human beings58. Our concept of law is this type of discursive concept o f law.
This “communicative socialness” is exactly the reason why the concept o f law  is  
"beyond" our thinking, and why there seems to be uncertainty in law. Because we do not have a n  
exact idea o f what communication is all about a priori the concept of law as a social phenom enon 
is beyond us and the uncertainty remains59.
All the same, this is not the whole story. The discursive and communicative concep t 
of law, although uncertain, can nevertheless be balanced against the idea o f discursive in tegrity  
of law60. Law regulated by this type o f idea - even in the case of uncertainty - maintains th e  
coherence o f such a concept, and we may preserve the idea o f “gapless” law.61
However, we must ask, in relation to this concept of gapless law, how can th e se  
ideas o f discursive integrity and uncertainty in law be described? An answer to these questions is  
necessary if we want an explanation o f the role of legal sources in relation to discursive integrity  
of law.
We may re-emphasize the point that problems of the social concept of law  
described above concern different forms of communication and their decisiveness. W e may sp eak  
of uncertainty connected to language (words, phrases, and sentences etc.), regarding th e ir  
syntactic, semantic and pragmatic dimensions, and uncertainty as to the interaction betw een 
different elements of language. However, one has to be still more analytical and specific.
As is known, any “situational disturbance” can function as a "basis" o f  
communication. The colour o f the speakers* clothes, his symbolic surroundings, his behaviour, 
and the tone o f  his voice are good illustrations of properties which may determine the affective 
nature o f  the everyday communication. Analysis o f these traits is a matter o f rhetoric. All th e  
same, they do nevertheless form a part o f the study o f legal discourse too in the following sense.
The communicative uncertainty is often the reason for certain strong reductions 
being made in the social realm and in the realm of law. These reductions can be reductions - fo r
by this tension between objectivity and solidarity, between foundational commitment and face to fa ce  
responsibility, as we strive towards "as much intersubjective agreement as p o ssib le to w a rd s a  
discursively principled morality".
51 Haberm as, J., 1987,1992. Some criticism o f  the discourse philosophy, see W einberger, O., 1994, p .240-247. 
W einberger m aintains (1994, p.247): ‘7  completely agree with Habermas that discourses in society and an  
appropriate organization o f them is one o f the most important and even a defining characteristic o f every democratic 
system. But I  disagree with him that discourses as such are a measure and, so to speak, a sufficient legitimation and  
justification o f any result o f a social discursive processes”.
** F or instance any idea regarding transparent communication seem s to be  problematic.
“ This idea m ay be derived from the idea ofD w orkin, R., 1986.
61 O n  the theoretical concept of coherence, fo r example, Alexy, A ., Peczenik, A., 1990, p.131 ff., Peczenik, A ,  
1994 ,167  ff.
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example - to ideal form of language, to certain group o f people - or even to a person62. This 
seems to be due to the fact that human beings have a tendency to seek to safeguard continuity 
and predictability and to solve a priori the problem of uncertainty.
It seems to be correct that it is not sufficient simply to rely on our capacity, in every 
situation, to take into account different types of communicative acts. There is always the 
possibility that different persons look upon different things as relevant communicative acts, and 
in this sense, - even if agreement on some things seems to have been achieved - no factual 
understanding has been reached. For example, one person can concentrate his attention to the 
symbolic environment, and rely upon the holistic "experience" he gets from an act. Another 
person may observe the use of the words "law", "value", or "morals", and in recognizing them, 
may rely on the speakers sensibility to “human interests”. There can be differences also in 
"teleological" considerations. One can, in some historical "understanding horizon",63 see certain 
types of phrases leading to certain types of actions, whereas another person may forget certain 
historical experiences - and concentrate his attention upon the precise subject - matter to which 
the speaker refers to. On the other hand, the interpreter may have taken into account some kind 
of regularity o f action by the persons in the speaker’s. He may know that a type o f a slogan - 
gathers people together, who are interested in certain types of things, and that these types o f 
groups have a tendency to "motivate" themselves with similar types o f aim, which presumably 
leads in turn to certain types of actions.
On the other hand, the individual characters of persons in a group can also comprise 
part of interpretation, as well as the character of the original speaker. The way certain people 
tend to organize themselves can, for example, be a decisive part of interpretation.
Thus, it is recognized that there can be problems in interpreting and reinterpreting 
discursive situations. How could we, consequently, solve this problem of uncertainty, especially 
in the realm of law? How could we attempt to guarantee the discursive integrity o f law?
It can be claimed that all interpretations, reasoning, and arguments make sense in 
the legal sphere, if they are, firstly, aimed at interpreting law, and secondly, if they are reiving on 
prearranged categories of relevant distinctions (i.e. systems o f reflective concepts in concrete 
terms, a priori definitions of the things to be looked upon in a concrete situation, "legally relevant 
situations", descriptions of social problems, etc.).
The analysis of the discursive integrity of law has, consequently, the following 
dimensions. Firstly, the question may be about the categories o f the distinctions relevant to legal 
interpretation (and consequently, for reasoning and argumentation), and secondly, it may refer to 
the means of how we recognize legally relevant situations in the first place? The first question can
62These categories correspond to  different types o f authorities presented by W eber, for example (See, W eber, M., 
1978).
"F o r this concept, see Gadamer, H-G., W arenheit und Methode (Tübingen, 1965), p.265 ff.
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be defined as a question of sources of law, and the second as a question of the moral and political 
basis of law.
Here we will briefly analyse this latter question: How do we recognize legally 
relevant situations?
We can say, with regard to  groups such as police, parties of a legal disputes etc. 
that they recognize "relevant situations" based on their authority, which have has been conferred 
them by law (in constituting definitions). In other words, a person or a collective body has been 
given authority to act, whenever he perceives it to be important. They have been recognized as 
legally relevant actors. On the other hand, all recognitions o f "legally relevant situations" take 
place on the basis o f the societal discourse (and education) about the limits o f  the possibility to 
act (with regard to the police), or about one's rights and duties in society (with regard to 
individuals). Furthermore, in contract law, for example, the parties, in the form o f  a  contract, 
may further define their rights and duties in relation to certain specific commercial acts, as 
precisely as they want. In this latter sense, ad hoc - or more permanent - social associations 
(institutions) may define for themselves the basis of the interpretation o f  legally relevant 
situations and acts (certain breaches, for example).
The second question - the question of legal sources - is closely connected to the 
question o f the recognition of legally relevant situations. Namely, those who identify some kind 
of a possibility to act, must have, in some ways, an idea o f legal sources (comprising the sources 
of distinctions relevant to recognition). The role of the sources of law may become relevant in the 
"affirmative" sphere, based on a learning process and the "socialization" processes o f the parties 
in question (whether with a commercial, political or other type o f  organization).
Consequently, the recognition o f legally relevant situations is chiefly a question o f 
education and linked to the unconscious recognition of one’s rights and duties. The interpretation 
of law, on the other hand, is based on the intentional use o f legal sources so as to communicate 
with other persons, not to make value-based choices on the basis o f one's legal status.
The determination o f legally relevant situations is associated with the general 
societal discourse. However, whenever participating in general discourse, a person does not 
necessarily aim at the interpretation o f law, but at expressing his opinion in general. His 
orientation may not fulfill even our first condition, i.e. the idea that one must aim at interpreting 
law. In general discourse, persons do not act as legal persons, but as individuals with the aim of 
taking part in the discourse in a general public sphere64. In commercial interactions, for example, 
the question o f recognition is often closely connected to  the economic and material losses 
occurring. In a civil liberties question, on the other hand, the problem is often related to  one’s
“ For this concept, see  Habermas, J., 1986:2, p .320  ff., 1993, p.467. See also Baynes, K., 1992 ,1 7 2  ff.
In this sense see also the idea o f Dworkin that the public legal interpreter should be  seen as a "moral" 
actor seems to be problem atic (see Dworkin, R., 1986, p .l) .
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moral and political "sense" in a particular situation.
Legally relevant situations have to be recognized a priori. This makes it possible to 
interpret and to reason about law in a communicative way. Legally relevant situations then move 
in the sphere o f legal problem-solving, for example, by parties, administrations, or individuals. 
Here the competent body for this type of problem-solving interprets the situation. In 
contemporary legal systems we call these bodies courts, whether these be administrative courts, 
arbitration courts etc. To define these bodies as legal problem-solvers is extremely important. 
This is so because by recognizing these bodies as legal problem solvers, we link these bodies to 
law, and accordingly, to legal sources of interpretation. This does not mean that these bodies 
would be the only institutions which could interpret the situation. The crucial idea is that these 
bodies are leeallv bound. Only this way are we a priori capable of controlling them, and to 
discuss or debate with them in a problem-solving context with arguments, which are binding 
upon them. This way we are able to maintain the discursive integrity o f law. Consequently, the 
legal problem-solvers have to interpret law according to defined legal sources.65
Now, it can be noted that the definition of the relevant distinctions for interpretation 
is decisive in the interpretation o f  a situation. Without having an idea of relevant distinctions, the 
interpreter might make a use o f any type of distinction and the decision-making might become 
arbitrary from the communicative (and social) point of view and might serve to increase the 
uncertainty rather than preserve the integrative discourse on law. This type of situation emerges 
in a case where the "legal process" itself is not a decisive source o f arguments66. If the 
interpretation is not based on reasons deriving from the sources of law, the reasons may not be 
valid (there is no reason-ability, and the interpretation is not rational). The interpretative 
rationality, in this sense, means the teleological, historical, and other type o f interpretation of the 
valid reasons defined in the realm o f the legal sources. We cannot speak about communicative 
problems a priori in any way other than in relation to acceptable sources o f distinctions.
Who defines legal sources?
This question can be linked to the previous consideration of the identification of 
legally relevant situations. In this sense, the identification of legal sources may have a connection 
to moral, political and general discourses67.
However, we can say that the explainer of legal sources also is aiming at the
“  Some discussion, see Aamio, A ., 1997, p p .l  89-189, Peczenik, A ,  1989, p.313. Peczenik, A., (1994, p.153 ff.) 
developes his idea by  starting from a  M oral Education A rgum ent
66 This difference seems to be the decisive distinction between - for exam ple, Anglo-Saxon and continental legal 
thought One m ay say that English courts, which consider only the arguments presented by the parties, differ from the 
continental systems, where the legal decision-making institutions make a prelim inary examination of the applicable law 
and legal arguments.
67 This is especially so if the recognition o f legally relevant distinctions derives from the reasoning o f  the parties in 
the legal processes.
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interpretation o f law. Persons defining legal sources have to take account of the legal discourse. 
They should aim at guaranteeing the discursive integrity of law by understanding that they are not 
only bound to rather arbitrary distinctions of the contingent general discourse, but are part of the 
more universal legal discourse, in which they identify the relevant legal sources. One can claim 
that these persons are perceiving - on a scientific and permanent basis - the institutions (or 
“institutional actors”), which (re)produce the (possibly) relevant legal sources. This takes place 
by evaluation and demarcation of the communicative abilities of various institutions (or 
institutional actors) in order to sustain them as sources o f legally relevant distinctions.68
This leads to theories of legal sources, which are related to political theories. In this 
sense, different categories of legal sources may be defined - a posteriori - on the basis o f political 
theories or social practices. For example, in the realm of democratic theory, the relevant sources 
may be found in the materials which have been produced in the process of political law-making 
by traditional democratic institutions69. In this sense, the political discourse on an issue may give 
some indications as to the relevant legal sources. However, this is not necessarily so. The idea o f  
discursive integrity o f law has to be perceived.70
Returning to our basic definitions of law we can say that categories of basic 
distinctions - the legal sources - can be established in the realm of the legally integrative 
discourse. The rationalization of legal sources means the establishment of a valid source of law 
by examining the nature of the reasoning and arguments deriving from it, and by exploring the 
uses o f this reasoning, in political and legal practice. Simultaneously, this type o f study is 
connected also with the analysis o f the nature of these reasons in relation to their correspondence 
with theories concerning them and on the legal discourse as whole.
Now, the investigation presented above is fundamental from the point o f  view o f
6* W e m ay recognize the explanation o f this idea in Kelsen, H., 1992, p.13-14 (§7. Cognition of legal Norms vs. 
Legal Sociology).
For som e analysis of “communicability*, see Arendt, H., 1982, pp .63-65, pp.68-72.
m W hat, then, is a democratic body? This question is based on the political history, which, nevertheless, must be 
somehow related to  social utility and to  the question of a good institutional arrangement for the maintenance of the 
predictability of decisions. For some discussion, Sartori, G., International Encyclopaedia o f Social Sciences 
(MacMillan, Vol 4 ,1 9 6 8 )  p .l 12 ff.
W e do not go into this question here, because the question o f traditional democracy is not interesting 
to us in the context o f the topic. However, what we m ay maintain is that com parative law as a source o f law  is not really 
"democratic*' in this traditional sense of the word - as will be argued below.
W e could claim that, for example, different constitutional or European Courts are dem ocratic based 
on their "substantial" concern for individuals. The context of their establishm ent history does not give any  indication o f 
this, however. They w ere not bom out o f  the struggle towards individual rights, but from the formal establishm ent o f 
"guaranteed** rights. This way, their evaluation as dem ocratic bodies has to be m ade according to the evaluation o f their 
daily practice.
70 Raz, J., has proposed that the rule o f law should be understood as a part o f  the culture o f dem ocracy, where the 
judiciary is (publicly) responsible for a m ore slowly changing legal doctrine. The question is, according to  him, about 
a culture o f legality a s  such (1990, p.331 ff., especially pp.338-339). He also emphasizes the dem ocratic continuity 
(ibid., p .339).
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the subject of this thesis. Namely, we are studying the interpretation o f law on the basis of 
comparative legal information71. In other words, we have to stress the fact that in this 
investigation comparative interpretations examined are produced by some legal institutions which 
are aiming at the interpretation of law, and, first and foremost, they are normatively bound to the 
idea of interpretation o f law on the basis of legal sources.
Consequently, the survey of comparative law as a legal source is not based solely 
on the reference to authoritative legal institutions, but on the rationality of comparative 
arguments in these institutions. This way we may sustain a critical perspective upon the study of 
comparative law as a legal source.
Ultimately, the question is whether the distinctions deriving from comparative law 
can be considered legally meaningful, in the sense that they guarantee a predictable interpretation 
and integrity of the legal discourse in general?72 An answer to this question requires scientific 
rationalization of comparative legal argument.73
71 This study provides only a brief survey o f  comparative law in legislation.
71 One can claim that the fundamental (rational) premisses o f the legal discourse are in the sincere value-decisions. 
Nevertheless, these value-decisions should be traditionally oriented, because the traditional orientation is the only way 
to avoid the inslrumentalization of law.
Philosophically speaking, sincere value-based expressions are  the only possible way to identify oneself 
to others ideas in some dialectical discourses. Otherwise, no sincere communication exists, or, instrumental acting 
generates instrumental identity, and this causes a negation of any discourses as possibilities for a social process. On the 
other hand, value-based discourses are also ways to learn. In value-based acting, the environment is seen also as a 
possible source of valuable information. O n the other hand, value-based acting makes one susceptible to 
instrumentalizations. Here the role o f traditionality is visible. It is only way to find out the distinction between 
instrumental and value-based acting.
Ultimately, as the theory of legal discourse seems to  maintain; the traditional quality is guaranteed by 
the auditory, which can control the nature of the value decisions.
Any evolutionist idea o f systems o f law lacks an idea o f value decisions, because they lack context The 
particular context has to  exist to enable one to recognize any value decision. Evolutionary systems can be seen only as 
"analogical". In this sense, any separate 'application* discourses do  not seem  to exist (some d iscussion, see Alexy, R , 
1993, p.157 ff.). In this sense, we can have instrumental and evolutionary theories (though they lack any value nature 
in discursive sense).
Some critical analysis o f the “evolution in law” -theories, La Torre, M. (1997, especially p.344 ff.) 
recognizing the phenomenological (“metaphysical”) nature o f these theories (ibid., 331 ), and contextuality of the 
application o f law related to their problem s (ibid., p.346).
73 Generally speaking, by rationalization, one attempts to get rid  o f myths residing in the creation of social meaning. 
This way one is able to transfer the discussion to the spheres hidden from dogm atic forms o f rationality, i.e. to begin a 
new discussion about the rationality o f a system in other terms.
Barthes, R ,  (Mythologies, Paris 1975, see also, Vattimo, G ., Società Transparente, 1986) who studies 
how the myths are dealt with by "archaic", "cultural relativistic" and "moderate irrationalism” modes. (Barthes, R., 
1975, p.429). Myth cannot be a subject o f rationalizing and demonstrative knowledge. Especially in the cultural 
relativistic approach the study of the myths of the "other" starts the discovery o f  the myth and belief system of one's own 
culture. The basic structures o f both cultures are "mythical" (Vattimo, G., 1986. p.46). These myths are narratives on 
the mythical experience.
Comparative law, for example, is a  strongly unstructured and "unscientific" discipline, which transfers 
problems, connected to  it, to these types of areas o f cultural discourse (cultural relativism). Comparative method is a 
narrative explaining about experiences. The "danger" of comparative law  as a  process o f explanation is seen in its 
nature of being a mythical (see for example Strömholm, S, Comparative legal sciences. Risks and Possibilities, In: Law 
under Exogenous Influences, ed. Suksi, M., Publications of Turku Law School, V .l ,  N o.1/1994), and Kahn-Freund, in
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The main question seems to relate consequently to the transfer o f  comparative law , 
comparative legal arguments, and comparative considerations from the phenomenological, 
practical, value-based, and instrumental "inspirational” phenomenon to the rational sphere of leg a l 
reasoning. Furthermore we may also ask on which scale this could be done.74
In a concrete form, this requires an examination o f the nature and the tradition o f  
comparative law discourse, i.e, a study o f particular legal systems as one of the basic sources o f  
legal reasons. On the other hand, one should be able to find answers also to questions such as , 
“in which systems comparative arguments are used“ (the quantitative aspect of the study), a n d  
“what functions comparative considerations have - in that particular legal system - in relation to  
particular legal norms” (i.e. the legal-logical causalities between the norms and com parative 
law).75
C om parative law as a  source o f law, and  the study of legal gaps. We return here to  o u r  
original question. It has been maintained as I have already argued that there are no gaps in law , 
but because o f communicative uncertainty, the idea o f sources o f law is needed in order to  
maintain the discursive integrity o f law.
Nevertheless, a question remains: why are comparative arguments sought to  b e  
used in cases o f lacunae, and how could this particular characteristic be taken into account? T o  
put it in another way; what kind of attitude should we take towards the fictional processes o f g ap  
filling?
It is noted that we have to incorporate the social and communicative concept o f  
law, as well as the functional side of the law, and commence to take seriously the processes o f  
fictional gap filling. The demand o f sincerity of a discourse demands that all “hardnesses” m ust
a form of a joke (witticism), "On the professor o f comparative law the gods have bestowed the most dangerous o f  a ll 
their gifts, the gift o f freedom ” (1966, p.40). Com parative legal studies usually leave the "basic principles" open a n d  
maintain the myth. T h is takes place in order to m aintain "cultural organization".
The narrative model in historical research reveals new forms of rhetorical models, on which the  
historical writing itself is based upon (Vattim o, G., 1986, p.49). Comparative law, for example, is a narrative m odel; 
itself a kind o f  a culturally relativist model o f argumentation. By these narratives the myth of culturally relative law is  
kept alive. In reality, however, the cultural relativist models are not possible to keep apart
The research of comparative reasoning, on the other hand, is a study of the use o f  these narratives (an d  
their forms) in the argumentative practice on the culturally relative law, a study o f  the processes o f  dem ythologization 
or remythologization - both occurring in the same process of the "non-metaphysical" ("demythologizations" of) law  ( o f  
the m odem  or m odem  law) (compare, ibid., pp .50-51).
74 The use o f com parison as inspiration becom es evident for example in the article by Koopmans, T ., 1995, p .5 4 5  
ff, 549 ff.
73 An example m ay be given on this stage. Libera] positivism considers the freedom  of expression to be guaranteed 
by positive rights. Nevertheless, as we will see, cultural restrictions play a role in their application. This, on the o ther 
hand, is only to be found in cases where the application o f  positive rights is com bined with normative com parisons, fo r 
only in these cases is the factuality • the connection betw een the normativity and factuality - to be found. Here the "form  
of life" (W ittgenstein) meets the linguistic behaviour, and the "cultural limits" are seen. The nature o f com parative 
considerations is bound to the interplay betw een the normative (systems) and the cultural spheres.
mmm
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be taken seriously. If the sincerity rule is followed, all “hardnesses” are real in the sense that they 
are believed to be true.
Consequently, one could claim, for example, that these fictions are so as to explain 
something which seems to be important, but which does not seem a priori to be legally accepted. 
This is why the difficulty of a situation is explained by fictional means, and why the filling up of 
fictional gaps has been called for in hard cases76.
In conclusion, we can concentrate on (comparative) analogies. We do not have to 
solve the problem of "fictional” gaps. We can merely rely on the integrative discourse of law. We 
can examine the fictional gaps and their filling by going all the way through the process of 
interpretation. This way we may discover the result o f this fictional operation. These cases are 
exceptionally interesting because the fictions operate to resolve a problem of the “existence - 
nonexistence” o f law, and furthermore, because, through its study, one may arrive at a genuine 
emphasis upon the normative issues involved77.
Therefore, in the final analysis, interpretation is normative and not only (legal) 
philosophical and (legal) theoretical78.
76 The reference to  hard cases, fictional lacunae etc. connotes the tragedy of "socially not knowing". This is very 
persuasive. Aristotle, for example, thought that the fear and pity could be provoked by referring to these types of tragic 
phenomena. On the other hand, this type of reasoning does not seem to rely on discursive concept o f law.
It looks as if the fictious situation is refers directly to the emotions. This way the analogies for "solving 
the problem" seem to be - rhetorically - "strange saviors". (See, Janaway, C, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 
p.279). Consequently, the use of analogies seems to be connected to the rationalization o f affective situations by poetic 
means, where
"the tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore, like alt the imitators, he is thrice removed from the
king and from the truth? That appears to be s o ” (Plato, Republic X, trans. Jowett, B., New York,
1992, p.598).
On legal fictions, Maine, H.S., 1952 (1861), p. 13 ff. ("These instrumentalities seem to me to be three 
in number, Legal Fictions, Equity, and Legislation Their historical order is that in which I  have placed them", ibid., 
P-15.)
77 This type of operation in interpretation is based on the “goodwill" analogy, and makes it possible to arrive to a 
fairly extensive interpretation of the nature of the fiction and its filling up. In other words, to study an analogy, one has 
to use analogy as a basic method.
The study concentrates, consequently, on questions like what one uses in the discourse, how the 
discourse occurs, between whom it is effected, where the discourse takes place, and what follows from  it.
71 We may also speak about "political gaps" in systems. These are the gaps resulting from the fact that political 
discourses are incapable o f resolving problem s in society by formal means (legal means, see Granger, R., 1979).
A characteristic - and a "tragedy" - o f the legal comparative filling of gaps may be, for example in the 
supranational and international level, that a comparative interpreter may start to see unacceptable also all those legal 
rules, which have been constructed on the basis o f discursive political processes o f another social system. In his context 
such rules do not exist because of this "political gap", and this “should be so also in other systems".
This phenomenon may be related to the phenomenon, visible on international and regional level, that 
roles deriving from national political processes are rejected on the basis that they are somehow unacceptable on a 
principled basis. In this type of process, the basic and static distinctions o f  different "functions and roles" prevailing in 
the supranational institutions start to determine the evaluation o f  socio-legal systems as such. In realm  o f this type of 
conception the possibility for changing any ro les and functions is replaced by static and relatively permanent social 
ideals. The political gap is replaced by one basic distinction as a normative fact, and by this distinction the politically 
constructed legal norms are evaluated In the ultimate sense, this may be related to the expression "substantive 
principles". This is also related to the functionalist approach to law. By the principled restrictions, the basic structures
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6. The methodology, restrictions, and structu re  of the study
M ethodology and restrictions. This study has several dimensions, and is related to v a r io u s  
questions. It is associated with the questions on axioms of interpretation (logic and meaning), t h e  
types o f linguistic social actions, the discourse in general, rationality of the legal reasoning, t h e  
nature o f the legal discourse in systems of law, the relationships between legal systems, a n d  
finally, with the question of the role of comparative law in the system(s) of law and law i n  
general. All these dimensions have had an impact upon the methodology, restrictions, and t h e  
structure of the study79.
As maintained, the approach of this work is legal theoretical. Consequently, t h e  
legal scientific methodology is - mainly - comparative80 and legal historical. However, t h e  
methodology is “comparative” in an extremely wide sense. It consists o f  some dogm atical 
observations and the use of methods of qualitative social sciences in the legal sociological sen se . 
The legal sociological observations are related to the analysis o f legal systems and institution, 
which - on the other hand - provides a possibility to focus on some legal normative questions 
from the point of view of the basic legal categories like principles and legal sources (core o f th e  
legal dogm atic opinions)*1 The interest on the behavioural regularities (in legal institutional 
sense) are not related directly to the content of the legal norms as such82. However - a s  
indications o f ‘‘customary*’ institutional procedural norms - they may have some legal relevance  
associated with the core of the legal dogmatical opinion in matters of legal institutional (a n d  
perhaps systematic) nature of legal orders.83
The problems of the legal historical methodology are dealt with in connection to th e  
historical observations.84
are m aintained, and the political discursive processes are restricted.
Another tragedy may be, all the same, that the political processes can be ''total'', in the sense that t h e  
political gaps do not exist at all (like in totalitarianism). However, in discursively open political processes these ty p e s  
o f  phenom ena do not exist. On the other hand, too substantively principled systems may also appear po litica lly  
"totalitarian”, because they tend to emphasize the effectiveness (functionality) in social relations.
19 The impact has been not only to the 'logical" structure, but also to the “quasi-logical" structure of the work - to th e  
interaction between the main text and the comments in the footnotes.
10 See, supra n 14.
11 See A am io, A ., 1997, p.75.
W e m ay ask whether legal systematization of legal systems as such is possible. Comparative law  -  
trad itionally  - has maintained that nit is possible. This has led to certain attem pts of classifications, as seen below . 
However, in  this w ork, we maintain the dynamics o f  such systematizations.
12 A am io, A ,  1997, p.75.
13 A am io , A ., 1997, p.76, and 286. A am io calls this “theoretical legal dogmatics" (ibid, p.285-286).
14 The legal historical method is, in this sense, mainly descriptive and explanatory. The is to describe the historical 
forms o f the use m ade o f  comparative reasons (a history of the legal methodology), and, on the same time, to  focus o n  
some intentions o f these historical authors. Furthermore, questions o f  historical causality may be perhaps identified in  
relation to some of these legal institutions in question. M oreover, some context m ay be created for studies related to th e
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More concretely, the literature is composed of articles and books on social and legal 
philosophy, legal theory, and the tradition of comparative and national law.
The legal theoretical analyses, which have proceeded this study have been largely 
excluded for discursive reasons. However - as has been already noted - the theoretical analysis 
is based on a discussion of general theory of rationality (Weber83 *), and its criticism based on the 
theory of communicative action (Habermas86). The legal approach has been discussed on the basis 
of remarks by Kelsen and some other writers. The move to more legal discursive spheres is made 
with the help of general theories of argumentation (Perelman)87.The legal discursive theories have 
been chosen on the basis o f different types of rationalities (value-based theory88, and more 
“traditional legal discourse theory89). Furthermore, some more sociologically oriented theories of 
law have been “adjusted” for discursive analytical purposes90. From the structural point of view, 
these legal theories will be referred and used in the course of the investigation in several 
occasions. However, their use is related to different parts of the study so that the traditional 
comparative law theory is analysed - in the end - by the traditional theory of legal reasoning, 
whereas the instrumental and value-based theories (of legal justification) follow the empirical 
study of concrete legal justifications.
In the history of law, the discussion of comparative law is extensive. Most of it was 
not at hand. Consequently, there were no possibility of considering it all. Practical limitations had 
to be made.
The material on comparative law theory consists of writings of traditional 20th 
century comparative law authorities. The method of selection o f the comparative law theory has 
been mainly a “reading” method. The elements for this study have been adopted from various 
materials dealing with types o f issues in the comparative law context. This is related to the fact 
that no equivalent studies really exit. The discussion on comparative law theory has been 
reconstructed for the purposes of the study. Some discussion o f the possible “social connections” 
between various discussions is made in the next chapter. On the other hand, the discussion on the 
comparative reasoning in European Courts attempts to comprehensive.
As maintained, many of the limitations o f this study are based on economic reasons
contents o f these institutions (On this, see A am io, A., 1997, p.76-77). See, part n , c h a p .l.
M W eber. M., 1978.
“ Habermas, J., 1987.
17 Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969.
“ The basic source, Alexy, R. 1989, and, in general, Aamio, A., Alexy, R., Peczenik, A ., 1981 (133 if, 257 ff, 423
ff.), and W rdblewski, J., 1974 (33 ff.)
“ The basic source, Aamio, A , 1986. See also, Bell, J, 1986, p.45 ff. H e divides these studies to studies o f the logic 
o f legal arguments and studies o f the practice o f legal reasoning. Arguments should be directed to someone, usually to 
people dealing with law (ibid., p.49 ff.).
90 Teubner, G., 1993.
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restrictions and limited time available. Furthermore, both the historical and more contem porary 
analyses have been based occasionally upon secondary and incomplete sources. One m a y  
rationalize these restrictions and imperfections with regard to the nature o f the work as a s tu d y  
of legal theory. When confronted with highly general questions, one has to use the results o f  
many other writers in order to avoid the research becoming an inquiry into specific questions, 
which would require instead a separate investigation. On the other hand, some "secondary** 
sources have been taken up simply because they have explained the context o f the issue  
discussed, or because they support the explanation o f the phenomenon.
On the other hand, there is use made o f legal decision-making material from th e  
European Court o f Justice (European Community legal order), from the European Court o f  
Human Rights (European Human Rights system), and more limited numbers o f cases fro m  
national courts o f some European states (from the Supreme Court of Finland, France, Germany, 
Great-Britain, Italy, Sweden, The Netherlands, and also the United States).91 Moreover, there is  
use made o f certain administrative documents and interviews o f judges and administrators f ro m  
some o f these courts (the European courts, supreme courts of Finland, France, Germany, G reat- 
Britain, Italy, and Sweden). Moreover, some remarks on the legislative practice are made on th e  
basis o f legislative drafting and legislative governmental proposal materials from Finland, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Sweden.
T he study is restricted to these countries (and legal systems) on the basis o f th e  
traditional classification of the major legal systems in Europe. When attempting to co v er 
"European" practices, it seems to be normal to look into the legal systems, which present 
different legal traditions as described historically by comparative lawyers. One may claim that th e  
legal systems analysed in this study represent more or less alternative legal "possibilities" an d  
"techniques", and function as general examples. Therefore, the selection does not have to b e  
inclusive.92
Administrative courts are not part of the study. There are study economical reasons 
for this exclusion. Furthermore, administration is strongly legal socio-systematically oriented,93 
which means that comparative observations do not appear in the reasoning o f these courts so  
frequently as in normal courts.
The study of interview and case material is justified on the basis that they are in the  
hard core o f the instrumental and value-based uses of comparative law material. The emphasis o f  
certain countries reflect the analytical quality and “quantitative openness”, which the justifications
91 T here is som e discussion on the selection o f  this material before the corresponding chapter.
91 Tur, 1977, p .2 4 6 . Some ideas on the criteria for the choice o f  countries and the usefulness, see M anila, H E .S ., 
1979, p .45 .
93 F o r this, Scheuner, U.,1963, p.714. For com parative law in administrative law in different countries, see R ev . 
Int.Dr.Comp., 1989.
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have in these systems.
One of the premises in the reporting of the results of the research is that no special 
attention is paid to the differences between countries as such, but the overall and particular 
features are analysed on a general basis. This is due to the fact that the purpose o f this work is 
not to make any fundamental comparative observations, but rather to explain the general features 
o f the use of comparative law and comparative reasoning in different spheres o f law. Often 
different systems are mentioned because they have a certain referential and explanatory 
importance.
In spite of all these restrictions, it is clear that one cannot avoid the intuitive, 
subjective and culturally determined factors determining the choices of the material in this kind 
of study.
Structure. The first part of the study examined the general theoretical framework for the study. 
The following part is devoted to the question of the concept of comparative law and theory o f 
comparative reasoning. The first chapter of the second part deals with the history o f  comparative 
reasoning94. The second chapter focuses on the idea of modem comparative law in general.
The third part o f the work concentrates on the examination of how European legal 
work must be seen from the point of view of this theory. In the conclusions, there is an attempt 
to combine these analyses and focus on the idea of how we must approach European comparative 
law (and comparative European law). Certain remarks are made concerning the practical role o f 
comparative legal arguments in European law and in legal discourse as a whole.
Some reasons can be given for the separation of the theoretical and “empirical”
analyses.
It would have been possible to present different “comparative observations” - fro 
different courts - in connection to the analysis of the theoretical questions (nature and forms o f 
comparative reasoning). Indeed, in doing so the theoretical observations could have been 
enlightened by some clear examples.
However, because different types of comparative reasons and interactions between 
arguments - in relation to normative solutions, and institutional and procedural questions - 
become easier to understand, if the case is presented as whole. This presentation maintains a 
division between the theoretical and empirical parts. This divided presentation attaches the legal 
normative questions more perceptively to the analysis of concrete forms o f legal reasoning. On 
the other hand, the separation o f these parts makes the examination of the nature of practical 
(comparative) reasoning - in the light of the argumentative principles developed in the theoretical
94 The study of the tradition of comparative law helps to "reconstruct" the way comparative law has been seen in 
practical decision-making in general. Here certain remarks are made on the role o f comparative law  in the history o f 
"governance", "legislation", and le g a l interpretation".
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part - easier.
Some comments on the empirical study of comparative legal reasoning. Two changes o f  
perspectives did take place during research. The first change has been explained above in re la tio n  
to the restrictions. The second change must be explained more thoroughly. *■
In the beginning, this research had focussed on comparative reasoning in c o n c re te  
justificatory processes. Subsequently, one could note that comparative law played, as well, a r o l e  
in the "context of discovery" and in the "contextual reasoning"95 of legal decision-m aking 
institutions. It was used in the context of constructing the argument concerning the interpretation 
of the rules o f the systems.96
It would have been interesting to note the relationship between the o rig in a l 
preparatory work and the final justifications, if this material was available. However, this m ateria l 
appeared to be difficult to obtain. In some legal institutions (such as the European Court o f  
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, for example), there are comparative s tu d ies  
made on a systematic basis for internal use, but these studies are classified as confidential. E v e n  
researchers do not seem to be able to access this material. The same seems to apply, for t h a t  
matter, also in national courts. However, in state legal systems, the "systematic" nature o f  
comparative observations does not seem to be similar. 1
remarks on contemporary European legal orders. Nevertheless, for this reason, the em pirical 
material of this study consists - in addition to written decisions o f the courts - in interviews of th e  
personnel in these courts. In other words, in addition to the traditional critical textual analysis o f
the lepal d n eu m e n ts  nrodureH  in Hidsinn-TnaVina then*, k  ncp maHi* n f  thp nimlitntiv*» n v th n H c
The mere knowledge of and information concerning on the existence and the n a tu re  
of these “comparative observations” would have been in itself a basis for certain interesting
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may expose some relevant features of contemporary law which are not directly visible in the legal 
arguments conducted in public forum. For example, these different organizational aspects and 
attitudes may explain the practical importance and the function of the "marginal" and "external" 
discourses of comparative law.98
II. TO THE CONCEPT OF COMPARATIVE LEGAL REASONING
1. Some etymological observations on the word "comparison"
With regard to the word "comparison"99, one may identify some etymological lines 
of the Indo-European languages.
The Sanskrit word "para"100 seems to be related to the Greek M7tapd" in 
"napapoAiV', and the Latin "para" in "comparo"101 The English, Spanish, and French words for 
"comparison" derive from the Latin form.
The German "vergleich" is composed o f "ver-"102, which is alleged to correspond -
98 For some discussion of the value of the interviews, see the chapter on the comparative reasoning in practice.
99 "Comparative law” relates to ” diritto comparato” (Italian),’* droit comparé” (French), “derccho comparado” 
(Spanish), “Rechtsvergleichung” (comparison o f law) “vergleichende Rechtslehre” (German), ‘‘komparativ rStt” 
“ rausjamforelse" (Swedish), “vertaileva oikeus” "oikeusvertailu” (Finnish), “rechtsvergelijking” (Dutch), 
“retsammenlignende underspgelse" (Danish).
‘T o  comp are":"implies as an aim the showing o f relative values and excellencies or bringing out o f 
characteristic qualities, whether they are similar or divergent. “Comparison **: "is often used as the comprehensive 
term: it is preferred when the differences are obvious and an intent to lay bare resemblances and similarities for the 
sake o f expounding or judging is implied" (W ebster's New Dictionary o f Synonyms, 1978, p .l 66)
100 It seems that "para" in Sanskrit refers to any kind of relating (Monier-W illiams, M., Sanskrit-English Dictionary. 
Etymologically and philologically arranged. Cognate Indo-European Languages, Oxford, 1899, p .586), but mainly to 
"leading beyond" o f place, time, amount, sequence, degree, range, relation (Macdonell, A.A., A practical Sanskrit 
dictionary, with transliteration, accentuation, and etymological analysis throughout, Oxford, 1954, p . l 52).
"Pari-", on the other hand, seems to refer to "around" (adverb), and at the beginning of the word, 
"fully", "quite", "entirely", "excessively" (idem., p . l 55).
101 It is also noteworthy that in the Latin there seems to be two versions o f the verb comparo; "compar-o" and "con- 
paro". The latter refers to “preparing” or "getting ready (physically or mentally", “to m ake', 'to  produce', 'to institute', 
but the former to “placing together", “matching", “treating equal” , “to estim ate or evaluate in relation to each other” . 
Taro", as such, means “to prepare" or to “get ready”, whereas "com" ("cum") means “with” or “together”, "con" related 
to time, manner, contrast, and reason (“simultaneity” , “connection”, “jo in t action","enclosure” , "completeness”, or 
“intensity” , see ancient "quom" or "quum". (Oxford Latin Dictionary, p.382-383).
The G reek expression refers to juxtaposition', comparison, Illustration', 'analogy', and also b y ­
word', conjunction'. In contemporaiy Greek “comparison” also "otSytcpioq". (see also Liddell, H.G., Scott, R., Jones, 
H.S., AGreek-English Lexicon, Oxford, 1937, pp.1304-1305). "poXfj", for example, a "throw", in m odem  also a "shot" 
Ibid., p.321).
102 Correlating: 01d(high )German, fir-, far-. O ld saxon far-, O ld english for-, Old Frisian fur- (for-), differing from 
Gothic faur-, fra-, fair-.
The Latin term "Univers-" is constructed from the Latin "unus" and common indo-European 
(Germanic?) loan "verto" ("Vorto", Gothic "waerthan”). In Latin "to turn", "to circle", time "passing", "to move" - and 
also to "to interpret” and "to explain", "to make something", "to change", also "to turn elsewhere", "turn upside-down".
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for example - to Sanskrit103 104, Greek101, Latin105, and common Indo-European (Germanic) words106. 
This prefix has been used in deriving "vergleich" from "gleich".107 The Swedish "for" or "fora" 
in "jam-fora" seems to derive from the same Germanic origin.108
In Swedish and in German there are also (borrowed) expressions corresponding to  
the Latin based "to compare” ("komparera", "Komparation")109. In Swedish, the expression 
"komparative rätt" seems to be the prevailing expression for "comparative law110, whereas in  
German "vergleichende Rechtslehre" corresponds to the expression for "comparative law" in th is 
context.111
"to destroy").
This is related to Sanskrit "vârtate" (ro tating '), German "werden" ( 'to  becom e').
T he relationship between " v e r- \  "verto" (uerto), and "wert" is not established, even though so m e  
connection m ay be seen.
103 "Pura", p ra-, pari- (Oldindian).
104 "Para"-, "pro-", "peri-".
io» -por.»t "pro_"t "per-",
106 "Per-".
See, Grimm, W., Deutsches W örterbuch, 1960, Leipzig, and Kluge, Etymologisches W örterbuch d e r  
Deutschen Sprache (Seebold, E.t Berlin, 1995) p.854.
In relation to verbs it m ay indicate some kind of "stronger" or "more effective" or "over" -acting (an d  
also opposite). In Gothic it also indicates "through" and "over" (Frisk, H., G riechisches Etymologishes W örterbuch,, 
Heidelberg, 1970, p .513) - as in Latin (in addition to "during", and "from the beginning to the end, completeness", a n d  
certain "intensity". A lso in Sanskrit "pari-", related. (Meillet, A., Em out, A , Dictionnaire Étymologique de la L angue 
latine, P aris, 1959, p.497).
107 T he  "gleich" has its corresponding forms in  different Old Germanic languages ("gelich-”, "gilih-”, "g ilik -Y ga- 
leika", "galeiks-", "glikr-", "gelice-", "leika-". (H u g e , 1995, p.326.)
This also corresponds to  the D utch "ver-Iijk" or merely “gelijk".
108 "Jam" relating to "jamlig”, "equal" in English. Earlier, "iaemn", "iamn", corresponding to “ 'even” ("equal share” ) , 
“just". In Island "jafn", "jaevn", and related to Gothic "ibns", Old Saxon "eban", Old German "eban" (now "eben", 
corresponding to “even", “plain”, “flat", also “equal share", “just", “exact”, (Breton, "ewn", "effen"). The origin is  
unclear (K luge, 1995, p.203, also W essén, E., V ära ord, deras uttal och Ursprung, Stockholm, 1969, p .l  84).
See also, Tur-"(even if history unclear). Islandisk, "fora", Saxon "forian", Old Germ an "fuorran" (now  
"fuhren"). N o t in  Gothic, Old English "féran" (Hellquist, E.( Svensk etymologisk ordbok, Lund, 1948. p .257). 
However, "for" or "före" corresponding to  forms in  Gothic (claimed to  be similar to ver- in Germ an, English "for") h as  
a unclear history. It could be related to "ver-" due to  its similar functions and accompanying rules, (ibid.)
109 K luge,] 995 , p.466, mainly professional usage. Swedish word, Hellquist, E ., 1948.
110 A s a  professional discipline. "Jämfora" is used also in the legal context. However, it seem s to refer more to the  
process o f com parison, not to the systematic discipline as such.
111 It has been claimed that the Finnish "vertailla" ("verta", "vertainen”) has its corresponding form s in O ld Germanic 
"W ertha" (W aerth), which has been the basis for "Wert" in German, ancient Norwegian "verthr", ancient Swedish 
"waerther", contemporary "vard" in Swedish and "verd" in Norwegian, the Gothic wairths, A nglo Saxon weorth, ancient 
Frankish "w erth  ("worth" in English, basically m eaning "value" in Latin term s ). (M en, V ., The birth  of words 
[Sanojen synty] Jyväskylä, 1985, p.438.) In this sense, "vertailla" seems to be connected to value com parison ("equal- 
value", "to value equal”).
E ith e r  the words have unidentified common origins, or the loan was connected, fo r example, to  
com m ercial relationships, where the process o f  "evaluating" could be the reason for the linguistic loan. The latter 
"loaning" has been  supported by etymologists (idem .). (On some proto-Germanic reconstructions, see, Languages o f  
the W orld, T he N ew  Encyclopedia Britannica, V ol. 22, Macropedia, Knowledge in Depth, 15 th ed. Chicago, 1985, 
p.658.)
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One could here go into the typologies of different languages.112 From the analysis 
of these expressions, one could draw some conclusions - by assuming an "unbroken historical 
transmission", or by taking into account the rules of typology, which suggest that adaptations 
make languages (and parts o f language) isolating and analytical.
The prevailing idea in this work is, however, that "language" is a product of 
continuous historical process, and a dynamic part of communication. Furthermore, the intention 
is not - on the basis of these minor observations - to produce any real interpretation of the 
expressions used. At least the modem usage of language seems to be connected rather to utility 
than to style113. Etymology refers to figurative (stylistic) thinking - obviously connected to 
different expressions. However, the "substantive" meaning o f each linguistic expression is a 
matter of use o f language and discourse.
One could claim, however, that the Germanic version “vergleich” connotes 
production', creation' or 'maintenance' of similarity ('evaluate equal' or to 'tum-into*equal') - 
as a kind o f a teleological idea114. In this etymological sense, the Germanic expression seems to 
take more of a "constructive" approach where the comparison is dealing with abstract entities.115 
On the other hand, the Latin-based expressions seem to connote procedural or productive aspects
The similarity is in Karelian-Aunus's "verrrata" ("verta"), Estonian "vörrata" ("vörd"), Vepsian "verz", 
Votian "vörröt" ("vörta") (Nykysuomen sanakirja, Häkkinen, K., Porvoo, 1987.). There is also a sim ilar type o f word 
in Lapp ("vaertti"). The Hungarian, Liivi and Mordovian languages do not seem to have this word, at least in this 
meaning (However, in Hungarian at least "összehasonlit" (“össza” m eaning “together” , and “hasonlit" meaning 
“resemble", “to be sim ilar to”). In Hungarian, there is the word “6rt” (“ to  understand”, “to refer to") and “6rt£k" 
(“value”). Összehasonlito jog means “comparative law”.
In Finnish, there also exists a word for value ("väärtti") and evaluation ("värteerata"), which however, 
seems to be more a late loan from Swedish, and indicates "evaluation", which is not the case in this context.
In Chinese, for example, >4to com pare” corresponds to "bi-jiao". Both syllables independently seem to 
refer to comparison, the latter, however, indicating also a  "check".
112 On constructive and non-constructive, and fusional and analytical languages, see The new  Encyclopedia 
Britannica M acropedia, vol. 22, Knowledge in depth, Chicago, 1985, p .588-589.
1,1 Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p.15.
Style is a relevant distinction also in the context o f comparative law. We may say - from  the point o f 
view of the communicative action theory - that style appears to be important in the sphere o f “affective” rationality. 
Namely, when the disagreement in a communicative situation is referred to be as fundamentally obstructed and the 
“integrity’* is breached, the style seems to be an explanation of the “irrationality” of the situation. Style is used when 
even the value based rational acting does not seem  to be important anymore.
114 Even if the distinction between com-paro is recognized in (Klein, E., A  Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary 
of the English language, Amsterdam, 1966), there is an argument that also in English 'com pare’ would mean 'to make 
equal'(ibid., p.322).
ns “Vergleich... 2) Rhetorik: rhetor. Figur zur Steigerung der Anschaulichkeit einer Aussage, wobei m it Hilfe von 
Vergleichswörtem (so-wie) zw. Zwei Wirklichkeitsbereichen, die in einem Punkt eine Übereinstimmung auf weisen 
müssen, eine Beziehung hergestellt wird” (Brockhaus Enzyklopädie, M annheim, 1994, p.205).
This may be seen in Daig, H-W ., 1981, p.397-398. He recognizes a possible “substantive" element 
in “comparative law".
- without any a priori '’similarity” aspect116. This may be more noticeable in languages w h e r e  
borrowing has isolated the "original" meanings (and perhaps resulted in more analytical a n d  
functional uses)117.
Even if the remarks on different connotations appear "weak", one o b serv a tio n  
seems to be remarkable. The formal expression for ’comparison’ itself seems to be capable o f  
being a matter o f a loan. One may ask: Can this really be so? Can also the idea of ‘com parative  
law*, for example, be borrowed? In this sense, how could comparative law be "thought"? Can w e  
learn comparative law?118
2. Comparative argum ents in  ancient and  new rhetoric
The comparison as "imago" and "sim ilitude"  in ancient rhetoric. There were - according t o  
some ancient theories of rhetoric119 - two different "types" of comparisons. While the com parison  
as "similitudo" was defined as a "manner o f speech that carries over an element o f likeness f r o m  
one thing to a different thing", the comparison as "simile" - which can be, in a way, identified  
with "imago" - was seen as"a pictorial image fo r  the aids o f memory, based on a p r io r i  
resemblance' \ 120
It was thought that, in the latter technique, there is a similarity already before t h e  
comparison (in thought), and its function is to "praise or censure" (or to blame) something. T h e
1.6 "Comparatio, I. comparison, a weightening o f the relative merits or other values (of), 2, (rhet.) argument b a s e d  
on the more probable o f two possibilities; plea fo r  justification from  the greater good o f the ultimate end,” (O x fo rd  
Latin Dictionary, 1968, p.372).
1.7 O n this problematics, Daig, H-W., 1981, p .397.
The Greek expression ("TtapaPoA.q" or "avT ixapaP oX ii” has in it the idea o f "putting together", a n d  
does not seem to have any connotation of production (latter, however, “reply by comparison or contrast”  (Liddell, H .G .,  
Scott, R ., Jones, H .S., A Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford, 1937, p .160 , referring to  Aristotle, Rhetoric. F u rth e rm o re , 
the noun "napaP oA ii" seem to have been associated - in ancient G reek - to  values based on moral stories etc.).
This exists - as a loan - in Latin ("parabola”) and also English ("parable", "parabola"), and in G e rm a n  
("Parabel"). In Latin "parabilis" means something which is (easy) to  acquire ("cultus, divitiae naturae").
The Finnish "vertailla” seems to have a  connotation o f 'evaluation o f things'. It seem s to  do with v a lu e s  
as such, a  way of ascertaining value comparability rather than any 'equalization ' o r 'production'. It might refer m ore t o  
a check on  comparability. Furthermore, it seems to  refer to the very ad hoc nature of the process, rather than a n y  
systematic process.
In  m odem  Greek the “ouvOetiko 6 fx a io "  seems to  be preferred in the context o f com parative law, 
connoting a  kind o f  a  'synthetic law ' ('law*) ("ouYx QlTlx1i to£> Ô ixaiou" and the “critical” aspect, see Daig, H -W ., 
1981, p.397). (In ancient Greek, ô ûcaioç, “observât o f the custom or a  rule” , 'civilized1, later “equal” , “even”, “w e ll-  
balanced” ; “ lawful” , “just” ; persons, things: “m eet” , “right” fitting”, “norm al” , “real”, “genuine”. “ouv0etik(5'\ 
“constructive” , “skilled in putting together” , ibid., p .1 7 1 6 ,429).
IU In  m odem  comparative law, "comparison"seems to refer to both co-production (production) and reproduction  
o f law an d  legal systems of positive law  - and som e qualitative aspects o f  law. Nevertheless, the m ethodological 
problems exist - and the question of "reproduction" and "production" is not so  clear.
1,9 Rhetorica Ad Herennium (AH), see, Caplan, H ., [Cicero, auctor incertus?] A d C. Herennium de Ratione D icendi 
(Rhetorica ad  Herennium) Cambridge, 1954.
120 AH. 4.46.59.
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idea of "imago" or "simile" was not to be a proper ground for a comparison ("parem rationem 
conparationis"). One could say that it was thought to be the basis of an ’'imaginary" discourse - 
and not a foundation for an attempt to maintain an analytical discourse and a parallel relationships 
of elements ("paria sunt omnia relata") of the compared.
“Similitudo*\ on the other hand, was seen as an orthodox conception of 
comparison, because - as one could inteipret it - it is based on a discursive approach stressing the 
element o f "speech" (reasoning), and not the subjective idea o f  a priori similarity. Furthermore, 
if the aim is to establish a detailed parallel ("per conlationem"), it functions as a rational 
(reasonable) and verifiable basis ("rationis confirmato") of a comparative argument - whether in 
legal or literary practice.121
The forms of comparative argum ents in the "new " rhetoric. The "new rhetoric"122 has 
distinguished between the argument by comparison, 123making an order ("ordering"), and the 
argument establishing "opposition” (according to some criteria). These are the "results” o f 
comparison.
One of the essential forms of comparison is the comparison by superlative, where 
the object (for example; a general custom in law) is considered superior to all members of a series 
(for example; "state law(s)”), or unique of its kind, and therefore beyond comparison (for 
example; the normative relationship between the “autonomous” superior orders and national 
laws).
These attributes generate the distinctions between "generality", "disparity" (many), 
and "example" types of comparisons. They are based on the structure o f reality.124
121 This idea can be used in the study o f comparative legal reasoning as a  form of legal interaction. W e can speak 
about a comparative discourse, which starts from certain systematic legal assumptions (difference), and where there is 
an attempt to  relate systems to each other -  and this way arrive at practical solutions to a legal problem. This 
com parative legal reasoning can be called comparative reasoning based on legal "reality", whereas the comparative 
"imaginary" discourse is based on the "fabled" nature of law.
In this latter sense, legal comparisons seem to be decorations o f the main argument, and not rational 
reasons proven to be valuable for the explanation. It is based on a need for rhetorical persuasion, which means that one 
is not aiming at an understanding based on alternative considerations.
122 Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969.
123 Arguments by comparison should be differentiated from arguments by identification and by analogy - to  a certain 
extent. Arguments by identification can be seen as universal and ideal arguments, whereas arguments by analogy as 
practical arguments. In a comparative arguments, on the other hand, there is no "measure" expressed. It is assumed, and 
it is precisely this feature makes them "quasi-logical". (Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L ,  1969, p.243). They are 
often presented as statements of fact.
124 With regard to the "example" or "illustration" type of argument Perelman (Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L , 
1969, p.350) says that "when the two relations encountered belong to the same spheret and can be subsumed under 
a common structure, we have not analogy but an argument by example or illustration”.
Lawyers tend to reason from (legal) cause to (legal) effect. This is associated with the nature of the 
legal argumentation and legal systems as legal "teaching" system (i.e. the nature of different types o f argumentative 
styles (idem., ff.). On the other hand, in an attem pt to a  avoid critique, to argue with persons which who are a priori 
assumed to be opposing - one has to argue with examples.
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Analogy. What about analogy? What is the relationship between comparison and its results, a n d  
analogy according to the "new rhetoric". Special attention should be given to argument b y  
analogy and argument by example.
Analogy - in rhetorical terms * is more a "resemblance of relationship" than a  
"relationship o f resemblance".* 12325 It "leads" to the relationship rather than is the relationship itself. 
It is an argument for the relationship. It establishes the "structure of reality"126. In that sense, it 
is the comparative argument itself, a finale of the comparison127. Because of its nature as a  
"conclusion", it could be regarded as a pure form of a non-analytical comparison.
A” rich analogy” results from the complexity o f each term in the analogy128. T h is  
could be deemed to be demand for a more analytical approach.129 The analogy can be extended, 
amended or corrected by the author herself, or by the critic.
In its supreme form, there exists a comparison by opposites.130
The choice of the terms o f the phoros in analogy can increase and decrease th e  
value o f the terms of the theme or modify them. The analogy causes an interaction between th e  
part o f the analogy, and this initiates a transfer of values.131
T h is  is connected to  the use o f  comparisons in reasoning. The inductive and exam ple nature o f  
comparative arguments seem to belong to  a  system where the reasoning is aiming not to teach, bu t to convince ex p e c te d  
critics. A t the sam e time, it looks like they are based on an assumption of “a  common structure**.
This may be related to the idea that in legal systems, where there is no prevailing idea o f au tonom ous 
formal authority o f  law  but an assumption of it, one uses more example type argumentation.
123 Perelm an, C h., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L ,  1969, p.372, referring to Grenet, Les origines de 'analogic ph ilosophique
dans les dialogies de Platon, p.10.
126 S ee , Perelm an, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, I*. 1969, p.350 (“establishing of reality” ). This is related to  th e  
argumentation by “comparative analogies” in law.
V a n s , M., 1998, p.101 ff. About “schemes” in language.
127 O ne can  find many indications in New Rhetoric (Perelman, C h., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L ,  1969).
121 Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p .375 . T h e re  is no whole to analogy" (or to rich  analogy etc) ( ib id ., 
p.385). Extension o f  analogy can be made to "inventive" (analytical?) and "probative" (principled?) directions (ib id ., 
p.386).
m  T he terms o f  the analogy can be divided into the "theme" and the "phoros" as sides of the analogical argum ent. 
(In law , for exam ple, the theme can be seen as the original system and the phoros as a com pared system.) T h e ir  
relationship determines much the nature of the analogical argument as a whole. The more complex the respective te rm s 
are, the m ore "rich" the analytical considerations m ust be - in order to grasp the complexity o f  the relationship o f  th e  
terms.
A  special case is the double hierarchy (For example, because Gd is superior to M h, Jd  is superior to  
Jh, is the sam e as a analogy: Jd is to Gd what Jh is to M h).
130 Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L ,  1969, p 3 8 7 . Comparison by opposites i s "taking analogy and showing how  
it is inadequate". H ere one occupies " - in the military sense o f the word - the hearers mind, and he is shown the  
falseness o f an idea that might arise spontaneously”. This is due to the fact th a t"the speaker manages to suggest tha t 
the sole basis fo r  the disputed thesis is the argument by analogy that he is engaged in refuting" (Idem.).
In a systematic sense, it seems that the comparison by opposites is connected also  to the argum entum  
absurdum . N am ely, this is so in those cases w here the opposite seem s to be absurd from the point o f  the system s 
internal rationality.
131 Perelm an, C h., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p .382  ff.
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Analogy is important for argumentation (and to invention and "discovery"), because 
it makes possible the development and the extension o f thought.132 Naturally, this creates dangers 
if taken too far. From the inventive point of view, the use o f analogy is not problematic, but from 
the probative point of view it is. Namely, it can easily lead to drop-off of in conviction. It is 
unstable133.
Different analogies have different results and structures in connection to the theme. 
They can also stress different aspects of the theme.134 This is why the "earlier" analogies certainly 
give light to an analogy. In this sense, it is possible to use several phoros - also opposites - in the 
analogical explaining. The separate explanation of the phoros emphasises the insufficiency of each 
of them separately - but taken together, it highlights the direction of thought.135
In analogical reasoning, one may attempt to unify and keep separate the theme and 
the phoros, where their “realities” are assumed to be reversible. This way the analogical argument 
seeks to "integrate" the theme and the phoros. In the same way, it can be claimed, they depend 
on a common principle.136 The intertwining can be neglected, however, by keeping the theme and 
the phoros explicitly separate.137 In general, one could affirm that this can be achieved by "poor" 
analogy - by comparing only the "necessary" elements.
One can sustain that the analogy serves as a means for an invention (an 
"induction"), rather than as a proof. If the analogy is to be fruitful, it should be employed with 
examples and illustrations of general aspects. By establishing this relationship, the theme and the 
phoros are unified138.
Example, illustration, and the  model. As maintained, whenever two relations belong to the 
same sphere and can be identified with a similar structure, we are speaking about argument by 
example o r  illustration rather than about a "poor" analogy.139 One could include within this type 
of argument the superlative type of comparative argument. However, example and illustration 
seem to be more clearly within the same structure o f  reality, as compared to the latter type o f
,3Î Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p.385.
133 Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p.393 and 398.
,34 Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L ,  1969, pp.390-391. A s an exam ple, he gives the idea o f how classical 
thought used more spatial analogies, whereas m odem  thought prefers dynamics (idem).
135 Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p.391.
136 Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p.394
137 This is typical o f comparative legal reasoning. The identity o f the system  is seeked to  ensure by  som e kind of a 
claim  of separation (in the end) - though the unity of the systems in real analogical argumentation is strongly 
emphasized. This attem pts to guarantee the relative and formal autonomy o f the systems involved.
I3> If  deduction creates a  result which is unsatisfactory as an answer to the basic question, it is interrupted by an 
invention, i.e. a  new rule is proposed or a new argument adjusted by taking account of recognize topos, Honoré, A M ., 
1974, p.84 ff.
139 Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p.373.
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argument.140
Where example makes generalization possible (by establishing a rule, for instance), 
illustration provides support for already established regularity.141 Models, on the other h a n d , 
encourage imitation.142
Example can function as a starting point for a generalization, but it does so w i th  
certainty only when a lesson is explicitly derived from it. The plurality of examples in troduces 
"poetic" generalizations. All the same, differentiation seems to  require justification.143 One c a n  
also go from a particular example to a particular conclusion.144 45 :
Example has many times the status of fact. This is part of its force. Furthermore, i t s  
effectiveness can be also related to the plurality of different examples. However, examples c a n  
modify the meanings of the other examples. By using "exemplum in contrarium", for exam ple, 
one can direct the generalization that follows in a certain direction. This can also be done w i th  
examples of "exemption".143
Illustration, being a clarification of an "existing" rule, can be more vivid. I n  
connection to illustrations, effectiveness and credibility are many times achieved by first s ta tin g  
the rule, and then the illustrations.146 Here the illustration functions as a concretization o f  th e  
general rule. In this way it endeavours to make the rule more understandable.147
M odels and anti-m odels. A ’model* type of argument can be associated with “inspiration” . 
Modelling is imitative behaviour. It is connected to the spontaneous identification o f prestige a n d  
value in the model. By modelling, one may try to guarantee the value of the behaviour.148
Indifference can also serve as a model. This shifts the nature o f the model to th e  
argument of the arguer, thus avoiding the imitation.149 On the other hand, a model can b e  
converted to an anti-model - deterring anybody from using it. Here the deviation is usually
140 This seems to correlate, for example, with the relationship between international and national systems and on  th e  
other hand with the situation internal to national legal orders. The social dimension, within the sphere o f  ech sy s te m , 
determines the similarity o f the structures o f reality.
141 It has been claimed that the argumentation by exam ple belongs instead to the deliberative auditory than to  ju d ic ia l 
debates (Aristotle, 1991).
145 Perelm an, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, I*. 1969, p .350  and 357.
143 Perelm an, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p.356. Perelman explains: *This is why persons engaged in  
argumentation frequently adopt the notions they use to suit their exposition - except in those disciplines, in which th e  
use o f concepts is accompanied by techniques defining their field o f application ".
I44Perelm an, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, pp.351-352.
l45Perelman, Ch„ Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p .354.
l46Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p.359.
,47Perelm an, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p . 360.
14*Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, I* . 1969, p.361 ff.
,49Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p .364.
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laboured, however, without it necessarily proposing an alternative.150
The arguments concerning models and anti-models can be applied to discourse it­
self.151
Because of the dynamic nature of reality, modelling (or anti-modelling) is 
problematic, unnecessary, and can even be dangerous. Namely, modelling in reality must also be 
dynamic.152 153
Arguments by e contrario, a fortiori and  a coherentia. Three types of arguments seem to exist 
in connection to "comparison": e contrario, a fortiori and a coherentia.
With e contrario arguments the rejection o f an interpretation or a conclusion is 
suggested. It is based, on the other hand, on a "fact" accomplished by a comparative treatment 
of a subject. This way, an alternative interpretation may be adopted e contrario to the 
comparative result.
Arguments a fortiori are characterized by the idea of "with a better reason". If a 
comparative generality for example is presented, the a fo rtiori argument connected to it may 
claim that (“with a better reason”) a solution must be accepted. In the form argumentum a 
maiore ad minus o f this argument, the claim is that because there is generality, the particular 
solution should be according to that "with a better reason”>53.
The argument a coherentia affirms that a solution - or an interpretation - must be 
complied with because of "comparative" coherence, for example, between (or within) the systems 
involved.
Some analysis o f analogy and  innovation in legal discourse. Analogy appears to be an 
incomplete imitation. The innovative character - which it is claimed to possess - could be, 
consequently, attached to this incompleteness. It is the restricted similarity which seems to be the 
basis of the innovative character o f the analogical arguments. This applies both to the main legal 
analogy between premise and the norm, but also to analogy between the comparative results and 
the “main” premise.
Furthermore, this incompleteness seems to be related to the analytical quality of the 
analogical argument. It seems that - in the case of a "rich analogy" - the innovative character is 
less visible. The innovative character is linked to incompleteness in the following way; the more 
the analytical analogical argument we are talking about, the less innovative possibilities we have.
IS0PereIman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p.367
lslPerelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L ,  1969, p.368.
t52Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p.369, referring to Kant, L, Critique de la raison pure (for example, 
Gallimard, 1980).
153 In the form of argumentum a minore ad maius the idea is "inductive": for example, if an act is prohibited - "with 
a better reason" - all such acts should be prohibited. In the case o f com parative law, this could be associated with 
reasoning which claims that the authority o f  one system (and its rule) in one case should provide authority in all cases.
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In realm o f this idea» we may refer to the theory of audience(ies). On the other hand, if the 
relationships in an argument are determined by a pure analogy (with no explanatory character), 
the innovative quality of an analogical argument can be considerable.
In conclusion, we could claim that the more we use poor analogies, the more w e 
have innovative space in a justificatory discourse. In this sense, the study of the analytical nature 
o f comparative argument is, to a certain extend, a study of innovation - and in legal terms, an 
inquiry into legal innovations.154
Is there  an  "institutional an argum ent"? As we have seen, analogical reasoning is often a  
matter o f innovation or discovery. That is why it usually belongs to the ’’context of discovery" in 
law.
One could maintain that whenever the (comparative) considerations in law fail to  
establish the value-based and traditional types of comparisons in an open form - and whenever 
they appear in the institutional context - the arguer argues by means of an argument based upon 
"institutional identity”. >
This can mean a partial identification of the (comparative) considerations - internal 
to the institution with the explicit public argumentation. However, this is characterized by the 
factual separation o f these two parts. Here an affiliation is created between the results o f  
comparative considerations deriving from the institutional discourse (internal discourse) and 
public justification, but this connection is not expressed.
In this sense a justification happens to be, for example, a normative definition (a 
"best definition"). These types of definitions indicate how the words or concepts should be used. 
Here the justification itself seems to function as a kind of a ’’descriptive” statement (however, 
being a necessary and normative by its nature - a "necessary" definition.).155
This is a typical attribute of a legal endeavour.156 Law is - basically - an attempt to 
resolve incompatibilities, to reach compromises. In this sense, law is a method of developing 
techniques. These techniques are always capable of being improved and there are always 
possibilities for resolving conflicting aims.157 The endeavour seems to  be to  restore the coherence
IS4 Consequently, we enter into the sphere o f  acceptability o f legal innovations. T his is  why the study of com parative 
reasoning must contain socio-philosophical. Rationally, innovation has to be determined on the basis o f reason. Through 
the analogies (and com parative arguments) one finds ideas on the basic principles and hard cases of the system. 
Furthermore, it is exactly here, where the system is "self-explanatory" - and where its identity can be revealed.
,J5 Opposed to this, there is a possibility o f  using descriptive definitions, which indicate what meaning is to  be given 
to words in  a  certain  environm ent and at a  particular time (definitions which point out the essential elem ents of a 
descriptive definition, o r a  complex definition, w hich combines, in various ways, elem ents o f the other three types 
(Perelman, C h., O lbrechts-Tyteca, L ,  1969, p .2 1 1).
l56Perelm an, C h., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L ,  1969, p .414.
157 Perelm an, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p .414 , referring to Demoque, Les notions fondamentales du droit 
privé.
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of the system by making a "distinguo".
All the same, there are certain problems connected to this idea. A line may be drawn 
in order to work toward discursive coherence and integrity.
We are not going to discuss this question here, but rather in connection to the 
analysis of specific examples o f legal reasoning. One could assert that this evaluation cannot be 
made in the abstract. This question has to be combined with the investigation o f the real 
institutional arrangements and their functions taken together as a whole.158
Conclusions. We may try to summarize the structure o f reasoning. This could serve as a method 
in the analysis of the comparative legal argumentation and justification.
Legal justification is, in general, based on generality argument and pro-arguments 
of a solution. It is a kind of an analogy between the result and the argument, which appears to be 
the decisive part o f a justification.
Comparative legal arguments are, on the other hand, generality, disparity and, and 
example types of arguments. The theme o f the comparative legal argument is the domestic legal 
system(atics), which is related to the “phoros" of the comparative counterpart of the argument 
(foreign system or systems).
The decisive comparative legal argument is usually in a comparative legal generality 
form (eg. analogy as such). It may be within a rich (i.e. analytical) or more synthetic type of 
generality argument. If it is an example type of argument, it usually is a representation o f a more 
analytic attitude in reasoning and in interpretation. In its illustrative form, it is kept separate from 
the phoros. If it is not analytic or illustrative, it comes close to pure modelling. »
We have to remember, however, that the analytical quality of comparison may be 
irrelevant to its persuasiveness159.
If comparative (legal) disparity arguments, whether rich or non-rich, analytic or 
synthetic - appear as decisive parts of the justification, the justification is not based on any 
generalizable premises - except on the comparative disparity as such. The justification is then, 
basically, a justification of these disparities (non-analogies in relation to the phoros, i.e. other 
legal systems). Then it moves in the realm of the tradition o f comparative law.160
However, this type o f disparity argument may appear also as a justification in an e 
contrario form. Then the generality is somehow autonomously resulting from the disparity as an 
unacceptable or rejected premise. Then we are close to an argument by identity or coherence. 
This may also be in a form of example or illustation. Usually, the latter type o f argument is based
151 See, Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p.456 ff. Perelman describes how the interaction between 
different arguments belongs - to certain extent - to  each systemic context and multiple themes (ibid., p .392).
159 Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L ,  1969, p.245.
160 For more discussion, see below.
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on the idea of anti-modelling. < '•
Same type of phenomenon can be seen in the case, where any other type o f  
generality is used in e contrario form. Then we are basically speaking about a justification b y  
comparison by opposites. These two types o f arguments may appear in synthetic or in analytical, 
rich or non-rich forms.
In conclusion, we may say that - in some ways - the identities and th e  
"nonidentities" belong also to the realm o f comparative legal argument and justification. T h ey  
seem to function as presumptions for comparative reasoning as such.161
In general, an adoption of a legal norm, without an analytical and "rich-analogical” 
approach, may be called the value-based establishing o f a comparative justification. A s  
maintained, this can be an argument by comparative generality or disparity. These value-based 
justifications are often established on the identity of some kind,162 and on concepts and "dogm as” 
internal to the value -based comparative argument and legal tradition. Here we approach also th e  
idea of “coherence”. *• •
These types of reductions should be, nevertheless, justified.163 Usually, however, 
these identities are not analysed and reproduced explicitly.164
In comparative legal reasoning, the question is usually about partial identity (a s  
opposed to complete identity)165. This is due to the closed system character of legal orders an d  
systems. This, on the other hand, can be associated with the idea o f normative legal culture. In  
the case o f nonidentity, which can be, for that matter, used as as well a legal argument, th e  
elements can stimulate a disparity o f approaches. In this case, the elements are "nonidentifiable”.
The fact that certain arguments can be arguments by "nonidentity" does not m ean 
necessarily that they are based on paradoxical thinking. Generalities are not necessarily 
determined by the "tautologies of identity".166
The analysis of the partial identities as "common" terms - the enquiry into the  
criteria, upon which the comparison is based - transfers the problem of comparison to the
161 Nonidentity can be  called "negation o f a term  by itself' or "an identity o f  contradictories" (Perelm an, C h ., 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p .218). Here in the beginning the terms are capable of being identified, but a fte r 
interpretation, difference arises, which can be known before argumentation (Idem).
162 Perelman, Ch., O lbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p .210. Identity is a result of a relation to something. Identity is itse lf  
an abstraction.
163 Here the interesting question is about nominal and real definitions. In law, nominalism - as an extrem e idea o f  
formalism - could be neglected as such, for nominalism assumes arbitrariness. W e should instead speak about rea l 
definitions as such, for in law  they are a m atter o f being either true or false, but not arbitrary (see, Perelm an, C h ., 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, L ,  1969, p.211).
,M This has to be distinguished from the basic "identity" o f law, which assum es certain criteria of being (see , 
Perelman, Ch., O lbrechts-Tyteca, L ,  1969, p.393).
1(5 For these terms, see Perelman, Ch., O lbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p .2 1 1 ff.
166 Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p .2 1 1.
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comparison of the elements themselves. This is a highly complex exercise. Ordering and 
opposition become often devalued, when one seeks to do justice to various elements in a 
comparison.167 The analyses o f the criteria uncover the argumentative structures - the elements 
upon which the ordering itself is based. The predominant - and often incompatible criteria then 
come to light.168
3. A history of comparative reasoning
3.1. Some methodological rem arks
Preliminary observations. We have maintained that comparison is a process. The 
conceptualization o f the elements compared can determine even the description of this process, 
as we have seen. In the most abstract sense, the definition of this process can be associated with 
the idea of value. However, one does not seem to be genuinely able to “borrow”, imitate, or
“compare” processes.169
Consequently, what could comparative law be in methodological terms?
If we follow this logic, it can be seen that comparative law emerges as a rewriting 
and renewed discussion of law. Comparative law is not a form of law, but a process of law, 
which both upholds the value o f law and changes law (where laws are rather not to be deemed 
of value). These processes take place paradoxically, simultaneously. Comparative law seems to 
be a process, where (the) law(s) - as abstract form(s) - has (have) value, but yet in substance it 
(they) does (do) not have value as such. This may be the reason why comparison is devised. 
(The) law(s) can be changed in substance without touching the form. The aim of comparative law 
- in the abstract - seems to be the formal continuity (vs. discursive continuity and discursive 
integrity of law). Consequently, we may say that comparative law has to do with substantive legal 
change, connected to a formal maintenance of law(s). From the point of view of positive law(s), 
this seems to be an unattractive proposition.
Ar the same time, it can be noted that comparative law demands - in order to be 
applicable - a certain degree of abstractness of (the) law(s) compared. It seems that comparative
167 Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p .2 1 1 ff..
m  Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 1969, p .2 1 1 ff..
169 This can be related also to the following idea: W e could maintain that one cannot either compare, imitate, or 
borrow any “ideal” concept o f equality, for the discovery of the ideal concept o f  equality seems to be also a matter of 
a constant process of comparison. If one 'borrow s" an ideal concept o f equality - or argues with it - one automatically 
commences to redefine i t  In "comparisons" and "equalizations", the most important element is the qualitative analysis 
o f the compared. Any previous definition o f equality and comparison is in vain. Comparisons and equalizations seem 
to be functional processes, processes o f rewriting and rediscussion.
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law can function only in an environment where we employ “substantively changeable” forms o f  
law(s). Comparative law thus seems to be most closely related to  certain type o f law(s).
The problem  of the identification o f  historical continuities in a historical study  o f  
com parative law. Both comparative law and the history o f law - and, moreover, the history o f  
comparative law and the comparative history o f law - all have an idealistic tendencies. They a re  
inclined to ignore the practicality o f  law as a basis for legal discourse and to give frequently to o  
much emphasis to temporal continuity o f different “legal” ideas. They also stress, for example, 
the methodological universality o f comparative law.
As maintained, the identification o f historical continuities in law and in comparative 
law is problematic - as in any o f the social sciences. This is also due to the fact that all pow er- 
systems - such as law - are instrumental in certain contexts. The concept o f constitution, fo r  
example, seems to reflect more different instrumental uses than historically coherent sets o f  
integrated reasonings. Neither does comparative law have any universal history. What is 
compared is what is needed to be compared in any given situation. It seems clear that th e  
historical orientation o f comparative law is not part of the discourse regarding forms o f legal 
rationality as such.170
This is the reason why the following (comparative) legal arguments have to be  
studied in historical "isolation"171. This is the only way to maintain the principle o f discursive 
integrity o f a historical legal argument. The idea of historical isolation gains - in a history o f  
comparative law - stronger significance than in a study o f “normal” legal arguments. Because the 
historical examination of comparative law is a deliberation over relatively contingent rewriting- 
processes o f law, the particular context o f  the comparator becomes central.172 > >
In conclusion, comparative reasoning is fascinating. It seems that when we study 
comparative legal reasoning, we study an argument of(in?) a change. In historical terms, such 
reasoning reveals itself as a types o f “legal change”. The legal nature of comparative law in legal 
history seems thus to be directly related to  its character o f a matter of change.
The function a n d  the nature o f com parative legal form ants173 o f  law. This part o f the study
170 O n different “families of legal sciences, see A am io , A ., 1997, p.75 ff.
171 On som e problem s, see Brusiin, 1953, pp .442-443 .
This can be associated to the problem s o f postmodernist philosophy of history.
172 If w e, fo r exam ple, directly identify a  legal argum ent within its historical context, this problem  does not appear. 
The co n tex t o f  an examination of an argum ent's legal nature does not appear relevant as it does in the study o f  a  
com parative legal argument, whereas the original operation has been a construction of the legal argument on 
comparative basis.
m See, Sacco, R., 1991.This idea will be examined in greater depth later in this work.
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of comparative reasoning in history is based on the idea of formative law.174 We will speak about 
this notion further in another context. However, we may say that this approach means that the 
identification of "legally” relevant subjects - such as Aristotelian constitutionalism, Machiavellian 
legal instrumentalism, Bodin's idea of sovereignty, and Montesquieu's notion of separation of 
powers - may be seen as "historical legal formants”. They appear as "legal" (formants) from the 
point of view of the contemporary formalistic theory o f law, and from the point of view of legal 
history. These historical legal formants have been taken from their historical contexts and used 
in different spheres in different ways. They represent the weak marginality o f law within the hard 
core of the legal discourse, but - paradoxically - also the most extensive and persuasive form of 
legal possibilities and legal formants.
How are these legal formants and “comparative formations” related?
As may be noticed, comparative law seems to function as a preliminary stage of 
abstraction of these notions. The argument on the second level o f (dialectical) legal discourse is 
derived from comparative processes. On the other hand, it is this transfer to the second level 
which usually leads to the formation of new theories and practical solutions (legal formants) in 
law.
Hence, concepts such as constitutions, sovereignty etc. seem to live their own life 
within the universal history of law ("universal discourse"), and they unquestionably form a part 
of our “basic legal culture” and in spite o f their historical contexts. For some reason, however, 
these formants have potential to be at the centre of cultural and systematic values.
One could ask whether or not it is the process o f the comparative formation which 
guarantees the relative historical stability of these legal formants? Or is it the peculiar nature of 
these topics which results in a dialectical approach? That is, are these legal formants directly 
reflected within the idea o f and examples for "good" form of government.175
On the other hand, we could ask, whether it is instead change in the actual nature 
of the form of life, which functions as a stimulant for comparative dialectics? Furthermore - seen 
from the phenomenological point of view - the explanation for the shift to the comparative 
approach and for two-level processes could be found in changes within subjective and personal 
experiences. A striking feature is also that in those cases where these types o f topics are 
adopted, one seems to be forced to move to the practical level - or to the socio-philosophical 
discourse on law - with all its life-formative aspects. Moreover, legal theoretical problematization 
does not seem to effortlessly subsist within comparative legal reasoning.
It can be maintained that it is this two-stage comparative process which somehow 
generates historically persuasive formants. It is contended that the persuasiveness of these
174 On the "formative" and "developing" nature (in contrast to the informative nature) of comparative law, see Fix- 
Zamudio, H., 1990, p.27.
175 Question recognized also by M cRae, K.D., 1979, p.A 28.
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“comparative legal formants” is a result of the fact that in these types o f arguments, two historical 
formants emerge: abstract but “strong” legal topics are intertwined with a historical “change” 
formant - Le. comparative ‘legal” analysis - with all its peculiar phenomenological, subjective and 
life-formative aspects.'76
Conclusions: the " te rtiu m  comparationis" within a  historical review of com parative legal 
reasoning. It seems to be impossible to coherently identify a concept o f law common to different 
(historical) societies which would be, on the one hand, the “tertium comparationis” - the common 
legal denominator - in history, and, on the other hand, also the element o f (“legal”) comparison 
by which different historical phenomena could be connected. Even if a comparative argument 
could be made, we may question what exactly make it a comparative legal argument?'77 How 
could we, for example, compare the archaic forms o f comparative legal thinking and 
argumentation with those o f contemporary forms of legal though?
This objection is sound. This is why aims of this study is not really to "compare" 
and to relate these different forms of comparative legal reasoning with each other, but rather to  
examine them as kinds o f possible legal arguments in history - as legal formants and as legal 
arguments in historical isolation - as we have maintained above.
Despite all these problems, we may try to explain the "tertium comparationis" o f  
this historical review in the following way.
It can be claimed that modem legal science - and modem legal practice - are based 
on the same legal ideology that was promoted by the medieval universities - as well as by those 
who sought to explain archaic forms o f law. This ideology is the supreme authority of law.176 78 
However - unlike in the study of a logical, fabled, and "exact" legal argument * in a study o f  a  
comparative legal argument, the supreme authority of law is expressed in a form of explanation 
o f the ideal law (or laws). We do not speak about "ritualistic" choices among the forms o f  law. 
This idea is related to the principle of the discursive integrity of law, which was explained above. 
The authority o f law is not directly derived from the "fantastic" explanation of positive forms o f  
law and legal texts in a particular society, but from the analytical explanation of these forms for 
that particular historical discourse and audience.
The performance in law is assumed, accordingly, to be linguistically and positively 
contextualized. Comparative law and legal reasoning are seen - in this study - as linguistic
176 “In this exercise, truly, I  have appreciated the saying o f Plato - nothing is more difficult or more nearly divine 
than to separate accurately” (Bodin, J., 1945, p .3).
177 For some discussion, Duxbury, N ., 1989b, p.95 ff., a critical point of view to Legendre, P., L'amour du censeur: 
Essai sur l’ordre dogmatique (Paris, 1974) pp.23-36.
m  See, Duxbury, N ., 1989b, p .95 ff.
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explanations o f law in a comparative form.179 Furthermore, the approach is modem. This means 
that the positivist and formalist legal tradition is assumed (vs. the "non-positive" and intuitive 
"context of law" approach). Consequently, there are no meaningful "structuralist” assumptions; 
if there is any structure, it is the reasoning within the discourse itself.180
a deviation takes place here from the closed idea of law as a "deductive” law, which 
persists in religious and ethnological legal systems. The history o f comparative law is based on 
the idea of linguistically rational types of persuasion rather than on the role of an "archaic" figures 
like priest-like or extremist logician (becoming paradigmatically o r institutionally blind lawyers). 
This type of "common factor" is increasingly more appropriate because in comparative reasoning 
we usually speak about a person (or a subject) as a "constructor" of a legal analogy. The 
comparativist perceives him- or herself a participator in a  historical legal discourse. He or she 
tries to explain his or her intentions rather than hide them.
Finally, the question of whether or how such comparative legal reasoning has been 
successful or understood has depended on various circumstances (such as the authority of the 
person, etc.) and on certain miscellaneous factors in a particular discursive sphere or in the 
universal legal discourse. However, its particular or overall "success" is not particularly 
interesting. That is, even if the particular (comparative) analogy was not successful in that 
particular historical context, it may have had - and may have in the future - some consequences 
for the historical discourse on law. It nevertheless comprises a ’legal possibility*. In this sense, the 
history of comparative legal reasoning is a  study of the attempts to construct an ideal and 
universal tradition of law within the universal legal discourse. These arguments do not seem to 
belong to any restricted "absolute equilibrium".181
m  Krygier (1986, p.251) explains how the authoritative presence is, inescapably, there in the tradition o f law. The 
pow er to decide on the past and present is, however, rarely absolute, *but it must conform to canons o f coherence and 
plausibility known to and accepted by participants in the tradition ”.
180 The anti-structuralist criticism claims (see, Duxbury, N, 1989, p.97) that it is problematic to assume the "logos". 
A ll the same, if the approach is modem, one does not have to assume anything, but may remain in the realm  of 
docum ented historical materials as material for interpretation.
Krygier, M. (1986) speaks about legal tradition. He m akes a distinction between the pastness, which 
is maintained by the idea of "origination" - and which is heterogeneous in nature - and tradition, which is authoritative 
presence - significant in the present. Thirdly, the tradition is a social phenomenon, i.e. it is connected to the real life 
(d iscourse?) of generations. They do not live only in the behavior of one individual. Law preserves and maintains 
tradition, and draws systematically and constantly from traditions (Ibid, p.240).
Gorla, G., (1980, p.308) makes an interesting point in relation to the idea of modem scholarship of 
comparative law: “ We can say, using our comparative terminology, that the modem scholar o f comparative law, in 
order to appreciate his position in the contemporary historical period, has to compare (we could say vertically’) his 
own position with that o f the scholars in the different periods o f the history o f comparative law, always bearing in 
m ind the more general context o f the legal history o f the jurist's cultural setting ” (ibid., pp.269-274)
1,1 Contrary to the "closed" idea of law, as an ultimate societal authority in the form  of legal text and positive the 
comparison of law is connected to the "self-authority” o f legal sciences. It does not represent the rationality of the legal 
tex t as "one text”, but as determined by the com parator’s intentions. The Com parator deviates instead from  the 
particular ritual - abandons the rituality o f law  - and treats the law as a "possibility o f  law".
For some discussion on the need for a  historical study of com parative law, see Gorla, G., 1980, p.308.
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3.2. Some forms of comparative legal argument
3.2.1. The early legal comparisons
Context. Early Greek law, for example, was never thought to have been collected.182 Law was 
"philosophical", but also "political", in the sense that law was based on the procedures effected 
in the tribal groups forming the state ("polis")183. Nevertheless, it may have been separated from 
pure vengeance.184
The codes came later, during the time of Dracon (621 BC) and Solon (594 BC), 
during the Aristotelian age, when the judiciary asserted its position in Greek society.185 The early 
codes are reported to be based on comparative observations.186
The early Greek187 laws were orally "procedural’' and not "legal-positivist" - in the 
modem sense of the word. Like in all "archaic" systems, the magico-religious power o f the judge 
o r the "lawyer" (having the "autoritas, basileus") - or of the witnesses o f oaths - seemed to be 
the main determinants of the effectiveness of the law.188 This appeared to  be so even if the forms 
were extremely strict and clear. It has been maintained that this is the early idea o f the 
"psychology" o f the leg a l,189 The "sacrosanctness" of the nomos proved to be obstacle for the
He maintains that “such an approach would enable us to know where ’m odem * or ’contemporary ’ comparative law 
stands in relation to somewhat more general or extensive history o f law (in its political, economic and cultural 
contexty\ For certain directives for this type o f study (applied in this study too) (ibid., p.309).
182 Duxbury, N ., 1989a, p .243, referring to Calhoun, G .M ., Introduction to G reek legal science (ed. Zulueta, F. D e, 
Oxford, 1944) p.7-8.
183 O n the analysis o f “polis” , see Arendt, H., 1998, p .28 ff. On problems and developm ent of comparative law, 
“polis” , and Aristotle, see Péteri, Z., 1977, p.100 ff.
O n the stages o f legal development in the O ccident in general, see, W eber, M., 1969, p .303-304.
For some discussion of early “transplants” , see Schlesinger (1980), p .9 .
184 Duxbury, R ,  1989a, 257, quoting Wolff, H.J., The O rigin o f Judicial Litigation am ong the Greeks, In: Tradition 
4 ,1 9 4 6 , p.33,34,59.
185 Duxbury, N„ 1989a, 245, quoting Brehiér, L., La Royauté Homérique: Les Origines de  l'é ta t en Grèce. In: Revue 
H istorique 84 ,1 9 0 4 , p .l  ff.
186 u...and the goal o f both Solon and Lycurgus to supply much needed legislation from  the observations o f a  long 
journey” (Bodin, J ., 1945, p.7).
187 A s well as early  Roman techniques o f "law" -  though the latter was strongly based on codified law.
188 Duxbury, R ,  1989a, p .245-247 , referring to Huvelin, P ., M agie et droit individuel. In: L’année sociologique 10, 
1905-1906, p . l -147, G em et, L ,  D roit et prédroit en  Grèce Ancienne, In: Anthropologie de  la  Grèce Antique, Paris, 
M aspero, 1968, p. p .248.
Duxbury, R ,  1989a, p.252, speaks about the "secular-religious dim ensions" o f the oath. (For this, see 
W atson, A., 1993.)
119 Duxbury, R ,  1989a, p .253.
These features could be associated w ith medieval legal thinking o f law as a  "regiment o f men" and not 
as a  "regiment o f formal laws". T his seems to be was typical to  early Canon law  and Roman-catholic administration, 
which was evidently based on the Roman legal thinking and ideas o f  administration. T hese Romano-canonic processes
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legal comparison190.
Plato's Nomoi (Laws) seems to be based on the idea of positive law.191 He compares 
the historical laws of Vetus Graecia, and takes into account also the laws and produce of peoples 
outside the Hellenic ethnic group (and makes critical remarks regarding them ).192 He analyses the 
laws of Attic, Sparta, Crete, Cartage, Cynthia, Persia and Egypt ("autochthonous" law).
His comparative treatment may be claimed to be "value-based" in the sense that he 
does not aim to justify the uses of comparative observations, but he instead uses them as 
arguments in order to persuade and legitimize, and in idealization.193
The context o f A ristotle's comparative project; positivity an d  natural ethnology of 
comparative law. The first "legal" comparisons, in the history of law, are found in the works of 
Aristotle194. The first extensive comparative work in legal history was this Athenaion Politiea, 
consisting in a collection o f "constitutions" o f 158 city states195. It is likely that the pupils o f the 
school had a central role in its production, though the idea seems to originate from Aristotle.196 
The work consists of (comparative) historical treatment of the constitutions, and a description of 
the function of each constitution. In other words, the comparison is “historically” comparative.
The comparison of "laws" or different rules does not make sense before a certain 
level of formal positivity o f law exists. This was the case in Aristotelian Greek society and long 
before that. Aristotle's study of different constitutions was based on already well-established rules 
of procedure and societal power in Greek societies. The fact that Aristotle made an attempt to 
construct a scientific synthesis of the constitutions of many city states means that at least for him 
- and evidently for his compatriots - the law was positive in form, and to a certain extent, 
independent from the religious and archaic forms of case law.
were the basis of administrative law of the emerging m odem European states (see. Néve, P .L , 1986, p.50).
190 Hamza, G., 1991, p .19 , referring to Triantaphyllospoulos, J., Rechtsphilosophie und Positives recht in 
Griechenland, In: Festschrift Zepos (ed. Wolff. H.J., Athen-Freiburg, 1975) p.689.
1,1 Plato, 1970,1961. A lso, Prigsheim, F., The Greek Law of Sale (W eimar, 1950) p.128.
192 Haxnza, G., 1991, p.10.
m  Hamza,G., 1991, p,10„ referring to W eiss, E., Griechisches Pricvatrecht auf Rechtsvergleichender Grundlage I 
(1923), p.7, and to W enger, L ,  Römisches Recht und Rechtsvergleichung, ln: Archiv für Rechts- und 
Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 1920/1921, p p .123-127. Also Hug, 1932, p. 1028.
1‘’"However, one could claim that many comparisons made by Aristotle were not exactly legal, but rather political and 
moral - continuations of the Mgood life” definitions in Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics (Aristotle,1953).
A private law  comparative argument was presented by  Theophrastus in his analysis of sale and 
purchase. He takes into account the Attic law, the law o f  polis Thurioi, the law o f  Mytilene and statute of Charondas, 
see H am za, G., 1991, p . l l ,  referring to Theophrastus' Peri Symbolaion (In: Stobaeus., Flor. 44, p .20-21, and to 
Dareste, R., La science du d roit en Grèce. Platon, Aristote, Théophraste (Paris, 1893, repr, Amsterdam 1968), p.305 
ff..
1,5 Jaeger. W, 1955.
Aristotle w ent through 158 constitutions (Aristotle, 1952, p.2).
196 Aristotle, 1984, p .9 ,1 3 .
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Consequently, here the idea o f law presumed not an equilibrium based on things 
such as sacrifices or other types of “ritualism” of law or case law for the resolving o f social 
conflicts or moral breaches, but rather a stable idea of law as a social instrument, and as an 
effective and rational means of persuasion. This assumes a power of discursive audience 
considering positive laws as good instrument.
It has been maintained that Aristotle's method turned towards empiricism at the end 
his life.197 It has been also claimed that “Politics” was based on the collection o f constitutions 
preceding it.198 Against this background, Aristotle's comparative analysis in books IV-VI o f  
Politics could be placed within the latter part o f  his "career" rather than the earlier one.199
The nature  o f Aristotelian comparative reasoning in Politics. Aristotle's project in Politics 
had an objective of constructing the ideal of best possible form of government of a state. In this 
sense, the project was "normative". However, according to him, only small reforms - executed 
on the basis o f "knowledge" - were considered fruitful in practice. This way, changes could be 
seen to be moderately good, i.e. it could be observed as to whether they turn out to be good 
rather than bad.
To achieve his purpose, he analysed ideal forms of government in theory, the basis 
o f his method (the comparative method), and the empirical (comparative) aspects of different 
"systems".
In relation to the first question, Aristotle makes a distinction between a form o f 
government and laws. The latter are something which express the principles o f a form o f  
government. One can study laws as a separate phenomenon in addition to  their relationship to the 
form of government. While the form o f government question seems to  be, basically, the question 
of the "existence" of the form of government (and its laws), the question of the laws is a matter 
of laws' relationship to ethics.200
Keeping this in mind, he emphasizes - in relation to the study of the comparative 
method - the knowledge on (1) the different possible forms o f government, (2) restrictions upon 
the study of the construction of the "ideal" (according to circumstances), (3) what kinds of forms
197 For example, Sihvola, J . , , 1991, p.279.
,M Rhodes, P J . ,  1972 ,12-13 .
m  For problem s in the interpretation of the history o f  Politics, see Jaeger, W ., 1955.
F o r the idea that Aristotle was not so keen on Athenian democracy, see Rhodes, P.J., 1972, p.13. 
However, it is possible that Aristotle's comparative project w as his or somebody else s reaction against the collapse and 
intentional destructions o f the city-states on G reek soil. It could be seen as a respond, for example, to  the policy o f  
Alexander the G reat, which diminished the importance o f  the traditional city-states.
200 Aristotle, 1962 [Now: Politics] Book IV , Chapters 1-2, and 3, see, Sihvola, J ., 1991. This follows from the 
distinction between ethics and politics in Aristotle.
H ow ever, one could claim that the existence o f a form o f governm ent was an ethical question for 
Aristotle, which becomes clearly visible in his defense o f the city-states.
of government there are in reality, (4) the historic-cultural background of these "examples", (5) 
what kinds o f people have constructed them, and (6) what are the material and human factors 
which might determine the creation and preservation of a form of government201.
Aristotle’s method, in general, looks "traditionally" comparative. He emphasis the 
fact that there are necessarily different types of forms of government, depending on the material 
conditions dissimilar between them.202 Nevertheless - as we may note - he maintains, for example, 
the supremacy of the "Greek" forms of government over the Jaws of the non-Greeks, the 
barbarians.203
His more thorough historical-comparative reasoning204 concentrates on the types 
o f nominations of officials,205 political disturbances206, the types o f revolutions in governmental 
systems207. On this basis, he constructs the conditions for the maintenance o f governmental 
systems. This includes, for example, measures such as the obligatory laws, the stabilization o f the 
population, the balancing of different groups, the prohibition of benefiting from public offices, the 
protection of property, the prevention of capital concentration, and the selection o f suitable and 
competent people to offices, education etc.208 Kingship can be preserved, not by the use of 
excessive power209and tyranny rather by using it in order to come closer to the kingdom. 
However, the best form seems to be civil society based on the principle of freedom and virtues, 
mixing many characteristics of many different systems210. The conditions for the best form of 
government are connected to the agrarian form of society taking into account geographical 
circumstances.211
Som e concluding rem arks. Aristotle examined the Hellenic forms of government, laws and 
power structures in order to find confirmation of and deviations from Platonist ideas and ideal
2tn Politics, Book V.
202 Politics, Book IV, C hapter 3.
203 Aristotle’s comparative approach was thus limited by the distinction between the superior Greeks and the non- 
G reek (barbarian) world.
204 His historical-comparative analysis is wide. It includes examples and their analysis from the period 700-340 B.C. 
Geographically, the examples extend to Persian, Macedonian, contemporary Sicilian, Assyrian, Kosian, Rhodosian, 
A thenian, and Mythilian politics.
205 Politics, Book IV, chap. 15.
206 Politics, Book V, Chap. 1 ,2 -4 , and 12.
207 Politics, Book V, Chap. 5 -7 ,10 .
20* Politics, Book V, Chap. 8.
209 Politics, Book V, Chap. 11.
2,0 Politics, Book VI, Chap. 15.
Civil society, in this sense, can be interpreted "holistically” • in relation to more "segmented" way of
thinking.
211 Politics, Book V , Chap. 6-7.
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models, which comprised the conceptualization of political philosophy of that time. From this he 
drew some generalizations.
It ought to be asked whether the interest of Aristotle was really to reproduce the 
"positivized" Hellenic constitution by scientifically comparing and historically narrating on it, o r 
merely to find empirical evidence for the acceptability of the Platonic and his own ideal cons­
titution? The type o f reasoning in Politics would suggest that his main interest was political 
theory and not the maintenance of any tradition.
However, the issues o f the context remains unclear2I2 *.
3.2.2. Roman law
54
It has been proclaimed that early Roman law was based on the Roman jurisconsults Responses, 
on which the development of law mainly depended, and that the fall o f the republic caused 
"institutionalization" and "systematization" of principles (compedia).2U
Comparisons by the Roman iuriscunsultis have been seen as "theoretical".214 
Furthermore, the use o f foreign law does not seem to be a particularly central idea. However, 
when comparative arguments were used, their application was extremely "practical"215 and 
instrumental. The interest in such studies arose from the need to resolve a particular case. This 
can be related to the Roman iurisconsultis' main focus upon private law216 *. In addition, external
212 It is possible to see the Aristotelian project from the contemporary m odem  perspective.
Som e have claimed that Aristotle's project was “philosophical speculation” on the basis o f 
comparative law (Zweigert, K., Kotz, H., 1977, p.42). This kind of statement is a quite “modernist” interpretation o f  
the Aristotelian attempts.
Some writers, such as Dworkin, see the great classical political philosophy as utopian, and claim  that 
these ideas were bom  in the studies of "social justice from the point of view of people committed in advance to no 
government or constitution, who are free to create the ideal state from the first principles" (Dworkin, R., 1986, 
p.164).
In m y view , this idea is based on a misinterpretation. W hatever one thinks about the historical 
construction o f  constitutions and law, the fact is that these studies of political philosophy are bom within a certain 
context, in some interest, and are based on observations o f som e systems which seem  to be valuable for the observer.
This is exactly what takes place in the Aristotelian project. Consequently, one may say that the purpose 
of Aristotle was to find the best constitution, but also to defend the city-state institution as a  traditional form o f life and 
law. These two objectives w ere not necessarily in conflict w ith each other.
21J Maine, 1954, p.24. "The final blow to the responses was dealt by Augustus, who limited to a few leading 
consults the right o f  giving binding opinions on cases submitted to them, a change which, though brings us nearer 
the ideas of modem world, must obviously have altered fundamentally the characteristics o f the legal profession and 
the nature o f its influence to Roman law"  (idem.). This institutionalization was connected to " the most active I
promulgators o f constitutions (by) princes, who like Constantine, have the concerns o f  the world to readjust" (ibid., (
p.25). ‘71 permanent court of appeal and a collection of approved commentaries will very shortly be added; and thus 
we are brought close on the ideas of our own day". '
For some comparisons of ancient and m odem  western law and legal concepts, see Smith, J.C., 1968. >
114 Hamza, G., 1991, p. 13, referring to the M arcianus’s definition of Lex, *
1.5 See also, H am za, G., 1991, p.19. >
2.6 Hamza, G .,1991 ,p .7 . »
observation - in the form of visiting foreign countries - was used, at least in earlier times217.
Sextus Caecilius Africanus was one of the first in Roman jurisprudence to use 
comparisons. He considered Plato's Nomoi and the twelve tables parallelly - and contemplated 
the laws of the city-states as well.21* Gaius also made comparative observations in his treatment 
of the origin o f the Lex Collegii (associations) and actio finium  regundorum (the end o f the 
regime)219,
Cicero, on the other hand, referred only briefly to Roman and "foreign" law {nLex 
Athenis" and "Attic law", as ormes gentes) in his treatment of ius naturae.220 His unanalytical 
comparative observations expressed the idea o f natural law being above the laws made by senate 
and peoples. Some remarks are made also on Plato's Politea. Furthermore, in mentioning civil 
institutions of Roman law, Cicero referred to “all other national law” - the laws of Lycurgus, 
Draco, and especially Solon - as "ridiculous". He argued from absurdity so as to maintain the 
superiority of Roman institutions. Comparison is thus used for rhetorical effect, but also in order 
to encourage comparative observations. Thus he also had pedagogical purposes.221
Roman law is contrasted with Greek law also in his remarks on parricidum.222 The 
comparative remarks refer to the “wisdom” of one's own ancestors in declaring parricidum  
strongly punishable, for this serves to deter anybody from committing this act. In connection to 
rituals - regulated in twelve tables - he makes reference to Solon's laws. Here he interprets 
certain provisions based on the fact that these laws were borrowed.223
Cicero's comparative remarks did not aim at any explanation or contextual 
treatment of the subject. This may be due to the extremely value-based nature of the subjects.
After Cicero, the attitude toward the Hellenic tradition remained dismissive.224 
Comparative law really did not develop further.225
The comparative reasoning in Roman writings seems to be characterized by "critical
2,7 “As well as the purpose o f the decemvirs in traveling throughout Greece” (Bodin, J., 1945, p.7). Sec also Hug, 
P„ 1932, David, R., Brierly, J.E.C., 1978, p . l .
211 Hamza, G., 1991, p. 13 (ref. N oct Att. 20,1,4).
G reek law had upon impact to the development of Roman law, see Hug, 1932, p.1030, referring to 
various writers. However, there was no evidence of real scientific development (ibid., p .l 031).
219 See, for direct reference, Hamza, G., 1991, p .l 8.
220 Cicero, 1970, HI: xxii, 33 , also, 1993, xxxi, xxxiii, IV:iii., V;ix.
221 Cicero, 1942 .1:xliv, 197.
222 Cicero, 1939, xxv, 70. "Parricide" being the m urder o f  a parent (father).
223 Cicero, 1970, U:xxiii, 59-64. Also Ifcxv, 38.
224 Hamza, G., 1991, p .l 6 , referring to Beauchet, L., Historié du droit privé de la République Athénienne (1897, 
Paris, reprint Amsterdam, 1969) p.ix. The phenomenon can be seen also in the w orks o f Tacitus, for example.
223Hamza, G., 1991, p .l 8. Cicero as a m aster o f eclecticism, van Zyl, D .H., 1985, p.55.
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contrasting”.226 An uncritical viewpoint regarding one’s “own” rules seemed to prevail227 - unless 
the question was about historical connections. Especially in public and “international” law, the 
Roman legal thinking was ’'Latin" centred228. This may have been due to the fact that the law was 
powerfully connected to religious rituals. The binding character of law was strongly linked to the 
same religion.229 Law was presumed to be a combination o f archaic rituals and positive rules.230 
It appeared to be impossible to declare law to be obligatory solely on the basis o f  its statutory 
form and its subjective acceptance by a person or an abstract public entity.
3 .23. Medieval comparative law
Collatio legum  Mosaicarum et Rom anarum ; Lex Dei. The idea prevalent in the middle ages 
was that one could compare nearly everything both historically and sociologically. Comparison 
in the middle ages was also a practical exercise. In this sense, the approach did not really differ 
greatly from the approach which prevailed during the previous periods. On the other hand, it has 
been argued that the idea behind comparison was integrative rather than contrastive231.
Nevertheless, comparative legal studies seemed to be rare phenomena232, even if  
some examples of comparative law may be found in some medieval legal collections.233
Collatio legum Mosaicarum et Romanarum is a collection and comparison o f laws, 
mainly "public laws" (criminal law) made in approximately 400 AD.234 It contains comparisons 
of laws from Hebrew and Roman origins, and its method is "universal-historical" It seems to be 
impossible to  identify the author of this comparative collection of laws and many other features 
o f this book also remain obscure 23S. This body of writings is perhaps the only source of
226 Bodin claim ed that lack o f education maintained this primitive “comparative mediocracy” (Bodin, 1945, p .145, 
172).
227 Hamza, G., 1991, p .20, and, for example, Rabel, E ., Aufgabe und Notw endigkeit der Rechtsvergleichung, In: 
Rheinische Zeitschrift für Zivil- und Prozessrecht, 1924, p.7.
221 W atson, A ., 1993. O n the lack of “public law" in Grotian sense, see Vitanyi, B ., 1983, p .4 5 ,47 ff.
229 See W atson., A., 1993.
230 W atson, A ., 1993. Schiller, A A ., 1978, pp . 160-161.
231 Schlesinger, R.B., 1995, pp. 477-478. O n Lombardian School and its precedors, see Hug, P., 1932, pp. 1035- 
1036.
232 Hug,P„ 1932, p . l035, referring to Savigny, C.F., Geschichte des römischen Rechts im  Mittelalter (2nd ed, 1834), 
p .459 ,463 .
233 "Neither Hadrian nor Justinian had any interest in foreign law..," (Bodin, J., 1945, p.7).
234 Hug, P., 1932 ,1033 . Neum eier, K.H., 1973.
235 Triebs, F ., 1905 ,p .iff.
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comparative legal jurisprudence from this period236.
This corpus seems to form part of the establishment of Canon law in the middle 
ages. It has been one o f the main sources o f learning on the development of the merger between 
Roman criminal law conceptions with the Canon law. In this process, Germanic and Christian 
ideas generated the ideas underpinning canonic law delicts237.
In general, the 11th century establishment of Universities and the glossatorical 
explanations o f the Corpus Juris instituted "legal science". In addition, this development also 
reestablished the preeminence of "pom ifices" from the Roman tradition, as the main explainers 
o f  the "holy" law.238 As a result o f this development, one of the most productive and basic 
"comparisons" was the practical comparison between and synthesis of the rationalistic Roman law 
and the more socially-oriented forms of Germanic law. Many modem functional and collective 
legal institutions, such as security and incorporation, would not have been perhaps possible 
without this synthesis.239
Conclusions concerning the early comparisons. Both ancient private and public comparative 
law had radically contrasting function. Furthermore, it has been claimed that comparisons in the 
law of ancient times and the early middle ages were only comparisons of customs240. During this 
period, comparison as a systematic method seemed to be related to political theory, and not to 
any systematic studies o f positive laws in the modem sense. Some exceptional "positive" 
comparisons were attached to different codifications during that time. We could say, for example, 
that because codifications were rare, the historical comparisons were accepted without criticism. 
The idea of a universal history of law prevailed. This feature can be related also to the difficulties 
entailed in acquiring sufficient information concerning societies and their laws.
3.2.4. From  12th to 16th century
Machiavelli and the establishment and m aintenance of the state; an example o f an 
instrumentalist com parative government. The renaissance has not been seen as a particularly 
vivid period from the point of view of comparative law. This period was characterized by studies 
o f ancient laws. On the other hand, renaissance development was typified by the birth o f the
236 Sec also Schitzer, 1961, p.8.
O n the relationship between Canon and Roman law in practice, see in this context Triebs, F ., 1905,
p .v iü .
237 Triebs, F., 1905, p.x.
231 Duxbury, N., 1989b, p .90, referring to Legendre, P ., Jouir du pouvoir: Traité de la Bureaucratie patriote (Paris, 
1976) p .1 0 2 ,188.
239 Van den Berg, G .C J J . .  1984.
240 Valladâo, H ., 1961, p .99.
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national lawyer and so called "national purification".241
Machiavelli has not thus far been mentioned as a legal comparitivist in legal history. 
Nevertheless, an attempt to do so is made here. It can be said that one of the basic types o f 
comparative legal approaches and uses of comparative observations - the instrumentalist form - 
was first set forth in his work, the Prince. This type of strategy was, however, not without 
historical modelling.
15th century Florence - the context o f Machiavelli's Prince - was characterized by 
much disparity, argument, and arbitrary rule, and Italy as a whole was lacked a centralized power. 
Concentrated power was established, by contrast, in France and Spain. It was powerful city- 
states such as Venice, Florence, and Genoa together with the Church state, Milanese Duchy, the 
Napolian “foreign” kingdom, and several small principalities which instead ruled the 
Machiavellian world. In this context it was quite evident that Machiavelli had in mind examples 
of diverse power struggles, and that he was principally interested in the means of retaining. The 
idea of having a national unifier was a key issue for him.
Machiavelli observed the situation also from the "internal" point of view as he was 
involved heavily in Florentine public life through his official assignments. In his early career, in 
the last decade o f 15 th century, Machiavelli was responsible for the external affairs' magistracy 
under the authority of the governing Council of the Republic. During the period between 1500- 
1504, he spent some time in France, where he was introduced by the idea o f a "strong nation" -
i.e. one united under a single “prince”. He went later on various missions, which obviously also 
had an impact upon his thinking on government. These missions took him to Italy, Switzerland 
and Germany in 1508, and to France in 1510-1511242.
Machiavelli wrote the Prince after the revival of the Papal power to Florence in the 
form of the Medici government. The book seems to be, in a way, a history of the pre-Medician 
form of government in Europe. However, his context was always the Florentine republic and its 
development.
M achiavellian com parative argum ent. Machiavelli was an extreme "instrumentalist". The 
P rince  included various descriptions o f "good” uses of laws and religions in governance.243 
Machiavelli was familiar with the idea that ample knowledge o f the areas requiring government 
was essential.
241 See, Hug, P ., 1932 ,pp .I039 -1041 .
242 K ekew ich ,L M ., 1997.
243 Kekewich, L.M ., 1997. See also, Skinner, Q., Machiavelli (Oxford, 1981), Ridolfi, R., V ita di N iccolo 
M achiavelli (2 vols.3 ed., Firenze, 1969) [The life o f Niccolo Machiavelli, trans. Grayson, C., 1961]
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Machìavelli's interest was in introducing the comparative legal method so as to 
serve the State. He considered comparative information - knowledge of the prevailing and 
previous laws of other systems - valuable for the effective establishment of the State. He saw 
comparative observations as a relevant part of the effective use of power and of the maintenance 
of law and order. The key idea was the maintenance of power by the instrumental use of laws of 
the conquered areas.
With the help of examples, amongst others, from Florentine governance o f Pisa, 
Sparta's rule in Athena and Theba, and the Romans's domination in Greece and in the 
Mediterranean area Machiavelli gave examples of the governance of the conquered areas by 
means of using the existing positive law as instruments. The analysis of the circumstances was 
considered important. This idea was illustrated by a two-tiered example. While Turkey, with its 
’’decentralized" system, appeared to be difficult to obtain, but easy to keep, the French system 
was based on a centralized system of loyalty, which made it easy to conquer, but difficult to 
keep.244
This idea formed the beginning and the context for the further study o f the 
government of the states, which were accustomed to living in accordance with their own laws. 
The precondition for this type o f governance over these "legal" states was the idea o f  the 
positivity of law. One had to keep these areas "under their own laws”, but at the same time utilize 
this system by establishing a government according to the form familiar within that system. 
Machiavelli^ idea was not necessarily to adopt similar forms of government. Indeed, and this 
connection, Machiavelli speaks, with a help of certain examples, about the dangers o f letting the 
peoples keep their previous laws. Namely, In the stage of the revolution, the ideal of freedom, 
associated with the tradition of the state’s former laws and giving the possibility of reference to 
the earlier form of is a strong weapon in the hands of the revolutionaries. For this reason, the 
areas and their laws which were accustomed to the idea o f freedom and strong legal tradition 
should be totally destroyed.245! ! ^  is related to the fact that areas which do not have tradition but 
which are still accustomed receiving orders, such as rural areas, are very useful allies in the 
establishment of government.
Conclusions. It may be said that Machiavelli expressed a particular “legal point of view” in 
Prince, He saw legal systems as forms of effective power. However, the problems o f  the 
Machiavellian approach are also visible from this same legal point o f view. For Machiavelli, law 
was an instrument of power, but without any idea of (discursive) continuity. The Machiavellian 
approach stresses the importance o f knowing the laws o f other "systems”, so as to instru- 
mentalize those parts or forms of the law which are best suited to the purposes of the ruler. This
244 Machiavelli, N ., 1997, p.24.
245 Machiavelli, N ., 1997, p.27.
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includes the manipulation of relatively "empty" forms of law - divorced and purified from any 
substantive tradition - by giving them substance in accordance with the traditions of the ruler 
i.e. by infusing them with ruler’s intentions. At the same time, the pluralismof the legal system 
was taken for granted. The Machiavellian idea o f comparative law thus represents a pure form o f  
the instrumentalist approach to (comparative) law.246
Machiavellian historical-comparative examples were highly superficial. He selected 
comparative examples predominantly on the basis of his intention o f  highlighting successes and 
failures in the establishment of comparative government. However, his insight into the political 
and cultural context seems to be exceptionally profound.
Machiavelli was genuinely one o f the first to emphasize the study of existing 
systems in a systematic way. He identified similarities and differences. Nevertheless, it seems as 
if the basic principles of governance and the use of comparative information derived from his ow n 
tradition.247 On the other hand, even if he had a standard historical-comparative approach typical 
of that time, his own examinations were related primarily to “real-life”(-time) observations. He 
based these "comparative" commentaries mostly upon his personal experiences. *
One of the basic methodological standards for instrumentalist comparative law in 
Prince was unequivocally the idea of "power"248 - in a “personalized” form. Machiavelli appeared 
able to identify the limits of the implementation of power within societies and (changes to) law 
in fairly absolute terms. In this sense, his comparative approach was in some way restricted. In 
terms of this approach, any society could be compared - inasmuch this helped the strategies o f the 
intellectually and physically strongest power.
It has been claimed that in the 15th and 16th centuries Machiavellian ideas 
established the basis for an idea of the nation state. This was a  result o f  an empirical orientation 
within the political sciences.249
246 On M achiavelli’s concept o f law, see Bodin, J, Republic, First French ed., the Preface I, in Bodin, J., 1979.
247 An interesting comparison may be made between the Machiavellian use o f foreign laws (e.g. the statements by  
the Pope Gregorius the G reat in his letters to  missionaries) where he spoke about the use of foreign religions (from  
Grimberg, G., History o f Nations, 1965, p.163, unofficial translation):
"After much thought 1 have come to the conclusion that one does not have to destroy the English 
pagan temples, but only the pictures in them".
Gregorius urged missionaries to replace these objects w ith catholic ones. Furtherm ore,
"When the people notice that their temples have not been destroyed, thus come more readily to their 
old meeting places,... Namely, it is absolutely impossible to destroy suddenly pagan ideas from the 
hearts o f the barbarians. He who wants to climb a hill cannot do so in one leap but step by step".
248 Or even violence.
249 Cassirer, E., The Myth o f  the State (Oxford, 1946) p .l  19.
Some other comparativists during the period under examination can also be mentioned.
1470 Sir John Fortescue (Justice of K ing's Bench) wrote the De Laudibus Legum Angliae (London, 
1616, Fortescue, The Commendation of the Laws o f  England, 1917, transl. Grigor, F .) in some kind o f a  com parative 
form  (Winterton, p.89), studying basically French political and legal institutions in quite  contrasting ways (see also. 
Hug, p .l 039, referring to H olds worth, History o f  English Law, 3d ed., 1923). The com m on law and civil law  w ere 
compared with the purpose o f  contrasting the goodness o f  the common law w ith the civil law  (p. 116, Graveson, 1984,
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Bodin: the dynamics of sovereign power, and  law as an  argum ent within a  discourse. The 
16th and 17th centuries were characterized by emerging modem comparative law and by the so- 
called "differentia" literature250. Comparative studies were concentrated on internal comparisons 
of the laws in certain territories251.
The context for Bodin was religious war, the religious absolutism, and the collapse 
o f civilized society.252 During this period, Huguenot constitutionalists expressed their opinions 
with the aid of Calvinistic ecclesiastical practices. Governmental powers were to be distributed 
in order to help the Huguenots have something to say in administrative policy. They proposed the 
idea of federalization. This was to be basis of provincial and local authority. This created a
Schm itthoff, M., 1941, p. 102). The work was in the form of a dialogue with a fictional Prince and the Chancellor. 
Fortescue was him self in exile, and a diplomat in Portugal and Scotland, returning to England in 1471. Holdsworth 
maintains that "his exile made him a diplomat and a statesman. He was at leisure to reflect from the outside upon the 
condition of his country and upon its system o f law, in the study of administration o f which he spent the greater part 
o f his life... like Bentham, a lawyer and a practical political philosopher. Both men clearly saw some of the evils from 
which their own age suffered'.
Roman law  and Lombard law was compared for example by Ferenti of Ravenna. Also American 
Indian law was studied by Garcia (Originen de los Indios de el nuovo mundo e  indies occidentales, 1607). Some Civil 
and  Roman, and Civil and Canon law comparisons were made (Christopher S t  Germain, 1523-1530). Raguellus 
com pared Justinian law with that o f new and old testament (Hamza, G., 1986, p.57).
The “civilian” William Fulbecke - contemponuy of Bodin, and influenced by him and Fortecue -  wrote 
the Paralelle or conference o f the Civil law, the Canon law, and the Common law o f  This Realme o f England (1601, 
1618 notes by Hargrave, F., London) It was written in dialogical form, and - in its part dealing with sovereignty - 
suggested compromises (see Terrill, RJ., 1981, p.177). H e wrote also "The pandectes o f the law o f nations containing 
several discourss o f the questions, points, and matters o f law, wherein the Nations o f the World doe consent and 
accord, giving more understanding and opening o f the principali obiects, questions, rules, and cases o f civili law, 
and common law o f this realm of England”. Opinion commenta delet dies: Nationum iudicia confirmât” London, 
1979, Amsterdam, (1602). In this latter book, historical and present comparisons did not differ (typical of this period). 
F or some analysis o f this, see Terrill, R J ., 1981, p.174-175.
Sir Thomas Ridley wrote (1607) A view o f the Civile and Ecclesiastical Law. (Analysis, see Terrill, 
R J . ,  1981, p.178-.
O ne "public” comparativist was also William Prynne (Soveraigne Power o f parliaments and 
Kingdoms, 1643), McRae, KJ3., 1979, p. A 60. Furthermore, Stair in Scotland published 1681 The Institutions o f the 
Law o f Scotland, collated with the Civil, Cannon and Feudal Laws and with Customs of neighbouring Nations. 
Thom as Wood has been also mentioned (See, Constantinesco, J-L*., 1971, p.77).
On the practical nature o f comparative observations in England, see Hug, p.1039. The “civilian" 
ex p e rts  were employed in the service of internationalized law, but also in “internal” functions - especially after the 
reformation. They were opposed by common lawyers and the humanist revolution in the writing of history, (see, Terrill, 
R .J., 1981, p.172-173).
In France, the comparative method was propagated by Francois Hotmann (Anritribonianus, 1567).
In Hungary, Werbôczi (Tripartitum 1517, see Szabó, L , 1977, p .9).
O n some comparati vists, comparative law, and comparative “legislation” in the history o f Benelux area 
from  16th century to  20th the century, see N éve, P.L., 1986, pp.47-74.
250 Hug,P.f 1932, p.1042, and different examples.
251 Hug, P., 1932, p .1044. There was also a  tendency toward a reorganization o f  law  - especially the customary law 
o f France at the time, McRae, K.D., 1979, p. A  6.
232 See, McRae, K.D., 1979, p. A  67.
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problem for Bodin from the point of view of sovereignty253 254.
B odin’s argum ent. Bodin’s Methodus254 gives an interesting picture o f the transitional period 
from medieval to the modem age.255 It has been claimed that it reflected the move from an 
authoritarian philosophy of history in a type o f “pseudoscientific” direction256 *.
M ethodus was * to a certain extent - an empirical inquiry and a work on the 
methodological ideas for his later work, the Republic251. It was about methods o f studying 
history, and about the philosophy of history. It dealt with the idea of universal law.258 According 
to Bodin, only in the narratives of human affairs is the best part o f universal law hidden. One may 
learn from the study o f history.259
Essential historical research consists in the study of “human actions and human 
rules”, aside from philosophical and theological studies: \
"From this subject we have collected the widely scattered statutes o f ancient 
peoples, so that we may include them also in this work. Indeed, in the history the 
best pa rt o f the universal law lies hidden; and what is a great weight and  
importance fo r  the best appraisal o f legislation - the custom o f the peoples, and  
the beginnings, growth, conditions, changes, and decline o f all states - are 
obtained fro m  it. ”260
253 Reynolds, B., 1945, pp.x-xi. For some other interpretations, ibid., see p.xxi. Bodin was himself arrested and 
accused of heresy for nearly one and a half years, McRae, K.D., 1979, p.A 7, A  24. He later also faced inquisition on 
several occasions (ibid., p.A  11). For Bodin’s treatment o f the subject, see Bodin, J., 1955b, pp.105-106.
T he  com parative method was one of the methods used in resolving the problems of cohesion and 
autonom y o f the state (see, Terrill, J.R., 1981, pp.170-171).
254 Bodin, J., 1945. An earlier book was the Juris universi distributio ([1559] In: O euvres Philosophiques de Jean 
Bodin, ed. Mesnand, P., Paris, 1951). Here he claimed that the development o f the legal system development had failed 
because of too great a  reliance upon Roman law. For the strategy of collecting and com paring public law, private law, 
legislation, edicts, and customs of the famous commonwealths, see Terrill, R .J., 1981, p .l  72.
235 One could speak o f a change from strict Aristotelianism toward more “analytical** logic.
256 Reynolds, B., 1945, p.xi. However, we may say that it was also a change away from  a certain type o f restriction 
o f  the relevant data toward another type of restriction upon data - a change in methodological thinking. See also, 
M cR ae, K.D., 1979, p .A  28.
^ B o d in , J., 1979. See, Reynolds, B., 1945, p.xi, and M cRae, K.D., 1979, p .A  6.
It has been maintained that this was influenced strongly by Peter Rasmu$*s teachings (for analysis o f  
th is  see M cRae, K .D., 1979, pp .A  26-27). It characteristics were the strong interest in “empiricism”, its simplicity, 
d irectness and practicality.
258 Also as an anti-nationalist method, see analysis o f  this, Reynolds, B., 1945, p.xxiii. B odin’s universal law aim has 
also been seen as aiming towards a  more comprehensive science o f society, M cRae, K.D., 1979. p.A  6. His corcem  was 
the general problem  o f  social o rder (ibid., p.A 21).
259 Bodin, J., 1945, p . l 7. H e gives also several examples o f direct im itation by rulers in history (ibid., p .13). 
H istorical learning is based on its profitability, pleasure and facilitating qualities (idem.).
260 Bodin, J., 1945, p.8. “The chief subject matter o f  this method consists o f these facts, since no rewards o f history 
are more ample than those usually gathered about the governmental form o f states
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In Methodus, Bodin described historical studies as universal or particular. Universal 
history includes studies of many men and many states - those histories, which have been recorded 
or best known. The study can be made comprehesive or brief. In its latter form, history (annals) 
is a recording of events without an inquiry into causes.
Bodin goes through the essential elements which make up a good historical study. 
These elements included ideas on the reading and arrangement of the material, comments on the 
choices of the material, and some directives for the evaluation of the material.261 He proposed a 
move from general observations to more particular ones (towards detailed narratives).
The interpretation o f some historical writings should take place according to the 
background and training of the historian in question.262 Furthermore, he notes also that the lack 
o f an emotional standpoint - an essential condition for a successful study - is related to the fact 
that one studies either a society in the distant past, or a society which is not his own. However, 
any “morality” attached to the interpretation is problematic, unless one has an authority in that 
field o f matter.
Furthermore, a separation of societal control mechanisms (government) is proposed 
as a methodological directive. However, Bodin does not support any division of the ultimate 
authority.
In the end, Methodus turns into the study of different forms (or arts) of 
government, and an analysis of their characteristics.263 This was essential for the understanding 
o f  history in general, but it also generated - according to Bodin - the possibility o f good 
administration.264 Here the examination departed from the empirical emphasis, and became an 
inquiry into the best form of government supported by comparative-historical - but also 
comparative-factual - observations, and furthermore, by family analogies. This all led to the 
description of sovereignty based on some kind of a limited monarchy in the interests of all.265
It has been claimed that Bodin*s approach in M ethodus renders it different from 
previous works on the subject, because it introduces juristic knowledge to the study o f the 
philosophy of history. Bodin was a “comparative constitutionalist** in modem terms. In fact *
261 Bodin, J., 1945. pp .l -2.
262 W e may say that Bodin explicitly restricted the sources according to  their reliability (the backgrounds o f  the 
a u th o rs). There was no real discussion o f different types o f interpretations. In this sense, he regarded the writers 
trustw orthy as “institutional” actors.
263 McRae, K.D., 1979, p. A  75. Contrary to  Republic, definitions of sovereignty and distinctions between law  and 
ju s tice  do not appear.
264 Bodin, J., 1945, Chapters V  and VL
263 Bodin, J., 1945, pp .l 56-164. See, Reynolds, B., 1945, p.xx, for analysis o f certain contradictions, ibid., pp.xxv- 
xxvi. Interestingly, in his analysis of changes and declines, the greatest reason seemed to be the unequal distribution of 
w ealth  (Bodin, J., 1945, p.223). However, Bodin, J, 1955b, V.2-. See also, Reynolds, B., 1945, p.x.
In the preliminary remarks - in the 1606 version, Bodin disclaimed any support for absolutism  and 
objected  to the increase of the royal power.
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according to his own view - he seemed to be the first one266.
Bodin presented his legal material in the following way:
“Then from  every source I  collected and added the legislation o f a ll people w ho  
have been famous fo r  m ilitary and civic disciplines. In  this connection, also, I  
made use o f the standards o f jurisconsults, as well as o f  the historians, so th a t 
consideration is given to degrees o f the Persians, o f the Greeks, and the  
Egyptians, no less than to the Romans. From the Pandects o f the Hebrews, also, 
chiefly from  the books o f  the Sanhedrin, I  planned to take all the best things In  
this matter... have promised me their aid. Not to be w ithout the statutes o f the  
Spanish and o f the British and o f all the most fam ous states o f Italy and o f  
Germany (for it would be endless to seek more obscure) I  trusted to be able to jo in  
them to our own at the same time. I  wish we might also posses the civil code o f the  
Turks. Certainly by some means we should have the public law on which the  
flourishing and powerful empire has been established. To these will be added the 
legal doctrine and the supreme authority o f the decisions in [your] court, as well 
as those in the Imperial court. I  have obtained them partly  from  the work o f our  
men, partly from  .... Thus, by the rule o f Polycletus, we have decided to examine 
laws and actions o f law; but by lesbian rule, to examine equity and the office o f  
judge [Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics]”.
Bodin’s comparative studies themselves do not make any distinction between the 
historical and the more contemporary comparative approach.267 On the other hand, his sensitivity 
to historical, sociological and systematic contexts in Methodus was not impressive. Bodin's 
approach was not based any socioeconomic analysis, but he used as reflective concepts ideas 
deriving from the religious ones, as well as from the contemporary “natural’* sciences.268
He considered mainly the "methodological" benefits of comparative law. However, 
he evaluated, for example, his scholarly sources with an analysis o f  their backgrounds, and 
defined criteria for their evaluation, in which the analytical approach was decisive.269 On the other
266 "So it seems to me remarkable that, among so many writers and in so learned an age, until now there has been 
no one who has compared fam ous histories o f our forbears with each other and with account o f deeds done by the 
ancients" (Bodin, J., 1945, p .9 ).
267 For some analysis of the Republic, McRae, K.D., 1979, p.A 27.
268 Montesquieu, nation and socio-geographical criteria.
Bodin s works m ay be seen as one o f  the basic texts of state positivism (Bodin, J., [1576] Territorial 
sovereignty), applied, for exam ple, by Hobbes in his Leviathan (1651) and Grotius (1625 ). On this, the context, see 
Yntema, H.E., 1958, pp.495-496. It provided a basis for further development towards m onarchial and democratic states 
w ith  ideas o f economic and social justice (ibid., p .496).
269 Bodin, 1945, pp.5-6. The last [best] type consists o f those trained not only by precepts and forensic practice 
but also in die finest arts and the most stable philosophy, who grasp the nature o f justice, not changeable according 
to the wishes o f men, but laid down by eternal law; who determine skillfully the standards o f  equality; who trace the 
origins o f jurisprudence from  ultimate principles; who pass on carefully the knowledge o f all antiquity; who, o f 
course, know the power and the domination o f the emperor, the senate, the people, and the magistrates o f the 
Romans, who bring into the interpretation o f legislation the discussions o f philosophers about laws and the state; 
who know well the Greek and Latin languages, in which the statutes are set forth  fund. MK)_. Who at length
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hand, there is a negation of most of the classics as relevant material.270
Furthermore, a specific feature of Bodin’s approach was that he repudiated the idea 
of deriving any “universal principles” from Roman law, mainly because of the functional nature 
of Roman law as it stood.271 He neglected the authority of the scholarly interpretations by 
claiming that scholars commenting upon Roman laws
“should have read Plato, who thought there was one way to establish law and 
govern a state: wise men should bring together and compare the legal framework 
o f a ll states, or o f the more famous states, and from  them compile the best 
kind'.™
This idea was the basic objective of his comparative legal approach.273 
Bodin*s theory - based on his “comparative” approach - was that the course of 
events was determined by popular traits (the character of the people), and these in turn by 
climate. He added also some other determinants to the picture (“primitive traits”).274 On the other 
hand, his comparisons were “absolute” and functional in nature. All things compared had a
circumscribe the entire division of learning within its limits, classify into types, divide into parts, point out with words, 
and illustrate with examples” (p.6).
On others. Ibid., pp.5-6, and p.8.
Bodin’s material derived also from his discussion in  the Paris bar (McRae, K.D., 1979, p. A  38).
270 Reynolds, B., 1945, p.xxv.
271 Bodin, J., 1945, p.2. He maintains also that "At a time when all things suffered from the crudest barbarism, 
fifteen men appointed by Justinian to codify the laws so disturbed the sources o f legislation that almost nothing pure 
is dragged forth from the filth and mud" (ibid., p.4). He recognized the instrumentality related to this historical 
codification: “from this condition has originated that immense and diffuse abundance o f degrees to eliminate 
discrepancies among the laws themselves and to put together in some way members tom from the entire body” 
(idem.).
See a lso , McRae, K.D., 1979, p A  6. Bodin proposed a kind of ius gentium, to base law s upon the 
common practice of all nations (idem.).
m  Bodin, J., 1945, p .2 , and also, p. 4. "... but it cannot be doubted that had the elder Francis [Francis 1?, 1500} 
lived longer he would have undertaken this additional task of correlation and would have completed it. It would not 
have been necessary to invite jurisconsults from Greece or to summon legislators from elsewhere” (Bodin, J., 1945, 
P-7).
273 “To this objective I directed all my studies - and all my thoughts” (Bodin, J., 1945, p.2).
274 Bodin, J., 1945, pp.144-145. See also Reynolds (1945,pp.xiii-xiv), where she dcmostrates how different peculiar 
factors (such as racial, planetaria, numbers etc.) w ere well suited to the “Platonism o f the Renaissance” . O n Bodin's 
Platonic “great chain of being” , McRae, K.D., 1979, p.A  22. However, in Republic Bodin distinguishes his approach 
from  the Platonic one {Republic, 1955a, I, p.2).
The influence of climate was claimed to be a continuation from Hippocrates to 20th century theory, see 
fo r example, Reynolds, B ., 1945, p.xii, referring to Busson, H., in Introduction to Pom ponazzi's Les causes des 
merveilles de la nature, p.25, and Febvre, LP.V., A geographical introduction to history [Tene e t révolution humaine] 
(coll.with Uonel Bataillon,trans. E. G. Mountford and J. H. Paxton, W estport, Conn) 1974 p.108). Febre has claimed 
that Montesquieu, Buckle, and Miss Semple are only "Bodin revised, corrected, and considerably enlarged, but it is 
never anything but Bodin" (Reynolds, B., 1945, pjui). In Montesquieu’s  Spirit o f Laws many similarities can be found, 
though direct references are lacking.
See, Bodin, J., 1979, V .l. On Bodin’s theory of climate, see M cRae, K.D., 1979, p A  21 .
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“function” in a “unity” despite their differences. :
In the Six Books on Commonwealth (Republic) Bodin’s starting point was the idea 
o f M ethodus i.e. the idea of the study o f universal law or knowledge of human affairs.275 
However, Republic is a book more concerned with and ideal form o f government (sovereignty) 
than an argument for a particular situation. The “comparative” legal material serves now as an 
established and a well-defined reference point in different stages o f the development of the 
argument - appearing as listed examples, but also in more analytical form.276 The comparative 
methodological observations no longer emerge to the extent they did in Methodus.271 However, 
the “climate” theory is repeated in a compact form.278
Republic clearly defines the concept of sovereignty, and examines its limits and 1756*
175 See also, McRae, K.D., 1979, p.A 24.
176 McRae, K.D., 1979, p . A 39 "and 1 have supported this by divine and human laws and authorities, and most 
of all by reasons which compel assent" (Republic, the “Geneva edition", the preface).
For example, extensive historical analysis was made of ideas o f citizenship in Rome (Bodin, J., 1955b,
1.6., pp .54-56), the Swiss type of divided sovereignty (I.7., p.75-79), Feudalism “and tributary princes" in different 
countries (L9., pp.l 16-119, historical analysis, listing, for example, England, Scotland, Denmark), analyses o f types of 
sovereignty (I.9., p .l 28 ff., in Germany, Italian states, England, Switzerland, Lithuania, Poland, Jerusalem, Hungary, 
Papal state - especially in its relationship to Emperor and King of France - and shortly also the Koranic and 
Muhammadan world, listing also Scotland, Ethiopia, Turkey, Persia, Muscovy, also in 1.10.), types of states (II. 1. and
2., especially pp.186-192, II.6-7, using Italian states, Swiss Cantons, Germ an Em pire, Spain, England, Denmark, 
Sweden, Rome, Athens, also in n.4-5), definitions of state bodies (m , som e countries like Spain, England, Germany, 
Poland, extensive analysis of the Roman public law), the rise and fall of entities (IV.7., City o f Muenster, Persia, Egypt, 
the Hebrews, Macedonians, Corinthians, Spartans, Athenians, Celts, election o f  a  prince in Poland, Bohemia, Hungary, 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Italian states, Switzerland, etc.), avoidance o f sedition (IV .7., Italian states, reformation 
in Sweden, Scotland, Denmark, England, Swiss Confederates, Empire o f Germany), attitude towards the prohibition 
against discussion of religion (Kings of East and Africa, Spain and Muscovy, the H ebrew s, some German towns, Turks, 
Goths), form o f  commonwealth in different conditions, in relation to dispositions (V .I ., "Swiss, a people who came 
originally from Sweden” (!?), Hannibal-Italy, Arabs-Spain, Spaniards-Geimany, etc. list o f people and historical 
events), "Swiss Confederates wisely preserve their popular forms of Government.. all their Kings are elective, and 
they expel them the moment they turn tyrant, as was done to the Kings o f Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Poland, 
Bohemia, and Tartary" ( V .l l i s t s  of climate and condition analysis), m ilitary training (V .5, p.605, Venice, in general, 
and many other countries), neutrality and alliances (V.6., p .623, Italian and Swiss cities, Scots and England, papacy, 
etc), revenues (VL1., Italian states, Swiss, Spain, Poland, England, Germany), types o f  commonwealths (V.4., various), 
succesion of power (VL5., p.728, especially England, Salic law), some criminal law questions, etc.. Furthermore, many 
cross-comparative “synthetic” examples are presented in the chapters m entioned above.
It has to be noted that references in different versions differ considerably.
177 The first French version differs - to a certain extent - from the later Latin version, see McRae, K.D., 1979, p. A
30, analysis, ibid., p.A  37. In the preface o f the Latin version the list o f  “good” sources - in studying the art o f
government - are repeated, including also personal experience in public affairs (ibid., p.A  73).
A lso the "audience” seems to differ. M cRae, K.D., (1979, p . A  31) which claims that Bodin - in  the
Latin version - "made a genuine attempt to accommodate the new [Latin] version to the foreigner's point o f  view".
It seems to be more contextual in the political sense, whereas the French version is “legal” in its relation to  comparative
aspects (ibid., p.A  37). In addition to further reading (German examples), his experiences in visiting England and the
Netherlands influenced arguments by providing detailed exam ples (ibid., p .A  32). Furthermore, the emphasis upon
universality and legal rules is less visible in the latter version, and the stress seem s to be  more in practice - contrasting
the ideal and the factual (for example, Bodin, J., 1955b, 5.10., McRae, K.D., 1979, p . A  36). For some interesting
comments on the English version used here, see ibid., p.A  37.
271 Bodin, J., 1955b, Book V.
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functions in theory.279 However, one can easily notice that it is - in its historical context - a 
regeneration of royal authority in France.280 On the other hand, it is a product o f the time 
(including examinations of paternal powers and slavery etc.)281 *
Later on, Bodin’s writings turned towards philosophy and religion. However, his 
comparative method prevailed, even if in a different form.252
Conclusions. It has been claimed that Bodin’s approach demonstrated some kind of a theory of 
continuity.283 We may say that Bodin stressed the importance of discourse. This may be seen, for 
example, in the fact that the comparative approach ran through all his works. In the ultimate 
analysis, he considered that the failures o f one type o f discourse could be replaced by other 
discourses, and by the discourse between religions (i.e. between those particular elements, which 
were to destroy the ultimate sovereign).284
However, Bodin - in his comparative approach - took part of a discourse, which 
was extremely value-based. He did not discuss possible alternative interpretations of the rules of 
different systems according to different writers, but made a selection of the “relevant” or 
“trustworthy” writers as sources a priori according to their background and nature as legal 
historians. Furthermore, even if “sociological” observations were part of his comparative method
279 Absoluteness (perpetualness), natural law limitations (like the rule o f “promises-keeping", “everyone shall have 
his due“, the requirement o f a consent, property rights), lex imperii limitations (succession rules, “non-alienation of any 
public  domain” -ru le ,) see, McRae, K.D., 1979, pp.A  13-17. These rules are strongly related to the constitutional 
h istory  of France. They appeared in Republic as strongly restricted principles (and in Methodus under a  wider 
interpretation, ibid., p.A  16).
These rules seem to be connected to some kind of idea o f continuity. However, Bodin did not really 
have an idea o f political constitution. Analogically, we may say that the Lex Imperii functioned as guaranteeing the 
modem political continuity or integrity, (see also, M cRae, K.D., pp.A 18-19). In his analysis, M cRae, K.D., has a sort 
o f  constitutional idea, which does not consider any continuity in the discursive sense, but as a  legal logical problem -
as did Bodin).
See also B odin’s ideas on continuity (Bodin, J., 1955b) IV.3. There he discusses the possibilities for 
avoiding the causes of changes in states, the maintenance o f consistency, how in different states different laws function 
to  preserve of the state, good reasons to changing old laws, gradualness in changing laws and reforming magistrates, 
etc. (also ibid., IV.7., p .530).
2.0 McRae, K.D., 1979, p. A  9.
2.1 Bodin, J., 1955b, pp.32-46. Republic seems to  rely on ideas such as m eans o f transitions from family to civil 
society . There are also distinctions drawn between different types o f associations such as town, cities, and 
commonwealths.
2,2 Bodin, J., Colloquium of the Seven about Secrets o f the Sublime [Colloquium Heptaplomers de Rerum 
Sublim ium  Arcanis Abditis] (translation with introduction, annotations, and critical readings, by Kuntz, M ., L ,  D., 
Princeton, 1975). This work inquired critically into the ideas of the Christian religion. The book is a  discussion o f  seven 
p ersons from seven different religions. These aspects were already visible in his last versions o f Republic (McRae,
K .D ., 1979, p.A 32).
O n the dialogue form on many comparativists, see Schmitthoff, M ., 1941, pp.102-103.
2,3 Reynolds, B ., 1945, p.xxvii. “ ... ruling in rectitude and integrity” (Bodin, J., 1979, Republic, 1. French ed, the 
preface I). “There is nothing more dangerous to the commonwealth than that its subjects should be divided into two 
fractions, with none to mediate between them” (Bodin, J., 1955b, V .2).
234 For some analysis, see McRae, K.D., 1979, p.A24.
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and approach, it was distinguished - in practice - from the main “legal” observations. It appeared 
mainly in theoretical and separate form as an indication of the methodological premises Bodin 
had. In some analyses, the climatical context was used in connection to analyses o f legal 
institutions.284 85
Bodin was the one attempting to  throw light upon to the concept o f sovereignty 
which had, in his time, been so badly confused in the abstract and which had also been muddled 
within the practice o f the medieval feudal system.286 This may also be the reason why he refused 
to see the concept of sovereignty in any functional sense (the idea of a mixed state etc.), and why 
he maintained a strict concept of ’sovereign* and of the proposed monarchy.287 On the other 
hand, his theoretical concept was morally neutral, accepting any type of sovereign as a 
sovereign.288 The functional problems were the problems of rules (functional) rather than a matter 
of fundamental premises.289
Bodin was modem in the sense that he associated the supreme political authority 
with the state. This authority was realized by lawmaking. His interest was apart from the judicial 
and administrative functions as such.290 On the other hand, it has been maintained that Bodin was 
directing his attention to the real world rather than simply to  the theoretical realm. Its 
comparative approach must be seen part o f Bodin’ s desire to apply his concepts to a 
“comparative” reality o f a European legal world.291
Bell and the "C om m on European Ju risp rudence". In the practice o f  the time, this idea was 
that foreign authorities could be referred to (especially the communis opinio totius orbis) when
385 B odin ,!.. 1955b. V .l.
284 Also, M cRae, K.D., 1979, p. A13.
287 Bodin, J., 1955b, V IA
218 This latter aspect is reminiscent o f the Kelsenian approach to the question. E thical qualifications appear in the
concept o f state, however (M cRae, K.D., 1979, p.A 20).
289 For Bodin’s problems in understanding any functionality in legal orders o f his tim e, see McRae, K.D., 1979, p.A
20. M cRae’s constitutional idea is evident also in  his analysis o f Bodin’s work.
290 McRae, K .D ., 1979, p . A 14.
291 McRae, K .D ., 1979, p. A  20.
W e may say that Bodin’s ideas on sovereignty were in line w ith the development o f m odem  
constitutional traditions in m any countries (contrary to som e opinions, M cRae, K.D., 1979, p .A 21).
It has been claimed that his ideas suit well also to the idea o f European federalism. It has been claimed 
that Republic would provide many ideas for reformation o f the national state (also in the form of European integration, 
McRae, K.D., 1979., p A  66-67). However, some ideas in the Republic may be difficult to adjust to the notion o f  supra- 
(national)state legal orders: “I f  however, the orders o f the prince are not contrary to the divine and natural law, he 
lmagistrate} must execute them, even iftkey are contrary to the law o f nations, for the law o f nations can be modified 
by the civil laws o f  any particular state provided natural justice and equity to which the prince is bound is not 
infringed, but public and particular utility only is in question " (1955, HL4. p.86). In this passage Bodin seems to 
construct a  hierarchy between the law of nations and the law  o f  the sovereign. Equity and natural law seem to justify 
deviation from the law  of nations.
i
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the statutes» customs» and judicial and doctrinal determinations were in accordance with each 
other in the European area. This was so even if the case was clear according to the applicable 
municipal law.292 Comparative law was considered as a necessary ingredient in the practical and 
theoretical activities o f jurists.293 The main purpose was to find the "similarities". The differences 
were the "varietas in unitae”.294
Many treatises and commentaries on municipal law included comparisons for 
various purposes» and were used mainly to illustrate and integrate municipal law within the 
framework of the common law of Europe. However» continental lawyers - with few exceptions - 
considered the "orbis" to be continental Europe» or regarded, for example, English law within 
a narrow perspective. This applied also to the practical jurisprudence, to the A lleg a tio n s  and 
Consilia of lawyers.295
The “common law of Europe” has been defined as a juridical idea, according to 
which there was a concordance between the laws of states, especially among those emerging and 
developing between the 15th and 18th centuries. This accord related to the various feudal, canon, 
roman, commercial and international laws existing at that time. In this sense, it comprised a 
"Common European jurisprudence".296
Bell297 was one of those who applied a comparative approach to the consideration 
o f the Lex Mercantile and the principles of European private law. He himself called it the 
“common jurisprudence of Europe”.298
292 Gorla, G., 1982,129 . This was based on the practical and theoretical role those jurists (o f each country), who 
were trying to show that municipal law was not based on arbitrary ideas (i.e. that it accorded with common experience 
and common reason, as represented in the communis opinio totius orbis). This is different from the idea that an idea 
be “in accordance with natural law” (idem.). There were no dominant authorities in England, however, (Schlesinger, 
R.B., 1995, p.480).
293 Gorla, G., 1982, p.129.
294 Gorla,G., 1982, p .l  30. It was typical to compare municipal law  with the Roman "ius commune” o f the author. 
A lso Gutteridge, H.C., 1944, p.3 ff.
Regarding Ius Commune and its reception in Europe, see W iegand, W., 1991, pp.230-231. O n the 
unified Europe o f 17th century, Schlesinger, R.B., 1995, p.278.
295 Gorla, G., 1982, p.130.
296 Gorla, G., 1982, p . l 33. See also, Gorla, G., Moccia, L ,  1981, p . l  4 4 ,1 6 3 . Regarding its disappearance and the 
consequences of this, see ibid., pp.153-154.
297 M r George Joseph Bell (1770-1843).
298 B e lls  writings are interesting, because they give some indication o f the ideas prevailing during this period.
B ell explores the idea in his book that there is recorded evidence o f the Universal Law Merchant, 
grounded upon principles o f equity (Bell, G  J . ,  1870 [1810], p.xi).
His treatment of the subject is strongly Roman law based. However, he maintains that "the object o f 
this work... [is] directed to an investigation into the differences... between international law and conflicts o f laws... 
object mercantile usage... to a common standard in different countries” (ibid., pp.4-5).
He starts from Lord Mansfield s definition of the mercantile law as "a branch of public jurisprudence, 
not restricting for its character and authority on private institutions or local customs of any particular country, but 
on the principles and usages o f trade, which common convenience, and a universal sense ofjustice had recognized 
as f i t  to regulate the dealing of merchants... in all the commercial countries o f the world” (ibid., p.3-4). "the law
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Bells comparative considerations were fairly unanalytical. He did not go far in his 
works to investigate different legal systems, even though he mentioned practices - and especially 
the writers o f other European states - as sources o f his statements.299 However, he regarded 
foreign sources as "not to be quoted as precedents, or as authorities to be implicitly fo llow ed , 
but to be taken as guides towards the establishment o f the pure principles o f the genera l 
jurisprudence",300
Bells aim, in his research, was to  highlight differences and similarities betw een 
systems, and to compile legal material for lawyers in England and Scotland.301 On the other hand, 
he wanted also to separate, with regard to certain legal institutions, "modem" law from the law  
in the Roman system, and especially to distinguish certain concepts in Scottish and English law 
from Roman concepts.302
In speaking of the international character of maritime law, he establishes a doctrine 
concerning the adoption of foreign law303:
"The continental collections and treatises on this subject, and the English books 
o f reports, have been received as authority by our judges, where not unfitted fo r  
our adoption by any peculiar idea, which our practice does not recognize. O f 
these authorities it may not be entirely useless to make a slight enumeration,304
He makes explicit the idea that the "first authorities in order and weight are the
merchant is universal. It is part o f the law o f nations, grounded upon the principles o f natural equity, as regulating 
the transactions o f  men who reside in different countries, and carry on the intercourse o f nations, independently o f  
the local customs and municipal laws of particular states., consist... decisions o f  courts... writing o f lawyers in 
different countries ( ("not making law, but handing it down")... recorded evidence o f the application o f the general 
principle... guides towards the establishment o f the pure principles of general jurisprudence".
The comparisons - in the book - are Roman law  based (according to  him, others had "peculiarforms 
and narrower maxims”). H e uses Scottish law and English law, American (adoptions based), French, Dutch law , and  
that o f different types of institutions ("tribunaux de commerce”). Russian cases are also quoted (Custom H ouse C ourt 
o f S t  Petersburg, ibid., p.238). The use was basically "illustrative". There is no  extensive comparative analysis in  the 
m odem  sense o f  the word. T he analysis of Roman, English and Scottish law  is "reproductive" (descriptive).
A t the end o f  the book, there is a  kind o f an analysis o f conflicts o f law  situations.
Bell also wrote “Inquiries into the contract o f sale o f goods and merchandise judicial decisions and 
mercantile practice o f modem nations” (Edinburgh, 1844), which referred to  foreign authorities, institutions, and 
treatises (Bynkershoeck, Questiones juris privati, Statutes o f  N ew  York, Law  of Holland, French Law, and English 
law).
299 Bell, G  J . ,  1870, pp.x-xi. Interestingly, he speaks about "integrity o f our system o f law”..."still much caution is 
to be observed in the adopting o f English judgements as authorities in Scotland”.
300 Bell, G J ., 1870, pp.x-xi.
301 Bell, G J ., 1870, pp.xiii-xv.
302 For example, in connection to concepts such as M andate, Partnership and  Insurance, and Paper money, see Bell, 
G.J., 1870, p .506.
303 According to Gorla, G. (1982, p.127) Bell also applied these determinations to m ercantile law jurisprudence and 
to the general jurisprudence o f  Europe, where in the case o f the latter customs and statutes are not mentioned.
304 Bell, G J ., 1870, p.547
I * »
ordinances or statutes and Customs of maritime States"205, then the "determinations o f Maritime 
and mercantile Courts o f Modem Europe", and finally the ’’works o f foreign authors in maritime 
law which are relied on in our courts'*?06 These sources apply, where lacunae or uncertainties 
exist (omissus or dubious) in local law* 30607 *.
In treating the French Ordinance of Louis XIV, he analyses the reasons why this 
particular law ought to be considered as an authority. He referred to the
"...patient and careful digest o f all that was fixed  in the usage and customs o f 
maritime nations or expressed in the ancient codes.... and by settling with a wise 
and comprehensive spirit o f legislation, looking to the general jurisprudence o f 
Europe, those ambiguous points o f maritime law in which either the customs o f 
nations were at variance, or on which no prevailing usage or certain rule was to 
be fo und ,,m
During this period, modem comparative law gained gradually increasing role in the 
development of law. Comparative law become a form of legal learning. This kind of interest was 
related to the various laws becoming a subject matter o f academic learning and writing. This 
began to occur in the middle ages in continental countries and in England just after nineteenth 
century.309
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3.2.5. “M odern” com parative law
M ontesquieu and the  “Spirit o f Laws” . The 17th and 18th centuries were characterized by 
influences from the natural law school, methods of speculative rationalism, and a lack of 
empirical studies310. Comparative studies as such were exceptional, even if there were differences
** Rhodian laws. D Consolato del Mare, the Laws o f Oleron and Visby, the Ordinances of the Hanseatic Towns. Le 
Guidon de la M er, the O rdinance de law Marine o f Louis XIV of 1681, the French Code de Commerce o f 1807.
306 Bell. G J.. 1870, p .547 ff.
307 In the 16th and 18th century conceptualization, the casus was "dectsus" (decided) where the statutes and customs 
left no room for interpretation (it was decided in point, in puncto). If  this was not clear, the courts decisions 
(decisiones) were used. In the absence o f the latter, the case was decided according to the "consilia" or "allegation's" 
o f the lawyers. If th e Bcommunis opinio" was not found in this field within the law in Europe, the search was then for 
the majority opinion, the best opinion, or the opinion which best accorded with the local law. (Gorla, G., 1982, p.128).
301 Bell, G.J., 1870, pp.547-549. Gorla G. notes (1982, pp. 127-128) that the passage expresses the idea o f what 
jurists of the 16th-18 th centuries called recursus ad legem alii loci; the law o f “this place" was considered to prevail 
in a certain matter. Foreign ideas were considered suitable for the particular conditions and exigencies of the local law.
309 Rheinstein, M. 1968, p.204.
310 Some examples of the promoters of comparative legal studies in different forms can be mentioned: Leibnitz (Nova 
Methodus), Selden (especially works on Hebrew and oriental law), Herman Com ing, Arthur Duck, Grotius, V ico and 
Montesquieu, Heineccius, H ugo (Hamza, G., 1986, pp.57-66), and also Putter (ibid., pp.62-64), Schiller (ibid., p.63), 
and Schott (ibid., 64-65), Portalis, Toullier (Gordley, J., 1995, p.555). That natural law was the first real basis of 
comparison of laws, which seemed to challange the ideas of comparisons in antiquity (ibid., p.66). How historical
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- for example - between continental and English law311. An increase in legislative activity was also 
characteristic of this period.
The early basis for the comparison of laws, in modem terms, was established by  
Montesquieu, the great enlightenmentian thinker. He is perhaps the most well-known user o f  
comparative observations from this period. Indeed, Montesquieu defined the basics of m odem  
comparative law312, and himself made extensive comparative observations. It has been claimed 
that with his idea of ’comparison o f nations* Montesquieu (re?)established the modem ethno­
cultural and national state paradigm o f legal comparison.313 It may be said that he used the 
concept of ’nation* as a basis in establishing a solid alternative to the prevailing religious and anti- 
empirical paradigm.
Montesquieu's concept o f ’law* and ’nation* were associated forcefully with the 
‘'spirit of laws", which was related, on the one hand, to the “physical” conditions and 
circumstances of peoples in certain geographical area, or on the other, and to the laws systematic 
relationship and reciprocal influence upon each other.314
One may say that this idea generated a growing attention to  different legal cultures.
Montesquieu’s tests consisted o f all relevant characteristics. At the centre was the 
climate, but features such as environment, geography, fertility o f soil, size, geographical position, 
sociological and economic factors, cultural factors (family structure), national characteristics
school opposed the comparisons (ibid., p.66). O n some methodological discussion during that time, see Hug, P., 1932, 
pp.1046-1047.
ln  De Jure Belli ac Pacts G rotius makes a  distinction between natural and human law. Natural law  is 
based on the divine will, and it can be found by reason. International law (law of nations) and civil law belong to  the 
latter category. They are based on human will (see, V itinyi, B-, 1983, p.42 ff.). Although Grotius can be seen as a  legal 
scientist who derived his natural law ideas from  the hum an nature, he also saw the importance o f  studies o f the 
"factuality o f law" (Verheul, J.P., 1994, pp.143-144, also , Hamza, G., 1986, p.59 ff.) (custom). These observations 
supported his idea of law common to all nations, and the rationalistic natural law system  (Hug, P., p.1049). Yet, the 
project o f Grotius has been seen aiming to  provide legal tools for Dutch com m ercial capitalists. Furthermore, 
international law - especially private law - was still unregulated by national states. It m ust be noticed that Grotius wrote 
also his De Jure Belli ac Pacis abroad - in exile.
V ico  attempted to prove, on the other hand, the existence of a  universal legal history, reflecting 
different legal developments in relation to general truth and metaphysical principles (H ug, P., 1932, p.1049).
3.1 Hug, P., 1932, pp.1051-1052.
The development of case law - in the context o f the influences deriving from  Roman law  sources -  w as 
typical also within Swedish law during this period  (see Jagerskiöld, S., 1978, and Blomstedt, Y., 1986, pp.14-17, 
adoptions in Finland, see Blomstedt, Y., p.18 ff. A bout influences from different countries, see Björne, L., 1995, p . l ,  
235 ff.
3.2 M ontesquieu can be considered as the founder o f  m odem  comparative law, see for example, Gutteridge, H.C., 
1949, p . l 2 , D avid, R., Briefly, J.E.C., 1978, p .4 . H ow ever, it has been claimed that Montesquieu developed the 
concepts o f Savigny (W interton, G., 1975, p .90). Also, Kahn-Freund, 0 . ,  1974, p.9, H ug, P., 1932, p . l 050.
M ontesquieu's approach can be considered as the basis of sociological comparative law.
313M ontesquieu, 1 9 8 9 ,1 .1 .3 , and 3.19.27.
314 M ontesquieu, 1989,1.1.3. In the spirit o f  law s, political and civil laws are not separated. Political laws form the 
principle and nature o f the government, and civil laws m aintain i t
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(temperament), religion, and political factors were also momentous.315 These factors and laws had 
dynamic and reciprocal inter-relationships, and influenced each other.316 317*
By using criminal laws as an example, he maintained that laws must be compared 
in a "holistic" way:
"Thus, in order to judge, which o f these laws is more in conformity with reason, 
they m ust not be compared one by one; They m ust be taken all together and 
compared together"?11 ... "What laws seem alike are sometimes really 
different"?1*
Laws must be therefore examined in the light of their purpose and context.319 
These observations expressed the systematic and the sociological dimensions of 
comparative law.
Montesquieu's personal history explains his interest in foreign legal systems. We 
may say that just as for Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Bodin320, his personal experiences abroad were 
extremely significant for him.321 On the other hand, he used historical material, in an extensive 
way, and seemed to rely on various “anthropological” studies.
Furthermore, Montesquieu used comparative climatic and legal observations in 
mixed form, perhaps more than any other writer before him.
M ontesquieu's argum ent. Montesquieu examined comparatively "constitutions", forms of 
governments, and different laws, and defended an idea of the best constitution against other
315Montesquieu, 1 9 8 9 ,1 .1 3 X 3 .1 4 . l - 2 \ 3 . 1 8 .1-31V5.24.1-.SeealsoCohler, A.M., 1989,p.xxv.
'7  do not say that the climate in large part produced the laws the mores and the manners o f each 
nations, but I say that the mores and the manners o f a nation should be closely related to its laws” , Montesquieu, 
1989,3.19.27 (See some analysis, Graveson, 1958, p.649 ff.).
For Montesquieu's criteria, and economic and social factors, see the analysis of Kahn-Freund, O ., 1974, 
p.7.
W hat he failed to take into account were the more modem ideas about "political and ideological 
missions", capacity to accept/resist economic and political influence, techniques o f  executing and formulating foreign 
policy, different types of institutions, different concepts o f law and methods of legal discourse, the interactions between 
international and national law, etc. These elements refer to many ideas o f positive (post-national) state law, and to the 
self-referential features o f law (the law as its own determinant?). (See also, Butler, 1977, pp.l 15-116).
Even if Montesquieu does not make explicit reference to Bodin in his Spirit o f Law's, it is clear that 
B od in 's  climate theory has had an impact upon M ontesquieu's approach. It would be interesting to study the 
relationship between these theories (see also, Reynolds, B ., 1945).
3,6 Montesquieu. 1989,3.19.27.
317 Montesquieu, 1989,6.29.11.
3,3 Montesquieu, 1989,6.29.12.
319 Montesquieu, 1989,6.29.1-19.
310 De Tocqueville, etc.
311 On his personal history see Kahn-Freund, O ., 1974, p.9, Cohler, A., M., 1989, p.xviii.
forms of governments; the objective established in the Greek tradition.322 However, his 
preliminary ideas and the empirical analysis are not very clearly separated in his “final report'*.323
Montesquieu's agenda seems to be partly a defence o f the legislative and executive 
against the judiciary. His concern was the invalidation of statutes by the interpretation of the judi­
ciary.324 These observations originated within the context o f French political life, even if the 
arguments he used were historical and comparative observations of the differences and 
similarities in laws in different times. One may observe many fallacies in Montesquieu's theory 
concerning the role of the judiciary. Neither did his idea survive the realities of the revolutionary 
agenda nor was it reflected as such in the French legal system.325
However, Montesquieu's ideas concerning the separation of powers became an 
essential element o f the revolutionary conception, and had an impact both upon the anti-federalist 
and federalist schools, including those in America.326 His influence is also seen in the works o f  
Hugo, Savigny, Eichhom, and some other writers of the German historical school, and in the
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312 We m ay recognize an idea of social integrity in his works, see Cohler, A .M ., 1989, p.xxvii. In despotic 
governments, people are separated from each other, whereas with a moderate government, people share something.
323 On this “rococo” nature, see Cohler, A .M ., 1989, p.xxi.
324 Montesquieu, 1989,2.11.6. Also, Capelletti, M., 1989, p.137. Cohler says (1989, p.xxv) that M ontesquieu's idea 
was the same as Burke's and Blackstone's: The basic principle was attached to the structure of the government as such, 
not to some first [legal?] principles.
325 Capelletti, M., 1989, p.137 ff., Merryman, J.H., 1996 111 ff. Certainly, and even if  the jurisprudence was and has 
been glanced at by the courts, they never cite it. Contrary to these views, see Cummings, R., 1986, p.594 ff., and p .627 
ff., relating the increase o f  the role of court mainly to the development since II W orld War, but emphasizing the 
importance of the discussion on the separation o f powers.
Theoretically one could say that in Montesquieu's vision, the doctrine itself guarantees the separation 
o f  the different functions. The doctrine controls negatively the functions o f  the different branches o f the state. The 
balance o f powers doctrine in  the American sense one may be seen more clearly as a "political'1 balancing in strongly 
institutional sense. It seems that the relative pow er and coherence of the institutions themselves are the guarantees o f 
the functioning o f  the system.
M errym an’s analysis o f the “reality o f  French (and Soviet) revolution” in his article is interesting 
historically (especially the history o f the evolution of the French court system). H ow ever, it is strongly ideological and 
based  on impressions (as h e  maintains himself too). One may also recognize a  peculiar idea of the right “European 
course” (i.e., he maintains that there was “the attempt to turn Soviet law from its European course and build a 
socialist law on the principles stated by Marx and Engels..." (ibid., p .l 18)). (M arxism  • according to  M enym an -  is 
not European!).
W e may say that changes are not bom  in a “vacuum”, and neither do  they cease to exist - even if  the 
institutional forms may disappear. Merryman seems to have quite strong institutionalist analysis. Moreover, he 
emphasizes, and rightly so, that Montesquieu was interpreted wrongly in the following centuries. However, he sees this 
misinterpretation concerned mainly the doctrine o f separation of powers (ibid., p . l  10 ff.). Personally, I think the 
misinterpretation was about the general political philosophy o f  Montesquieu and the enlightment in general. I think his 
and  enlightment* s main idea was a search o f a  sensible political and legal auditory, rather than to “paint in dark 
colours" the past (ibid., p . l  14). The idea was, evidently, based on an attem pt to take clear distance from prevailing 
institutions deriving from p ast instead of reproducing them  in a speculative m anner (like it may have happened in 
Germany in the post-cnlightm entian period). In M errym an’s analysis the discussion on  the “filtering” and controlling 
mechanisms of general legal discourse is ab sen t The separation powers is seen too formally (in ibid., p . l  13).
326Cohler, A M ., 1989, pp . xxiv-xxv, xxvii. Capelletti, M ., 1989, p.137 ff.
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ideas of Hume, Ferguson and Smith.327
Montesquieu’s paradox and Its explanation. Montesquieu's argument seems to be paradoxical. 
For one thing, it seems to neglect any legal relativism between different national laws. He seemed 
to be also against any possibility of "transplantation" of legal rules from different societies, stating 
that if something like this was to be done, it had to be done with the utmost care.328 At the same 
time, nevertheless, he put forth one of the most major intentional doctrinal adaptations within the 
history of legal thought based on an (historical and empirical) analysis of English "constitutional" 
life. He offered a clear “foreign” model329 His comparative approach establishes one o f the most 
powerful doctrines within western legal thinking, the separation o f powers, which is used as a 
model in many countries in the western world.330
Hence, it may be said that Montesquieu's basic ideas related to the 
institutionalization o f political discourse. In order to do this, he laid down fundamental concepts 
governing the divergence between social systems. His idea seemed to be that only by having 
fundamental distinctions between nations, could one transfer the discourse from legal and 
principled discourses to political institutions, which were to be related in a certain way 
(separation o f powers). Unclear definitions of the political community made justification and 
reasoning - by means of “necessary” (legal) distinctions - depend upon arbitrary universalist 
relationships and connections. Consequently, only a system, which is concentrated within three 
types of power-structures - and is based on this solid and quite "natural" national identity - can 
function well and is able to solve societal and political problems within this institutionalized 
discourse.
The impact of the M ontesquieuan comparative argum ent; “ nation-law” , legislation and 
“ descriptive” comparative law. We could claim that Montesquieu's ideas have had an impact 
upon the study of comparative law in two ways.331
Firstly, the role o f the courts and material law was due to the "bouche de le loi" 
doctrine, minimized, even if they were (and are) essential elements o f legal comparison. Secondly,
327 Rheinstein, M., 1968, p.206., Cohler, A M ., 1989, p.xxvi.
A lso interesting was M ontesquieu's "fictional comparative reasoning" in his Persian letters". The 
situation in Europe was compared - by two Persians in Europe - to Persian society (see, Montesquieu, Persian letters).
321 Montesquieu, 1989, 3.19.1 ff.
329 Montesquieu, 1989,2.11.6, p.166.
330 Cohler, A.M., 1989. One of the M ontesquieu's paradoxes was that he understood the relativity o f  societal 
discourses (national ones). A t the same time, however, he made incorporations from  other systems, which -  in  theory - 
seem  to contradict his own ideas.
331 See also the analysis by Constantinesco, L-J-, 1971, p.78 ff.
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the interest o f comparative law became attached to the legislative332. The emphasis upon the 
importance of parliamentary laws in comparative law ensured that national legislation became the 
main idea o f comparative law. These propositions were to prevail in the theory o f comparative 
law for centuries.
On the other hand, modem comparative law - especially in its 19th century form - 
seemed to merge the legal and “natural” (non-relative) ingredients o f  Montesquieu s theory. At 
the same time his ideas on governance became “legal”. The problem has been, in the 
reinterpretation of Montesquieu's approach in recent times, the overemphasis o f the idea o f a 
’legal’ nation and ’national law’ within a modernist and holistic context. What has been 
considered as a notorious fact of law, sociology, and political philosophy. This has led , within 
the study of comparative law and in the use of comparative law in legal and political institutions 
to an unanalytical approach to the characteristics of the “nation-law” as a process. We may claim 
that it has also engendered the possibility o f the holistic instrumentalization of law.
Consequently, the Montesquieuan heritage seemed to have given modem law a 
more "descriptive" direction. The repercussions o f this approach have been, in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, the idea o f the independence o f comparative law as a legal discipline and the 
overemphasis upon the idea of the autonomy of comparative research333. In its ultimate form, we 
are faced with institutionalization of comparative law. The “scientification” of comparative law 
has reproduced - especially in its institutional form - one type of concept o f legal system. We may 
say that this approach made comparative law turn away from the practical discursive sphere 
toward some kind of "cultural" approach, whereby other systems were seen, again, a priori to be 
in contrast.334 Namely, it may be said that, in this paradigm, legal systems seem to have identities 
as socio-legal systems. This has resulted in practical self-maintenance o f national legal systems 
in a process o f similarity/disparity exploration, made without any normative aim in mind.
The Montesquieuan approach emerged also as a perfect model for the nationalist 
and ethnological comparative law of the 19th century. It had all the qualities of a persuasive 
socio-historical analysis. The claim regarding the autonomy of the nation suited many purposes 
perfectly.335
Nevertheless, the analysis in the Spirit o f Law's was practical, as we have 
maintained. Many interpretations of Montesquieu's approach do him no justice. If his approach
333 Gorla G., has claimed for example (1981, p. 147) that this was the reason for the disappearance o f the European 
Common law, and that this w as basically only English law where it remained.
333 On the struggle for independence see Hug, P., 1932, p.1029.
334 Some discussion on different periods in this respect, Schlesinger, R.B., 1995, p .477 .
O ne of the contemporary misinterpretations o f Montesquieu by Legrand, P . (1996, especially p .8 1) 
missing the discursive point o f  view.
335 On ethnological approach, see Schmitthoff, M ., 1941, p. 102. It is based on ideas upon the “different evolutionary 
stages of mankind” and the prim itiveness of societies.
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is to be understood properly, one has to interpret it in its context. To interpret it solely as a 
transplant or as a categorical statement is to put too much emphasis upon political dimension and 
to comparative law methodologization.
M ontesquieu's idea can be interpreted not as a transplanted model as such. His 
approach was to produce an extensive argumentation on behalf of a type of “new” government 
in some historical context.336 His aim was practical, and not methodological in theoretical terms. 
We may say that Montesquieu took part o f the socio-political discourse, and he recognized his 
audience - even if he sometimes tried to universalize his basic arguments. In the end, we may 
claim that the idea o f the autonomy of socio-legal systems he proposed created possibilities for 
fruitful receptions, and he did not try to discourage this from happening.337
One may understand the nature of his approach also from the point of view of the 
comparative law discourse prevailing during this time. There was no systematic comparative 
discourse in place. There was thus no real comparative audience for Montesquieu. The audience 
was the political audience of a particular political system. Every use of comparative argument 
was instrumental in the sense that other legal systems represented a legitimate argument and even 
a legitimate model. This is why he did not see comparative law as a method, but as a practical 
argument.
Consequently, Montesquieu's idea was to argue for the universality of the doctrine 
of the separation of powers. To be able to do this comparatively, he had to maintain the existence 
of disparate systems. He started from the relativization o f political systems as "natural” - socio- 
anthropological and fundamentally political nations338, and relativized in this way the legitimation 
on which the existing political systems were based. In this way he was able to use comparative 
argument. This should be remembered in the modem comparative law. By relativizing social 
systems in general, he made it possible to argue comparatively for a fundamental political change. 
Consequently, he saw systems as being "culturally" different but politically alike.339
336See,Cohler, A M , p. xxiii, Montesquieu, 1989,6.30.1 ff.\6.31.1 ff.. He clearly took part, in the final analysis, in 
fundamental discussions o f that time.
337 See, for example, Hug, P., 1932, p.1050.
331 Montesquieu, 1989,1.1.3.
339 Montesquieu maintains: “s o m e  have thought that government by one alone is most in conformity with nature. 
But, the example o f paternal power proves nothing... it is better to say that the government most in conformity with 
nature is the one whose particular arrangement is best related to the disposition o f the people fo r whom it is 
established" (Montesquieu, 1989,1,13) (see, interpretation, Cohler, A .M ., 1989, footnote q, p.8). (compare, Bodin, 
J ., 1955b)
In his analysis o f Bodin’s Republic, McRae, K.D. (1979, p.A  22) makes the following rem ark: 
“Bodin did not systematically relate the theory o f climate to his theory o f sovereignty and his 
classification o f states, but its impact on this part o f his thought may be clearly seen. The theory o f 
climate served as a strong conservative force, depriving his political theory o f its otherwise 
revolutionary implications. Bodin had a strong preference fo r  the monarchical form  o f government, 
but he did not advocate its indiscriminate export The best form absolutely is not necessarily the best 
form  fo r  particular situations, and some people were plainly unfitted fo r a constitution on the
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In this way Montesquieu dispensed with prevailing religious and historical methods 
o f argumentation.340 It was possible for him to neglect the natural and universal legitimation o f  
the existing paradigm and to challenge it as being static vertical (ideal)» horizontal (historical), 
and “natural” political construction o f that time.341 This way, we could claim, he attempted to  
maintain the discursive integrity of the prevailing particular political discourse; one in which 
people were no longer convinced of the merits o f “descending power”.342
Conclusions. Whereas Aristotle saw comparability as being based on the uniqueness o f the 
Greek city states and their ethnological essence, Machiavelli on the power of the ruler, and 
Bodin, ultimately, relied on the idea o f plurality of religions, Montesquieu established the basis 
for comparability, and possibility o f reciprocal discourse upon the universalist model o f  
government in relation to the sociological and political essence o f a nation and its individual 
people343.
Montesquieu taught us an important lesson concerning comparative reasoning. In 
its “sociological” form, comparative reasoning makes it possible to maintain the internal political 
discourse of a particular social system, while simultaneously avoiding the problem of considering 
the specific political system under review as the only one which should prevail. Montesquieu 
aimed at a more open form of government by these two ways.
It has been claimed that the elements defined by Montesquieu have lost - to a 
certain extent - their relevance, and that political and structural factors have gained importance 
in the legal discourse344. However, within traditional comparative law research, these elements
French model  The whole tenor o f the theory o f climate was to justify existing forms o f eovemment. 
to promote broad tolerance for the world as it is. and to cast doubt upon the wisdom of deliberate 
political chanee. [und. MK] (ibid., p.A23 relating Bodin to Burke).
340 Comparative argumentation appears, in his work, as an alternative to this type o f  argumentation.
341 Montesquieu, 1989, LI .1., especially, p.4. He maintains that “god has called him [man] back to him by the laws 
of religion. Such a being could at any moment forget himself. Philosophers have reminded him of himself by the laws 
o f morality. Made for living in society, he could forget his fellows; legislators have returned him to his duties by 
political and civil laws" (1.1.1.).
On the 'vertical* and 'horizontal* in this sense, see Zweigert, K., K otz, H., 1977, p.8,
341 We may say that this process started quite early, but was intellectually related to the reformation of the 16th 
century.
343 Montesquieu, 1989,1.1,3.
O ne should make the following com m ent The idea o f 'nation* for Montesquieu seems to be an 
idealized concept This means that the nation - and the differences between nations - seem  to refer to differences in how 
persons in different area and social communities see their possibilities, probabilities - and how and in what form they 
want to increase these opportunities The different concepts and criteria o f M ontesquieu for distinguishing nations may 
be seen as the basic concepts o f  reflection, by which certain groups of people regulate their opportunities.
344 This m ay be related to the fact that the state paradigm  has concentrated m ore upon the politization and 
legalization of the concept o f  nation than upon its empirical and discursive nature.
For the state paradigm of law, see Raz, J., 1971, p .8 1 1 ff. H e is interpreting, however, Kelsen’s legal 
theory quite narrowly and seem s to miss its “liberative” aspects (ibid., p .8 13, and n. 36 ).
n.i i » w  ■ ■ ■ i n i ..............■ ■ ■ ■  |,|
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maintain their role as methodological premises.
3.2.6* 19th century com parative law
Context The political context for 19th century European law was the growth of nationalism34 *45 
and state corporativism. Simultaneously, the prevailing legal ideology of the 19th century was 
characterized by an increasing rationalism. National systems became more politically organized, 
and the accompanying ideas of democratization and the politization of law gave rise to an 
enthusiasm for the comparison o f legislation.346
Nationalism related to the increasing internal political coherence - in its various 
forms - and, on the other hand, to economic competition between national states. As is well 
known, elements contrary to political unity came under close surveillance. On the other hand, 
national economic policies seemed to be ad hoc in the sense that international economic 
regulatory forms and customs were used so as to protect national economies from external 
disturbances. Benefits were granted to different nations depending on different circumstances. 
The instability and unpredictability of the international trade increased protectionist policies, with 
predictable results.34^  the same time, constitutional and legislative autonomy increased.
Law . The 19th century was the period typified by tendencies towards unification and 
simplification in law.348 Furthermore, during this epoch the positivization of natural law thinking 
also took place.349
343 For example, David, R., Brierly, J.E.C., 1978, pp.2-3.
346 One of the greatest “comparativists”  o f this period was Alexis de Tocqueville. I am not going to deal thoroughly 
he re  with his “Democracy in America”  (Trans. Reeve, H., rev. Bowen, F., Intr. Renshaw, P., W ordsworth, 1998). 
However, some remarks can be made (see also, Renshaw).
De Tocqueville dealt, in the beginning, with the prison system o f the United States. However, perhaps 
for systematic reasons, he related this study to general observations on the American political, cultural and institutional 
context and his main work become “democracy in America” . These two studies can be connected to  each other in many 
ways.
Later he formulated his aim for an examination o f the laws o f democratic developm ent T his can be 
d irectly  related to the discourse in France on this issue. He studied the relationship between revolutions and 
democratization. He saw democratization as a preordained form of government.
Tocqueville conducted interviews and historical studies, and had keen sociological insight
Generally, concerning the constitutional structuralization and expansion of commerce in Europe from 
the 16th century to  the 18th century, see Gorla, G., M occia, L ,  1981, pp.145-146.
347 See, for example, M ackinder, H J . ,  Democratic ideals and reality: a  study in  the politics of reconstruction (N.Y.) 
1950 [1914],
341 Gutteridge, 1949, p .145, Hug, P., 1932, p.1052. Zweigert, K, Kdtz, H., 1977, pp.44-45.
349 Capelletti, M ., 1989, pp.122-123.
This m aybe related to the ideas of the universal historical school and the universal law movements (for 
exam ple, Anselm von Feuerbach).
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As mentioned above, several "national" codifications were drafted350. T h e se  
codifications can be seen as reactions towards the overwhelming transplantation of Roman law . 
The autonomy of systems became emphasized from the beginning o f 19th century onw ards.351 
This led also to a focus upon the study of private law, and to analysis of the codifications o f  th is  
time352, as well as to several “modelled” laws.
The nationalization o f private law - via national codifications - led to a stress u p o n  
the importance of national states as legislators and law makers and - especially - the centrality o f  
the emerging democratic legislature.353 One may say that the role o f state as a legislature w as  
increased in general.
Furthermore, we may claim that this led to the concept of private international law  
in its contemporary form, where established internal rules comprise the basis o f private 
international transactions. This was connected also to the importance o f modem comparative law  
as a means of making sense of increasing international commercial activity.
Consequently, we may say that at the beginning of the 19th century the state h ad  
the monopoly o f control over both the context in which international trade occurred. 
Furthermore, we could claim that the rise o f the use o f the statistical methodology led to  
increasing powers o f the bureaucratic state.354
C om parative law.355 19th century comparative law began to apply these emerging system- 
concepts to different models of legal practice and to make distinctions, within law, philosophy 
and the natural sciences, between different systems. This was due especially to the emerging o f  
organismic theories o f law and nationhood, and the step from rationalism towards romanticism356.
Increasing interest in comparative law arose, in the second half o f the century, in 
many countries in the western world357. An interest in European law also increased, in other *32467
350 France, Germany, etc. See, Schlesinger, R.B., 1980, p.479.
3Î1 Lambert, E ., 1978, p .41. One may also speak about the new coming of the "popular legislation", see Capelletti, 
M , 1989, p .U  8. See also, p.131, and Haberle, P ., 1994, pp.22-23 (and W ieacker, F ., 1967, Privatrechtsgeschichte der 
Neuezeit, 2  aufl., Gottingen, 1967, p.131).
332 Hug, P ., 1932, p .1053. For the French developm ent in particular, see ibid., p .1060.
333 It has been argued that the codifications were related, in Germany, to German legal socialism, which criticized 
the abstract legal language used by the French C ivil Code. This divorced, as it was argued, legal language from popular 
language and m ade it incomprehensible to the m asses (Sacco, 1991, p.15).
334 For this latter idea, see  Foucault, M., 1990, p.25 ff, 136 ff, 143-145.
333 For a  thorough introduction to the history o f com parative law, see Constantinesco, L-J., 1971.
336 For a characterization o f comparative law  during this period in general, see H ug, P ., 1932, p p .1069-1070.
One may claim that the distinction between mechanical and organic transplantations was a result o f the 
development o f the natural sciences. Before this, legal discourse was understood in  a  very practical way.
W e m ay say that this the period was characterized by a  move from the modem to the modernist.
337 Hug, P .,1 9 3 2 , p .1053.
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countries such as Japan.338 Modem comparative law took shape* in European countries, once a 
systematic study of legal systems emerged. It has been claimed that 19th century comparative law 
had mainly role in the field of criminal, procedural, patent, and copyright law.* 359
19th century comparisons were dominated, especially in Germany, by the historical 
school360. This was based on the idea o f universal legal history, with its accompanying ideas of 
different "stages" of law and on the idea of "Volkgeist" as a source of law.361 The nationalistic and 
narrowly norm-oriented studies and techniques of law largely neglected the study of sociological 
and political factors - and more generally - functional, cultural, and humanistic aspects o f law and 
legal systems.362 Furthermore, the interest was basically on one's own law363.
The beginning of the 19th century was characterized also by an interest in 
comparing compare Roman and Germanic law.364 One could claim that the focus of this exercise 
was aimed at the "equalization" of these systems. Furthermore, Roman law was the basis o f inter- 
systematic comparison.365 In Germany, comparison between the Roman and Germanic traditions 
resulted in some strong disputes and account was taken of the differentiated legal systems all 
around Europe, i.e. in France, England and as well in Scandinavia, where no extensive adaption 
o f Roman law had occurred.366
In the United States, this period can be characterized as "formative". In this period, 
comparative law played an essential role367. This interest in comparative law was, in the early 
20th century, also a matter of immigration to the United States.368
Even if the practising lawyer in England did not seem to be interested in continental
3Î* See, Igarashi, K.„ 1977, pp. 36-42.
359 Kropholler, J., 1992, p.702.
360 See, Hug, P., 1932, p.1053. It stressed the importance of Roman law  studies. See also Constantinesco, J-L., 1971, 
p .93 ff.. In 1814 Savigny and Eichhom had established the Zeitschrift fur geschichtliche Rechts wissen sc haft.
361 Zweigert, K.. Siehr, K., 1971, p.219.
362 Capelletti,M ., 1990a, p.2.
343 Schmitthoif, M., 1941, p.103 ff.
364 Zitelmann, E ., 1900, pp.329-332. For the development o f similar ideas in  England, see Schmitthoff, M ., 1941,
p .106 .
365 Hamza, G., 1991, p.81.
366 Rheinstein, M-, 1968, p.206.
It has been claimed that, a t the beginning of the 20th century, comparative law, together with the 
“ intressenjurisprudenz”, assisted the study o f private law to open up in a  more “universal” direction after the 1900 
codification Ranieri, F., 1980, pp.34-56. However, we have to remember that “universalization” took place in 
extrem ely strict state-paradigm of law.
O n the comparative development o f  German administrative law  (French influences during the 
Napoleonic era, Restauration, and the end o f 19th century and Austrian influences) see Scheuer, U ., 1963, p .714 ff.
367 Pound, R., 1928, p. 183,191 (see the analysis o f  this situation in Hug, P., 1932, p.1066). See also, Bognetti, G., 
1980, p.5-30.
3M Bognetti, G-, 1980, p .5-30.
82
law369 370, comparative observations did, for example, function as illustrations , and one may 
recognize the direct use of civil law conceptions and principles371 in the work of some lawyers372. 
In England, the basic feature was its "practicality", which resulted in isolation but for reasons 
different than in continental Europe.373
The liberal constitutional movement had a strong impact on Italian constitutional 
thinking in the end o f 18th century. In the beginning of 19th century the focus of constitutional 
law was in history and the comparison o f modem political systems. Towards the end of the 19th 
and the beginning o f 20th century, emerging social problems resulted in the need for the 
codification o f public law.374 *
In Finland, the legal discourse followed foreign development, especially the 
codifications in the end of 19th century. Explicit comparative studies, in the form of articles, were 
published on the criminal law especially in the end of the 19th century (concerning Switzerland, 
Austria, Nordic countries). In the procedural law, the influence from Sweden was constant 
towards the end of 19th and the beginning of 20th centuries. The German law was followed in 
the field of private and commercial law, labour law, and in some social law issues in the end o f 
19th century.373
The beginning of 20th century was quite lively in Finland in the field of comparative 
law (or foreign law studies). However, it was mainly Scandinavian (especially Swedish) and 
German systems which were studied. Nevertheless, in the field of private and commercial law 
also some other systems - like French, Italian, Dutch, Belgian, Estonian, United States, and 
English systems - were considered.376
3W However, on the obligatory use of comparative law in Judicial Committee of Privy Council (serving the British 
Em pire) see Hug, P ., 1932, p.1064.
370 Bentham, J., 1972 (see also the analysis o f  Hug, P ., 1932, p.1063).
371 Austin, J., Lectures in Jurisprudence or the philosophy o f positive law (1832).
372 Some influential examples may be mentioned: Burke (Commentaries on Colonial and Foreign Laws, 1837), Levi 
(Commercial Law, its principles and administration, or the m ercantile law of G reat Britain compared with the codes and 
laws o f commerce o f the following Mercantile countries, 1950-1951). See, Hug, P., pp. 1064-1065.
373 Rheinstein, M ., 1968, p.205. See also Capellettî, M ,  1990a, p.3.
374 Zagrebelsky, G., 1980, pp.85-112.
373 In general, Finland maintained, during the 19th century, its Swedish traditions and developed legislation 
accordingly (see, M odeen, T ., 1993, p.784 if.).
376 This list is not exhaustive.
From 1930 s  on, legal dissertations have usually included com parative p a r t  References can be found 
(in order o f quantity o f  references) to legal systems of Scandinavian countries, Germany, England, Scotland, France, 
Soviet Union, the U nited States, Switzerland, Baltic states, Italy, Hungary, Belgium, Austria, Portugal, Canada, N ew  
Zealand, and Turkey.
A s during the end of 19th century, the comparative observations were strongly related to  new 
codifications elsewhere.
Som e discussion on the need o f com parative law approach, see Lilius, F.O., On comparative legal 
science and the law o f Finnish related nations [Vertailevasta oikeustieteesta ja  suomensukuisten kansain oikeudesta]. 
In: Lakimies, 1903.
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In Sweden the end of 19th century was characterized by influences from France and 
Germany in private law, and Germany in criminal law.377
Independence and unification in comparative law, 19th century comparative law had two 
basic features. Firstly, comparative law had gained a relatively independent status as a 
methodology and science378, and, secondly, the task of comparison was to construct - 
scientifically - common rules at the international level.379 On the other hand, typical of this 
modem period was the increasing focus upon practicality of comparative law even if a separate 
tendency seemed to  be also the study o f "system of systems" in the realm of culturally and 
politically defined comparative law.380 The focus of the latter idea seemed to be related to the 
“common origins'” approach.
Textual interpretation was the basic method of scholarships. This may be associated 
with the strong status granted to legislation as a source of law. As maintained above, the law was 
legislation, and comparative law - consequently - the comparison of legislation. The great 
codifications in Europe, from the 17th century on, which had established the basis for the 
nationalization of law, and for practical national legal science, including comparative legal 
science.
The emphasis upon the idea o f the independence o f comparative law seemed to be 
even stronger than it had been at the beginning of the 19th century.381 Its "autonomy" was 
possible because of the recent codifications, especially in the field o f private law382. Furthermore,
One peculiar incident was related also to the construction o f the Finnish constitution in the beginning 
o f the century. The United States and England had some conditions for the acceptance o f the Finnish independence in 
1918. The United States and England required that Finland should be a  “ liberal democracy” (not a  Kingdom). W e may 
say  that these requirements had an impact to the form o f the first constitution, and to the peculiarities o f  Finnish 
constitutional system compared to the rest o f Europe (On this, see Paasivirta, J., T he winners of the I W orld W ar and 
Finland [Ensimmaisen maailmansodan voittajat ja  Suomi] (Porvoo) 1961, chapter V  (especially, p .l 11 ,138. O n this, 
and the traditional and political background (internal elements) and development in general, Jyranki, J., 1989, pp.403- 
527 (p.485 ff).
377 Sundell, J-O ., 1991, p .237, Hafstr5m, G., 1965, p.195.
371 One of the leading figures in this development was Anselm von Feuerbach. He was a strong "Kantian" rationalist, 
but emphasized the importance o f empirical studies, and, for example, the idea that comparative studies must be  guided 
by the philosophical method of jurisprudence (see, with direct references, Hug, P ., 1932, p .l054, Constantinesco, J-L., 
1971, p.97 ff.).
O n the independence o f  comparative law, see Ancel, M ., 1978, p .350, and de Gruz, P., 1993, p . l .
379 For the factual development in this respect, see Schmitthoff, M.» 1941, p . l 09.
380 The distinctions in comparative law have been based on different ideologies o f the legal systems (David, R., 
1950). This seems to be the reason for the difference between the common law and continental law being considered 
m ore as comprising a difference in technique.
3<‘ Lambert, £ , 1978, p.36.
312 The "independence" o f a discipline has to do w ith the specific interests involved, which direct the research (see, 
Rotondi, M., 1973).
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comparative law became more "formalistic".383 Its systematic features were stressed. The no tion  
of its independence was to become related also to  the reality, that comparative law was well able 
to define its object, functions and methods in the abstract.
This generated the specialization o f the comparative lawyer.384
In the 19th century one could, for the first time, also make the distinction betw een 
historical comparative law, which studied systems which had since, disappeared, and the study  
of living where the prevailing systems. The general prevailing approach seemed to be interested 
in the practical and instrumental value of comparative law.385
Distinctions such as "ethnological"386, "historical", "systematic", and "dogmatic" 
approaches to law were also introduced.387
The “academic institutionalization” of com parative law. Unification was to be established 
through scientific studies o f private law codes in certain political areas. This became the main 
focus, for example, at the International Congress of Comparative law in Paris 1900, and for the 
Annual meetings of the Institute of the International Law.
In Germany, the Kritische Zeitschrift fü r  Rechtswissenschaft und Gesetzgebung des  
Auslandes was established in 1829 publication o f which ceased in 1856.388 In the Coltegé de  
France, a chair was established for comparative law in 1832. The University o f Paris did the 
same in 1846. Furthermore, the Revue éntrangiere de legislation was started in 1834, which 
continued publishing until 1850.389 The Société de legislation comparé was established 1839390. 
The highest point of enthusiasm for modem comparative law can be found in the establishment 
of the Société de Législation Comparé in 1869391. As maintained above, this development cul-
9,3 O ne could say that the lack o f codifications in the Anglo-Saxon world generated a more practical idea o f  
comparative law.
914 See also, Schlesinger, R .B., 1995, pp.479-480 on specialization and institutionalization.
9,5 Lambert, È , 1978, p.44.
9M For exam ple, Kohler, Sailles, R., Lambert, È. (See, Constantinesco, J-L-. 1971, p. 145 if.).
987 R abel,E ., 1978.
988 On the role o f  publications, see Hug, P ., 1932, p p .1056-1060, Valladâo, H., 1961, p .l  10.
O f comparitivists during this period, one can mention Thibaut, Gans, Mittermeier, Zachariae, B em höft 
(la tte r 's  über Zweck und Mittel der vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, in: Zeitschrift fur vergleichende 
Rechtswissenschaft, RW I. O n Diering's influence (Zweigert, K., Siehr, K., 1971, P, 215 ff.). These men were 
influenced strongly by Kant, H egel and Feuerbach (Constantinesco, 1971, p.91).
989 Its founder w as the French jurist Foelix, w ho in m any ways, laid the foundations o f comparative law in France 
(Hug, P., 1932, p .1061-1062). The "revue" becom e later Revue étrangère et Française de legislation et ¿'economic 
politique (1835-1850).
990 Valladâo, H ., 1961, p p .l 10-111. One can mentioned comparativists such as Antoine de St. Joseph, Saleilles, 
Lam bert
391 Rheinstein, M ., 1968.
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minated in the Paris conference o f comparative law in 1900.391 92
In England, interest in foreign and comparative law continued, mainly because of 
the global connections of England, a chair of historical and comparative jurisprudence was 
established at Oxford (for Sir Henry Maine) in 1869.393 The Society o f Comparative Legislation 
was instituted in 1895.394
In the second half o f the century, there was a renewed interest in comparative law 
in Germany, France and in the United States. In 1878, the Zeitschrift fü r  Vergleichende 
Rechtswissenschaft was established. The Max Planck Institute was also established in Berlin.
Yale, Columbia and Harvard were the pioneers in academic comparative law in the 
United States since 1876.395 In the United States, this the interest in Comparative law disappeared 
towards the end of the century396, but comparative law "came back" to a certain extent, after the 
second world war both in Europe and the USA.397
We may say that towards the end of the century, one passed from comparative 
legislation and jurisprudence to comparative law in the contemporary sense of the word398.
Conclusions. One may assert that comparative law already occupied a centra] place in the 
European legal discourse in the pre-nationalistic period.399 The highpoint of modem comparative 
law was unequivocally, however, at the beginning of this century, when the legal identity o f the 
nationalistic systems seemed to be strongest. Comparative law appeared to be combined with this
391 Winterton.G., 1975, pp.92-93. The m ain prom oters o f the conference were Lambert and Saleilles.
On its development in Italy, see Gorla, G., 1986, pp.66-86.
393 And, at the beginning of the centuiy, in Cambridge. Maine has been considered to represent the "evolutionist" and 
"organismic" comparative law approach by stressing the idea of "civilized nations" (Maine, H.S., 1861, p .76, see 
M organ, J.H., 1954, p. v). O n his ethnologisism, see Schmitthoff, M., 1941, p.102.
Maine put emphasis on the idea of a "group" (family), not on the "individual". Furthermore, he stressed 
the idea of "will" as a distinction between the early and the ancient law. Through these ideas, he explains the place of 
custom , code and fiction in the development o f early law, the affiliation o f international law and ius gentium, the law 
o f nature, and the origins o f feudalism. He em phasized the moral philosophical questions and the theological doctrines.
His comparisons were derived from Hindu and Irish law. During his time Hindu law was becoming 
an  important reference point. The fact that he was bom  and raised in India was a  source of this in terest N evertheless, 
he  was applying "universalist" approaches, in the sense that he compared historically (see also, Morgan, J.H ., 1954, 
P*xi).
Maine considered the "new" comparative law method in his lectures on T h e  effects o f observation o f 
India on modem European Thought* (the Rede lecture, London, 1875, p.30-31). See also Maine, H.S., 1954, and Sir 
F . Pollock, Introduction and notes to Sir H enry M aine 's  "Ancient law", London, 1906.
394 Winteiton, G., 1975, p.91.
393 Also, Chicago and Tulane followed a t the beginning o f this century, see, Pound, R., 1930.
396 Hug, P., 1932, p.1068. See, however, developm ent after the 60’s in practice, Bade, H.W., 1983, p .502, and on 
the development o f transnational litigation law.
397 Graveson, R.H., 1984, p .l  17.
399 ValladSo, H., 1961, p .l  11.
A  history o f  comparative law , see Zweigert, K., Kfitz, H ., 1977, pp.48-51, Zajtay, L, 1981, p .596 ff.
399 For comparable development in the U nited States.
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'’construction" of legal identity and its interpretation. The identity comprised also forms o f  
"groupings"400.
What really happened in 19th century law? The coherence of law based on the 
Roman tradition was dissolved, and European law at least came to be influenced by positivist 
pluralism. The methodology of comparative law concentrated on the idea o f the tertium  
comparationis itself. In the end, ultimate positivization seems to have caused the degradation o f  
empirical research.401
3.2.7. 20th century an d  post-w ar com parative law
Context. As maintained above, one began in comparative law, from the beginning of the century 
onwards, to stress the economic and historical closeness o f  nation states, although sensitive 
points at the ideological and theoretical (philosophical) levels remained. This applied also to  
institutionalized comparative law.402 This century comparative law, at least in the first half o f  the 
century, has considered its methodological issues mainly in the context of private law.403
The breakthrough in system relationships took place after the second world war. 
"Universalist" concepts were introduced to the European states and the inter-relationship o f  
systems was build up on a supranational basis. All the same, legal discourse remained a matter for 
particular legal systems. National systems seemed to remain domestic in their focus and concern. 
It has been maintained that comparative law helped in getting rid o f this national insularity, and 
served the practical purpose of assisting in the construction of, for example, new constitutions. 
This opening-up seemed, however, fairly temporary.404
The ’European* legal level was, during this era, designed as a system with a 
subsidiary character. Systemic relationships were established by semi-political considerations (i.e. 
ECHR), or the relationship was regulated by advisory systems (EEC). The universalist legal 
discourse remained, nevertheless, as a minor issue. On the other hand, the points of contact 
between legal systems were considered to be, necessarily, points in need of legal regulation, and
400 Lambert, for example, made a  distinction between "groups latin ", "groups germanique", "groups anglosaxon ", 
groupsmusulman", and "groups slav”. On different "static” groupings, see Bogdan, M ., 1990, p.82. O n  the centrarily 
o f the comparison to anglosaxon law in France, Zajtay, I., 1981, p.597.
401 Markesinis, B., 1990, p.20, Heldrich, A., 1970, p .441.
40 For some analysis see Constantinesco, J-Lr., 1971, p. 159 ff.. For an example, see David, R„ Brierly, J.E.C., 1978, 
p.16, stressing the idea of the “Experience of all nations“. A s Schmitthoff, M. (1941, p. 103) maintains “the parallelism 
o f the reorganization ofths international society and the revival o f Comparative law found their visible expression 
in the constitution o f the International Institute fo r the Unification of Private Law in Rome, which works under the 
direction of the legue of Nations". However, on the reality o f  the comparative law  function, see Gutteridge, H.C., 1944, 
p.6-7.
403 Kropholler, J., 1992, p.702.
404 Zagrebelsky, G ., 1980, pp .89-116.
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"voluntary" legal consideration o f other systems' solutions seemed to remain as specific matter 
for isolated comparative law professionals.
We could assert that 20th century comparative law was a direct descendent of the 
culturally "nationalistic" approach, and that it even went beyond. Cultural differences between 
legal systems were seen to be increasingly self-evident. However, some innovations during this 
century render it different from the previous periods405.
Contemporary comparative law reflects the basic features of 20th century 
globalization, economic, social, and cultural assimilation, and political differentiation.406 
Furthermore, the concept o f what comprises a 'legal system* has become central. It has also been 
claimed that increases in capitalist production and economic activity, which served to break down 
national boundaries, changed the "aims” of comparative law. Comparative law became a matter 
for lawyers dealing with these questions.407
Transnationalization and coordination. It has been contended that the interest in the 
peculiarities o f each legal system, which had already emerged by the 19th century, had been 
replaced in the middle o f this century by the interest in unified comparative law.408
On the other hand, after the second world war, the connection between 
comparative law and "transnational" doctrines was established. We may say that in the post-war 
period, there had been an increasing interest in transnationality in the realm o f "universalized" 
legal principles.409 "Transnationalism" was seen as the raw material from which "diffusions" or 
"distillations" were made to different legal systems as “general" law410. Transnational adjudication 
and legislation in the field of public law developed accordingly.
Consequently, one of the functions of comparative law in the 20th century has been 
the coordination function. This is especially the case in the regulation of private transactions
405 20th century comparative law, see Zweigert, K., KBtz, H., 1977. pp.52-56, Zajtay. I -  1981, p.598 ff.
406 Kahn-Freund, O., 1974, p.8. The latter idea may be contested in contemporary global developm ent Some 
analysis, Capelletti, M., 1973, pp.74-75.
407 Peterf, Z., 1974, p.46, Ancel, M., 1971. See also, Zweigert, K., Ktttz, H., 1977, pp.52-56.
This is also due to the increasing importance of economic efficiency and integrated economic markets, 
which neglect the analytical approach, and which stress the relevance of the examination of the economic context o f law 
and legal systems in comparative law.
408 Gorla, G., 1982, p.130. O n transnationalization, Schlesinger, R .B., 1995, p .479.
409 Capelletti, M., 1989. p . l  19 ff.
Contemporary legal positivism has been claimed to be a synthesis, w ith higher supranational principles 
connected to ordinary legislation (Capelletti, pp. 130-132).
After the second World War, we can start to speak o f an em ergence o f new principles, and also  about 
the  positivization o f principles. Consequently, courts started to apply different principles within different forms of 
judicial review (Capelletti, M ., p .l 18).
410 M idi, F., 1978, p p .6 -7 ,35-40 (referring to Langen, E., Transnational commercial law (Leiden) 1973).
The idea of transnational private law was considered to be a  central idea to the "socialist" comparative 
law , whereas the principle orientation may be seen more central to the western scholarship.
(private law) and economic activities, in the coordination o f macroeconomic aspects, and in the 
clarifying of the idea of the separation of powers4". The first area has been instrumentalized by 
international legal practice.
Scientifically, on the other hand, comparative law has, in theory, oriented itself 
towards sociological comparison, adopting a qualitative approach.41 12 However, attempts to  
resolve its internal philosophical problems still appear in the discussion413.
On the other hand, the internationalization and régionalisation of law has facilitated 
the use of comparative law also in the implementation of international and regional rules and its 
control.414
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Some post-w ar distinctions. Post-wars comparative law reflected, from the outset, the "cold 
war" distinctions. Generally, these distinctions had highly political flavour415. Distinctions such as 
socialist countries/westem democracies and developed/developing legal systems were the basic 
distinctions in the comparative law o f this period 416
The idea o f families-of-law was the main connecting factor, and the history and 
individual system structures came under close scrunity417. Nevertheless, in the context o f this 
development, comparative law gained greater practical significance due to the globalization o f  
world markets and the emerging liberal economy in the west. Comparative law started to be 
connected, instead, to different branches of law418.
It could be claimed that one of the major causes for the decline of the traditional 
comparative law approach and the confusion of the 90's was due to the fact that some self- 
evident and fundamental categories of comparative law, such as the socialist group419,
411 “Koordinierungsaufgabe”, see Buxbaum, R.M., 1996, p.213.
412 Buxbaum, R.M., 1996, pp.222-223, Capelletti, M ,  1973, p.68.
413 Buxbaum, R.M., 1996, p.224.
4,4 Buxbaum, R .M , 1996, pp.226-227.
4,s Kahn-Freund, O., has claimed that the "political factors gained importance in M ontesquieu's strategy" (1974, p.9).
4.6 See, Zweigert, K. Kfitz. H., 1987, p.37, and Hazard, J.N., 1973, p.362.
On the development of the distinction betw een the socialist and non-socialist law, see Eôrsi, G., 1973, 
pp.183-184. In United States, Hazard, J.N., 1973, pp.360-361. The "iron curtain" in the field private law, see 
Schlesinger, R .B., 1968, p.67. The role of the socialist/non-socialist distinction, T unc, A., 1964, p.285, 294. Some 
analysis on the comparability, Sacco, 1991, pp.5-6, and on M arxist theory, Klami, H .T., 1981, p. 134 ff.
4.7 Lambert, É ., 1978.
T he idea was that structural differences (sources of law etc.) deepened the identity o f these systems 
(idem.). For a contem porary discussion, see Interpreting Statutes (Dartmouth) 1991.
4I* Ancel, M ., 1978, p .357. See also Ajani, G ., 1995.
4,9 See Zweigert, K, Kôtz, H. (1977, p.16) w ho maintained in a  perceptive way that “As the threat o f war recedes, 
the relations between capitalist and socialist countries will become much closer and their ideological differences will 
probably d im in is h This show s, nonetheless, how  greatly the distinction between them  was political.
O n the o ther hand, the argument seems to  assume the existence o f  a  universal system of law, from 
which the “socialist”  system w as merely a deviation. This idea seems to be related to  a  “non-empirical”, logical, and
fSW W W W W W W *
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disappeared during the 90's. This revealed the categories’ "political” nature. At the same time, 
after the second world war, the actors in European legal systems and European legal orders were 
directing their attention strongly towards the United States. Latter part of the 20th century 
European law has been clearly influenced by its relationship to United States.420 The reasons for 
this may be numerous, but an example o f the form of this has been transplantation of American 
models to the European legal thinking (and systems) in a value-based manner.421 This 
development was related to the inter-penetration of different forms of language, but had also a 
jurisprudential and educational dimension.422
Legal institutionalization. Internationalization has also generated the need for an understanding 
of the global circumstances and international contexts of the application of law. This has caused 
the revival o f traditional comparative law. However, whereas the 19th century tendency was 
towards unification, the 20th century strategy seems to be instead the harmonization of law.423 In 
this sense, relativism has entered into comparative law thinking. This has also been described as 
the "realism” o f comparative law424.
Comparative law established itself once again as a practical measure.425 After the 
First World War, comparative law was "institutionalized" within various forms of international
categorical idea o f comparative law. It also assumes a  development o f  legal systems toward a  more sophisticated, 
harmonized, and unified system o f law. However, in this system of law “environment... social justice... These problems 
cannot be solved by any one state in isolation’’ (ibid., p.16). Finally, however, the state seems to be the basic category 
for analysis “ .. they call fo r fu ll cooperation o f all state and people”, idem.). Consequently, the idea o f Zweigert and 
Kotz is “Bodanian”; i.e. the idea that the study o f comparative law would guarantee a more universal concept o f  law 
(see also, ibid., p.17).
49 The German constitutionalist influences in Europe (Koopmans, T ., 1991, p .494) can also be seen as an  indirect 
adoption o f American constitutionalism in Europe.
421 Pugliese, G.. 1978, pp. 100-101.
422 Wiegand, W ., 1991, pp.232-235. For some conceptual and ’leg a l institutional" examples, see ibid., p .236  ff.
423 Winterton, G., 1975, pp.76-77. For the harmonization and unification of comparative law see Schlesinger, 1980, 
p.33.
Mouly, Ch. (1985, p.896 if.) has suggested three conceptions o f  European unification (integration). 
The first is the legislative one, which was the conception o f the past century. The second is the practical and educational 
conception, and it is more based on sociological analysis. The third seems to be related to  the (romantic?) revival o f ius 
commune. The fourth seems to be based on integration driven by some type o f  rational and discursive community.
424 Capelletti, M ., 1973, pp.74-75.
It has been maintained that contemporary comparative law is, and should be, more realistic (ibid.,
p.72-73).
This realism has certain peculiar characteristics. Namely, for contemporary comparative law "closes" 
the systems with greater ease in order to b e  able to  use them as legal arguments (for some discussion, see A ncel, M „ 
1973, p.5).
423 De Groot, G-R., Schneider, A, 1994, p.53.
For the discussion, in France, on the need for comparative research in practice, see F16cheux, G „ Israel, 
J-J, 1996, p.319ff., 325 ff.
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legal cooperation.426 Comparative law, which was already ensconced in a scientific crisis, w as 
adapted also to different legal institutions as a means of internal legitimation427. After the tw o  
world wars, global peace was to have been established by organizational cooperation betw een 
states, and this meant, to certain extent, and for a period of time, a step away from the legislative 
formalism and a move towards more substantive approach to comparative law.428 This reflects the 
20th century’s so-called "state-centric universalism".
Recent changes within contemporary Europe have created an enormous enthusiasm 
for the trans-national transplantation of law. Many systematic and theoretical concerns have been 
supplanted by economic pragmatism, and eclecticism can therefore be seen. This applies not only 
to legislation, but also to adjudication and to legal training and education.429These types o f  
transplants are ultimate examples of the pragmatism in contemporary comparative law430.
Taken together, the tendency within the postwar period has been to shift from the 
inter-state character of comparative law toward the more pragmatic comparative law o f  
international organizations. International organizations identify their competencies and norms 
based on comparative observations. Comparative law is used in the formation, formulation, 
interpretation, and application of norms. The international, even global, audience has to  be 
convinced on comparative basis.
Comparative law has become in many ways, also in the sphere o f education, a 
matter for institutions. This has moved the discussion on comparative law toward the institutional 
functioning o f law.
Consequently, one could claim that, from the scientific point of view, sociological 
aspects seemed to remain only as declarations o f the emerging theories o f comparative law. M ore 
sociologically oriented approaches to law took the place of scientific comparative law431.
426 Like Société des Nations, see Ancel, M., 1968, p .354. In Japan, see Igarashi, K., 1977.
417 The "institutionalization" of comparative law m ay have been a result o f the fact that comparative law  w as 
incapable o f resolving the problems of legal cooperation prevalent at the beginning o f the centuiy.
421 Ancel, M ., 1968, p.355.
429 Ajani, G ., 1995, pp. 107-112. This transplantation has been encouraged, for example, by  the European 
Community association agreements, and by different western countries, such as the U SA, in the form  o f international 
commercial agreements. This can be called legally regulated transplantation. The so-called "specialist" transplantation, 
drafting of "western types o f  constitutions", is also a contem porary phenomenon (see, Venice Commission Bulletin on 
Constitutional C ase Law, edition 3 (Council o f Europe) 1994.
430 W e may recognize two tendencies in contem porary "applied comparative law". First of all, there is a  tendency 
toward extrem e pragm atism  in the use of comparative law . Secondly, th is pragm atism  is seen within the dynamic 
political changes in contemporary legal systems. Pragmatic comparative law  is an instrument for the stabilization o f  
dramatic political changes.
431 Consequently, contemporary comparative law  has been obliged to consider sociology only as a  "supplementary" 
part of comparative law. It is part o f comparative law doctrine, but it does not have a  real and essential application in 
i t  Instead of following its methodological conclusions, com parative law has been institutionalized. It has becom e a  
matter o f expertise, and a m atter o f restricted juridical thinking rather than a complete and applied method o f  law.
In this sense, contemporary comparative law  cannot be identified as an adequate legal science, bu t as
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3.3. Some thoughts on the history of comparative law in general
The history of comparative argument as a  history of legal phenomenology. It is unsurprising, 
that the works of all great comparativists were based on their own experiences in foreign 
countries.432 We could call this the phenomenological dimension of comparative law. It could be 
said that comparative law is bound to the experiences of individuals and that it is strongly 
inspirational.433
On the other hand, these experiences were instrumentalized for practical purposes 
according to changing circumstances. All periods were characterized by revolutionary changes 
within legal and political life434.
This is one of the most interesting features o f comparative law. Namely, one could 
predict that the systematic study of other legal systems would be the most fruitful starting point 
for a comparative legal studies. However, the need to write about these observations arises from 
the fact that there is something in this experience which does not accord as such with previous 
experiences, as is the case in all social discourses.
The history of com parative argum ent as a history of political theory. The history of 
comparative law may be roughly divided into different cultural and political periods. On the other 
hand, these different "periods" correspond to unifying and separatist tendencies within these 
societies435.
Comparative argument is often used in the context o f political theory. It seems to 
be related to the justification of fundamental changes within the basic cultural system. It has to 
do with situations where internal arguments are somehow problematic from the point of view of
a  practical form o f argument within a legal discourse, a technique of law (See Capelletti, M., 1973, p.63).
The lack o f a social dimension within contemporary comparative law makes comparative law a 
phenomenological legal argument rather than a scientific one.
For the evolution of legal systems and the role o f comparative law from the point o f view of 
contemporary French legal discussion, see Agostini, E ., 1988.
432 O n this, see Jamieson, M ., 1996, p .l .
433 It has been maintained that the "intuitive" model o f comparative law  cannot be called comparative law, Bogdan, 
M ., 1990, p.27, Kamba, E .J., 1974.
434 It seems that all the great comparativists worked in a context of disappearing social forms o f life. It appeared as 
i f  they  all were facing the decline of the traditional forms of legal order and social system. They saw comparative 
observations as essentia] for its conservation.
On this and the dialectical method, see Terrill, R J., 1981, p . l78.
435 Hill, J., 1989, pp.109-111, referring for example to Schmitthoff, M., 1941, p . l 03, Bedwell, The Present value 
o f Comparative Jurisprudence. In 29 Yale Law Journal, 1919, p.512-515, Gutteridge, H.C., The V alue o f Comparative 
law, 1931, JSPTL, p.26, a n d . A s a  concrete program, Hazard, J.N., 1951, p.273.
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societal communication43 *36. This seems to be the basic feature of all comparative political theories.
This may be seen in all approaches we have dealt with; those of A ristotle, 
Machiavelli, Bodin, and Montesquieu. By providing observations upon several systems and com ­
bining them in the concept of constitution, Aristotle managed to create convincing arguments fo r 
the establishment of the constitutional tradition. This was in accordance with his general 
philosophy on the "middle road". On the other hand, Machiavelli followed the Aristotelian 
tradition, but towards the opposite conclusion. He advised the ruler to maintain disparities in 
order to be able to retain power. However, in both approaches, one did not consider it important 
to stress any autonomous features of the system; the main interest was instead the effective and 
“good” way o f using power. Any argument on substance would have decreased argument’s 
persuasive power.
Bodin, on the other hand, following Aristotle put, to a large extent, emphasis on the 
idea o f consensus. He stressed the importance o f the balance between the contending powers o f  
that time, both of which related to religious movements. In the beginning, he attempted to derive 
arguments from examination of laws, but in the end he understood the fundamental problems 
behind "legal disputes" and turned to the general legal themes o f political philosophy437. Finally, 
he stressed the importance of dialogue between the religions and emphasized different moral 
ideals.
Whereas Bodin stressed, ultimately, the comparability o f religions in a highly 
dynamic sense, Montesquieu saw the problem in the use o f sovereign power in general. Unlike 
Bodin, he established (historically, and from the point of view o f the normative sciences) a strong 
“natural” division between nations and their laws, and yet tried to maintain the dynamics o f  
political discourse.
Modem comparative law has also changed according to political-social 
circumstances. Whereas early modem comparative law stressed the "similarity" of problems and 
solutions despite the differences in method438, post war comparative law was characterized, quite 
evidently, by solutions in different political contexts vis-à-vis Eastern and Western legal
434 A s we have seen, comparative "law" is a  w ay to  challenge and reexamine the very basic premises o f positive law. 
It functions in a  process, whereby the basic presum ptions o f  forms of government etc., are considered anew. O n the 
o ther hand, it reproduces these forms and basic assum ptions in another, and perhaps, more developed form. It is 
strongly connected, in its contemporary form, to  the reexam ination o f institutional arrangements.
In  its argumentative form, it challenges traditions of positive legal thinking. These features are  
balanced by legal theoretical devices.
O ne could claim , however, that com parative law and com parative observations, and their use as 
arguments in  political philosophy, are often pa rt o f "realist" political theory, as opposed to political philosophical 
speculation.
437 M cRae, K .D ., 1979.
431 See Hill, J ., 1989, p .107, Zweigert, K., 1966, p.17, David, R., Brierly, J.E.C., 1978.
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systems.439 The similarities and differences depended upon by different political factors.440 Inside 
these different "comparative legal cultures", further distinctions were considered to be minor 
importance or as matters of “styles”.441 Perhaps the motive behind this was that further analysis 
would have required a detailed grasp of the application o f individual rules and norms.442
The history of comparative argum ent as a  history of the  tertium  comparationis. The history 
o f comparative law can be also characterized by categorizations of the tertium comparationis. 
This gives an indication o f different "periods" of comparative law.
Early comparative law was determined by the distinction between natives and 
barbarians. It also expressed the supremacy o f a system as a traditional form of government. On 
the other hand (for Machia velli, for example) all socio-legal systems were utilizable in the same 
way, and, accordingly, comparable. Nevertheless, in all these types of comparisons, the common 
factor was their "internal" systematic point of view with regard to the issue o f tertium  
comparationis. This “Romanist” perspective remained strong for centuries.
For Bodin, systems were comparable based on the theory of climate, and for 
Montesquieu as national "legal, climatic, and socio-cultural systems". These types o f ideas 
expanded thought concerning tertium comparationis towards more sociological and universally 
oriented (non-historical) forms of tertium comparationis.
W estern "modem" law has, however, over the centuries, defined its tertium  
comparationis by reference to Roman law. The break in this tradition has produced several 
"alternative" ideas on comparative law, and has resulted distinctions, such as the distinctions 
between continental and common law, socialist and liberal systems etc.443 At the moment the 
fundamental distinctions seem to be related to institutionalized constitutional traditions, and also 
to different conceptions of democracy. At the moment, the European legal systems seem to be 
comparable, within the institutional framework, as constitutional legal systems with their "own 
traditions”.
Different ideas on comparability have also been determined by the different
439 An example o f this may be seen in the critical evaluation o f the Zweigert, K., K atz, 1987 by Hill, J. (1989, p .108). 
He maintains that "The Soviet legal system, fo r example, as a result o f its ideological bases, faces the ‘problem’o f 
how to prevent citizens from acquiring unearned income through the purchase and resale o f consumer goods at a
profit”.
440 Zweigert, K., Kotz, H., 1987, p.48.
441 For example, Hill, J„ 1989, p.108. For post-war ideas of culture, see Schweisfiirth, T., Cultural and Ideological 
Pluralism and Contemporary Public International Law. In: Reports on German Public Law and Public International law 
to XDth International Congress of Comparative law (Heidelberg) 1986 (169-182). There is no clear definition of 
culture and ideology in contemporary public international law. It seems to be a pre-Iegal fact (ibid., p.179) related to 
peaceful coexistence o f nations (ibid.p.180).
441 Zweigert, K., K6tz, H ., 1987, p.36. Some criticism. Hill, J., 1989, p.109.
443 The latter distinction has also been seen as a  distinction between the planned economy and market economy, 
Bogdan, M., 1990, p .61. The function o f this distinction, see ibid., p.64.
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conceptions of dynamics and statics. These aspects have also been related ultimately to  
explanations of the acceptability of comparative observations. *
Contemporary (modem) comparative law is problem-oriented in a quite peculiar 
sense. The tertium comparationis is the problem in itself. This is why we are dealing, in 
contemporary comparative law, with legal institutional solutions444. Modem comparative law is 
"functional" and “instrumental” in nature445. On the other hand, in contemporary “highmodem” 
comparative law, we may speak about distinctions such as professional, cultural and scientific 
comparative law.
The history o f comparative argument as a  history of discursiveness. Within the history o f 
comparative law, one can identify a change away from practical discursiveness (natural law- 
oriented) toward the more positivist, system-oriented discourses.446 In its ultimate sense, we may 
speak about institutional discursiveness.
This fact has caused many problems for the interpretation of the history of 
comparative law. One could claim that in the interpretation o f the early classic and medieval 
writers, and even Montesquieu, one should stress the practical application rather than the 
systematic features of modem law. It was only during 19th century developments that autonomy 
o f  a legal system began to be recognized. This may have, on the other hand, generated 
contemporary ideas of critical comparison as a counter-reaction447. -
The history of comparative argument as a history of legal identity. We may identify from this 
short description of the history of comparative law how legal systems and their rules have been 
used as arguments for some kind of "identity" o f systems. This identity argumentation seems to 
be based on static presumptions concerning city states, civilization, "Legitimacy" (or “rightness”) 
o f power, religion, natural law, nation, ethnicity, and, in the end, on the relative stability o f 
positive and formal legal systems, legal rule, and legal institutional arrangements. '
These presumptions concerning identities of law have enabled the dynamic use o f 
comparative observations as an argument in legal discourse. The aim has been, as we have 
maintained, to prove the existence of constitutions, the "goodness” of one system, different types 
o f sovereign power(s), the existence o f common norms, the superiority or uniqueness o f a 
particular legal system, and, as in contemporary discourse, the relative autonomy and sovereignty 
of legal cultures, particular fields of law and, finally, the institutions and norms of supranational
444 Capelletti, M ., 1990a, p .6 , by  referring to the impact o f  M errym an's thought on these ideas.
445 Zweigert, K., 1972, p.465, and Pizzomsso, a., 1987, p .79.
446 Capelletti, M ., 1973, p.72.
447 Capelletti, M ., 1973, pp.71-72.
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regional systems.448
On the other hand, it could be claimed that the increasing discussion concerning the 
methodological aspects o f comparative law is related to the instability and unclear premises of 
law given the role o f  different "nonlegal” discourses to law in the 20th century449. The 
independence o f comparative law was seen to guarantee the legitimacy o f a situation, where legal 
systems clearly lacked a coherent idea of law. Methodological speculations were reflections of 
"modernist" ideals o f law450. It could be argued that comparative law reflected a "crisis" within 
law, where an attempt was made to solve so-called "hard cases"451.
Conclusions. The role o f comparative law, within the history of law could be analysed in tandem 
with ideas concerning the role of natural law in the development of law:
".„it slings between the revolutionary and conservative function. While institutions 
are still stable and not too incongruous with existing demands, natural law tends 
to be fo u n d  bolstering up the status quo. A s the institutional status quo becomes 
increasingly incongruous with the changed economic, cultural and social 
conditions, this law may become a revolutionary instrument fo r  challenging and 
demoralizing existing institutions"*52
However, comparative law has had an ultimately conservative function, and its 
revolutionary tendencies can be seen mainly in the substantial changes which have occured in the 
interpretations of existing systems and institutions. In this sense, it can be called positivized 
natural law.
In modem comparative law, the conservative and revolutionary functions seem to 
coexist and to have some parallel functions. Comparative law may support the idea of the relative 
rationality of the systemic innovations under consideration, but many support also the up-holding *43012
448 Even if we may claim that there are certain "phenomenological features" in each of the works mentioned above, 
there are many differences between them. It could be maintained that, from  the point o f view of contemporary ideas of 
law, Aristotle is a "dogmatic" comparativist, whereas Machiavelli, for example, seems to  be more a "phenomenologist". 
Bodin can be placed more close to Aristotle. Montesquieu seems to be m ore a  political sociologist and an em piricist
449 What we have faced during the last 30 years, and m ay be seeing increasingly in  the near future - is the decline of 
the traditional political and democratic state and its deregulation, the decline o f the political party system at national 
levels, increasing localization, European centralization, increasing corporativism, increasing governmental regulation, 
and the development o f closed processes o f rule-making and interpretation.
430 Some seem to suggest that the modernist era has ended in the sense that there is a  tendency to turn to a polycentric 
(international) law. O ne has failed in the modem (modernist?) reconstruction o f institutional structures (Koskenniemi, 
M ., 1997, pp.337-338).
431 The history o f comparative law is a history of legal identity; a history o f legal systems.
432 Stone, J., 1968, chapter 2. See also W eber, M „ 1969, p.288, Graveson, R.H., 1958, p.652. Furthermore, Hill, J., 
1989, p.103 referring to the Roman ius gentium , "applied to  all nations”. One could see a direct link between the ius 
gentium , ius naturaie and general principles o f all nations (idem.). O n natural law  and comparative law, see Klami, 
H.T., 1997.
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(self-maintenance) o f existing structures. Consequently, when at the beginning o f the century 
states searched for their legal identities, now the state and supranational systems search for their 
procedural- and rule-identities. This process applies also to the segmented systems o f law o f  
post-industrial cultures.453
This is why the nature o f comparative law has to be studied in the context o f the 
discourse theory of law and theories concerning the sources o f law. 43
433 Concerning “segm entation”, see W eber, M ., 1969, pp.301-303.
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Many views on the best methods of comparative research and optimal usages of 
comparative observations had already been found within the tradition and history of the com­
parative law discourse. On the other hand, certain ideas concerning the regulative principles of 
comparative law may be found in contemporary discussions on comparative law theory.
Here the idea is to critically examine the types o f structures of comparative law that 
have been identified in contemporary comparative law theory within modem institutionalized 
comparative law.
- 4.1. Traditional definitions and concepts of comparative law; What is
comparative law?
What is comparative law (droit compare)? It has been asked whether it is art (Levy- 
Ullmann), science (Lambert), or a method (Gutteridge)454. No general definition has been 
found455 or at least such a definition is contested.
It has been suggested that comparison as a process o f law consists in the selection 
of the tertium comparationis, the establishment of similarities and differences, essential traits, and 
the defining of concepts456, searching of development trends, and identification of the concrete 
forms of law.457
4. The contemporary "institutionalized” comparative law
434 Ancel, M., 1962,1962, p.32, Lambert, J., 1959, p.273, Gutteridge, H.C., 1944, p .l .  For a thorough analysis of 
the comparative law method, see Constantinesco, L-J., 1972, p.23 if.
Sacco, R ., 1980, p.306, claims that “comparative law u  a science According to him, it leads to a 
better knowledge of law.
455 Constantinesco, L*J., 1971, p.206. The three core questions o f comparative law are: why one compares 
(function), what one compares (object), how one compares (method) (de Vergotti, G., 1993). O n the nature of 
comparative law, SchmitthofF, M ,  1941, and Kropholler, J., 1992, p.702.
Comparative studies can relate to sociolegal systems, the norms-structures of these systems, individual 
institutions or norms, or legal argumentation or to all o f them. Comparative law  is, in this sense, a historically and 
sociologically oriented legal study. Contrasting between sociological (Pound) and psychological (Del Vecchio 
(Feuerbach)) approaches to comparative law, see SchmitthofF, M., 1941, p.101 fF.
One has also made distinctions between applied comparative law, comparative legislation, comparative 
history of law, abstract and speculative comparative law, and comparative jurisprudence, and comparative Nomoscopy 
(description), Nomogenics (evolutions) Nomothetics (politics and merits) (three last by  Wigmore in A  Panorama of the 
W orld legal systems (1928) see, Baxter, L.G., 1983, p .88 , for some analysis, see Constantinesco, 1971, p.245 fF..). On 
different distinctions, see Hug, P., 1932, p.1027-1028 (by referring to  W igmore, 1928, p .l I IS  and Lam bert’s 
definitions in The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (1931), p .l 26) (commentary on W igmore and Lambert, SchmitthofF, 
M ., 1041, pp.94-95, and on applied comparative law, ibid., 100,102 ff).
456 Kokkini-IatridouJ)., 1986.
However, contemporary comparative law  is not only a  list o f similarities and difFerences (Markesinis, 
P ., 1990, pp. 19-20).
437 Peterf.Z., 1974, p.53.
98
One could say that within the idea of comparative law, a double meaning is 
embedded referring both to the method and to the result458. In this sense, comparative law seems 
to be a dialectical distinction, which represent both "law" and a "norm”459, and the comparative 
process itself460.
In the normative sense, comparative law has been identified as positive international 
morality461. In this sense, it seems to be the empirical part of general jurisprudence. On the other 
hand, comparative law has been asserted to be jurisprudential expertise and learning of the 
dogmatic content462.
On the other hand, comparative law is alleged to "increase" the number o f available 
"perspectives", “broaden” and “deepen” knowledge. This is the academic justification for
451 Loussouam, Y., 1981, p.128.
Because comparative law seems to be  both a  m atter of general and particular features, it is not only an 
instrument of legal dynamism, but also dynamics itself. This is reflected in the two dim ensions o f comparative law: in 
the discourse on the methodology, and in the discourse on the practical results o f  law.
4”  Valladâo, H. Argues that these do not have a positivist aspect as "law" (1961, p .108).
460 Because law requires a certain degree of systematization, and because comparative law is dynamic and contingent 
in nature, it does not really seem to be part o f systematized law. The idea of comparative law, as law, becomes a matter 
o f an evolutionary process.
The attempt to "systematize" comparative law has led to enormous speculative studies on its method
as a systematic one.
A  m ore systematic approach to comparative law requires imagination and discipline (Zweigert, K., 
Kotz, H., 1987, p.33).
Szabô, I (1977, p.41 fF.) has defined comparative law as I. “Historical”  comparative study (1. 
Subsequent legal systems o f an identical type, 2. Legal types o f different periods), and H. “Logical” comparative study 
(1. Law s o f a social system of identical character a. Branch, family, group, b. Laws belonging to different groups of 
legal systems within a same type of society, 2. Legal systems of countries belonging to  different social systems, a. Every 
legal system  b. Groups of legal systems)
461 A ustin, J., Lectures o f jurisprudence and the philosophy o f  positive law [1832).
In practice, the basic idea of comparative law is that by observing the practices of nations and their 
laws, one m ay acquire scientific evidence regarding the higher form  of law, and a  sense o f  m ore universal morality.
H ow ever, there are problems in this idea. It assumes that transcendental values are "produced" 
somehow by the comparative method (Hill, J., 1989, p.103).
It has been argued that comparative law could "deepen the sense o f unitary sense o f justice" (Zweigert, 
K , Kbtz, H ., 1987,1:3) by being a  m ore universal legal science (see also. Hill, J., 1989, p .1 14). An extreme example 
of problem s centered universalism, Godley, J., 1995, p .560 ff. O ne of the first in the 20th century in this respect, del 
Vecchio, G ., L’idée d ’une science universelle du droit com paré, 1909. For an analysis, see  Lambert, J., 1959, p.273 
ff.).
442 T ut, R .H .R, 1977, p.238. O ther type o f approach, see N elken, D., 1990, p .102. One o f  the aims of comparative 
legal study has to be the aim of considering its implications for legal theory or jurisprudence (See, Hill, J., 1987, p .l 13, 
criticizing Zweigert, K., Kôtz, H ., 1989). That com parative law  is a method for the definition of law as such 
(Schm itthoff, M „ 1941, p . l 00). O n comparative law  and learning, see also Frankenberg, G., 1985, pp.411-455. 
Substantive opus on this approach is Markesinis, B ., Foreign Law and Comparative M ethodology Oxford) 1997.
Nevertheless, it looks as if comparative law has stronger connections, in the traditional sense, to the 
positivist approach to law than to the jurisprudential one.
On the other hand, w e can identify the use o f comparative law everywhere in social discourses. It has 
been used by legal researchers, academic professionals, legal historians, jurisprudence and law  teachers, sociologists, 
practitioners, philosophers, and political scientists, etc. (see, David, R., Brierly, J.E.C., 1978, p.6).
Comparative law is in many ways connected to philosophical considerations, Yntema, H.E., 1958,
p.498.
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comparative law.463 It has been maintained also, on the contrary, that it can have a function of 
"scientific" manipulation, whereby it stresses certain characteristic and categories of the "law”
AJL*
in contemporary society.
All the same, the general opinion seems to be that comparative law is an essential 
element of general jurisprudence.465 Because general jurisprudence also explores concepts which 
do not necessarily belong to any particular legal system, it has similar aims as comparative law. 
In this sense, both are aiming at establishing a conceptual framework.466
There has also been some analysis of the different phases o f comparative study. It 
has been maintained that in the descriptive phase one undertakes the description o f institutions, 
the investigation o f socioeconomic problems and their institutional solutions467. Secondly, in the 
identification phase, one identifies similarities and differences and in the explanatory phase, one 
explains these results.466
Furthermore, a distinction has been made between the explanation o f the structure 
of law in force, functions o f the law in force, and the structure of the law in real life (legal reali­
ty).469 These results can be applied to a concrete problem470.
The distinction has also been proposed between descriptive and applied 
comparative law.471
463 Tut, R.H.S, 1977, p.238 ff.. Zweigert, K., Kfitz, H., 1987, p.12. For some criticism o f  this idea, see Klami, H.T., 
1981, p.85. Klami asks, what kind of interest o f knowledge.
464 Tur, R.H.S., 1977, p.238 ff.
445 See, David, R., Brierly, 1978, p.5.
Tur, R.H.S., 1977, p.240.
It has been claimed that, in its traditional positivist form, comparative law is a comparison o f two or 
more legal systems in the o f the conceptualization o f general jurisprudence (KokkinMatridou, D, Netherlands 
Comparative Law Association, Seminar report, Introduction to comparative research (Inleidning tot het 
rechtsverlikende underzeuk, Deventer, 1988)).
447 This "understanding’* must take place in the social, political, moral, historical, religious, scientific, and ideological 
environments (Constantinesco, L-J., 1972, p.232).
** Kamba, E J ., 1974, p.517.
In its most sim ple form, it is a  study of the differences and similarities o f systems and their solutions 
(de B oer, Th-M., 1994, pp.22-23). This is a  "true" comparative argument, and in this form it can be used as an 
argument in different types o f legal decision-making processes. In a more complicated form, it explains similarities in 
relation to  the functional contexts. (Ibid., p.24). On the problems of the “critical assessment’* of the results in 
com parative law related to historical traditions, social conditioning, and political m otives, see Kropholler, J., 1992, 
p.706.
469 Kokkini-Iatridou, D., 1986, p.179, Losano, M.G., 1978. p.247.
470 M össner, J.M., 1974, pp.220-224.
471 Gutteridge, H.C., 1949, p.7. Schlesinger, R.B., (1980, pp.2-18) identifies Foreign application as a modeling, 
contrasting, and a gaining of perspective. Applied comparative law may be contrasted with the “pure comparison of 
laws’* ("Reine Rechtsvergleichung") (ibid., p.41).
“Applied" comparative law has been described as a "better solution" comparative law (Hill, J., 1989).
This approach stresses the normative evaluation of the "external" legal systems and their norms. It upholds the te c h n ic ^ j-Q v . 
nature o f  comparative law. 6 ^gwm\
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°%Oüri^0
100
Modem comparative law seems to lack an element, which it, nevertheless, 
recognizes as one of its basic ideas: the empirical analysis of the "natural” and sociological 
connections of law.472 These elements would make it distinctive from other legal methodologies. 
The lack of these aspects in modem comparative law may be connected to the fact that a high 
degree of unification is really not the main aim o f modem comparative law.
There has been some discussion concerning the relationship of comparative law to  
the philosophy of law, linguistic philosophy and the philosophy of religion473.
472 Conditions "de la vie naturelle", include the econom ic, moral, religious, and the political constitutions o f sta tes 
(Lambert, È., 1978, p.46).
473 Rabel, E., 1978, p.87, See also, von Ihering, R ., Geistes des römischen rechts auf den verschieden Stufen se in e r 
Entwicklung (1852-1865) p.265.
Religion has been viewed also as explaining the definition of jurisprudentia ("iurisprudentia est 
divinarum atque humanarum rerum notifia, iusti atque iniusti scientia”, Ulpian, see Triebs, R , 1905, p.3). S om e 
(critical) remarks have been m ade also on comparative philology and comparative mythology in connection to  
com parative studies (Maine, H .S., 1875, p.6, study of comparative mythology related to emerging studies o f  the 
Sanskritian language).
Comparative religion seem to have much relevance, when one departs from  the W estern tradition (see , 
for example, Hill, E., 1978, pp.282-283). Some use o f religion as source o f law, in the absence o f provisions, has been  
made, for example, in the Egyptian Civil Code, 1948 (idem).
A  good example o f this kind of relativization can be found in W eber, D ie protestantische Ethik und d e r 
geist des Kapitalismus (Finnish trans. Kyntäjä, T., Porvoo, 1980). For some analysis of the connexion between relig ion 
and law  in M iddle East law, see  Habachy, S., M iddle East Law, the Link Between law  and Religion. In: R apports 
Généraux au Vile Congrès international de droit com paré (U ppsala) 1966, with exam ples o f “internai” differences and  
most striking examples taken from  matrimonial law.
O tto  Brusiin has, in the context o f  matrim onial divorse, made a distinction between three basic  
(ideological) attitudes: the catholic-protestant, secular, and Marxist attitude (See, Brusiin, O., Z um  
Ehescheidungsprobleme (Hyvinkää 1959) p. 17 ff. A  thorough analysis of Brusiin’s theory by Aamio, A . (Die “W elt 
des Rechts”  in der rechtstheoretischen perspective von O tto  Brusiin. In: Rechtstheorie 28, 1997, pp .405-419)). 
Brusiin’s idea has been interpreted by Aamio in a  following way.
Law is a pow er structure, bu t also a  “communicative” order. Law is part of sociality 
( “Gesellschaftlichkeit"). However, it is not an absolute value system, but a social phenom enon related to  value- and  
aim  complexes. In this sense, it has its societal “traditionality” (Aamio, A., 1997, p .407). Consequently, the m ain  
importance (method) in legal com parison, for Brusiin, seem s to  be related to these value- and aim complexes (ibid., 
p.410). The main concepts o f comparative study are, in  this sense, the concepts o f attitude (“verhalten” , social), legal 
norm ("RecAftnonn”, juristic), and basic ideological attitudes (“ ideologische Grundeinstellung”) (ibid., pp.412-413). 
The concept relates - in the case o f divorce, for example -  to the distinctions mentioned above, which, on the other hand, 
seem to have their relation to religion too (ibid., p p .4 14-415). Basically, these distinctions relate to the attitude tow ards 
the continuity of a matrimony (ibid., p .416). According to  Brusiin, this type of conception o f comparative law does not 
endanger the matrimony as a  social institution (ibid., p .415).
In this (religion) context, the problem  o f comparative law seems to b e  related to the question o f  
w hether we can go "beyond” law  in the context o f com parative law. We enter into a "non-systematic" sphere o f law. 
This can be linked with the question o f  the nature o f  the "Rechtsstaat”.
O ne could  affirm , philosophically, that a  possible "reason” does no t determine the nature o f  
comparative law, but instead it is the legal discourse covering it, which does. T he question about the nature o f com pa­
rative law is not associated with its relativization with religious and linguistic philosophy, bu t rather with its nature in  
the legal discourse. The former places too much stress upon the "autonomy" o f comparative law from the overall legal 
discourses.
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It has been claimed474 that the primaiy aim of comparative law is the (re)production 
of knowledge475. The goals of modem comparative law have also been seen in the increasing the 
scientific level of legal studies476 and understanding of national law, in the perfection of legal 
language477, in the promotion o f international understanding of law, in the unification and 
harmonization of legal systems478, and in reaching a dynamic understanding o f legal systems.47’
Furthermore, one o f the aims of practical comparative law seems to relate to the 
establishing o f minimum standards. This applies especially to the use of comparative law in 
international institutions and practices. At the national level, the minimum standard approach has 
not been regarded as particularly important.480 When principles and comparative observations are 
combined, the question may also be about establishing o f the highest standard481.
Unification and harmonization, two of the most important aims of comparative legal 
research, have been divided into common core research and the study of general principles.482 
Common core research has a larger sphere of application than the establishment o f general 
principles. The latter idea seems to be more connected to the study or “creation” of legal sources.
4.2. The aims of comparative law
474 In general, W interton, G., 1975, pp.97-99, also Fix-Zamudio, H., 1990, p.29. For an analysis in  general, 
Constantinesco, 1972, p.331 ff., Zweigert, K., Kötz, H., 1977, pp.1-3.
475 Gutteridge, H.C., 1949, p.7
476 The idea that comparative legal science could reach an audiëntie scientific level is connected to the view that legal 
sciences cannot stay solely as national (David, R., Brierly, 1978, p. 93).
477 This means an establishm ent o f an "international" legal language (Fix-Zamundo, H., 1990, p.29).
471 See, for example, W ilm ars, de, J.M ., 1991, p .37, Kropholler, J., 1992, p .704. Unification, see Schmitthoff, M, 
1941, p.108 ff. Unification has been seen a fact (Lévy-Ullman) method (Saleilles) doubt (Lambert) as a  dream 
depending on the political aspect o f the situation (Gutteridge) (idem.).
479 David, R., Brierly, J.E.C., 1978, pp.6-10, stressing the unificatory aspect. See also, Fix-Zamundo, H., 1990, p.28- 
31 (referring to M erryman, J.H.).
This process o f understanding has to  do  with enabling one to see what is essential for the purposes of 
law and what was an accidental product o f history and tradition (Kahn-Freund, O ., p.328). See also Tunc, A ,  1978, 
p.285. Graveson, R., 1984, p.109. This is linked with the promotion o f the international understanding o f law. It causes 
changes in perspectives. T his way one m ay gain a  peaceful and harmonious coexistence within the legal sciences 
(David, R., Brierly, J.E.C., 1978, p.9, David, R., 1950, pp.78-111).
The philosophy of this understanding in comparative law can be explained, to a  certain extent, as 
contrasting one’s "own system" (which is needed) w ith other systems (which are not needed). One allows systems to 
stay  as material possibilities, as possible legal worlds, which could be realized in some time and place. For some 
analysis for this point, see below.
It has been  argued that the contemporary relevance of comparative law is in the creation of 
understanding regarding the old and the new "law" (de G ruz, P., 1994, p.343). Nevertheless, it can be maintained that 
the former functions o f comparative law are still re levan t
**° See, Scrisk, R., 1973. However, see Doetring, K., 1987, p.56.
4,1 See Doetring, K., 1987, p.56.
442 Winterton, G .t 1975, p .I0 4  (see Schlesinger, R .B., 1968). For a  commentary on the latter, Davis, F ., 1969, - 
p.617. Also Schlesinger, R .B., 1980, p.36.
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The study of the comparative legal m ethod. It has been affirmed that the essence o f  
investigation by the comparative method is to arrange and order the process of comparison.483 
Some basic approaches to this review o f the comparative legal method may thus be mentioned.
The functionalist approach stresses the idea that law and legal systems are part o f  
a general system containing other relevant systems o f norms too484. This is why socioeconomic 
arguments must be taken into account in certain situations. This is in contrasts to the analytical 
approach, which studies separate elements and isolates parts from the whole.485
Furthermore, some have used distinctions such as bilateral and multilateral, 
substantive and formal, as well as micro (institutions) and macro (systems) comparison.486 The 
functional approach is often related to the "micro" comparison, where the idea is not to compare 
systems based on their belonging to different larger groups o f legal systems, based on certain 
criteria, but rather to compare the legal norms of certain systems concerning particular 
problems487.
When the study is about the sources of law etc., we may speak about formal 
comparative law. This can be contrasted with an examination o f  some specific legal institutions 
and problems. This can be called dogmatic comparative law.488 The distinction between internal, 
regional, and universial comparative law refers to the geographical frame of a study.489
It is obvious that comparative legal studies are normative in relation to the *4367
4.3. The comparative law method
413 Kokkini-Iatridou, D., 1986, p.155.
434 One may contend that the functionalization o f  comparative law does not necessarily mean its functionalization in 
comparative reasoning. In other words, even if the use of com parative law has gravitated towards legal institutions, the 
reasoning in these institutions does not, necessarily, appear any longer to be directed tow ards the functional analysis o f 
legal ideas, concepts, and rules, (i.e. to be analytical etc). Q uite the contrary, in fact.
One could assert that the unifying tendencies in modem legal thinking (“form of life in a post-industrial 
societies*') abolishes the need to any functional analysis. It also looks as if the more historical approach stresses m ore 
the analytical approach, the examination of differences and similarities. This is due to stress laid upon the importance 
of conceptualizations as a historical phenomenon. In institutional and functional comparative law, the main emphasis 
is social unity (as a basic assumption).
It has to be remembered, nevertheless, that even if we speak of functional comparative law, the 
relevant restrictions are still backed up by certain principles or normative criteria. In  fact, one cannot see a great 
difference between the functional approach and the historical one.
4,5 Kokkini- Iatridou, D., 1986, p.177.
436 Constantinesco, LrJ„ 1971, p.258 ff., Bogdan, M., 1990, p.57, Rheinstein, M , 1974, p.31, Kropholler, J*, 1992, 
p.702.
437 Sanders, 1990, p.64.
433 Kropholler, J., 1992, p.702. This distinction does not seem  to be very clear.
m  Kropholler, J., 1992, p.703. "Internal” or "intrastate” comparison is a  com parison in one state or federation. 
“Regional” comparison is related to a harmonization or unification framework in one region. “Universial** comparative 
law is a comparative study of all legal systems. (Idem.).
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restrictions o f the study and the choices made. These choices are regulated by the internal 
methodological principles of comparative law. This is due to the free nature of comparative 
studies490. As a result, comparative law is a problem-centred method, and, on the other hand, 
concentrates frequently upon its "internal'* principles as the main issue491.
Comparative law is, a priori, open to many possibilities, though it seems to be, in 
its applied form, a very strict discipline.
Some rules of the comparative legal method. There are several proposals for the 
methodological basis o f comparison in law.492
One o f  the major criteria for comparison is the precision of the subject. Analysis 
should include the sources493, styles and techniques of many legal systems, and their institutional 
and factual elements, including procedural and evidential law.494
On the other hand, some have emphasized the actual results connected to factual 
situations rather than statutory or judicial language. One of these approaches to comparative 
studies stresses the importance of "authentic" comparison. In this approach, one may reveal more 
freely the motivational basis and the sources of arguments. This is not necessarily the case in 
traditional rule/case studies.495 The “authentic” approach seems to recommend the use o f group-
490 Jescheck, H-H., 1974, p.765. The central idea in legal comparison is the choice o f elements and parts (Mössner, 
J.M ., 1974, p.197).
491 However, all restrictions in the sphere of comparative law have a  normative character. These restrictions function 
as the basis of the comparative legal argument. Consequently, the study o f the quality o f a comparative argument in 
legal discourse, and in justification, is related to these restrictions (Some discussion, though on different basis, see 
Schlesinger, R.B., 1968, p.75). This idea seems to apply both to the restrictions o f the interpretative use o f comparative 
law, and to the argumentative and justificatory uses o f comparative law. The reevaluation o f these restrictions can take 
place on the basis o f the legal discourse theories.
491 See, Schlesinger, B.R, 1968, Schmitthof, M ., 1941, p.96-97 (comparability of compared. Legal and social 
background, application).
For an extensive analysis, see Constantinesco, L J . ,  1972, p p .150-230. He proposes rules o f 
comparison relating mainly to legal sources, and their relationships and priorities. Also, Schmidt, F„ 1981, p.527.
There are some problems in the legal source oriented approach in comparative law. Namely, where 
one is “blindly” concentrating on the idea o f legal sources in different legal systems - as the basis o f the classification 
or orientation - one may loose sight o f the actual arguments which are deriving from these sources and, furthermore, of 
the problems for which these arguments are used. The classification o f systems - based on the approach stressing the 
centrality of legal sources - may appear contextual, but, in  fact, the results can be m ore “non-normative" than within the 
traditional “nominalistic” approach. One may pretend to be self-sufficient w ithout a  real need for a  dogmatic and 
general discussion.
493 Modem comparative law selects its material based on the sources of law  doctrines. It “closes'* itself to the 
doctrines o f the sources o f law. For an emphasis o f legal sources idea, see Bogdan, M ., 1996, p-5.
494 For the idea that considerations of many systems increase the reliability o f the result, see Schmitthoff, M ., 1941, 
p .9 7  (referring to  professor Kaden). All states should be considered, if  the question is about uniformity o f law 
(Kropholler, J., 1992, p.704). The choice is, in many ways, functional and related to  the goals of the study (ibid., p.706).
495 In this type o f  study, lawyers are given clearly explained cases, which they have to  resolve according to  their na­
tional law "authentically". This material, on the other hand, functions as material for comparison (for the application, 
see Schlesinger, R.B., 1968, p.76. Also, Sacco, R., 1990, pp.28-29).
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based working method, for example.496
Generally speaking, it appears as if, in comparative studies, one has to make an 
independent examination of the subject matter independent of any other elements.497 Secondly, 
one has to connect this to its environment (background) by considering surrounding legal and 
nonlegal factors. Thirdly, one has to make certain explanation. Fourthly, one may m ake 
predictions on future development.498
Some have proposed that the selection of the law to be compared ought to be based 
on the idea of “parent legal systems**. According to others, any legal system, and not merely the 
parent legal system, could form the basis o f selection 499 On the other hand, it has been suggested 
that one should select the compared systems according their "distance".500 Some have proposed 
a simple common sense501 approach to comparative law, where all systems are comparable502, o r 
that, at least, one should go into comparative studies with an open mind. The comparison should 
be based on the absence o f any limitations and restraints.503
In several works, the idea of the perfect comparative method has been discussed 
without any attempt to  illustrate its application.504 This has led to  several "overambitious" 
features of contemporary comparative law discussion in theory. There seems to be a need for a 
more realistic approach.505
C om parative law and  o ther scientific disciplines. Sociological jurisprudence declared its
496 Kokkini-Iatridou, D., 1986, p .l 82 ff. Also Schmitthoff, M „ 1941, p.99.
"Comparative coordinator", Lando, O., 1977, p.649.
This 'expertise’ system may be criticized because it can result in an extremely positivistic approach; 
nam ely, one takes formally into account all accepted legal sources. Formality results, because the situation is 
"hypothetical”. N o genuinely-affected interests are involved (see, ibid., p.651.)
497 Kokkini-Iatridou, p . l986 , p .l  82 IT.
498 Kokkini-Iatridou, D., 1986, p. 190. On this point, see also  W rdblewski, J.t 1976.
499 Drobning, U ., 1969, p .228.
300 L a m b e r t ,  fe, 1 9 7 8 , p .4 4 .
301 Frankenberg, G ., 1985, p .431.
m  Bogdan, M., 1990, p.64. Sacco claims that a priori restrictions - based on non-comparability - lack the necessary 
scientific detachm ent The apparen t dissimilarity approach can be based, for example, on European ethnocentrism . 
(Sacco, R., 1991, p.7).
509 Some discussion, Zweigert, K., Kfitz, H., 1987, p.31. A lso  Drobning, U ., 1972, p . l 23.
Kropholler, J. (1992, p.703 and 705) gives an  example o f how comparative law questions are related 
methodologically to  the common sense approach. Instead o f asking questions in  a  legal conceptual framework, such as 
“how pension rights are treated?", one asks the question w ith common language “how economically weaker spouse is 
secured in the event o f divorce 7” . However, one should rem em ber the rank of legal sources, for example (ibid, p .705).
T his should not, however, lead to  formal approach to sources, but to  an  analysis o f reasoning.
304 Kokkini-Iatridou, D ., 1986, p.145.
305 Kokkini-Iatridou, D ., 1986, p.147.
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agenda by stating that comparative law should be aimed at a study of systems, doctrines, and 
institutions as social phenomena. This means relating them to general social conditions.
It seems that there are different approaches to the question o f the relationship 
between law and sociology in comparative law. Some consider sociology as extremely useful for 
comparative law306 307*912, while others, on the other hand, consider sociology as an essential part of 
comparative law, at least in the form of legal sociology.507
The sociological strategy in comparative law as a distinctive approach, claims that 
legal rules are applied in a specific area o f social activity along with other rules508. By this 
approach, one can investigate the differences with the help o f concepts such as class, 
socioeconomic status, religion, ethnicity etc.,509 and, for example, relations of production510.
It has been maintained that the use of the sociological method is based rather on a 
selection of knowledge, where this selection is determined by values.511 In this sense, comparative 
law cannot be methodologically sociological. The relevance o f sociological knowledge in 
comparative law may be revealed in the application of sociological data.512 Rational comparison, 
however, includes different kinds of sociological observations.
By and large, it looks as if the comparative approach to law is considered, neces­
sarily, secondary in nature, and that it assumes the existence o f other methods which are the 
primary sources of relevant knowledge ("legal norms" and "social facts”)513
It is clear that a strict legal positivist approach to comparative law would also be 
problematic514. Where the aim of comparative law is clearly to find out the effects and causes of 
differences between legal systems, the pure positivist approach, assuming that differences are 
based on the absence of common rules or institutions, may lead to a reluctance to interpret a 
"legal" case or make a value-based solution, or to introduce regulatory or deregulatory
306 Bogdan, M., 1990, p.39, referring for example to Constantinesco, L-J., 1972, p,261. Yntema, H.E., 1958, p.498.
307 For the use of the tools of legal sociologists, see K6tz, H., 1982, p.358, Kokkini-Iatridou, D., 1986, p.172. For 
som e analysis, David, R ,  1981, p,201.
501 Feldbrugge, F.J.M .,1973, p.215.
309 Abel, R L ., 1978, pp.219-224.
5,0 P e te i iZ ,  1974, p.54.
511 Hall, J., Methods o f comparative research in comparative law. In: Legal thought in the United States o f America 
under contemporary pressures (Brussels), 1970, p.150.
It seems that comparative law, directed towards sociological observations, achieves additional 
"political" meaning. This is related to the fact that, under this approach, the autonomy of the systems is emphasized.
312 Drobning, U ., p., 1971.p.296 ff.
3.3 Pcterf, Z., 1974, p.51, Kckkini-Iatridou, D., 1986, p.156.
3.4 Capelletti, M ., 1973, pp.74-76.
O ne could say that, in legalistic traditions, comparative observations of foreign positive law are 
strongly considered as a  political issue. Legal comparison is treated as a  legal "myth" which should be left untouched 
by critical legal science.
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measures315.
Sociology may, in the study o f a foreign systems, provide information also about 
the efficacy of certain types of regulation.516 In this sense, it is not so far from the premises o f the 
legal realism.317
There have been some concrete proposals on the question concerning the use o f  
sociological information in comparative law.318
4.4. The basic prem ises o f com parative law
G eneral rem arks. As may be seen, comparative law presupposes some kind of structural, 
linguistic or common sense understanding of law.519 What follows is an attempt to present some 
"legal" distinctions associated with this idea.
The contem porary state paradigm  of com parative law. Comparative law maintains the 
positivity o f law, and is in this sense a part o f the formal and positive rationality of law520. 
M odem  comparative law is connected traditionally to the state paradigm of law. The 
constitutional state represents the basic value o f the law321. *31
313 If we understand comparative statements as declaratory statements, we may see that they reveal legal ideologies. 
Sacco R., argues (1990, p .31), for example, that "Statements, which can be seen as legal formants, may be 
propositions about philosophy, politics, ideology, religion.... declaratory propositions have a particular danger o f  
encouraging a false understanding".
This is the basic problem of the European law having, as its basic prem ise, the positivist approach to  
law. If one cannot recognize the reasons for the diversities in social practices, one tends to  reregulate the situation, until 
it is properly covered. This leads to conflicts between regulatory systems, and to pathological forms o f  regulation.
This idea is connected to the instrum entality o f law.
5,6 Kropholler, J., 1992, p.705, Heldrich, A ., 1970,
5,7 For an exam ple o f this type of approach, Husa, J., Comparative research and the research interest in law 
[Vertaileva tutkimus jaoikeudellinen tutkimusintressi]. In: Kunnallistieteellinen aikakauskirja, 1996, p.326, and Husa,
J., 1996, p.96.
31* Drobning, U ., 1971, pp.503-504.
It was discovered, in the course o f the study, that Drobning's proposed questionnaire was relatively 
sim ilar to  the questionnaire used in this study. H owever, no "modeling" had taken place.
H eldrich, A. (1970) has also maintained that, vice versa, the verification of the im pact o f different 
social structures to  legal frameworks and creation o f  law, in social sciences, is not possible without comparative legal 
approach.
st9 A s we have seen, in this study, the (discursive) linguistic approach is assumed.
F o r some analysis and criticism o f  the com m on sense approach to language in comparative law, see 
F riedm ann, L.M ., 1990, pp .49-50. Problems o f  translation, see Terré, F ., Brèves notes sur les problèmes de la 
traduction  jurid ique. In: Rev.IntDr.Com p., 1986, p.347 ff  (349). However, legal translation is a from of practical 
translation (ibid.. 347)..
520 For exam ple, Jescheck, 1974, p.772. For problem s o f  the positivist com parative law, see M bssner, J.M., 1974, 
p .203.
521 A lso, M bssner, J.M., 1974 ,p .241 .
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Many methodological ideas in comparative law are related to this premise of the 
state paradigm. One may contend that typical to this approach is the ’consolidating* method, 
which has, as its explicit objective, an idea of the common core (i.e. assertion, no doctrinal 
improvement)522.
Praesumptio sim ilitud is. Praesumptio similitudis is the working rule of comparative law. It is 
a heuristic principle dealing with the sources of comparative law ("legal life"). It has been claimed 
that it has no use in fields of law, which are attached strongly to political and moral views (and 
values).523 Laws can be meaningfully compared only if they perform the same task and the same 
function524.
Foreign law. Comparative legal studies have been divided into presentations o f foreign law525 
and examination o f methodology or specific institutions526. This may include also presentations 
o f legal culture, legal actors, and forms of "legal life".527 The study of foreign law can be 
considered as a preliminary stage in the comparative process52*. However, study and description 
o f foreign legal system(s) is considered separate from comparative law having evaluative aspects 
in it529.
C ulture and ethnocentrism . The legal culture can be claimed to be one of constant identity 
building.530 This is related to the traditional cultural comparative law idea of widening cultural
S22 See, Schmitthoff, C .M ., 1968, p.565.
The limits o f contemporary comparative law seem to be connected to conceptualizations in the national 
legal systems. Com parative law cannot accept any other element as part o f the legal discourse than those elements 
which appear in national legal systems.
For the idea that contemporary comparative law would not be restricted by the premises related to 
national state, see Husa, JL, 1996, p.85.
For some analysis o f the constitutional-state comparative law, Suksi, M., 1993, p.267 if. H e seems to 
understand the comparative constitutional law study as based on a kind o f “structural-realist” approach, prevailing also 
in political sciences. For different “constitutional” classifications of legal systems (ibid., p.269). That constitutional 
systems should be studied “as a whole” relating different institutions with each other (internally) (ibid., p.271).
Sîî Zweigert, K., Kôtz, H ., 1987, p.36.
524Drobning,U ., 1971.
525 For this distinction, see Winterton, G., 1975.
526 See in particular, Zweigert, K., Kôtz, H., 1977, p.5.
127 Fix-Zamundo, H., 1990, referring to works o f Merryman, J.
Bmsiin, O., 1953, p .437, de Boer, Th.M., 1994, p.16.
M odern comparative legal science include the presentation o f foreign law, analysis o f  foreign law, 
analysis of methodological problems, and the study o f  specific institutions (Fix-Zamundo., p.30-31).
529 Kropholler, J„ 1992, p.707. That the study o f the law of a single country is not even possible, see Goidley, J., 
1995, p.555 if. That comparative law is study of two or many systems, Lambert, J., 1959, p .271.
SM Clark, D.S., 1990, p p .l  1-23, referring to works o f Merryman and to David, R., Brierly, J.E.C., 1978.
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horizons, o f understanding the scope of the law, legal problems, and legal evolution531, o f  
creating greater sensitivity in resolving legal problems, of improving legal instruments through 
experience and knowledge, and furthermore, of the perfection of legal language and 
understanding532.
Despite the lack of clarity surrounding the idea of culture533, the translation o f  
comparative legal material is often made on the basis of this cultural comparative law,534
There has also been discussion on legal rules based on comparison as "ius com m une 
denationalise'535.
It could be claimed that the prevailing paradigm of comparative law is a kind o f  a 
realistic paradigm based on cultural, national, linguistic, ethnological elements, which does not 
emphasize the political discourse as the basis o f comparative law.536 o
Tertium comparatif)nis. The tertium comparationis the common denominator of the com pared 
(“similitude minimum”, **minimum com mune”). In modem comparative law, the tertium  
comparationis is historical and ideological in nature537.
The tertium comparationis is, however, the legal dimension of comparative law. 
The common denominator is the decisive step in the entire comparative process. It is also the *3567
531 Watson, A., 1974, p .16
531 See also, Bogdan, M ., 1990, p.28, David, 1978, pp .6-8 , Kahn-Freund.O., 1966, pp.59-60, Rheinstein, 1974 , 
p .191. Summers, R.S., 1991,p .461.
533 Smith, R J ., 1989.
534 For a study o f  this phenomenon, see Fedynskyj. J-. 1975, p.550, Dainow, J., 1975.
335 Trindade, A.A.C., 1977, p273.
336 See, Bermann, G.A., 1990, Frankenberg, G ., 1985.
337 Tertium comparationis is a  point o f departure for all comparisons (for example, Zweigert & K6tz, 1971, p .4 3 ). 
It has been maintained that the tertium comparationis is the superior common notion (une notion commune supérieure, 
Knapp, V ., 1973, see also, Constantinesco, L-J., 1972, p.88).
This is a quite dogmatic idea. It is based on the assumption that there should be a priori som ething to  
be  com pared, clearly defined, and rational. However, the idea is associated with a  k ind o f  historical necessity. W hy  
com pare something if  it is already defined? Com parison seem s to be more a  confirmation and reproduction o f  the 
historical forms (in  many respects), than a sincere attempt to  understand w hat is going on.
One could claim  that the tendency is separate from a clear historical tertium comparationis, tow ards 
more "factual", "sociological", and scientific tertium comparationis. This type o f functional approach is explicit in  the 
use o f comparative arguments in legal decision-making.
In a  historical sense, the tertium comparationis is related to  a  kinship or derivative relationship 
(pattern  o f resemblance?) (W ise, E.M ., 1982, p .365). For a  strongly historical approach, see, Legrand, P., 1996, 
pp.279-280.
F or an  theoretical economic and situational construction of the “ideal model” as tertium 
comparationis, see Tolonen, J.P ., 1974 (for analysis of this, Klami, H.T., 1981, p p .127-134).
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criterion for the categorization of systems and legal families.534 *38
The basic distinction between the structuralist and the functionalist method539 
relates to the different judgments regarding the tertium comparationis.54°
Roman law as tertium  comparationis. "Unification" usually accords with some criteria within 
a concrete discipline. In the western legal tradition, Roman law has functioned as a fundamental 
legal criterion for comparison and for attempts at unification.541
The role o f Roman law as tertium comparationis was decreased considerably, 
however, after the great codifications in the turn of the century. The utility o f Roman law was 
replaced by its elegance in legal thought.542
The significance of Roman law seems to be historical.543 It can be considered more 
as "a Jaw" than ''the law", something with which many experiences can be gathered. Furthermore, 
it is declared to be a  representation of continuity544 and a symbol of harmonious interaction.545 
However, as a dead legal language, Roman law guarantees for its user an unvariable point of 
reference.
Nevertheless, Roman law is not without practical significance in practical 
institutional legal argumentation and justification546.
Style. It has been argued that "style" is one of the decisive feature of legal systems.547 This 
distinction has been divided to five factors claimed to be relevant for making of the distinction 
between groups of legal systems: origin and evolution, characteristics in legal reasoning (legal 
thought), institutions characteristics to that system, the concept o f legal sources and their use,
534 Eorsi, G., 1973, p.182. On the functions of the tertium comparationis, see Zweigert, 1C, KBtz, H., 1987, p., 42.
For its criticism, Blakojevic, P.T., 1973, pp.32-33.
Tertium comparationis and different cultural distinctions seem to function as dialectical principles of
comparative law.
539 See, for example, Schlesinger, R.B., 1968, p.74-75. For a structuralist approach, see, M ossner, J.M ., 1974,
p.227.
340 Kokkini-Iatridou, D ., 1986, p.166, and Drobnig, U., 1984, p.243 (on optimism and scepticism).
541 Lambert, 6 ,1 9 7 8 , p.40.
542 Zimmermann, R., 1995, pp.22-23. A lso, Lambert, J., 1959, p.275.
543 Yntema, H .E., 1978, p.163. Zimmermann, R., 1995, p.22 ff.
544 Yntema, H.E., 1978, p.176.
545 Roman law as tertium comparationis seems to  b e  clearly applicable in the realm  of private law. However, the 
Rom an law as tertium comparationis does not function in the same way in connection to public law.
346 Some Advocate Generals in the European Community system, for example, often relate the examination o f  a  legal 
situation  strongly to the analysis of Roman law (see below. Advocate General Mancini in the European Court of 
Justice).
547 Zweigert, K., K5tz, H ., 1987, Constantinesco, 1981, p.161.
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ideological factors.548
No doubt, style seems to be one o f the distinctions, which applies, for example, to  
the differences between analytical and more formal approaches to law and legal justification.
4.5. The function of comparative law
G eneral rem arks549. In theory, the function o f  the information gained from comparative law 
studies relates to the ability of comparative law to illustrate legal possibilities.550 These types o f  
possibilities can be discovered in an academic discipline, or in a study o f one or more legal sys­
tems. This way comparative law can propose "new" methods o f thought, "new” systematic 
conceptualizations, "new" methods of posing questions, "new" discoveries, "new" standards o f  
criticism.551
However, it has been also argued that comparative law has suffered from a self- 
inspectorial nature as a method of law552, that it has a modest role in all legal work,553 and that it 
is impractical.554 Nevertheless, counter arguments prevail as well.555 Comparative law functions, 
in reality, as a relevant source of information based on practical experience556. For this reason, 
comparative law seems to have its function in legal education, legislation, and judicial 
interpretation.557 In practice, the scope o f  the emphasis of the information depends on the legal
548 For some analysis, Zajtay, L, 1973, p.212-213, Kropholler, 1992, p.706.
549 For some general rem arks, see Zweigert, K., Kötz, H ., 1977, p.12.
550 Tur, R.H.S., 1977, p .246, Zweigert, K., Kötz, H., 1977, p.12.
551 Zweigert, K., Kötz, K., 1987, p.44.
511 Kahn-Freund,0., 1966, p.59.
” 3 Hill, J., 1989, p .102 .
554 Shapiro, M ., 1981, p.vii
553 Zweigert, K., Kötz, K ,  1987, p.15, Watson, A ., 1974.
Frankenberg, G., 1985„p.420.
556 Drobnig, U ., 1972, p .l  15. Comparative law can be defined as a nonnative source o f  law, Capelletti, M ., 1973, 
p.70. M össner, J.M ., 1974, p .242.
337 Zweigert, 1949-1955, p .21 , Kamba,EJ., 1974. B enos, G. (1984, p.244) speaks about the use in formation, 
interpretation, and im plementation.
For some contemporary discussion concerning education in the realm  o f  comparative law, see Bell, J.,
1994, p.30.
The idea o f  a harmonizing construction in the comparative interpretation has been proposed (Kisch,
I., 1981).
The "harmonizing construction" has been claim ed to  make freer the determination, as to which foreign 
law is to be used, whereas the historical construction is seen to be bound to features which are common. W hen it comes 
to borrowing, the historical construction seems to be freer, and the harmonizing construction is attached to foreign law 
as it actually stands. These approaches have a different type o f  rationale (ks Kisch, L, 1981, pp .165-167).
One could also assert that where the historical connection has been found, one is freer to  use foreign
I l l
system in question.
Education. The function of comparative law in legal education can be divided into its practical, 
sociological, political, and pedagogical functions. The emphasis may vary in different social 
systems.33* For the purposes of the current discussion, it has been extensively agreed that compa­
rative law is an important part of legal education, and its role in education has been discussed in 
many connections539
The discussion on the role o f comparative legal teaching is a controversial subject. 
Traditionally, it has been seen as an important part of education, because it extends knowledge 
as such, and maintains interest in law in general.560 The main idea is that comparative law is 
interesting and increases knowledge.561 It makes education more lively562. On the other hand, it 
may also liberate from the borders o f other systems, and show different possibilities563. Here, the 
interest is pedagogical and educative, in both the general and particular sense.
In addition, it may make international understanding possible564. The teaching of 
comparative law may create a basis for legal and cultural communication between lawyers from 
different countries.565 It is important in educating international lawyers566.
Furthermore, comparative law has, as we have seen, its connections to general
law  and to determine the nature o f the foreign element in the context o f  the borrowing system. O n the other hand, the 
historical approach seems to emphasis systematic autonomy, where the harmonizing construction is related more to 
ideas of reflexive evolution. Furthermore, it appears as if  the harmonizing construction concentrates on the role o f 
comparative law from the legal order’s point o f view, and neglects the relatively autonomous history of comparative 
law.
It may also be noted, that different types of analysis may derive from these different approaches. The 
harmonizing construction m ay orient itself more to the analysis of the foreign system, whereas the historical approach 
m ay direct its attention to the suitability o f the foreign element to one’s own system. In reality, however, these two 
approaches may not deviate greatly. The analysis o f foreign law is still determined by its "own system" conceptuali­
zation. The differences m ay appear at the "translation" level; the harmonizing construction may be only a stage of the 
translation, i.e. it leads to further analysis o f the adoption.
351 Winterton, G., 1975, p.81. Some discussion, Constantinesco, 1972, pp.367-368.
539 For example, Fix-Zamundo, H., p.38, Friedmann, W„ 1973, Kropholler, J., 1992, p.705.. Development of 
comparative legal teaching, K5tz, H., 1997, p.10.
360 Tur, R.H.S., 1977, p .237 ff.
361 Tut, R.H.S., 1977, p .238.
361 Bmsiin, O., 1953, p .435.
563 Kropholler, J .. 1992, p.704.
564 Tunc, A., 1978, p.291.
T he idea that law is a  discursive system, and a matter o f a  best argument deriving from a  bunch of 
different legal sources, suggests that comparative law is a relevant part o f  education.
563 Schlesinger, R.B., 1980, p.40.
366 Blanc- Jouvan, 1996, p.347 ff.
For example, in European law, the main task of the functionaires is to  analyze comparatively different 
legal systems. Some analysis o f this point is provided below.
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jurisprudence. In this sense, the teaching o f comparative law can prepare the ground fo r 
comparative legal studies567.
In practice, however, comparative law has been included in many countries* 
curricula as an option only.568As a university discipline, comparative law does not have an im p o r­
tant role.569 Furthermore, it is not clear what type of context the comparative law curricu lum  
should contain. The question has been asked, for example, whether it should it include th e  
teaching of foreign languages, computer sciences etc.570 It has also been maintained that teaching  
should prepare for the post-university career.571
The basic obstacle for its inclusion in programs of legal education is the idea o f  
legal education in general: the learning of binding systems o f law.572 It has been contended also 
that in comparative law education one should stress the cultural differences between nations, and ,
567 Kahn-Freund, O., 1973, p.328. However, one may notice that in different universities and institutions co m p ara tiv e  
law is related to different subjects. At the formal level, there are jurisprudence-comparative law combinations, b u t a lso  
social sciences-comparative law combinations.
5M Fix-Zamundo, H., 1990, p.38.
m  For W ales and England, see. Hill, J., 1989, p .l 14.
Some exam ples may be mentioned. T he  teaching of comparative law  in United States has a p p e a re d  
European centered. This was so, at least in the second half o f  the century, because there were many Europeans in  U n ited  
S tates' law schools (See, Hazard, J.N., Comparative Law  in Preparation to Statesmanship, Rotondi, p .359). S o m e  o f  
these Europeans include: Rheinstein, M„ Neum ann, F., Ehrenzweig, A.A., Riesenfeld, S.A., Schlesinger, R .B . (ib id . 
p.360). For the post-war situation in the United States (see Zweigert, K., Kôtz, H., 1977, p. 16). Teaching is m any tim es 
based on translations. Comparative law courses are not obligatory, and they are often considered marginal. It seem s that 
effectiveness demands have resulted in this. The Federal system is a separate comparative law sphere in itself. 
Internationalization has increased the interest in com parative law (Moore, R., Le droit comparé aux ètats-U nis. In: 
Rev.Int.Dr. Comp. 1994, p.758).
In Japan, comparative law has had an extremely central role, especially in the construction o f education  
and legal culture in the 19th century (See, M itsuta, Y , 1973). See also, Takizawa, T. (Pp.871-876), A tsushi, O . 
(pp,877-883) Rev.Int.Dr.Comp, 1995.
For the situation in Italy, see Sacco, R ., 1996, pp.273-278. The organization of comparative stud ies 
in France after the second world war (Zweigert, K., Kôtz, H ., 1987, p.l 6). It has becom e more general.
W est-Germany before 1977, see Zweigert, K., Kôtz, H., 1987, p . l 7.
For Switzerland Stoffel, W.A., 1994, p .762  ff. European law is also Mcomparative”(?).
For the Netherlands, see Hondius, E.H., 1977, pp.560-577.
An extensive study of the role o f com parative law in educating “domestic” lawyers, see R ev.Int.D r. 
Comp. 1988, pp.703-751 (Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Greece, Japan, France) and “foreign lawyers, see 
RevjnLDr. Comp. 1993, pp.9-79 (Germany, England, Italy, Switzerland, France, Europe in general, the United States). 
T here are internal and external differences. These differences seem to relate to the structure and effectiveness o f 
education  in general, and to  the general “homogeneity”  and the “orientation" of the educational and socio-political 
thought in these countries. Europeanization seem s to have a strong impact to the orientation.
For the comparative law teaching and legal professions, see Rev.Int.Dr.Comp., 1994 (pp.725-807).
570 Bogdan, M ., 1990. O n some problems, see Capelletti, M ., 1973, p.73. Also Hondius, E.H., 1977, p.562.
571 Capelletti, M ., 1973, p.71.
572 For problem s regarding the comparative law  curriculum , see Winterton, G., 1975, p p .97 -99 ,116-118.
T he role o f comparative law as a  part o f  the University curriculum has been discussed extensively.
T he role o f comparative law is seen m ainly in scientific and political discourses, rather than in legal 
discourses. Comparative law  has been regarded m ore as a  professional-scientific and professional-governance issue.
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for that matter, the problems of language.573
It has been argued that the “Europeanization” and “integration” in Europe has 
changed and will change the styles of legal teaching.574 This is related to the teaching of 
comparative law in the future.
4.6. Some thoughts on traditional comparative law in general
General rem arks on the  characteristics of traditional comparative law. As we have noted, 
traditional comparative law examines contemporary forms of legitimation in law and legal 
systems. It tries to reveal the structure and functions o f law in different societies, and seems to 
be able to deduce legal dogmatics from it, to a certain extent.
Ultimately, one can observe positive law and conceptual underpinnings of one 
system on the basis o f the “law” o f another system. Furthermore, one can, and one usually does, 
reveal the customs o f  the one's own system in the process of selection and choosing customs, 
institutions, concepts, and structures from the other systems. All discovered elements can be used 
in argumentation within the "internal" discourse.575
As we have maintained, comparative legal research parallels every discipline, and 
can contribute concepts and ideas to the legal discourse. In this sense, it is part o f legal 
systematization. It opens up systemic possibilities for the legal discourse. It brings legal 
arguments to the legal discourse o f a system.576 The more analytical, the better.
In this sense, comparative law seems to be the purest form of empirical legal 
research in general Basically, it is not bound to practicality in any "normative sense", apart from 
its attachment to a political theory. Furthermore, it departs from the idea of social sciences in 
many ways.
On the other hand, comparative law research, if done properly, is burdensome, as 
it requires much time and dedication. It is linguistically and methodologically problematic, and 
irritating because o f“cultural” barriers.577 This is why comparative law has problems being "living 
comparative law", and why it tends to be only a professional matter, an issue for those who are 
obliged to undertake it or who are dedicated to it. This, on the other hand, may lead to a
573 Winterton, G., 1975, p.81.
374 See also, Moccia, L., 1997, p.800 ff.
373 This is the phenomenological side o f comparative law. This dimension has been identified by the tradition of 
comparative law by "understanding” and “developing" one’s own system.
376 For the idea that comparative law is a  source o f arguments (dialectic), Kekkonen, J., Legal research in  changing 
Europe. In: Oikeus, 1992, p.345.
377 Frankenberg, G., 1985, p.420.
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relatively superficial and frivolous comparative law discourse. Comparative explanations appear 
in rather abstract forms. Moreover, the contemporary professionalization and institutionalization 
has caused strong "stereotypical" observations o f foreign legal systems and legal “cultures”. This 
seems to lead more to misunderstandings than to understanding.
Traditional comparative law seems to be based on a ’rationality’ assumption o f legal 
systems. It takes it as given that legal systems are a guarantee o f the rationality o f law571 *78. 
Contemporary comparative law has taken, to a certain extent, many system distinctions for 
granted. This has, it may be claimed, affected the emphasis of the research o f comparative 
methodology and comparative legal cultures.579
In addition, the comparative law discourse, based on these cultural spheres, has, as 
an autonomous branch of law, fallen into an internal crisis as a discourse. This can be seen 
especially in the spheres of law, where development is fast580. On the other hand, attempts have 
been made to establish the authority o f comparative law by a massive endeavour to discover the 
system of the systems, a cultural classification of legal systems as a cultural endeavour. The result 
has been a kind of legal-cultural-political science581, based on legal material, which is attached, on 
the other hand, to the basic structural characteristics of the traditional nation state.
At the same time, comparative law seems also to be bound to the general rationality 
assumption. It assumes a separate rationality o f the comparative legal discourse.
Consequently, the role of comparative law has been, in the sphere of legal systems, 
that of an imaginary and independent "legal systematic discourse”, in which different influences 
appear at the back of one's mind, or in which comparative observations may be used in extremely 
abstract way! One may say that the practical value of the systematic interaction has been hidden 
within a scientification o f system relationships, which has resulted, on the other hand, in an 
internal rationality problem for comparative law. It has failed to establish its own authority as an 
authoritative source of inspiration.
In this work, the functions of comparative law are evaluated and described more 
thoroughly in connection with the study o f institutionalized European law. One could claim that
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571 The basic feature of m odem  comparative law is the closing up of legal systems and the reduction of existing
complexity o f  socio-Iegal systems to simple, legal formalism (Frankenberg, G ., 1985, p .437, Sacco, R., 1991, p.401,
Legrand, P., 1996, p.59 ff.).
T he closing up of systems in comparative law enables instrumental uses of the legal systems as
arguments. In this sense, modem comparative law is based on a closed system conception. On the other hand, the use
o f comparative observations in open legal discourses may open these closed systems.
T he clear p rob lem  of comparative law is its the inability to  recognize different levels of conflicts
between different socio-Iegal systems (Loussouam, Y „ 1981, p.134).
579 Zweigert, K., Kôtz, H. claims, however, that comparative law has not concentrated extensively upon its 
methodology (1977, p.24). This statement sounds quite odd given the contemporary co n tex t
5.0 It is not sufficient to say that comparative law  should go to case law to find its practical importance, see M ar- 
kesinis, P ., 1990.
5.1 For example, David, R., Brierly, J.E.C., 1978.
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the legal function of comparative law appears there more clearly. The abstract description of the 
functions of comparative law remains more or less ritualistic, until the normative targets and aims 
are revealed.582 This makes it seem also instrumental in theory.
Quantitative and qualitative dimensions, and  structuralist and functionalist approaches in 
com parative law. Is there something more? As maintained, comparative law assumes the 
qualitative and quantitative dimensions o f law. The quantitative aspect refers to the quantity of 
legal systems required for comparison. The qualitative aspect seems to refers to the extension of 
the analytical approach in the comparison.583
Traditionally, the quality o f comparative legal studies has been associated with the 
examination o f traditional legal systems from the point o f view o f the traditional theory o f legal 
sources. While more value-based comparison refers to more restricted sources, the 
instrumentalist approach takes into account the law as a social instrument, and in this way orients 
itself towards political, sociological and other "contexts" of the traditional legal sources.
Traditional comparative law has concentrated on the establishment of the function 
o f  certain legal institutions in different societies. On the other hand, its scientific aim is to find 
essential, similarities, and differences, and the comparability or incomparability o f these 
structures.584
This may be related to the structuralist and functionalist approaches in the tradition 
o f comparative law.585 The first approach aims at confirming the structures, forms and "figures" 
o f legal institutions, while the latter, on the other hand, stresses the importance of the functions 
o f law in certain concrete situations, and laws' ability to adapt itself to changing situations. In this 
latter sense, its aim is to study the functions of law in different systems as a resolver of conflicts 
o f  interests.
On the other hand, the structural and historical approach of comparative law 
stresses the importance of the ideal dialectics o f certain concepts. The restricted idea o f the 
relevance of the context-bound discussion may leave essential features o f the phenomenon in the 
background. In this sense, the value-based nature of the structuralist approach encourages the 
strong functionality of the study itself. These types of studies are easy to use in legitimating 
functions, because of this lack of context. The comparative-contextual (and the socio-historical) 
approach, on the other hand, in stressing the importance o f the context, maintains the autonomy
582 Jamieson, M ., 1996. This "suits the pedantic fram e o f mind (ibid.).
It is quite generally recognized that until we claim openly what we want and what is our aim, we are, 
in a discourse, trapped in a ritualistic use of words and sentences. Every form of "translation" is based on this fact (ibid., 
p. 124). For the view that comparative law is essentially instrumental, see Pizzorusso, A., 1987, pp.79-84.
583Some analysis of the qualitative aspect, Schmitthoff, M., 1941, p.98 ff.
38* Rozmaryn, S., 1973, pp .581-583.
583 Rozmaryn, S., 1973, p.580.
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of historical discourses, and becomes closer to  the scientific study o f comparative history o f  law .
Both have their ments. The object of the study of comparative law is evidently som e 
kind of confirmation of structures o f law. All the same, one has to look also into the functions o f  
these structures as social phenomena in real life, so as to be able reasonably to "instruméntate" 
them both in theory and in practice. Functionality is the necessary aspect of the com parative 
study of the legal phenomena.586
Nevertheless, rarely in comparative law, is the attention paid to the actual "legal” 
effects of these differences and similarities, comparabilities and in comparabilities. This m ay be 
due to the fact that legal effects of the similarities and differences function at the limits o f  law . 
They are functioning in a sphere which is determined by political theory and the self-evident 
primary rules of systems. These effects, however, are part of the comparison as an argument, and 
may have further legal consequences.587 Comparative legal studies, which concentrate on the legal 
functionality of comparative law itself, take, in other words, the study further.
The autonomous and substantive na tu re  of com parative law. As we have noted, som ehow  
the idea of the relative autonomy of the discipline o f comparative law had been inherited in 20th  
century.588 This idea puts emphasis upon the idea of developing the comparative method, i.e. fo r 
arriving at a method o f comparative law which would best serve scientific interests, i.e. the 
objective inquiry into knowledge. As we have seen, it has been claimed that comparative law is 
* more a method an and activity rather than a substantive discipline in its own right. This 
perspective has led to the study of the autonomous purposes and uses of comparative law in 
theory.589 It can be said that this resulted in an impractical orientation of scientific comparative 
law590.
However, the postulate that comparative law reveals patterns, developments and 
concepts common to all nations reflects the idea that 20th century comparative law tries also to  
be a substantive subject. This interest in “substantive” comparative law has, to a certain extent, 
grown on the theoretical level, resulting in works attempting to connect comparative law to the
SM Rozmaryn, S., 1973, p .5 8 1.
5,7 C ontem porary comparative constitutional law, for example, could be an attem pt to study these aspects. 
Comparative historical approach concentrates on  these aspects, but is m ore based on the general idea-historical 
approach than on the legal discursive approach. This latter approach stresses the importance of the larger (social) 
context within the discursive functionality.
588 For some discussion on this autonomous scientific nature, see Constantinesco, L-J., 1971, p.203 flf., pp.272-273. 
In the 19th and 20th  centuries, comparative law  has increasingly maintained its "autonomy" as a distinction in law 
(Ancel, M ., 1973, p .9). Some analysis, see N eum eier, K.H., 1973, p.521).
5W Baxter, L G .. 1993, pp.86-88.
590 W here medieval and early modem com parative law emphasized the idea o f Roman law as a tertium 
comparationis, the 19th and 20th century comparative law seem s to be based on the national state legal system as a 
tertium comparationis. On the other hand, while 19th century comparative law had its political and ethnological forms 
o f state, the contemporary paradigm  seems to be “political".
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development o f law in general, i.e. more closely to social scientific research.591 It can be claimed 
that the focus on more sociologically determined comparative law is a step away from the 
traditional conceptual-analytical comparative law.592
On the other hand, the underscoring of the substantive dimension can be seen in 
more detailed and specialized comparative research in both the private and public sectors, 
developing in the fields o f specialized legislation, international unification, and the everyday 
practice of international commercial transactions (for example in the coming of the new 
mercantile law). This internal segmentation o f legal systems has had effects also on comparative 
legal research.
Contemporary comparative legal research has a substantive character also in the 
form of inter-university activity.593
One of the problems connected to the idea of the autonomy, or to the independence 
and distinctiveness, o f comparative law is the relationship between comparative law and law in 
general. Certain remarks may be made against the idea of autonomy and independence.
The legal institutions studied in the realm o f comparative law are determined by 
formal and positive law. In this sense, comparative law has to have a direct relationship to the 
branches of law studied. Comparative law has its own material basis. For the same reason, 
comparative law can be claimed not to be a method in the study law, but rather a scientific 
orientation or a form o f legal discourse.594 *
For that matter, the idea o f the relationship between general jurisprudence and 
comparative law seems to be relevant to the question of "autonomy". Namely, we may maintain 
that comparative law does not, in a jurisprudential legal discourse, really "establish" any 
conceptual framework. All legal systems, as with comparative law itself, belong within the sphere 
o f  the general jurisprudential discourse. In this way, the comparative discourse may be, in a 
sense, analogical to general jurisprudence, but not really a distinctive or a special "part" o f it593.
On the other hand, even if one could claim that comparative law is relevant only for 
legal science, one cannot avoid the fact that it is used also in practical decision-making in law as 
an argument, to whatever audience it is directing itself.596 In point o f fact, it is quite problematic
591 Zeitschrift ftir vergleichende Rechtsvisscnschaft (1878*), Ernest Rabels Institute o f comparative Law, University 
o f  Munich, Kaiser Wilhelm (Max Planck) Institutes for private law (Hamburg), and for foreign and international public 
law  (Heidelberg).
592 Rheinstein, M ., 1968, p. 207. A  similar "cross-scientific" development can be seen in the United States.
" T h e  inter-subjective and communicative approach has been claimed to have impacted upon the comparative legal 
research in future (Schwarz-Liebermann von Wallendorf, H.A., 1973, p.615).
594 Rozmaryn, S., 1973, pp.590-591.
5W For some discussion, see Bell, J, 1994. For some ideas on the relationship between jurisprudence and 
comparative law, see Schlesinger, 1980, p.42.
S96 De Boer, Th.M „ 1994, p.24.
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to think that no value or instrumental interest would be involved in comparative studies.
Furthermore, the illusion of autonomy seems to be connected to the belief that in 
particular (closed) legal discourses, comparative considerations do play an enormous qualitative 
role.
Consequently, comparative law may maintain its "autonomy" only within a sy s ­
tematic framework, but not in a "free" legal discourse as such.597
Analysis of the relationship between comparative law and o ther social scientific disciplines.
It is quite evident that any fundamental "naturalization" of comparative law, by introducing, fo r 
example, factors such as climatical dimensions - tends to turn comparative law into a merely 
contrastive process. On the other hand, some contrastive naturalization is needed for the 
discipline to even exist. Law viewed only as a matter of systematic political discourse tends to  
universalize any argument, and consequently, to show law as an unnecessary distinction between 
different societal discourses.
On the other hand, as we have seen, sociologizations in contemporary comparative 
law, where they are made, tend to be constructed upon extremely general conceptions. 
Sociologically-oriented comparative law has a character o f being a "program", a teleological 
discipline. The idea that sociological observations are part of the discipline is repeated in the 
theoretical research time and time again, without any real attempt to start to really "sociologize" 
the discipline.
Because some natural relativism must, and can, scientifically, be established as an 
a priori idea, comparative law can be claimed to have relevance as a feature of and a distinction 
in legal discourse. Comparative law is, accordingly, based on some cultural relativism within 
reason. On the other hand, even if the sociologically oriented approach to comparative law 
stresses the differences between law in books and law in action598, it has to take into account the 
distinctions between legal systems to be able to  maintain itself as a legal scientific discipline599.
Consequently, we may say that behind the subject of comparative law, there is an 
assumption of an already existing conception of law, and as well a political theory, which assumes 
that certain processes o f law creation are legally valid. It seems that in more sociological appro-
397 In this sense, the claim  that general jurisprudence w ould be empty without com parative law is not convincing 
(contrary to Tur, R.H.S., 1977, p.249). There is a  fruitful interaction between these tw o relatively "distinctive" spheres 
o f  law, but comparative law, as a  discipline related to the positivist tradition, is still only one argument within the 
general jurisprudential discourse.
O n different systematic connections, see Klami, H.T., 1997, p.6-7
591 See, Drobning, U ., 1971.
399 The problem o f  the sociological approach to  law  is em bedded in the aim, characteristic of this type of approach, 
to  reduce the law to social systems. These reductions, in the context o f the state paradigm , lead unavoidably to disparate 
conceptions. Consequently, com parative generalizations seem  to be difficult to  make.
O n the other hand, one must be  critical o f the claim that sociology can  assist comparative law by 
explaining “social facts*’(?) (Zw eigert, K., Kotz, H ., 1977, p.10).
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aches to law» one sees law as a product of social practices, but does not merely stress the 
centrality of specific political processes as a basis of law creation.
This means also that the pure sociological, plurality-based, approach to law is not 
so central to comparative law. Comparative law, in order to exist as a balanced subject, has to 
assume a political conception of law as its basis, and not only as a  plurality-based sociological 
approach to legal formations.
This does not mean, however, that the sociological approach would be completely 
useless. Its use merely has to be regarded in a political context, that is, all alternative processes 
of law creation must be reflected within the prevailing political theory. This means, for example, 
that what would seem to be an extremely "sociological" approach in one society, could be 
regarded as fundamentally political in another society, and, accordingly, to be legally relevant.
Consequently, as one may understand, under the comparative approach the roles of 
political, legal, and social science become mixed. One really does not have to make a clear 
distinction between these different approaches any longer. The central idea in comparative law 
is rather the philosophical and historical interpretation more than is true in any other legal 
approach. Features such as comparison and culture and all conceptions of comparative law 
become "weak" conceptions as anthropologic-cultural conceptions. However, this does not 
mean, as we have maintained, that law should be seen as a necessarily pluralistic and polycentric 
concept. This idea would suppose another type of political theory.
In conclusion, even if the role of the sociology can be seen as crucial in comparative 
law, its role is restricted.600 Comparative law is a legal discipline. Within the contemporary 
paradigm, state systems function as possibilities for comparative legal studies as sources o f legal 
norms, and different types of "scientific" generalizations. Too much sociology closes these 
systems as normative social systems.601 This may pose unbearable burden upon the entire 
concept. Absolute sociologization could mean deconstruction of the ethnological state paradigm 
of comparative law, and the basis of the dynamic would disappear from the discipline. This would 
also entail problematic consequences for the idea of law in general. Comparative law should, in 
o ther words, recognize the political nature o f legal communities, and in this way restrict itself 
both scientifically and argumentatively to the traditional sources o f law. It should not freeze the
600 See also Klami, H.T., 1997, p.9.
601 Example of this, Kulla, Oikeusvertailu ja  eurooppalainen hallintooikeus. In: Comparative law: what, why, and 
how ? [Jamforande juridik, vad varfbr hur?] M eddelanden frSn ekonomisk-statsvetenskapliga fakulteten vid Abo 
Akademi, Abo) 1996, p.40. Kulla maintains:
“Occasionally some have been skeptical about the possibilities o f  comparative law because o f the 
cultural, political, and economic differences behind the legal systems. This type o f scepticism does 
not seem to be justified in relation to research on the European legal systems. Even social scientific 
research has shown that European countries are lareelv similar, for example. bv their industrial 
structure” (emphasis added).
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social systems on the basis of general practical statements, unless it recognizes the possibility o f  
system change. This is achieved by the use o f  traditional legal sources, and by following closely  
the legal discourses in legal systems. If legal systems were not seen within comparative law  
paradigm as dynamic and evolutionary systems, this would mean a problem for the integrity o f  
these systems as legal systems.
To a certain extent, the comparative perspective is related to the critical analysis o f  
legal systems.602 When using the comparative method, one is able to accord with the cu ltural 
heritage of one system, with all and its peculiarities, its political and social philosophy. A t the 
same time, one has an analytically legitimate perspective upon it, which is not based on  
hypothetical situations. In this sense, comparative law is a means o f using law as a conceptual 
framework for social observations. Comparative law appears to be legal sociology.603
602 An indication of this type of idea, Capelletti, M., 1990a, p.2. Schlesinger, R .B., 1980, p.41.
603 The function of comparative law appears to  be problem atic from the point o f view of the discursive con cep t o f  
law. This is related to the problems of affiliation betw een comparative law and sociology. Namely, so  ca lled  
sociological studies may “normativize” forms o f  behaviour, even if these forms do not appear in political o r legal 
discourses, which, on the other hand, result in legal forms and their interpretations. This way sociology generates th e  
identification of phenomena o f regular social behaviour, w hich cannot be grasped necessarily in concrete discourses o f  
law and politics. The question consequently, concerns the bringing into light forms o f behaviour, which persons m ay  
consider normatively binding.
Now, essentially, we may say that it is up  to  the legal and political discourses to choose norm ative 
societal values. "Sociologically identified forms o f behaviour” may, evidently, function as a healthy source o f  
alternatives, or confirmations, to be used in the dialectics o f  politics or o f law. One could even claim that sociological 
observations are extremely effective, because they have a distance from any "self-referential” forms o f politics and  law , 
and may indicate a need for a change in the normative "planning" taking place in the political and legal spheres. In fact, 
the customary, non-discursive, forms o f behaviour have always functioned as a  “natural”  basis of change. This is w hy 
m odern law is obliged to take these types of observations into account so as to be able to follow the tendencies in 
societal discourses, which are effected in a form other than that suggested by “official”  and “formal” discourses (sim ilar 
types o f ideas (for similar types o f ideas, see David, R„ Brierly, J.E.C., 1978, p.13).
Now, comparative law, as such, does not depart from this too far. T he professional and institutional 
idea of national, regional and international orders has imm ense instability, if  they do not take into account the deviating 
form s o f discourses in national and other legal systems in  relation to each other. Sociologized comparative law  m ay 
grasp  phenomena which the self-referential institutional discourses cannot master. It is a  way to avoid fundamental 
conflicts between different legal orders and to maintain their discursive integrity.
O n the other hand, we may identify a  peculiar problem in the sociological comparative law.
If  the sociological approach to law  would prevail, we could start to evaluate also deviations from  law  
in other societies as comparative legal material. Namely, traditionally sociology in law has identified forms of behaviour 
in societies in order to help legislators form positive legal rules. In this way, sociology is a discipline which produces 
data for interpretations “outside the legal”.
However, in the comparative legal approach, sociology appears tempting because the peculiarities o f 
one society are often related not only to legally-acceptable behaviour, but also behaviour outside the law. W e may often 
identify  specific features o f one society by referring to deviations from legally acceptable behaviour. Furthermore, 
because comparative law is often phenomenologically oriented, legal diversity catches the eye, and may appear relevant 
to  the legal analysis o f another system.
N ow , in this sense, comparative law is frequently oriented also not only to “non-law” in som e 
acceptab le way but also to “illegal” behaviour, which m ay, to  a certain extent, be “acceptable” according to  its 
custom ary basis. In fact, whereas in the traditional legal approach one feels bound to  forms of behaviour, which are 
normatively regulated and categorically binding, in the com parative approach, however, one has lost the conventional 
“ relevancy” distinctions, and m any regular, even illegal form s o f behaviour m ay seem to  be relevant ,(from the legal 
po int o f view”.
This somehow gives even more importance to  the “ legality” approach to  comparative law. Because o f
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Some problems within the distinctions of comparative law. As we have maintained, the basis 
of the modem idea of comparative law is the nation state paradigm of law. The nation state is the 
object of classification.
M odem  comparative discourse has been characterized by distinctions such as 
sources of law and principles regarding their treatment, legal families604, leading systems605, legal 
traditions, style, historical background, development, ’’modes o f thought" in legal matters, 
distinctive institutions, ideologies, religions, the “great” or “main” systems of law, common 
core/radically different countries606, and furthermore, by distinctions such as mature/immature 
(affiliated), developed/developing, modem/primitive, parent/derived etc.607 These are the 
distinctions of the macro comparison608.
The typology or classification of legal systems is one of the crucial questions in 
comparative legal science. It is the basis of the whole idea of legal comparison.609 All these 
distinctions give rise to possibilities of different types of approaches to the relationship between 
legal systems.
One can claim that the basic distinctions directly parallel different conceptions of 
law. We may speak about fundamental values, or even about reflexive relationships between the 
basic concepts o f "private and public", within the realm of these distinctions. "Families" refer to 
the "archaic" basis o f systems, and the analogy is taken from the concept of family (in the 
"ethnological" and "geographical" sense)610. The idea of main systems, for example, has to do
the lack of traditionality, one has to remember that everything, which seems to  be allowed, is not legally allowed in 
som e society. On the other hand, because one cannot leam everything from law  books, customs appear im portant 
Nevertheless, they function, for a comparative lawyer, only as preliminary steps for understanding the legal-non-legal 
distinctions in some societies.
The sociologization of comparative law is to do with this phenomenon. Without the traditional con tex t 
the comparative lawyer may sometimes identify legal customs, which are strongly opposed to more "traditional law”.
604 David, R., Brierly, J.E.C ., 1978, p .l, pp.17-29.
605 See, analysis by Kirsch, I., 1981.
606 Schlesinger, R.B., 1968, also Frankenberg, G., 1985, p.42.
607 Malmstrom, A. (1969) notes on the problem of classification in comparative law. See, Frankenberg, G., 1985, 
p.422. For some comments on classification, Friedmann, L.M., 1990, p.50 ff. The Modem/primitive distinction relates 
clearly  to the premises of the classical antropology (“’they" could be accurately described in ’our’ terms,T) (see, 
MacCarthy, Doing the Rights Thing in Cross-cultural Representation. In: Ethics, 1992, p.637).
** See, Bogdan, M., 1990, p .82, David, R., Brierly, J.E.C., 1978, and Sanders, A J.G .M ., 1990, p.63, Zweigert, K., 
Kotz, H., 1977, p.33 ff.
609 Rozmaryn, S., 1973, p.585.
6,0 The idea of David, I t ,  Brierly, JE .C . in this matter is highly complex (1978, p p .19-20). David, R., explains that 
"the idea o f a legal family does not correspond to biological reality: it is no more than a didactic device** (teaching 
legal families?). The idea o f legal family seems to be an  ideal and non-normative criterion:
and in that light, almost any systematic classification would serve the purpose.**
On the other hand, the classification o f legal families does not seem  to be connected to any particular
legal rules:
"The classification of laws into families should not be made on the basis o f the similarity or 
dissimilarity o f any particular legal rules, important as they might be. This contingentfactor is, in
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with the modem utilitarian criterion o f the importance of these systems (an idea- and political- 
historical criterion)611. The modem/primitive" distinction, on the other hand, stresses the 
(modem) rationality o f the system.
"Style" and "technique" can be associated with the argumentative aspects o f  
systems, and the "philosophy" criterion seems to  stress the importance o f the internal discourses 
and some kind of closed evolution. Style seems to be strongly connected to the "persuasiveness" 
of justifications, and, in this sense, it has to do with the "self-maintenance" of the system o f law 
as a "cultural" system. Consequently, styles may be important for the "maintenance o f cultural 
law", and to the existence of the legal system as a cultural system. Nevertheless, at the same time, 
the discourse on law seems to resemble more like a  discussion concerning stereotypical "identi­
ties" and the stressing o f cultural distinctions rather than a discourse on law612.
effect, inappropriate when highlighting what is truly significant in the characteristics o f a given 
system o f law”.
The general and connecting factor seems to  be  based on a  universalistic category more than a  com plex 
of particular legal rules (a tertium comparationisT). This non-contingent idea seems to  be the idea o f a  legal system  as 
a subject of classification:
“We are attempting no more than to underscore the similarities and differences o f various legal 
systems”
O n the other hand, the whole idea of classification seems to  be strongly context dependent:
"The matter turns upon the context in which one is placed and the aim in mind”
In other words, it appears as if  the classification of legal families takes place in the context and o f  
highly specific aims, where non-normative criterion is applied to  an a priori idea of a  legal system. Any particular legal 
rules are considered to be irrelevant to the distinction.
This idea is interesting. We may say that we are left with a strongly-established link between categories 
o f  legal families o f legal systems as idea-historical categories with a subjective aim and context The acceptability o f  
the results of this classification, on the other hand, seems to  be dependent on the “universality” of the perspective and 
some legally relevant distinctions:
“The suitability o f the classification will depend upon whether the perspective is world-wide or 
regional, or whether attention is given to public, private, or criminal law”
In this sense, clearly some legal normativeness is involved (as a structural assumption). Namely, 
Markesinis, for example, observes how the possibility to m ove beyond the criminal law/private law distinction is typical 
to comparative lawyer (193, p.630).
For some further analysis, see Friedmann, L.M. (1990, pp.50-51) w ho attaches the family distinction 
to coherence. Pizzorusso, A., on the other hand, maintains that distinctions of legal families is based exclusively on rules 
concerning the application o f  law by judges (1980, p.301).
<M For some problems concerning the "families" distinctions, see Bell, JM 1994, p.19. Earlier, Zajtay, I., 1973, p .2 1 1
ff.
612 For an example of this type of legal discourse, see Legrand, P., 1996, p.282.
This type o f discourse - it may be claimed - is typical of the period after the second world war.
O ne may ask, what difference does style make to the hard core of law. Style seems to be one o f the 
distinctions of "cultural" com parative law, which, as noted, pays more attention to the "identity" of the system than to 
its discursive and normative functioning.
For the distinction based on style, see Zweigert, K., K6tz, H ., 1977, pp.61-63. This is a  “modernist”
distinction:
“The concept o f style which originated in the literary and fine arts has long been used in other 
fields. Style in the arts signifies the distinctive element o f a work or its unity in form. But many other 
disciplines use this fertile concept to indicate congeries o f particular features which the most diverse 
objects o f study may posses ”.
T he criteria o f  a  style include historical, philosophical, institutional, legal source and ideology based
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In modem classification, "political” resemblances have also played an important 
role. This type of distinction is the distinction between the socialist and western systems. Here the 
criterion has been the political nature of the system. These types of "political" criteria have been 
taken from socioeconomic theories. Furthermore, some "mixtures" of this idea have been also 
presented (“social types o f systems”).* 613
It has been suggested that the "variable criterion according to different branches 
o f law* is the idea to apply.614 This would be based on the fact that the object and the methods of 
regulations differ considerably. Systems should not be classified entirely according to basic 
"holistic" criteria, but according to different branches of law.
In the field o f private law, the distinction between "common law" and "civil law" is 
quite strongly established.615 The common law/civil law distinction refers, for example, with the 
help of institutions such as trust, to different conceptions o f property, but also to other which 
elements have been seen as important in this distinction616.
On the other hand, some "substantial" distinctions have also been proposed, which 
are based on the "legal" qualities o f certain systems. For example, a distinction between "legal 
types" or "typical solutions” seems to belong to this category.617 This is a step away from the 
"political realists”" solutions to more "legal idealists”" solution, and it appears as a change in the 
comparative paradigm.
As we may see, the idea of basic distinctions and classifications has remained fairly 
controversial, and may be said to be unresolved. The problems surrounding different distinctions 
are connected to the lack of "social" dimensions and functionality o f systems in a meaningful 
sense. Furthermore, classifications seem to give a justification for peripheral countries being able 
distinguish themselves from the "hard core countries".618 Furthermore, political changes seem to
features (ibid,, 1977, pp.62-66).
An example of the geographical distinction is the “Rechtskrcisc” by Zweigert, H., and Kbtz, H ., (1971) 
(See, Zajtay, I., 1973, p.212 ff.).
613 Rozmaryn, S., 1973, p.586. For a comparative study with an extensive analysis of differences, Manila, H.E.S. 
1979 (for example, p.47 ff.).
T he com parison of socialist and W estern systems has been divided to comparison of “system- 
conditioned” (administrative law and the law of state organization) and “system-neutral” (family law, criminal and 
procedural law) institutions (Kropholier, J., 1992, p.706..
6)4 Rozmaryn, S ., 1973, p.588.
615 Rozmaryn, S .t 1973, p.587. Analysis, Schlesinger, 1980, p.222 ff. An “epistemological” analysis, see Legrand, 
P ., 1996, p.62ff.
6,61 consider this distinction as one of the m ost challenging distinctions in contemporary comparative law, especially 
when it is related to different conceptions and functions o f property and discursive differences
Schlesinger gives the emphasis upon the procedural differences (Schlesinger, R.B., 1980).
Some analysis is found below related to the examination of legal reasoning in some legal systems.
6,7 Drobnig, U., 1972, p. 124.
611 Frankenberg, G., 1985, p.422.
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be capable of "reconstructing" socio-legal systems fairly quickly. The basic distinction within lea­
ding systems and legal families connected to the socialist group of law shows how problematic 
these "ideological" and "cultural" distinctions in comparative law can be.619
Distinctions correspond also to ideas concerning legal history. In its analysis o f 
historical forms, comparative law is between two poles; firstly, it has to maintain the dynamics o f 
systems, and secondly, their integrity. We may say that historical connections between legal 
systems, in the form of similar rules, are not always proof of connections between contemporary 
legal systems. There can be differences, and usually there are differences, even in spite o f the easy 
adaptation of a system or part of a system to another system. This may be due to the fact that the 
doctrinal and legal cultural "context" gives the same rules a totally different content.620 M oral and 
social views can vary extensively. The more real circumstances and discursive processes are 
focussed, the more historical aspects (positive and negative) lose their importance. Here 
comparative interpretation becomes a matter o f argumentation, and the balancing and weighing 
up of different methods o f interpretation included in comparative analysis621.
In the end, it has to be asserted that different basic distinctions are not ends in 
themselves622, though it sometimes looks as if they are.623 Some "realists" appear even to  even 
oppose any basic distinctions624. On the other hand, it is clear that distinctions such as the legal 
family distinction, for example, function as justifications for certain restrictions upon inquiry, or 
for pedagogical purposes.
E ducation. One could say that the importance o f the use o f comparative law in education is 
based on the need for non-dogmatic teaching.625 That is a value in and o f itself. Lawyers do not 
usually have experience o f the real-life functioning o f law in their own, or in some other country.
619 This demonstrates a connection between com parative law  and political certainty.
620 Kisch, I., 1981, p. 167. He gives an example by referring to the differences betw een French and German legal 
doctrines of causality, culpability, mistake and evidence.
621 Comparative observation of another system has to be there connected to three dimensions o f a legal system : 
substantive, formal and functional. This means asking the following questions: what is the law in practical term s? w hat 
is it in formal terms? and how does it function in society? Systems are interconnected on all these levels.
622 Bogdan, M., 1990, p.85.
423 For an excessive am ount o f discussion on purposes, see Kahn-Freud, O ., 1978, p.327,
624 See, for example, D robnig, U., 1972, p .123. Gutteridge, H.C., 1949, p.74. For some critical analysis, see 
Zw eigert, K., Kötz, H .t 1977, p .35.
T o  a certain extent, it is problematic to speak of similarities and differences in the realm o f  law , 
because law is a politica] and ideal construction of discourse. In more a concrete nominalist context one may, naturally, 
speak about an a  priori identification of similarities. However, systems are, in their application and discourse context, 
necessarily dissimilar. One should, therefore, speak about relative generality rather than similarity or disparity.
The argument from generalities and similarities seems to create a secondary level of law. The disparity 
argum ent, on the other hand, confirm s the original legitimacy o f  the system.
625 O n this function o f com parison in general, see Sacco, R., 1980, p.307. That comparative law is not, and should 
no t be seen either, necessarily “ anti-dogmatic", see Dolle, H., 1970. Also David, R., 1981, p.200.
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The objectives is to avoid dogmatic idealizations of law, and to maintain the ability of lawyers to 
evaluate different possibilities. This can be achieved through comparative legal education.
In this sense, by reproducing the state-paradigm of law and by maintaining certain 
alternatives of perspectives, comparative legal education is a fruitful and comprehensive form of 
legal education. Comparative legal education serves positive and critical functions, and can be 
claimed to be a form o f critical positivism.626
Furthermore, it is quite evident that comparative law is a good pedagogical tool, 
because it claims systematic generality with regard to law and legal systems. It shows that law is 
applicable in other societies, and that there may be a priori similarities, whatever they may be. On 
the other hand, because comparative law still claims the relative autonomy of laws and legal sys­
tems, it can be characterized as a discursive form of legal culture.
Som e thoughts on th e  tertium  comparationis and comparative legal cultures. The idea of 
comparative legal cultures is derived from the generalities existing within different legal systems. 
These generalities are identified by the difference principle, the contents of which on the other 
hand, is dependent upon the tertium comparationis or the prior similitude (as a practical 
criterion). The tertium comparationis is, in the sense o f comparative legal cultures, both the 
internal connector and the external disconnecter of different legal cultures. Furthermore, the 
tertium  comparationis determines the sphere o f comparative research in its attempt - in a 
comparative discourse - to maintain coherence between these different legal cultures and legal 
systems. The tertium comparationis is the "cultural possibility", the discursive "blind spot" o f 
comparative law.
However, one may claim that what takes place in the explanation by culture is a 
kind o f "over-intentionalization” of societal practices627. Practices are seen as being holistically 
intentional. This idea posits the possibility of taking into account all practices and interpreting all
626 Comparative law seems to be extremely conservative idea. It seems to reproduce the traditional legal forms by 
having alternative perspectives to  law. On the same time, it gives some dynamics to  them. In its modem form, it seem  
to  b e  kind of a critical positivist approach to law (Zweigert, K., Kötz, H., 1977, p.12. critical capacity and better 
solution).
It has been maintained that all valuations connected to the positive functions of comparative law  belong 
rather to the realm o f legal criticism  ("Rechtskritik"). This may be contrasted with legal politics ("Rechtspolitik"). See 
also, Schlesinger, R.B., 1980, p.41.
A  more “universalist point of view is stated by (Zweigert, K., and Kötz, H., 1977, p.16):
“B ut it is the general educational value o f comparative taw which is the most important: it 
counteracts positivism, dogmatism and narrow nationalism, and thereby points to the universality 
o f legal science and transcendent values o f law.: by rising above mere technical specialization it 
leads to leeat thinking at a higher and more general level, and it offers the mind thus induced to be 
critical and provides a world-wide supply o f solutions" (emphasis added).
In contemporary law the situation, however, seems to be the converse. The institutionalization and 
professionalization o f law is a contemporary phenomenon. The world-wide supply of solutions has led to  the 
instrumentalization of legal discourses to a large extent
627 For some analysis, see Smith, R J.,1989, p. 425.
the acts as social. In this sense, the idea of comparative legal culture could be described as an 
idea of legal phenomenology. Comparative law, in terms of culture, seems to be based on a 
method of understanding the nature o f the phenomenon of law in general.
On the other hand, explanation by "culture" is usually not analytical, but refers 
instead to the self-referential sphere o f language, which seems also to  be quite problematic.628 On 
the other hand, explanation by "culture" is part of the political integrity, and in this sense a  
political act in itself. It seems to be problematic to view this as a coherent explanation in a  legal 
scientific sense629. On the other hand, the premise of cultural relativism is connected strongly to  
the idea of ethnocentrism630
Legal tertium comparationis? Consequently, we could claim that the tertium com parationis is 
one aspect of the self-referential description of law, whatever form it takes. Tertium  
comparationis has to be a somehow "internal" element for any of the systems compared. Further­
M*For criticism of "culture” as explanation, see Brusiin, O., 1953, pp.441-442, also Frankenberg, G, 1985, p .439 .
It seems that a legal system is basically open to its environment in cases, where it has to "hom ophonic- 
ally" refer to itself. Here a legal system constructs its legal evolution by seemingly contingent factors, such as by  
sociological claims. That is the basic feature o f comparative cultural reasoning.
This opening up takes place, sometimes, in the form of open reasoning, especially in a value-based 
manner, but in many cases substantive evolution is hidden to within concrete closeness of a system. Even if a  system  
is opened up, a posteriori, in public discourse, substantial issues remain unclear. C losure is one o f the methods for a 
system to reproduce itself as a social actor.
629 It looks like comparative law is, and has been, a backdrop for legal cultural vanity. M any products o f com parative 
law can be characterized as endeavors to gain recognition o f a particular legal system or legal culture. Furtherm ore, by 
means of comparison, discourses aim at maintaining their coherence and at achieving “comparative recognition” . The 
process of comparison seem s to be a process o f political integrity seeking, without any particular practical role.
The striving for “comparative recognition”  can be a sign o f the inability o f discourses to  maintain their 
coherence or to sustain themselves as valid form s in society.
610 It also seems to  be that where the scientist explicitly neglects ethnocentrism , certain presum ptions on 
ethnocentrism are still made (For example, Derrida, J. Structure, sign, and play in the discourse o f human sciences 
[Rakenne, merkki ja  leikki ihmistieteiden diskurssissa]. In: Niin&Nain, 1/97, p.39 ff.
“Culture” also looks like an argument via a  system of beliefs. If  understood as part o f the instrumental 
rationality, religions, languages, or more “secular” cultures have a integrative function.
A ll the same, “culture” also tends to have an "expansive" function in cases, where it is already 
functioning as a  means o f socializing, but where this function cannot be seen (“clear, bu t enigmatic”). Namely, where 
one aims to keep alive and reproduce "culture" or a system o f  beliefs, there takes place a creation of new, "occupying” 
functions which are seen as valuable in a very prim ary sense. Only in this way can 'culture" reproduce itself.
Consequently, culture in its essence is blind, and every adoption of argum ents based on culture seem
to be as well.
In contemporary legal contexts, the use of legal arguments concerning culture in the form of principles 
- based on this blind function - seems to correspond to the cultural "symbolic" developm ent of law (modernism). 
Expansionist development takes place in a culturally principled way. One could say, for exam ple, that principles cannot 
be based on culture, but culture can be based on principles. They may be derived from different genuinely discursive 
contexts. Only in this way can any symbolic expansion o f culture be avoided.
In the context of European law, as a  larger dimension o f legal discourse, one can easily recognize, how 
the  breaking down of the legal audiences and dogmatic discussions does not result in  proliferated discourses and 
reflexive relationships between these systems, but stronger attachment o f principled and cultural law of the institutional 
arrangements, and an orientation towards more and more closed ideas of legal discourses.
O n legal culture as culture in com parative law , see Friedmann, L.M., 1990, pp.51-57.
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more, whenever we are speaking about the tertium comparationis in comparative law, we are 
speaking about a legally relevant tertium comparationis.
In this sense we must ask, for example, whether a binding legal order or a system, 
function can as a tertium comparationisl This seems to be related to the question of whether 
comparative observation could be based on a common international treaty, for example.
At first glance, the answer must be negative. The legal system binding all systems 
is a common system, from which the legal orders of the parties cannot be separated. In this sense, 
we are speaking instead o f a study of a particular international legal order rather than a 
comparison of the laws o f the parties. The legal assumption is that the implementation and the 
application of international norms are uniform.
All the same, the common system can be an indication o f the existence of tertium  
comparationis. This may be a feature of the contemporary internationalization and regionalisation 
of law. Systems become increasingly comparable because of their common international features.
On the other hand, even if the legal tertium comparationis may be problematic 
because o f its legally binding nature, we may say that because of changes within international 
norms in the systematic discourse o f legal systems it may be applied as a tertium comparationis 
or at least as a scientific starting point.
“ Culture** as a  restriction o r as an  inspiration? It can be claimed that comparative law and 
recognition of other legal systems as analogical systems create possibilities for other types of 
analogies. Ultimately, these possibilities are "formative" ones (they form the legal system).
On the other hand, if the results o f comparative law are presented as types o f strict 
rules of (cultural) incomparability or comparability, the necessary nature of this distinction 
introduces a static dimension to the "cultural" sphere. The strict rules of incomparability and 
comparability create cultural obstacles, which might be later difficult to remove. In practice, they 
may become unavoidable distinctions in the legal and general cultural discourses (popular 
“stereotypes”).
Accordingly, comparative law makes it possible to find not only traditional legal 
arguments, but also the legal quality o f different types of arguments, which were previously not 
considered to be particularly relevant. On the other hand, in this way comparative law creates 
possibilities for making the distinction between legally relevant and irrelevant arguments and 
considerations.
"Cultural" based comparative considerations, not really part of the systematic 
dimension of deductive decision-making in law, on the other hand, is a "cognitive" approach 
towards other systems. This generates an inspirational and sources-of-ideas type of phenomenon 
within the traditional processes of state legal systems. This is a peculiar means of opening up the 
legal and social environments of legal systems.
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Consequently, there are basically two dimensions to consideration o f th e  
"inspirational" use of comparative law: the consideration as to how society is seen in general, an d  
consideration of the norms of the legal system in general and in particular.631
In practice, however, the interest in comparative observations seems not always to  
be determined only by these above-mentioned dimensions. A comparativist may also be interested 
in also developing her argumentative expertise in a particular or general scheme. This kind o f  
"instrumentality’' is a phenomenon occurring in many fields o f legal practice, but especially in th e  
scientific realm of comparative law. Furthermore, the phenomenon can be visible in different 
types of organizations involved in normative decision-making. Comparative considerations, even  
systematic ones, enable the decision-maker to reflect alternative possibilities (as alternative as 
they appear to him). As we may understand, these kinds o f comparative considerations are, in  
many ways, hidden from the public and explicit legal discourse.
Foreign law. Comparative law has been seen, traditionally, as distinct from practical studies o f  
foreign law. Comparative law is claimed to be an academic discipline which studies the 
relationship between different legal systems, and the rules of different systems. In this sense, it 
seems not to have a legal interest as such, but a historical and/or sociological interest.
This distinction has been challenged, to a certain extent. A study o f foreign law 
involves evaluations of relationships, and the study o f comparative law involves the study o f for­
eign law. On the other hand, one may claim that comparative law, if  stressing the separation 
between foreign law study and comparative law study, is not discursive because it has a tendency 
to interpret other systems based on some internal "objectivization"632 63. Thus, the main problem in 
"comparative law" and the study of foreign law is that the system, against which the norms and 
practices of the foreign system are reflected, tends not to be the normative premises o f  
recognition and interpretation of the foreign system, but one's own system - with its aims and 
objectives. Furthermore, no critical method of comparative law is applied.
It is true that there is some importance in an attempt to interpret foreign law from 
the point of view of its own aims and objectives - from the genuine legal point of view. Only by 
revealing basic aims and objectives, and the context of selection and choices, it is possible to  
consider as valid the evaluation o f the foreign law. On the other hand, only in this way one does 
establish possibilities for further analysis, and takes part in the traditional discourse. This is one
631 The process o f  com parative consideration seem s to be inspirational. O n the other hand, because it is determined
by  an "intuitive" sense of "cultural comparability”, it can be claimed to be also  a  "reproductive" operation.
633 Here we come to the question o f the relationship between the comparative law  method and jurisprudence in 
general. It seems that the com parative legal method could actually have a sim ilar function to general jurisprudence. 
Studies on the methodology o f  com parative law have the flavour o f general jurisprudence.
H ow ever, theories o f comparative law are "realistic" theories o f law because of their attachment to 
concepts such as "legal system”, 'legal culture", and the '‘political and economic system” . T heir problem is that they are 
not analytical in relation to these concepts, though they make generalizations based on practical legal observations.
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o f the principal benefits of comparative reasoning. Comparative law - traditionally and 
conceptually - seems also to belong to a sphere of law, where “one’s own law” is already known, 
and where comparison takes place in relation to one’s own law.633
Indeed, here we may recognize that the difference between foreign law studies and 
comparative law studies disappears.
Now, one may say also that the examination o f the reference system belongs to the 
comparative process. This has not been sufficiently emphasized. Nevertheless, it ought to be so. 
Pure comparative (and foreign law) studies based on the structuralist approach function only for 
the purposes o f modelling (or substantive reaffirmation).
Consequently, we may ask, what is the ratio o f the distinction between foreign and 
comparative law?
One could claim, against many comparative scholars, that the study of foreign law 
seems to be the only real form of comparative study, and that - in the scientific sense - there is no 
difference between comparative law and the study of foreign law. The difference may lie only in 
the terms of restrictions o f the audience and the argument, which we will analyse later.
Nevertheless, one could claim that the distinction between the study of foreign law 
and comparative law can be justified, to a certain extent, because it corresponds to the descrip­
tion of different functions of the 'comparative study'. The study of foreign law seems to be aimed 
at dogmatic alternatives or inspiration (and understanding), with the view to practical legal 
decision-making and planning, whereas the study of comparative law seems to strive more 
toward establishing causal and historical relationships and to create culturally systematic 
knowledge. The difference disappears, however, in this practical use63 34, within legal orders, and 
especially in their uses at the international level.
The distinction between foreign law and comparative law studies can also be 
justified also, because it makes clearer the idea that there is some difference between the study 
of one, and, on the other hand, several legal systems. Namely, in the study of many legal systems, 
there is a tendency to increasingly adopt a stock of reflective concepts, which seem to make the 
study "polycentricaliy” reflective. In comparative law processes, based on a study of many legal 
systems one is able to make a more analytical evaluation of different legal systems. In this sense, 
the comparison may be a more discursive exercise, because more alternatives can be considered.
633 O n the distinction between "we and "others” in comparative law, see Tunc, A., 1978, p.285.
This applies, to  a  certain extent, to the relationship between national, regional, and international
systems.
634 The problem of the distinction between foreign law and comparative law uncovers certain typical problem s of 
modem comparative law. It necessarily assumes that a "foreigner" undertakes the study o f law as a study o f foreign law, 
and furthermore, that there exists one's "own" law  and "foreign" laws in the strict sense o f the word. In other words, the 
type o f research into a legal system, and its norms, depends, somehow, on, for example, the "ethnological" origin o f the 
researcher himself, and on some kind of a “cultural determination" or even on nationality.
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The analytical assortment is larger*35.
Reference may be made to the characteristics of foreign legal systems as legal 
systems, in comparative law studies. This may be helpful for the development of the idea o f  
comparative law as a legal source.
Foreign law is assumed to be legally rational. That is to say, it is assumed to have 
rules, which are applied logically (rationally). Furthermore, and most importantly, it is assumed, 
that these norms are applied correctly. This assumption of correctness makes a comparison a 
priori a legal comparison.
Furthermore, in the study of foreign law one attempts, or should attempt, in the 
most extensive way possible, to follow the "internal" rules and logic o f the system studied by 
assuming the integrity of the foreign law. In other words, one is treating the system as binding (in 
some systematic context), even if its norms are not binding as such in the process of comparison. 
Foreign systems are seen as legal systems, even if the normative assumptions of the comparativist 
are not legal in the same sense as they could be when considering ones "own" legal system. There 
is some difference between the ’legal’ in the foreign and in one’s "own” law.
On the other hand, we can note that the legal nature o f foreign law is tried to  
achieve by applying the legal analytical devises to the foreign legal system. The legal integrity o f 
the foreign law is maintained - and all "conflicts" sought to be resolved - as conflicts between 
legal principles rather than conflicts based on the systems "natural characteristics".
In conclusion, there is not - and nor should not be - an intent, in comparative 
analysis, to make the mistake of the structuralist anthropologists and to apply the structural rules 
o f  ones own system, or some other system, to the analysis o f a foreign system. This is the 
"internal point of view" o f comparative law, which transforms any comparative observation into 
a legal comparative observation, though this approach differs, in some ways, from the traditional 
“internal point of view” o f a legal observation.
We could claim that this same idea applies to the analysis o f international law and 
national systems in international law. If one is to look into the rules o f international or regional 
organization, one studies those systems and their rules in a particular context, and does not, or 
should not, apply the source rules and principles o f one particular legal system to the analysis. It 
is admitted, however, that the study of international and regional systems differs from the study 
o f  foreign law. These studies are studies o f "legally" binding orders, o r systematically binding 
systems, and their binding quality, as such, does not have to be examined once again. Those 
obligations are incorporated into national systems in one way or another* 636. However, the study
633 O ne could claim that in the process of comparison, there takes place a construction o f  analytical networks.
636 W hen it comes to the legal nature of the decisions of international courts, one should perhaps be careful. W here 
the interaction between international and national, in many ways, looks more reflexive than traditionally regulating, one 
may claim that the legal nature o f  the decisions of regional and international systems is dependent on the nature o f the 
analysis in their decisions.
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of these systems is "comparative" in the sense that there is a difference between ’legality' on these 
two levels.
The same idea may apply to the interpretation o f national systems by international 
judges, for example637.
The problem o f “ understanding” . One could relate the previous analysis to another question 
of comparative law, namely, to the idea and aim o f "understanding". This idea makes clearer what 
could one mean by a discursive form of comparative law.
It has been claimed that comparative observations have a double function; they 
function in the creation o f  the better understanding of ones own law, and the explanation o f the 
law. The idea of better understanding seems to be connected to the theoretical aspects of law, to 
the ideas of legal sociology and legal history or legal phenomenology. "Practical" law is, on the 
other hand, part o f the legal explanation in normative decision-making and dogmatics, and in 
normative discourse in general.
Now, the traditional idea of comparative law, which suggests that comparative 
studies deepen the understanding of one's own legal system, seems to be more or less correct. 
Comparative study conspicuously refers to hermeneutic processes, to a prior understanding based 
on one’s own legal system, with regard o f an understanding o f its structures, forms, 
interpretation, and context.
Nevertheless, when this "better" understanding is part of legal decision-making, 
there is necessarily a slight shift towards "new" aspects of the interpretation of the system’s rules 
and dogmatic framework. The tradition changes. If some harmony or integration existed between 
different systems, it is at this point broken.638
For example, the decisions o f the International Court of Justice are binding only the parties (Article 59 
of the International Court o f  Justice). Furthermore, when we speak, for example, about regional orders, such as the 
European Court o f Human R ights and the European C ourt o f Justice, one has to remember that norms from these 
institutions are usually transferred to various contexts, not only in another factual-context (as are normal precedents), 
but also to another legal con tex t In this sense, the mere application of these decisions, analogically in domestic courts, 
is not ’legal’ in the traditional sense, but "legality” has to be created case by case by means o f an extensive analytical 
discussion. The same applies to  every change o f law enacted by the legislature relating to a supranational legal sphere.
Accordingly, because it is exactly the character o f the analysis, which transfers the comparative obser­
vation to  “legal” sphere, the discipline of comparative law  should turn its attention to  the nature of the comparative 
analysis in practice rather than to the study o f methodology as such.
637 W e may easily recognize this problem within the legal framework o f European-level legal orders. On that level 
there does not really take place the interpretation of national systems, but it is instead the task of the international or 
regional lawyer to provide "normative formants" for the national lawyer, interpreted in the regional or supranational 
context, to be used and "connected" in the national context. W e may speak about some kind of a instrumentalist 
polycentrism and reflexivity (see, analysis below).
Ml Bogdan, M. (1996, p.2) relates this idea o f “understanding” to the increase of “possibilities.
In fact, this idea seems to be the m echanism of comparative law as such. The “non-existence” of 
similar types o f regulation lead to “stronger" cognition o f one’s  own rule, or to cognition o f the “functional” situation 
in the other “systemic” spheres. From the positivist point o f  view, it is clear that the “own” system gets emphasized.
In this sense, it definitely leads to (re?]”evaluation” o f one’s own legal system (for this, see Jyranki, A .,
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In this sense, comparative argument within discourse does not seem to necessarily 
generate any "integration" or "harmonization", but it directs systems (or the discourses) in 
different “directions”. This is so because the role o f comparative argument is determined more 
by the prior understanding of the system than by the social and legal context of the another 
system, especially in its applied form. Where the understanding of one's own system is facing a 
change which is not, nevertheless, supported by any systematic interpretation, the disintegration 
in the adoptive (discursive) system causes general disintegrative tendencies within the (discursive) 
systems.639
In this sense, the idea of better understanding (even in its theoretical dimension) 
seems to refer more to instrumental possibilities (stabile deviation, for example) and to the 
disintegrative discourse. The traditional argument based on increasing understanding, on the 
whole, thus seems to be actually about disintegration640.
Because the issue is, however, also about a heuristic function of interpretation o f  
another system, we may argue that what takes place in this process o f understanding also the 
deepening of understanding of another system. Depending of the extent o f the study of the other 
system, comparative considerations may make it possible also to “understand” another system. 
The distinction between the understanding of one’s "own" and "another", however, becomes 
unclear641.
Finally, the distinction between one’s own and another system is made on the 
practical level. This practical (discursive) act does not, however, usually take place in relation to  
the other system Here we may speak about “understanding” in a  truly abstract sense.
1996, p .l  2).
639 Legrand, P. (1996, p .76 ff.) has attempted to  grasp th is phenomenon. Nevertheless, he stresses the (cultural) 
“ understanding*' dimension, and does not enter into the discursive side o f this “understanding". Legrand assum es 
“shared epistemological premises** as a basis o f  a  conversation, and maintains that “there can be no conversation 
among people unless they are bound by shared presuppositions, that is, common assumptions (something, which has, 
o f course, little to do with the truth and falsity o f their beliefs)** (idem., p.76).
This idea seem s to be controversial. W hat are common assumptions -  f  they are to have any real 
meaning - than beliefs upon falsity and truth? On the other hand, even if we would necessarily be “foreigners", this does 
not mean that we could not take part of die conversation as “foreigners" (unless there is som e kind o f coercive reasons). 
A re we “epistemological!/* foreigners? In other w ords, the differences in basic knowledge or premises cannot, in my 
opinion, create any obstacles for discursive relationship in theory.
Legrand extends his postulates towards the discourses between ontological legal units: "In the absence 
o f shared epistemological premisses, the common law and civil law worlds, cannot, therefore, engage in an exchange 
that would lead one to an understanding o f the other, if only to a virtual understanding'* (idem.).
In describing the differences between legal system s, he makes analogy to difference between men and 
wom en (ibid., 78).
640 This disintegrative tendency can be, on the o ther hand, itself instrumentalized.
641 N ow, it seems that, fundamentally, every coherent system  o f law is relatively autonomous and incomparable. 
However, when we enter the material and substantial levels, w e start a process of systematization. In this type of 
systematization, systems lose their coherent and systematic natures, and become a priori comparable. In every partial 
examination and consideration o f the legal system and its institutions and rules, systematic connections are lo st Here 
the examiner enters into the examination of his prem isses also on the basis o f a priori similarity too.
n iw p imwww ii w iiMiPMo p q
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Consequently, comparative considerations serve a double function: they deepen the 
understanding o f ones own system, but also the understanding of another system, although the 
argumentative and the functional results can be seen only in one's own system (and discourse). 
Only there is the use o f comparative considerations transformed into a discourse. Only in the 
adaptable (discursive and practical) system has the argument a normative role.
Nevertheless, it seems that in order to be correct, there is always at least a 
possibility for the instmmentalization o f an argument in the system of origin. This may take place 
by making a claim that now there exists argumentatively integrative tendencies642.
In this sense, comparative arguments can have changing and confirming, dynamic 
and static, functions643.
Modem comparative legal science seems to be in a difficult situation. This may be 
the basic reason why it is uses concepts such as understanding. Comparative law has to maintain 
the "centrality" o f the paradigm of states, but at the same time it has to explain itself, why the 
study of comparative law still serves valuable purposes. By the idea o f "understanding", one is 
able to justify this involvement in the definition of national legal systems and discourses. One 
does it by broadening redefining the narrow scope of the national legal system and by constantly 
reminding oneself of the narrowness of comparative legal study.644
One may say that comparative law, by aiming towards an increase in understanding 
has thus “come to grips with law” in many ways.
Nominalism and conceptual functionality. Here we come, once again, closer to the ingredients 
o f the discursive idea o f comparative law.
It has been argued that it is nominalism which presents a problem for comparative 
law. The basic problem of nominalism is the philosophical problem of comparability of nominal 
forms. One may say, for example, that "freedom o f expression" is nominally the same in different
642 This can be seen in any "tendency" reasoning*
643 In this sense, every result o f comparison is, normatively, a  fundamental elem ent o f culture. As a  legitimating or 
va lida ting  ideal, and as an ideal system of beliefs, it has a strong social im pact T his is, perhaps, the reason why 
comparisons and all analogical idealizations and similar types o f processes o f  idealizations, are somehow problematic 
as subjects of research, interpretation and argumentation. This is why, usually, it is only the result o f this process which 
is explicitly  expressed. Comparison, as such, seems to be, both in the factual and ideal senses, and as a  legitimating 
process, speculative and unnecessary, and even undermining. The deconstruction o f  the elements of the original ideal, 
and the  analytical approach to it, seems to problematize the original legitimation. The social system of beliefs is 
questioned. At the same time, there is a questioning of the whole process o f  the original idealization.
This seems to be the reason why comparison in law has been understood as an integrative process of 
the creation of understanding and as a practical discipline. If comparisons are made, they are usually not reproduced in 
norm ative decision-making, for in the ultimate social sense, these reproductions do not tell us clearly or directly 
anything regarding the belief-system in society. Rather, they open up normative and factual differences, and show the 
gap, o r the step, between the comparatively-interpreted and the originally-“ interpreted” norms, and, furthermore, they 
reveal the "in-built" pluralism and controversies o f the presumably-simple normative principle or rule.
644 Zweigert, K., Kdtz, H., 1977, p.27, Fix-Zamundo, H ., 1990, p.32.
134
legal systems, but that two forms of this law are basically incomparable because o f the respective 
systematic (and functional) connections.
The problem of nominalism is related to structural and formal comparability. 
Nominal comparison is an argument by formal analogy. It is a question about the structural 
preconditions and identity of the comparative discourse, which we have in many ways.
The nominalist approach may have problems of "superficiality". On the other hand, 
the impossibility of finding the "tertium comparationis", in the conceptual sense, for example, 
may pose a problem for the traditional nominalist way of approaching the legal comparison.
All the same, the discursive verification principle of discourse theory may liberate 
the strict conditions of incomparability.645 In this sense, one could tum to the nominalist approach 
as the main and the most rational approach to comparative law. It can be seen as a starting point 
to the hermeneutic interpretation of texts, and as a starting point for a selective process o f  
reading, which functions as a source of information in itself.646 One could say that the nominalist 
approach is the basic starting point of comparative law.647
If one could maintain, on the contrary, the a priori problematical character and the 
incomparability of the nominalist approach, one would not be utilizing the scientific benefits o f  
comparative law at all. This would mean closing oneself only to the possibilities available and 
reproducing of the certain distinctions rather than taking advantage o f the discursive qualities o f  
comparative law.
One may say that in the nominalist approach to comparative law, there are no a  
priori aims of integration and understanding in any material sense. Comparative law, having as 
its starting point the nominalist form, but being discursive, augments the understanding of law as 
a discourse, by revealing the conditions, limits and perspectives of law. It exposes the possible 
different and similar meanings in different legal systems given over to this nominalist concept. 
This enables, on the other hand, the use of these different perspectives on law in further 
discussions on law, legal systems (and their rules and norms), and to debate the normative 
qualities or acceptability o f a model in different contexts.
This nominalism and radical empiricism has been linked one with the other on 
several occasions. It is actually one of the characteristics of so-called "mediational" law.648 In 
terms of mediational law, every case is seen as being essentially unique rather than as an instance 
o f  a universal scientific law or a substantive normative ethical commandment or rule.649 The 
problems of nominalism are revealed only in the light o f strict deductivism, which does not seem 45*79
445 See, Schwarz-Ueberm aim , H.A., 1973, p .616.
646 Von Wright, G., 1983, p .202: "Non est ponendo pluralitas sine necessitate" (Ockham).
447 Klami seems also to have this kind of opinion (see Klami, H.T., 1981, pp.76-77).
644 Northrop, F.S.C., 1960, p .620.
449 Northrop, F.S.C., 1960, p .620.
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to be the case with interpretative and discursive law.
In this way, criticism levelled against the nominalist approach to comparative law 
seems to be exaggerated650, and an over-emphasis upon the philosophical question embedded 
within it.651
Comparability and social functionality. As we have maintained, in the tradition of modem 
comparative law the relationship between legal systems seems to be based on the state paradigm 
of law. Every comparison of law is a comparison of the laws of state legal systems. The "state", 
"system" and the "legal" have been seen as the key conventions of this relationship in the socio- 
functional sense. Into these ideas has been build the idea of comparability a priori. Contemporary 
comparative law is, evidently, bound to this modem tradition.
The main problem of comparability in the modem tradition is related to the 
comparability of functional legal systems. This has now been fully recognized in the comparative 
sciences652. In this sense, it is the different or similar functions in certain social situational 
contexts which determine comparability. Functional incomparability and comparability are forms 
of functional analogical argument. They are the scientific preconditions of functional identity.653
It should be noted that this type of functional state paradigm of comparative law did 
not disturb the structural state-paradigm.654 Law was still state law, seen as a political-historical 
fact. It was only the functioning of these systems which was to become the problem. By 
neglecting the formal rational basis of the comparison of laws, one was able to hold on to the 
form of law, state law, as a legitimate source o f law. At the same time, comparative law was able 
to claim that systems were not alike, autonomous, and incomparable on a functional basis.
The adoption of this type of functional state-paradigm in comparative law had two
650 It appears as i f  the question o f comparability could be answered by an idea o f relative analogy. This w ay  the 
question would be about ’'degree" o f comparability. Consequently, the main doubt would be regarding the character o f 
sim ilarities and differences, especially from the point o f  view of the social function of the compared institutions in 
different legal systems (Rozmaryn, S., 1973, p.584).
The answ er seems to be satisfactory, but, however, certain predicaments remain. How should the 
assessm ent of comparability itself be made? Is comparability already an answer to the legal relevancy o f  the 
comparison? The answer to this latter question must be negative. Comparability does not, from the legal point o f view , 
provide a basis of legal comparison, even if comparison could be made. The question must be answered from the point 
o f view  of the functional discourse.
6,1 Markesinis, B. (1993, p .627) explains, how nominalism may lead to the discursive legal rationality:
"... what started as a translation problem, was quickly turned into something more complicated and 
more significant, requiring a background explanation before it could be used by an English 
practitioner”
The confirm ative, inspirational, or guiding use of comparative law is based on this “creative 
translation” (ibid., p.632).
652 O n the notion, see Rozmaryn, S., 1973, p.584.
653 Zweigert, K., Ktitz, H. (1977, p.4) say that “comparison can be useful only if the legal institutions under 
investigation are naturally and functionally comparable” (underlining added).
654 A  good example is Zweigert, K., K6lz, H., 1977, especially at pages 18 ,2 3 ,2 5 -3 1 .
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consequences: legal systems remained under the concept of state law, connected to the state and 
only to the state. At the same time, international law, from the point o f view of comparative law, 
became a function of political states, not a function of a ’’legal" actor in any general sense. Only 
some ad hoc elements of law developed their autonomous spheres of international law on the side 
of the political state paradigm635.
Because the problem of comparative law was to be found in the functions o f 
systems, the solutions to functional incomparability were also to be founded on research into 
equal functions. However, functionality remained the theme o f comparative law as an 
independent discipline of science, rather than a matter for practical legal work in general.
One may say that this resulted in the institutionalization o f comparative law in many 
ways. One could claim that the functional approach to law maintained more the "functionali­
zation’ of comparative law, contrary to what the scientific approach to comparative law 
suggested.
All the same, the problem of comparability in comparative law is still embedded in 
the theoretical comparison, in the traditionally "descriptive" approaches to  comparative law. Only 
these theories seem to be capable of explaining, why certain comparisons, for example the 
comparison between different courts, are possible at all. This is why the problem of comparability 
still forms, and should form, the largest part o f comparativist studies in the realm o f the 
traditional science of comparative law.
T he  institutional functionality of com parative law. During decision-making and practical 
comparisons, normative choices of comparability are based on a legal-cultural and educational 
prior understanding, and comparability as such is hardly analysed. There is a  claim to 
understanding in the choice of the compared. This is why one is able to reveal the basic cultural 
attitudes of the decision-maker.
In the decision-making context, the ultimate question seems to be the comparability 
o f  the institutional decision-makers. If a legal decision-maker considers certain "comparative" 
aspects, he is actually asserting the comparability o f the decision-makers he is referring to. He is 
thereby claiming that the institution in another system, which has chosen certain normative
655 For example, the new “Lex Mercatoria*’.
The paradox o f  a comparative argument is that it is confirming the authority of the legal system ¡a 
g en era l, bu t at the same time it is challenging the authority o f  a (national state) legal system by going beyond the 
national state-paradigmatic idea o f sources of law. In other words, the comparative argument is confirming the authority 
of the general idea of the state legal system as the source of law, but it undermines a particular state as an authoritative 
source. In this sense, the comparative argument is, by definition, moving from the idea o f state law, as a basis of law, 
tow ards a more general level o f legal thinking.
At this stage, law is declaring its independence from  the particular state system. Furthermore, the legal 
system  becomes relatively independent from politics and does not appear any longer to be  the instrumental means.
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premises as the relevant premise in certain situations, is comparable to it656 *.
This nature of the decision-making comparison makes it an "institutional" argument, 
Le. an argument based on the qualities o f the chosen external reference rather than on reasonable 
factors. Here comparative reasoning becomes problematic. Basically, the argument should not be 
based on a choice of authority (or “self-authority”). It has to be rationally based. The decision­
maker cannot rationally use its own choices as a basis and the premise of a legal decision637.
Some conclusions: the problem of normativeness. The main problem arises, as we have seen, 
in the value-based nature of functionalized and institutionalized comparative law.638 The 
evaluations in comparative law involve strong value judgements o f a horizontal and vertical 
nature.659 Namely, even if one could claim the generality of applied legal norms, this does not 
guarantee the normatively binding character o f the forms created. This problem is related also to 
the logical problem of comparability and nominalism, as we have seen. Scientific abstractions 
cannot, as such, be part of valid (democratic or discursive) law. It has to obtain this quality from 
somewhere else.660
Consequently, the criticism of “normative comparisons” can be based on the idea 
that practical comparative law does not take into account the reproductive elements of modem 
law. Namely, the comparison is a comparison o f legal systems. Because legal systems are either 
state systems or subsystems within the sphere o f the state paradigm (international, regional or 
particular), the question o f values is not only in the value choice of the correct, good, or just 
norm, but also in the "legal generality o f practice" within the legal practices of certain systems.
Nevertheless, this seems to make comparative legal reasoning a restricted value
656 In this type of functionalist comparison, one claims comparability in many ways. The choice of a “comparable” 
argument is combined with the choice of a comparable decision-maker.
In non-decisionist comparisons, there is, naturally, also a claim  of comparability, but the comparability 
is no t claimed to exist between the comparativist and the actor whose (legal) acts are compared but between those 
several institution whose decisions are compared.
This establishes, for example, the relationship between national legislatures and supranational courts 
(as a matter o f political integrity).
w7 A  problem exists in the fact that in comparison, an institution interprets another institution, which it is basically 
incapable of doing. T he decision-maker assumes that he understands that particular system perfectly.
This way we come to the demand that comparative reasoning has to be either systematically analytical 
or practically analytical in order to comprise a valid argument, i.e. to be transformed from an intuitive choice to a 
reasonable choice, and to be discursive rather than "analogical".
This can be related to the idea of "deriving ought from  is" (see, for example, von W right, G., 1983 p.3). W right 
uses the concept "inference" to characterize the importance of the "is" in "ought", and "means to an end" (ibid., p . l ) .
659 Zweigert and Kbtz propose the criteria of "purposive and just" application of comparative solutions (1987, p .46). 
They also employ terms such as "equity, justice", "fairness ", and “common sense" (1987, n . p.255). See Hill, J., 1987, 
p .l 94.
660 See, on this problem, Bentham, J, An introduction to the Principles o f M orals and Legislation, 1823 [1789], 
pp.325-326, and Hill, J, 1989, p.103.
International law, relying on comparative aspects, reflects this same idea.
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judgement, and consequently, rational in the sense that the sources o f values can be, to a certain 
extent, identified a priori.
Comparison of functional systems? At this juncture, the main question within comparative law 
seems to be: can one really compare functional systems? As we have seen, the functionalist 
approach has been associated with the institutional legal framework.
If one is to compare law in functional terms, one has to establish, first, the 
comparability o f the legal institutions, and then compare their function in society. This type of 
functionalist comparison has to take place according to a "extralegal" conceptualization. In 
comparing, for example, functional law related to the administration o f social security systems, 
one has to identify, first o f all, criteria other than purely legal criteria. One has to consider the 
historical, political, sociological and socio-philosophical contexts. On the other hand, it is the 
broadness and procedural nature of the conceptualizations which define the nature of this type of 
legal 'acting', which poses problems for the comparativist.
Furthermore, because the application o f law is often autonomous and dependent 
particular situational and holistic considerations, and as the relevant actors, premises and results 
are difficult to identify a priori, comparison seems to be an impossible exercise.661 *
Moreover, by selecting the key concepts of comparison from sphere other than 
from traditional "legal sources", one ends up at the question as to whether an abstraction, 
deriving from this sphere o f "law", really is law in the traditional sense. Nevertheless, while in the 
realm o f the traditional idea o f the rule o f law, these types o f observations do not appear as 
"law", however, we know that many types o f institutional acts may be characterized as law even 
though they tend to base their authority only on procedural norms.
This causes problems also for the consideration of the validity of traditional legal 
rules, which are connected to these more functional rules. It seems to  be quite problematic to 
investigate this connection in an integrative way and to consider legal systems in general.
One of the main problems of valid comparison and comparative legal analysis seems 
to be related exactly to this question; namely, the functional features, which sometimes remain 
hidden, and which are the "mam" questions o f law o f  in social system, cannot be in as integrative 
sense connected to the comparative legal discourse. As a result, comparative law seems to be 
used mainly in the fields o f  law where nonfunctional forms o f law can be identified. While 
comparative reasoning tries to avoid any functionalist point of contact in relation to these types
661 For example, the com parison o f  the administration of social benefits is difficult, because it is, in many countries,
delegated to the lower administrations (regions etc.), and is procedural in nature. On the other hand, the procedural idea 
o f law would allow us to examine problem s common to all societies.
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of legal rules, it is exactly this feature which makes comparative law itself functionalist662.
4.7 Conclusions; Do we need comparative law at all?
Comparative law is based strongly upon the modem paradigm of positive state 
law663. However, comparative law is disconnected from the informal rules o f a political and 
sociological nature because they cannot be generalized within the contemporary comparative law 
paradigm. Only a comparative approach which would not have as its basic distinction a 
distinction between (national) legal systems could be able to also compare the socio-legal 
subsystems of national legal systems664. On the other hand, if comparative law could function at 
the level of social sub- or supra-systems, it would challenge the basic state paradigm of 
comparative law.
The contemporary idea of comparative law moves on the level of values by putting 
itself above the legal discourse. Comparativists seem to make generalizations, whether within 
legal institutions or in academic debate or scholarship, which are above any genuine 
jurisprudential discourse. Contemporary institutionalized comparative law has become an 
obstacle for a genuine form of legal discourse by closing it up. The problem of comparative law 
seems to be that it has lost sight of social distinctions, which are used in actual legal discourses 
in order to make distinctions between different cases, and in order to be to facilitate reasonable 
distinction-making. The analysis in traditional discourses is directed to the sources of law, 
interpretative techniques, etc., in a value-based manner. Contemporary comparative law cannot 
recognize these forms. It is thus blind to the analytical capacity o f the actual (genuine) legal 
discourses.
On the other hand, even if comparative law practitionar (judges, for example) may 
take into account the dogmatic discourses and different political analyses (eg. travaux prépara­
toires) and other contextual material in their decision making, they would still have only a very 
restricted idea of the integrity of law. In using this type of comparative approach, they are not 
able to take part - genuinely - to any dogmatic discourse and do not really aim at any adherence
663 It looks as if the functional approach in comparative law remains a form o f justification of the real functional 
analysis. The functional approach appears as a  "good intention" within comparative law. A t the same time, however, 
this feature causes problems for the consideration of comparative arguments as "valid" legal arguments.
Comparative law  seems to appear as a form of Tegal pathology’
For the concept o f social law and its characteristics, see Ewald, F., A  Concept o f Social Law. In: 
D ilemmas of Law in the Welfare state, 1979 (40-75).
663 It has been claimed that the idea o f comparative law, based on the state paradigm  o f law, can easily cause "optical 
illusions" (Sacco, R., 1991, pp.345-346). See Jescheck, H-H., 1974, p.772.
AH the same, one may say that a  shift in the paradigm is taking place. The segmented "subsystem s of 
law may be treated separately and, on the other hand, some dynamics may become visible. This question, however, is 
treated after the analysis o f the "European" material, which can perhaps shed light on certain questions.
664 For "Extra-national bodies", see Davis, F., 1969, p.628.
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of the dogmatic audiences. *
In this sense, contemporary comparative law does not, in reality, aim at the 
preservation of the discursive integrity of law. On the contrary. It refers to the "social" without 
being able to refer to anything else but "substance".
On the other hand, institutionalized comparative law seems to be based on the 
premise that the reproduction of law takes place on the basis o f an ideal comparative discourse. 
However, by neglecting the importance and in a sense by usurping the role of actual legal 
discourses, it actually functions in the opposite way.665
Consequently, we may ask; do we need comparative law within the legal discourse?
Now, one could formulate this question in another way. Should comparative law 
studies start to compare its premises (tertium comparationis) with the contemporary ideas 
appearing in the theories o f legal discourses? This would mean, in practice, that institutionalized 
and instrumentalized comparative law could and should be compared with particular legal 
discourses. Consequently, through an examination o f these means of using comparative law in 
modem law, one may be able to reveal the prevailing idea on rational audiences of law.
We will come to this question after examining some theories regarding the use o f 
comparative law information. 465
465 O ne may ask, whether this could be the basic, even intentional, strategy of contem porary comparative law? Is the 
primary idea o f current comparative law  theory to make distinctions between different audiences? Does the basic idea 
of com parative law refer to  audiences, which are seen as basic and "rational' audiences within the legal discourse?
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4.8. Some theories of comparative law: the theory of legal transplants
and the theory of legal form ants
4.8.1. The theories
Introduction. As we have noted, in the realm of comparative law, one speaks of an 
"understanding of law" in general, an "understanding of ones own law", and an "understanding 
o f legal development". These "understandings" seem to include ideas concerning the historical 
and sociological role o f legal innovations (resulting from comparative practice), the conditions 
for legal innovations and legal adaptations, and transplantations and reform as a whole.666 67
Here an attempt is made to briefly look into some theories related to these legal 
innovations and transformations.
The analysis of these theories serves the purpose of defining so-called “discursive 
standards” for comparative legal reasoning.
The theory of legal transplantation. In legal history, the spirit o f the people, as a basis for law,
has been contested:
"History o f system o f law is largely a history o f borrowings o f legal material from  
other legal systems and o f assimilation o f materials from  outside to the law.”661
One of the most interesting theories of comparative law related to this idea is the 
theory of legal transplants668. It is a theory examining historical relationships between socio-legal 
systems and their circumstances, and, in a concrete legal form, the relationships between legal 
systems669.
666 Watson, 1974, p.16
667 Pound, R ., 1954. Sec also, Lowie, R.H., Primitive society (N .Y .) 1947 (1920], Watson, A., 1978a, p.321, 
Jackson, P., 1968, p.372, 382-385. The latter recognized adaptations related to  general cultural patterns. Also, 
markesinis, B., 1993, p.635.
It has been claimed that usually the parent legal systems are imitated, Zweigert, K., K6tz, H ., 1987,
P-39.
For some analysis, see Koopmans, T ., 1991, p.507.
For some analysis of the leg a l imitation" in modem comparative law , see Yntema, H.E., 1958, p.498. 
In  contem porary discussions very practical and radical ideas on comparative receptions in 
interpretation have also been expressed (In the field o f environmental law, see Seidl-HohenveldenU., 1997).
668 Watson, A 1974. Some analysis, see Ewald, W., 1995, who recognizes the strong Roman Law background o f the 
theory (ibid., p.490,498 ff.). The basic philosophy of the practical comparative is that "we must always remember the 
possibility that some other legal system may have found a better remedy fo r the problem than our ownm (Graveson, 
R.H., 1958, p.655).
669 Watson, A., 1978a, p .321 .
Legal transplants can be defined as pieces of law of one legal system transferred  
systematically or unsystematically, on a smaller or larger scale, to another legal system. T ran s ­
plants are artificial constructions without any necessary connection to the (legal) culture itself. 
Transplants are part o f the historical process o f the development o f a legal system, and they a re  
one "source" of law or for a legal system.670 Transplanting is an easy way of adopting n ew  
rules671.
The circumstances in which legal transplantations (as all "political" and "legitimat­
ing processes") occur are usually connected to new situations in economic, political or legal 
life672. It has been claimed that the moment o f the reception o f foreign influences is usually th e  
moment when the legal provisions are examined closely (e.g. when there is pressure fo r  
modification or refinement of a law).673 It has also been argued that reception is easier if the  
recipient system is "less advanced from  the material and the cultural point o f view"674.
One of the possible motives for "transplantations" may be, in modem law , 
international pressure.675 Legal receptions have become commonplace because of the expansion 
o f the modem economic system. The "correct" law becomes a matter o f political and economic 
credibility. This may be related to the tendencies o f modem law toward ’materialization’676
The adaptation of legal material can be direct or indirect. Direct transplantation 
creates a system or a part of a system. Indirect transplantation occurs, for example, in the form  
of adaptation of different techniques and theories. Indirect adoption has been seen to result from  
the fact that transplants (adaptations) have been made first to the common language.677
Transplants have also been divided into so-called voluntary and non-voluntary
670 Watson, A., 1974, p.95.
It has been maintained that the results o f transplantations can be disastrous. When custom and positive 
law are in conflict, it is positive law that tends to fail. This failure shows itself either in  rebellion or in a  corruption o f  
legal and political officials, "which turns the positive law into something worse than a dead letter", Ehrlich, T he  
Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, 1936, p.493
671 N o particular part o f private law has been extremely resistant to change under foreign influence (W atson, A ., 
1974, p.25).
Constantinesco, L-J., makes a distinction between adoption or reception o f  a whole complex of statutes 
(“die globale Übernahme eines ganzen Gesetzbuches en bloc"), partial reception and adoption o f elements, and 
eclectic reception (1972 n , p .413).
672 Watson, A, 1974, p.28.
673 W atson, A., 1974, p.99.
614 W atson, A., 1974, p.100. A lso Schlesinger, 1980, p.17. O n the problems of reception, see Watson, A., 1978a, 
p .313.
475 Hill, E., 1978, p.298.
674 For some historical examples, see Hill, E., 1978, p.299.
477 This means that the spirit o f  the people instead rather in the details rather than in the system (Watson, A., 1974, 
P-97).
Indirect m ethods o f transplantation seem to  indicate that the  process is focussed more upon the
preservation o f the coherence o f  the legal system.
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transplants:
geographical legal transplants; people moving to a different territory with no 
civilization, taking their laws with them, or moving to areas with their own 
civilization,678
voluntary acceptance of a large part of another peoples' system, 
imposed transplantation,679
other forms of transplantation (solicited transplantation, penetration, infiltration, 
crypto-reception, inoculation etc.).680
Legal transplants could be found as far back as in antiquity and the Roman legal 
system.681 Many countries, such as Japan, Turkey and Ethiopia, have borrowed complete parts 
o f  legal systems from other countries682. However, the phenomenon is not unknown in any 
contemporary legal system.
Some contemporary comparative lawyers do not encourage transplantation activity, 
while others do not have a clear point o f view regarding this question.683 However, the general
671 See also, Schlesinger, R.B., 1980, p . l  I if.
679 On some results o f imposed “coercive” transplantation in India, see Annousamy, D„ 1986, p.57. He identifies a 
lasting change o f law, amalgamation, upsurging revival o f the old law.
680 Watson, A., 1974, Rheinstein, M., 1956, p.31.
681 Watson, A., 1974, pp.24-25. Quoting W ieacker, F, Privatrechtsgeschicte der Neuzeit unter besonderer 
Beriikssichtigung der deutschen Entwicklung, 1967.
Discussion concerning this is indirect (Watson, A., 1974, p.25). Indeed, some have reservations 
concerning this influence (see for example Arrangio-Ruiz, Storia del diritto romano, 1957.
682 For different adaptations, see for example in the Middle East, the Ottomanian Empire adaptations of the French 
Commercial Code 1850,1875,1883, and further adaptions in Iraq in 1870-1877 (see also receptions into the Turkish 
law in 19th century, Andersson, J.N.D., The Significance of Islamic Law in the world Today. In: Am.Jour.Comp.Law, 
1960, p . l88), french law to the Magreb countries in colonial period, Algeria in 1834, and in Tunisia (see also, Islamic 
law in Tunisia, Andersson, J.N.D., and in The Tunisian Law of Personal Status. In: International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 7 ,1958 , p.263), and Maroc. Sudan; English law in 1898 in India. On the "blending" of these laws within 
local systems and the context o f adaptations, see Hill, E., 1978, p.286 ff., 288 .299 . Schlesinger. R.B., 1980, p p .l 1-12 
(for example, concerning Eastern Europe after the second World War).
F or exam ple o f the colonial context, Egypt and the British occupation, 1822, and the British Civil, 
Commercial and Penal Codes (see Hill, E , 1978, p.290). British case law influences also in Palestine, Pakistan and the 
Sudan development
F o r adaptions in England based on economic, cultural and political factors (see Kahn-Freund, O.,
1974, p.4).
In concrete form, comparative legislation or legal transplantation can be seen in the history of 
seventeenth century states in Northern America. The adoption o f English common law was adapted, with 
transformations, in many states (Friedman, L M ., A H istory o f American Law, 1973, p.30-41). The historical drafting 
o f English model statutes was many times word for word, and it seemed to  be common professional practice. T he recep­
tion was also taking place through the doctrines o f com m on law (Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982).
Provisions, practices, approaches methodologies, and styles were also adopted from Roman, French, 
Mexican, and Spanish "systems" (for example the Code Napoleon). These adaptive practices took place during the 19th 
century in many part o f the United States.
Regarding German private law adoptions in Turkey, Japan, Norway, Greece, and the Soviet Union, and 
constitutional law influences in Greece, Spain, and Portugal in the 20th century, see Koopmans, T., 1991, p.494.
683 Kisch, 1,1981, p . l68 studying the opinions of Arminjon, Nolde, Wollf, David, Gutteridge, Schlesinger and Von 
M ehren.
1idea seems to be that borrowing should take place only after a careful examination o f  th e  
prevailing social, cultural and legal conditions.
It has been asserted that different transplantations can be examined by viewing th e  
adaptations and changes in legal systems in relation to the concepts such as the sources o f  la w , 
pressure forces684 *, opposition force, transplant , the role o f law shaping law yers, 
discretionary factors686 687, generality factor, inertÉP , field neetfS! With these concepts, fo r  
example, one is able to identify the dynamics o f law. This way there could be a creation o f  p o ss i­
bilities, and a pointing of a way toward better reform689. In other words, one could identify  
models for legal change in relation to law and society.690
The study of transplantation can have thus "predictive value". One can, fo r  
example, anticipate what the possible future influences of certain “transplants” would be.691
The theory o f legal formants. A second theory, which grapples with similar questions, is th a t 
o f the theory o f legal formants. This idea could be associated with an instrumental and form al 
theory of legal discourse (as opposed to a traditional or value-based one).
The theory of legal formants is a theory concerning the elements in practical legal 
discourse which shape legal interpretations, and which are removable, to a certain extent, from  
their context692. This theory does not stress the centrality of the transplantation of legal rules, b u t 
rather the essentiality o f extra legal elements693.
The difference between legal transplantation and the theory of form ants. The theory o f  legal 
transplantation regards the legal influences which have taken place within a quite arbitrary and
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684 Le. groups, which advocate the change. The emphasis o f lawyers’ role in society is remarkable in W atson’s theory  
(see also Ewald, W ., 1995, p. 497 ff).
6,3 This includes ideas such as receptivity, linguistic tradition, general prestige, and accessibility.
m  I.e. the law as it is applied.
687 A good analysis is provided by Kam i, H.T. ( 1981, p. 152) with reference to the ideas of Perelman.
688 See, W atson, A., 1978a, p.322. For a critical analysis o f those concepts, see also ibid., pp.330-331.
689 Watson, A , 1978a, p.324. For a quite extensive analysis o f these factors, see Klami, H.T., 1981, pp. 147-158. For 
a view visualizing the relationships between these factors, see ibid., p.154.
690 W atson, A ., 1978a, p.332.
However, comparative modeling is not modeling as such, where the legal institution is taken as such 
to the legal system. The model is taken through a variety o f legal and social analyses, and in this way transformed into 
the internal discourse. This type of modeling is dependent upon on the discursive culture o f each community. It is 
important to make this distinction between the normal idea o f  modeling and the com parative legal modeling.
691 Bates, F., 1981, p.273.
m  They have "life o f their own independent that o f the conclusion they supposedly supportM (Sacco, 1991, p.30). 
This idea seems to be based on the fact that similar solutions can be based upon different reasons.
693 See Sacco, R., 1991.
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contingent sphere. One is not really able to construct any principle from that theory for the study 
o f law694. The theory o f transplants seems to refer to non-discursive transplantation. However, 
in an analytical study of the processes of transplantation, one may draw distinctions between 
discursively rational and non-rational transplantations.
The theory of formants is better suited to the analysis of legal influences in legal 
discourses, and adaptations of the concepts, doctrines etc. in the adjudication.695 The legal 
formants theory seems to proclaim that there can be an element of a legal quality within these 
influences696. Consequently, the theory seems to indicate the possibility for discursively rational 
implementation. Nevertheless, the "hidden" instrumentality embedded in the legal formation 
theory could be more problematic, from the discursive point of view, than the instrumentality 
connected to the open legal transplantation, as we shall see below.
One o f the qualities of the theory of legal formants is related to the fact that one 
may also identify anti-formants, i.e. formant, which are not functional (such as formants not 
belonging to the realm o f the discursive integrity of law). In this sense, the theory is more 
"normative".
In conclusion, one could say that the theory o f legal formants may be, to a certain 
extent, associated with comparative discourse as an idea o f modem comparative law.
Both theories can be used also in the examination of "normative" transplantation (in 
vertical normative relationships).
4.8.2. Some problems concerning transplantation theory
T he nature of transplantation theory. It is fairly obvious that legal systems develop, to a 
certain extent, through borrowing. On the other hand, these legal transplantations take place most 
readily during periods of forceful historical transformations, as we have already indicated. These
694 Unless one adopts a  principle o f "imitation based on imposition o f prestige" (for this concept see Sacco, R., 
1991, pp.398-399). Prestige seem s to be, however, a  problematic explanation.
69! Some studies can be characterized as studies o f legal formants, see for exam ple, Roman and Germanic legal 
influences in Swedish case law  in the 17th century (Jagerskiôld, S., 1967, p.178). These adaptions took place often on 
the  basis of conceptions o f  "civilized systems" (ibid., pp.186-187). In the m id-17th century there was a growing 
influence of Corpus juris, lus Gentium, etc. (ibid., p.203). By the end o f 17th century the respect o f statutes arose (ibid., 
p .203). This seemed to be the end o f receptions. There were also, in the 1734 law, some directives forjudges.
It is interesting that these uses were sometimes "hidden" because of the obligation to  use o n e 's  own 
term inology (ibid., p.178). Furthermore, the uses did not necessarily lead to any substantive changes (ibid., p.202). 
Influences contained concepts, principles, rules o f interpretations, modifications, and legitimate source o f law  (ibid., 
p .205). lus Romanum used, when there was a  lacuna (idem.).
Legal policy was motivated indirectly by the adoptions o f legal scholars.
In addition Law Reform Commissions [Lag Komissionen] also used "foreign" models. There are no 
travaux  préparatoires on this. Laws appeared "national", though historical influences are easy to reconstruct (ibid.,
pp.208-209).
696 See Sacco, R., 1991. p .390.
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are situations where profound changes take place in society.
However, transplantation theory does not thoroughly consider thoroughly all 
aspects of these borrowings.697 Functionality is one of these aspects. In this sense, the problem s 
of the theory can be identified with respect to the idea of the reflexivity o f law. According to  th is  
theory the legal relationship between systems is reflexive. This idea applies, with modifications, 
also to the idea of legal formants.
We will come to this question after making some remarks concerning o th e r 
problems connected to these theories.
Identification, holism, system assumptions, and  the extem al/intem al distinctions. The m ost 
pressing problem of the transplantation theory is the same as that found in legal history in general. 
This is the problem of "identification". One of the problems of this type o f study is, for example, 
that frequently legal formalism is seen to be something meaningless. This causes a lack o f  
attention to the legal systems in their proper context.
The "external" point of view is connected to this aspect. The transplantation 
approach stresses the "historic-logical" nature of transplantations. Transplantation theory seems 
to start from the fact that transplantation takes place from an external to an internal sphere. It 
does not emphasis the possibility that transplantation could reflect internal conditions (and 
interests) in society.698 This leads to the idea that transplantation theory does not take adequately 
into account all relevant societal factors. Transplantation from the internal to an external sphere 
seems to be the preliminary starting point for the process of transplantation.
On the other hand, legal transplantation theory assumes that a body of law is 
transplanted to another system. The following assumptions are embedded within this idea: firstly, 
there is a body o f law somewhere, and secondly, that there is the possibility to transplant, via 
some process, this same body of law to another system.699 Accordingly, the theory does not stress 
the fact that the law is discursively systematic. Law is a process o f systematization. As and when 
a certain body of statements is adapted to a system of law, the systematic, and consequently, the 
legal nature of these statements remains a part o f the legal discourse. In other words, there are 
no normative legal rules or norms transplanted. Rather, there is an adoption of a body of descrip­
tive statements, from the point of view o f particular receiving system. The statements achieve 
their meaning and normative content within the discourse of that system.
Consequently, we may perhaps speak not about legal transplantations, but about 
cognitive transplantations o f ideas, which become "legalized" within the particular discourse o f 
a system. In the context of the discursive concept o f law it is problematic to maintain the idea that
697 For some criticism of the imaginative conception o f legal transplants, see Klaim, H.T., 1981, p.76.
691 See Sacco, R., 1991,p.400.
699 Regarding holism in theory, see Klami, H.T., 1981, p .147.
a norm or a part o f a system is easily seen as a whole (with all its institutional, historical, 
sociological and other dimensions).
We may conclude by saying that one cannot really see any "mechanical" or 
"organic" transplantations in law. One could, in the realm of theory, speak instead of different 
"degrees” of adaptations700.
The theory functions well in the context o f the "objectivised" transfer o f ideas. 
Nevertheless, because it seems to undermine the internal political and discursive elements of 
law701 it cannot be regarded as a "legal" theory, and, consequently, as having normative value702. 
On the other hand, it seems to be problematic also in relation to legal historical study. It may 
easily create a need for the “purification” o f influences.
The functional transplants. One of the ideas that the theory of transplantation may be 
neglecting is the idea that the most instrumental and effective way o f transplantation is in the 
creation of a functional institution. This may be called a functional transplant. Its effectiveness 
and instrumental nature derives from the fact that the identification o f a functional transplant, its 
aims, role and its relationship to the social system, is problematic for legal theory and legal 
discourse in general.703
One can also maintain that transplantation may result in a certain degree of 
comparability, and the comparative legal discourse may start after these transplantations.704 This 
is the aspect which should be taken into account in the theory.
Hidden transplants and  visible parallelism. There can also be "hidden" (comparative) sources 
o f law in a functional situation. For example, where normative and political systems are covered 
by "oppressive" and "official" normative premisses, the normative "subsystem", which endeavours 
to maintain its normative culture (continuity), may come to refer to another comparable culture 
in order to maintain the coherence of its interpretations. This is so in situations, for example, 
where the "official" system is considered arbitrary or problematic for some reason. These kinds
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700 Kahn-Freund, O ., 1974, p.5.
701 Jackson, P. (1968, p385 ) religious factors, social factors, personality etc. See also, Kahn-Freund, O., 1974, p.21. 
W atson, A. (1978a, p.315) identifies this as "arbitrariness".
It has been claimed that, for example, European receptions have not been forced reception (Sacco, R.,
1991, p.398).
702 Similar type criticism, see Abel, Law as Lag: Inertia as a Social Theory o f Law. In: M ich.LR., 1982 (785 ff.) 
(Referred by, Ewald, W., 1995, p.505. His defense of W atson’s theory, ibid., 505 f f ) .
There has been some discussion on the normative aspects of the theory, see Watson, A., 1974, p .3 17.
709 It is interesting to note, how the analysis o f a functional institution means the transfer of the conceptualization of 
legal research to the "origins” o f the transplant. In this sense a functional transplant remains a functional transp lan t
704 Walton, W„ Egyptian Law of Obligation. A Comparative study with special reference to French and English law, 
1920.
of cases may be identified, for example, in legal systems where the traditional system is replaced 
by another system via some historical incident, usually connected to  occupation or some o th e r 
type of "invasion". The traditional identity is maintained, in this situation, by "unofficial" 
reference to another comparable system, without maintaining it as an "official" source o f  law . 
This practical usage determines, in such a situation, the material content of norms and rules705.
On the other hand, many times transplantations have not been integrated thoroughly 
into the adapting system, but the outcome has instead been a system with "parallel jurisdictions”. 
This may generate, for example, not only separate institutions but also separate law for those 
institutions (so-called mixed systems).706 The idea of transplantation does not seriously 
contemplate the possibility that integration is incomplete, even though disparities are obvious.
Conclusions: transplantation in relation to  legal and political theory. Adoption or legal 
transplantation do not seem to be only the issues concerning legal norms and rules, but also legal 
theories and pieces o f dogmatics.
One has to make a distinction between two aspects o f legal transplantation. The 
first aspect of legal transplantation is the identification of legal transplants in the history o f  
comparative law. The other aspect may be related to the discursive situation of the adoption o f  
legislation from one system to another. These aspects related to different types o f governance, 
and they complement each other, to a certain extent.
Even if we are here mainly focussing largely upon the historical approach to legal 
transplantation, one could make some remarks concerning the relationship between political 
theory and "legal" transplantation.
One may profess that transplantation theory is rather a theory on, and an 
identification of, political processes expressed in terms of "legal" arguments deriving from the 
sphere o f comparative law. The question may not be about virtual legal transplantation, but
705 This seems to indicate that transplantation theory does not take into account the instrumental side of law as an  
object o f study.
Granger, R. (1979, p.37 ff, (116-125) has m ade very interesting and persuasive study on the tradition 
as a limitation for legal reforms. He classifies social fields, w here resistance occurs (traditions, irrespective of the field 
o f  law  in reform): politics (power), the state and administration functions, economic relations, urbanization, rural 
exploitation, work relations, education, freedoms rights and liberties. The resistance results in the ignorance of law, also 
by the lawyers (“ inflation”), bad conditions for the elaboration, application o f law , and teaching of law, and 
transformations o f the functions and the alteration o f the nature of law. The limitation o f the reforms has resulted 
d ifferen t transformations in the environment, consequences o f  the impact o f science and technology, deepening and 
quickening of social mutations, intention to exaggerate the rationalization of the social life, crisis of the socialization o f 
groups (young), population crisis etc.
He seems to suggests that there has been a change in the function and nature o f law. Lawyers have also 
a tendency to see law apart from social conflicts. On the other hand, he seems to suggest that the power of law has been 
limited it too extensively (ibid. p. 121-123).
I see this part o f the institutionalization and ultimate positivization of law.
706 Development in Egypt, see Hill, E., 1978, pp .290-291. M ixed systems have been seen as "non-systematized" 
systems.
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rather, the political transplantation of norms which have their separate legal history. In this 
process, even the "legal" character of transplanted norms can be contested. Namely, as explained 
before, the law requires a certain degree o f systematization within a legal discourse - within a 
legal tradition - whereas the legal nature of transplanted rules is legally distinctive. The "transpla­
nted” norms do not sufficiently satisfy the criterion of legal systematization.707
One could claim that "legal" transplantation is a form of comparative adoption, 
typical of a certain type o f "governance". Namely, the adoption and legitimation of actions by 
transplanting may be associated with a system which is not stressing the need o f general public 
discourse. "Legal” transplantation belongs to governmental systems where the public discourse 
is not considered to be the basic "transforming" social activity and important as such. This type 
of governance is based instead on the authoritative adoption o f legislation. This type of 
"govemmentalist" law, in this category of system, is based on adaptations of large bodies o f  law 
from authoritative sources without a discourse.
Conversely, in a system based on the "democratic idea o f law", on the other hand, 
one uses comparative information as an argument within a discourse. Here the main initiatives 
and the line of discussion are determined by the relative continuity (integrity) of the social system 
and its forms o f discourse.708
4.8.3. A special problem of transplantation and adaption 
of formants; the equalization effect
General remarks. Here an attempt is made to explain the idea of the equalization effect, which 
is, or can be, a part of the transplantation or adoption of formants.
We may claim that legal transplants and formants may be accepted passively within
707 In the context of discussion of middle Eastern Law, see Hill,, E., 1078, pp.284-285.One could call this as an 
”incomplete system imitation” (Sacco, R., 1991, p.400).
™ This may be related also to contemporary discourse. It can be maintained that industrialization, urbanization, and 
developm ent in the field o f communication have reduced the obstacles to legal transplantation. This is connected 
d irectly  to the features of the post (or high) modem society. There are no resources for discursive legislation, but 
institutions are transplanted because of the increasing need to stabilize the general discourse.
Concerning the general impossibility o f a theory of legal change, see Klami, H.T., 1981, p. 156.
In the end, w e may notice that also W atson A. (1995, p.342) notices the integrative formulation of 
doctrines in legal systematization (by comparative law). He does not, however, seem  to be willing to build up a legal 
theory on these basis. He maintains:
"When law is created by judicial precedent it has to wait on the course of events. A doctrine may 
emergefrom a line of cases over a considerable period o f time; and the judges in the first cases may 
be quite unaware of the parameters o f the resulting doctrine. What is not so easy to perceive is that 
a jurist, toot may fashion a doctrine in stages, unconscious of what his final result will be. This may 
be especially the case when a jurist is operating within a system that builds up its own law on the 
basis of another system”... "the inventive himself may not at once see all the hidden possibilities that 
will justify his approach”.
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a general normative framework (for example, on the basis o f an international arrangement, o r 
even as part of an obligation), or actively and "voluntarily". This latter idea refers to the 
observation o f social development elsewhere, and consequently, the introduction o f legal 
measures into internal political or legal processes. In other words, legal transplantation can take 
place either formally or practically. The motives for and the nature of the processes o f  
transplantation are, generally speaking, legitimatizing and/or practical.
On the other hand, within these processes, transplants can be taken from an 
authority, or from a system, having the same problems, and can, also, a practical legal solution 
to such problems. The reasons for the adoption are embedded, in the latter case, in the nature o f  
rules themselves. There is no relevance attached to them by any common and existing legal 
framework. Thus, rules are seen as tools or pieces o f legal technology.709
The reasons for the latter type o f adaption may be related, for example, to the 
similarity of traditions. On the other hand, adaptation may be also based on the fact that one piece 
o f legislation was codified first and formulated in an explicit form, thus rendering it easy to  
borrow or transplant.
Now, both comparative law and transplantation theories are based on an idea o f  
comparative processes. In both cases, one is bound to have certain observations concerning 
positive rules, in one form or another. In both processes, one observes something, which seems 
to be "external" to the system in the substantial and institutional sense.
However, one could define a reflexive (transplantative) adaptation as an adaptation 
o f an "external" rule whereby the “external” rule is observed from the point of view of some 
internal principles or processes within the adapting legal system. If this is not done, according to  
the theory of reflexive law710, the internal regulation becomes incomprehensible and no real 
justification for it exists.
Comparative law transplantation, on the other hand, differs from reflexive 
transplantation, because within this process the rule observed is somehow generally and formally 
binding (i.e. a source o f law). This means that the reflexive relationship is systematically 
regulated, and, in a way and to a certain degree, obligatory. This idea may be explained in the 
following way.
Differences between these two types of transplantations are connected to the 
binding nature o f the process. In reflexive transplantation the process is not binding as such (i.e. 
comparative law is not viewed as a source o f law). In other words, comparative law has not been 
formulated as a general source of law in legal discourse. With regard to comparative law 
transplantation, the process is relatively binding, because comparative law is considered a 
normative (reasonable) source of law a priori (at least in some circumstances or with certain
709 On these concepts, see Friedmann, L.M., 1975, p.195.
710 On reflexive law, see Teubner, G., 1993.
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qualifications).
In both cases, one is not able to transplant anything to the internal discourse, but 
one is obliged, to a certain extent, to take into account the internal premisses of the system. 
Nevertheless, in comparative law transplantation the idea o f comparative law as a source of law 
has been discussed, and comparative law has been accepted as a source of law, under certain 
conditions. On the other hand, with comparative law transplantation, a more analytical discourse 
concerning the acceptability of the transplant is possible because of the existence of a theoretical 
framework, and also because of the possibilities for drawing substantive comparisons. 
Transplantation is not based solely on the existence o f an internal principle which makes 
transplantation possible, as is the case with reflexive transplantation.
The differences between these types of processes may be associated with the 
difference between the transplantation theory and the theory of legal formants. It appears as if, 
in traditional transplantation, one assumes that transplants somehow automatically result from the 
similarity between the transforming and the receiving systems. On the other hand, in the formants 
theory, the similarity o f the forms - as between the transferring and the receiving systems is also 
assumed. However, in this latter theory, it is also nevertheless presumed that the form is a 
formant, that is to say, that it also forms the system.
The idea of formation, which may be connected to the formants theory is interest­
ing. However, the essential question is; how does the legal formant form the system? Indeed, can 
it do so at all?
Let us return here to our ideas concerning reflexive and comparative law 
transplantation, and to the different types o f internal justifications for a transplant. We may 
maintain that in comparative law transplantation one is able to observe analytically different types 
o f formations in connection with legal formants themselves - i.e. in the process of the 
transplantation o f these legal formants. This may inform us about the intentions o f the adaptor. 
On this basis, one may conclude, for example, that the forms stay as they are, and that no 
"external" elements are attached to these formants. Here the formants do shape the system, but, 
for example, only to the extent they have their "original" meaning. On the contrary, in some cases 
one may observe that the formant includes additional elements which did not originally belong to 
it. Here the difference between the original and the derived version of the transplant becomes 
problematic.
In comparative law transplantation, the essential point is, consequently, the 
observation of different types of "couplings’* in the transplantation process, whereas in the case 
o f reflexive transplantation we may only observe the process of transplantation, where the 
normative quality of the basic principle of the receiving system may be used instrumentally for 
different types o f “adaptations”. Here the legal and political aspects, for example, can become 
mixed up.
Consequently, in the active and voluntary application o f formants, regulated bv the
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comparative law discourse, one can more easily examine the rationality of the transplantation 
(formation process). One may, for example, criticize the suitability o f this transplant to  th a t 
particular social system by taking into account discourses of systems and discourses o n  
comparative law source theories. One may also attempt to make evaluations o f their pe rsu ­
asiveness from the analytical point o f view o f one's own socio-philosophical standpoint. 
Furthermore, one may examine the extension o f the formation in relation to its additional 
elements. In general, there are many possibilities for an examination of the communicative 
qualities of the “transplantation” process.
With regards to reflexive transplantation, and with normative fram ework 
transplantations, these aspects are more difficult to observe. The external and internal elem ents 
cannot be easily distinguished, if the idea o f "self-operating reflexiveness” prevails. In these cases, 
the normative (principled) relationship between systems alone determines the presumed substance 
of the reflexive application,, i.e. the application o f the legal formant. Here the normative quality  
o f the relationship prevents any discourse concerning this automatic process711.
In this manner we come to the idea o f comparative law discourse.
The "equalization" effect. Related to transplantation we may, accordingly, speak o f  an  
“equalization effect”. The equalization effect means that in the formation process, i.e. in the  
adaptation of a formative proposal (legislative or adjudicative), the original formant and the 
additional elements, which contrary, take upon the equal significance and are deemed to have the 
same legal value as the formant alone.
To conclude, this means, for example, that if the adaptions and transplantations are 
one of the essentia] features of the political or legal functioning of society, or comprise sources 
o f  norms in non-systematic way, we are speaking o f instrumental systems. The instrumentali- 
zation takes place by connecting some other external social-political element and aim to  the 
transplanted element. One uses "objective" and "authoritative" models as tools in implementing 
various elements, and not only the elements directly connected to the transplanted element. In  
other words, one “reads extra factors” into comparative arguments. We may even claim that one 
adds "non-comparable” elements to the transplanted proposal. As maintained, this, on the other 
hand, may be based only on the basic principle(s) o f the system (reflexivity). In such cases, the 
socio-phenomenological observations and the observations of the political or legal discourses in
711 W e may apply the so-called autopoietic theory to  the analysis o f the phenomenon (Teubner, G., 1993).
O ne may claim  that the systems m eet in term s o f  factual interactions. T his means, in legal terms, in 
argum entative trials (cases). Every  comparison is em pty on the phylogenetic level. N o  direct cognitive relationship 
exists between them, but the "co-evolution" is determined by the self-reflexity o f  the system. It is selective according 
to  the ideas internal to a particular legal system.
Every  com parison, in other words, if it is openly argued, reveals the internal elements o f selection: 
countries involved, types o f norm s and sources, the form o f adaption. The environm ental analysis reveals many 
characteristics o f the system, w hich is comparing.
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the social system are disregarded, or the observation is done in an extremely restricted way.
We may claim that the equalization effect takes place in legally "weak" yet 
politically "strong" systems (Le. governmental systems). The weakness is related, for example, to 
the inadequacy o f the discourse on comparative law and sources of law in general but also o f the 
legal discourse in generaL In these types of systems, the idea prevails according to which internal 
norms may be changed according to external premisses. The comparative-discursive relationship 
between systems is thus lacking.
On the other hand, it is important to note, in this connection that if the receiving, 
equalizing, and transforming system is in a normative relationship to the $ystem(s) from which the 
formants are derived, the formative processes may be used to accelerate changes in the system 
quite effectively.
W hat are the "equalization effect" studies? The rationality of the comparative formants may 
be evaluated by the study of the analytical quality of the formative discourses. On the other hand, 
this may take place in the realm of the discussion on comparative law712. We may call this a 
comparative law discourse in a normative sense.
As we have seen, the rationality of the reflexive formants can be evaluated by the 
analysis of the formants' quality in relation to the distinction between original aims and the 
"additional" aims, and the "dogmatic" (comparative law) content o f these norms in the system 
they are derived from. On the other hand, it is clear that the influence o f the study depends on the 
possibility for distinguishing between the formative proposal, the original idea, and their aims. A 
successful analysis may help one to find out whether these different aspects are mixed up, for 
example, in the legislative or adjudicative processes. One can find out, for example, whether the 
original aims are used in the normative application of the transferred rules as means to achieve 
purposes other than the original ones. This means, consequently, that one should be able to study 
the dogmatic contents o f norms in different systems.713
4.8.4. Some conclusions
G eneral remarks. As we may see, the original type of legal transplantation is fairly easily 
recognized, when the study concentrates on traditional historical phenomena. There the main 
focus is in the historical circulation o f legal ideas. The intentions and discourses and the socio­
712 In this sense, the discussion on comparative law may also function as a method for discussing on legal formations 
in the realm of binding international systems, and not only in the realm o f traditional comparative law. As w e have 
suggested, normal international rules may also be called, to a  certain extent, legal formants, though their nature is 
"legal** as a binding rule. Cultural aims may be seen as premisses for the equalization effect
713 This seems to be exactly the problem we face, for example, in relation to  regional and international organizations.
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political contexts remain outside the study, and the transfer of legal idea may be easily recognized 
as a transplant. In a way, the theory of transplantation remains beyond a legal approach, because 
o f its distance, both in its practical theoretical and in historical dimensions, from the social and 
integrative discourse.
However, transplantation theory, in its developed form, could be a study o f legal 
discourses with the help of some socioeconomic conceptualizations. This way it comes quite 
close to political history. This way one could attempt to recognize legal events, and explain their 
occurrence in those particular circumstances. With the help of the theory, one may be able to find 
out the reasons for the forms of law, and the absence o f particular pieces o f forms of law, in some 
systems. On the other hand, the problematic features of the transplants can be avoided by exa­
mining the role which has been played by "legal transplants”, if any, in each system, in the 
systems* development from a legal mosaic to a legal system.
Transplantation, comparative law, an d  the study of the com parative legal argum ents. As
we have seen, comparative and reflexive transplantations involve quite different forms o f  
implementation. The former can be seen as a systematically (and legally) "binding” form o f  
implementation. The second cannot necessarily be qualified in this sense.
On the other hand, these different types of implementations were divided also into 
discursive-rational and instrumental types of comparative and reflexive implementation. This 
distinction identified the quality of the comparative legal reflexivity for further discourse.
The study of comparative reasoning and argument is reminiscent o f study o f 
transplantation, because, essentially, we are speaking of the adaptation o f "foreign" discourses 
and reasoning to another discourse and form o f  argumentation, and, furthermore, we are 
discussing the possible abandonment o f those arguments which have been already considered 
arguments in the legal discourse of that system in some context. However, a study of com­
parative arguments and reasoning does not stress the finality of the reception o f the legal 
formation, but attempts rather focus upon the continuing process of equalization, its rationale, 
and normative implications.
We will come later to this question o f the comparative legal discourse and its 
relation to other types o f legal discourses.
4.9. Conclusions; tow ard a  redefinition of comparative law
Contemporary critical comparative law. Critical movements in contemporary comparative law 
stress the failure o f ethnological comparative law and its former distinctions in general714. This
714 Frankenberg, G ., 1985, p.415, Pôyhôncn, J„  1992, p .62 ff.
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kind of “postmodern” criticism of traditional modem comparative law stems from the insistence 
upon a more theoretical, methodological and in the normative sense, ethical approach to 
comparative law. This criticism claims that comparative law has been too greatly relied upon 
"common sense".713 *15 This phenomenology of comparative law has attempted to grapple with those 
issues speaking of the metaphorizing of comparative law as "travelling", or by seeing it as a 
"learning process".716
The critical approach goes back to basics, and seems to neglect any systematic 
component of comparative law717. This may be a result of the frustration caused by the 
contemporary institutionalization o f the law and comparative law. The critical approach 
recognizes the dynamics of this neo-institutional law, which the "normal" lawyer does not dare 
or bother to recognize so explicitly.718
One could say, consequently, that because the “modernist” comparative lawyer has 
gone beyond the traditional legal discourse, the integrity of law has to be maintained by a 
different type o f discourse. This is the reason why contemporary comparative law must orient 
itself differently.
The critical approach to comparative law, especially in the terms o f the political 
theory of comparative law719, would be a helpful approach in understanding the need for a new
713 Frankenberg, G., 1985, p.420.
One could call 20th century comparative law "intellectually isolated" (for good analysis, see M aine, 1 ,
For some critical reflections on contemporary comparative law, Mayda, J., 1978, pp..361-378.
716 Frankenberg, G., 1985, pp.412-413. For problems concerning this, see ibid, p.441. One of the problem s is 
naturally that the com parative discourse is part of the legal discourse (ibid., p.441).
The problems of comparative reasoning are connected also to its legal-phenomenological nature. The 
com parative argument would need - in order to be rational - go through the systematic and cultural study o f its 
relationship to the system w here it is adopted so as to be systematically understood. This is so, because the argument 
does not carry with it, as a normal legal premiss derived from the systemic legal discourse, the relationship with the 
system. Or, it does so in a negative sense (as a relationship with another system).
These problems of foreign connections bring also interpretational problems into the picture. Here the 
argum ent should be interpreted from the foreign premisses, which makes the arguments more difficult to understand.
The comparative argument should be, in this sense, understood with its restricted relationships with 
both systems. The system holistic approach should not be taken.
7,7 See in this regard, Frankenberg, G., 1985, pp.452-453). He, however, seems to recognize ideas regarding the 
integrity and coherence o f public discourses, and the distinction between the public and private etc.
The inability o f the postmodern critics to combine comparative reasoning with the discursive attitude, 
undoubtedly embedded in the method of comparative law, results in unjustified criticism against the use o f comparative 
law. For example, Watson strongly claims that comparative law is unsystematic almost by necessity (1974, p .l 1). This 
kind o f  criticism belongs to the non-discursive paradigm o f law, which fails to see the rationality o f comparative law 
based on the traditional restrictions of the sources o f the comparisons.
7I> Frankenberg G., recognizes the problem, and that it m ight easily result in more ethnocentric interpretations o f  law 
(1985, p.421. and 428 if.). The comparative lawyer is in a  different position than the "normal lawyer", because he has 
to  separate himself from the dominant legal consciousness (ibid., p.446).
Frankenberg has, in his presentation, some problems with ethnocentrism and "domestic legal 
consciousness"(ibid., p.442) and culture based language (ibid., p.443).
On the frustration in general, see Goodrich, P. Reading the Law (Oxford) 1986, p .210 ff.
719 Frankenberg, G ., 1985, p.452.
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type of discourse. One could also propose new classifications for comparative law in the “high” 
modem paradigm of law. This would entail changes in two respects: in the object of the classifi­
cation, and in the criteria of the classification. This idea could be connected to other phenomenon 
in "high modem" law: material and procedural segmentation. Nevertheless, as we have 
maintained, the nation state paradigm is still the modem basic unit of comparative law.
Another criterion of the classification could be found also in the "discursive" 
aspects of these systems. One could classify different systems according to their openness and 
orientation towards their environment. This essentially means the classification of different legal 
systems as either value-based, traditional, or instrumentally discursive720.
Comparative law as a ’’historical legal accident". In the end, one could claim that compara­
tive law has rather a direct phenomenological basis instead of any preexisting "legal cultural" or 
"legal systematic" one. Negative disturbances, caused by the cultural mis-match of normative 
practices, generates the general or particular interest to comparative law. This means that the idea 
o f comparative law is based on prior differences in some realm of social life721.
In this sense, comparative law does not seem to be based on any "rational" and 
predictable theory.722 Issues of comparability do not necessarily derive from rationalistic consi-
720 The problem of the state paradigm  of comparative law is in it’s strong idea o f the homogeneity of national legal 
systems.
721 For example, comparative law would appear quite meaningless to persons, w ho do  not have national legal 
education. They would not be able to  understand the differences between different socio-legal systems. Furthermore, 
comparative law seems to be strongly connected to contingent factors such as the availability o f information, resources 
in the term s o f time, etc. This is the basic feature o f comparative law.
The problem of every analysis, which includes sociological and phenom enological observations, is the 
"revelation" o f "oneself' and "ones own". Especially in the field of comparative law and international discourse, the 
extension o f the argument towards the factuality reveals "systematically" contingent factors. In these fields, the arguer 
comes to the value-based or o f though affective side o f the reasoning, which, nevertheless, reflects his "form of life" and 
traditional features o f thought
This en tails certain problems from the point o f  view of law. F irst of all, equality of application, the 
basis o f m odem liberal legal systems, comes into question. Secondly, integrity is at stake. However, from the point o f 
view o f the general integrity of law, this case has only positive features. Namely, it helps one to establish the division 
between different spheres o f integrity in analysis.
722 It is, instead, a form o f "legal curiosity" (de Boer, Th.M „ 1994, p.16).
Comparative law is primarily a heuristic method of legal science, Zweigert, K., and Kotz, H., 1987,
p.45.
The subjective elem ent in comparative law, Eorsi, G., 1973, p .182, de G root, G-R., Schneider, A., 
p.59, Bogdan, M., 1990, p.68. On the "attitude" element in restrictions, Hill, E., 1978, p .284. Markesinis, B., has 
spoken even with methaphors like “feeling” and “love" about another system (1993, p.625 ff.). Similarly, Legrand, P . 
(1996, p.78) making analogy to the relationship between men and women when speaking about the difference between 
legal systems. He tries to analyze the subjective elem ent (ibid., pp.77-79). From  this, there is not a long way to 
distinction o f  family as the basic distinction between the legal systems (David).
The idea o fT ertia  Valutationis, Kokkini-Iatridou, D., 1986, p .180, Constantinesco, L.-J., 1971, part
m.
ra i
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derations.723 Choices made with regard to comparison are not made according to any formal "law 
in books", but according to "law in action", or rather, according to “law as it is observed and 
experienced”.724 One compares learned patterns of behaviour and normative practices are felt to 
be binding to the deviating patterns o f behaviour, and becomes involved in the "understanding 
processes". Choices are made in the realm of "prevailing" patterns" o f behaviour, which are not 
necessarily the same as the learned patterns, but are instead distinct.
In this sense, every comparative law abstraction, whether based on law in books or 
law in action, remains an abstraction. This abstraction has to be reconstructed and "found" with 
reference to social behaviour or to the experiences deriving from meaningful practical 
discourses.725
Consequently, in the end, it seems that the "intersystematic" actors are the basis of 
comparative law.726 One could say that comparative legal research is determined by the 
systematic interests of the comparative lawyer727. Accordingly, every comparative law study, as 
a systemic approach, starts from a particular question regarding a legal institution o f a particular 
law, goes on to make comparative reflections, and comes a full circle by evaluating the disco­
veries made, and in making remarks concerning the starting point o f the process with regard to 
a particular legal institution within system. In this sense, there is no difference between national 
and international comparative law. The question is basically about which systematic framework 
the comparator is operating within?
Comparative law may be defined, in this sense, as a study of law as a form of life, 
or the phenomenology o f law. In the ultimate sense, its methodology seems to be based on the 
concepts of logic and the idea of coherence which are in fact, the basic premisses of the
723 See regarding comparability, Kokkini-Iatridou, D., 1986, pp. 157-158, Kahn-Freud, O., 1978, p.327.
One could refer, for example to the Hartian "internal" point of view, which assumes a pre-existing 
understanding of the relevant divergences (Hart, H.L.A., The concept of law, 1961). The main question seems to be, 
not the "acceptance o f the internal point of view", but, rather, the idea of the "relevant normative point o f view".
734 This means that academic comparative law  remains more or less a technical exercise.
P5yh5nen, I . (1992, p.61) has asked, w ho 's  law in action and w ho 's law in books the comparative
lawyers law is.
723 Comparative law  seems to  be by definition a way o f finding the positive law (Bogdan, M., 1990, p.68).
726 "The intelligent study offoreign legal system is difficult if not impossible without, at least sub-consciously, 
referring to one's own law comparing it to one's own" (Winterton G., 1975, p,70).
The in terest in comparison must be based on the idea o f  finding out the "reasons” behind these 
differences, and, furthermore, the general implications of these differences. This results in the idea of comparative legal 
research.
727 The idea of the subjectivity o f  comparative law has led to a  "Cinderella complex" (Gutteridge, H .C., 1949, p .23, 
also Frankenberg, G., 1985).
The Cinderella complex can be explained also in another way. Subjectivity, and its a priori orientation 
to  a legal system as a "coherent” legal system, results, in a “comparative situation*', and leads readily to  the 
"rom anticizing" of one's "own" system. This may be due to the discursive and interactive problems in relation to 
"another” system. This leads to pathological features from the point of view o f the concept o f law, and the legal system 
is thereforth not based on social discourse, but upon contrastive idealization process.
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contemporary discourse theory of law. Comparative law studies legal logic in the sphere o f legal 
phenomena and life worlds. Here law reveals itself in different static and dynamic constructions. 
Comparative law confirms both the deterministic and indeterministic basis of law, and is not 
relativized and reflected within different questions o f legitimacy and validity or with regard to  
political theories. In comparative law, even political theories can be studied with reference to  
comparative legal observations, as we have seen.728
This idea could explain, for example, why comparative legal reasoning in different 
socio-normative systems is a priori considered to be an "effective" argument. This effectiveness 
is measured not by the quality of the reasoning and its connection to different dogmatic 
frameworks but rather by its "correctness" in general. In this sense, it may also come closer to  a  
scientific argument than to a dogmatic legal argument. However, this type o f legal "correctness" 
seems to be related instead to political and cultural theory rather than to any dogmatic theory o f  
law. The persuasiveness o f comparative reasoning is transparently based on its relationship to  
politically and culturally prevailing features. The "generalities" and "disparities" in comparative 
reasoning are related instead to the socio-political generality than to the legal scientific general­
ities.
The problem in this is that the more we enter into the field o f socio-philosophical 
phenomena, the greater number of different factors enter into the discussion729.
In conclusion, there seems to be a fundamental conflict between comparative law 
as a science, and the use o f comparative information in legal reasoning. The interest of scientific 
comparative law seems to be in the eternal process o f  learning different forms of social behaviour 
and their legal counterparts, and in this sense we have some basis for providing genuine 
explanations of values and traditions. This seems to  be beyond any form of instrumentalization. 
This is where comparative law seems to approach its phenomenological essence. The utilization 
o f these comparative observations, on the other hand, establishes arguments for some purpose 
beyond this explanatory (phenomenological) interest. That utilization is in conflict with pure 
forms o f “meditation” regarding the possibility o f  difference. The instrumentalization makes 
forms o f  life necessity, a dogma, and not a possibility. This, on the other hand, seems to be 
connected to strict disciplines of ideological power730.
721 D avid, R., Briefly, J.E.C., 1978, p.6.
729 The more a  comparative lawyer chooses concepts o f  reflection from the sphere of som e other social phenomena, 
the m ore he bounds himself to those particular values which have a place in those spheres o f social life. Every tim e 
comparative law is practical, it in itself to these other spheres o f  social life, and relativizes itself with regard to certain 
traditions.
730 It seems that it is the conceptualization of organistic and closed systems which has m ade it possible to, in theory 
and in the realm of phenomenological empiricism and psychology, to arrive at these kind o f  speculative and derivative 
discourses o f  a  comparative nature. The speculative nature o f these discourses assumes a  superior level o f existence 
(form o f life) and it neglects the plurality of genuine discourses.
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The self-referentiality o f comparative law. Traditional comparative law can be also charac­
terized by its self-referentiality. The law refers to law. or to the premises of the institution itself. 
This is contrary to the traditional discourse and reasoning o f law in general, where one refers to 
the "best legal argument”, among pre-selected legal arguments, as the basis o f a normative 
decision, and which turns and is capable o f turning one’s interest in interpretation to other 
spheres and discourses than the legal rule or system itself. In comparative law, one refers to many 
’’best legal arguments and legal systems" as legal arguments in the interpretation of a "better” 
legal argument, but the step to any legal factuality and practicality does not seem to be there731.
The use o f comparative law in legal reasoning could be, consequently, called the 
"justificatory interpretation” of law (in contrast to "genuine” reasoning, which could be described 
rather as "interpretative justification")732. Comparative reasoning is never as such a reference to 
a legal system, its rule and its interpretation, but a reference to legal systems and their 
interpretations. It is a reference to different legal discourses. This is why it is a justificatory 
interpretation of law in general rather than the law of a particular legal system.
In this sense, we come again to the idea that the use o f comparative law is, in its 
contemporary form, instrumental Legal systems, their norms, principles legal constructions, etc., 
are used in political social and legal discourses despite their "comparability". This type of use has 
even resulted in features such as private law doctrines and constructions being used "inspi­
rationally" in the sphere o f public law in order to produce "new" types of approaches, and in the 
adoption of the legal doctrines of one country into the doctrinal argumentation of another 
country. There does not seem to be any "right answer” to the use o f comparative law in legal 
reasoning.733
In this sense, the contemporary approach to comparative law can be claimed to 
have abandoned the strict methodological and scientific ideas o f the traditional comparative law.
The comparatively reflexive systems. The fact that the legal discourse on comparative 
observations is a derived discourse means that these can always be brought down to some system 
with a "genuine" discourse based on a social form of life. This means that legal systems using 
comparative observations are comparatively reflexive systems.
731 T he idea of autopoietic theory that the normative closure of law is a precondition for any possibility of being 
cognitively open seems to explain this phenomenon (Teubner, G., 1993). All the same, we may say that law's self- 
referentiality is more in its general nature than in its autopoietic self-referentiality; in law one speaks about law, and not 
about legal systems and their norms.
732 Aamio maintains that where legal dogmatics, for example, uses the interpretative method (and systematization), 
comparative law method is an interpretative method supplemented with empirical methods and those of history (Aam io, 
A., 1997, pp.77-78).
733 On eclecticism, see Edrsi, G., 1973, p.186. The fact is that comparative law instrumentalizes law  as much as it 
is functional in certain discourses. This is reflected in the traditional forms o f  comparative research. O nly those rules 
and elements which do appear relevant for the legal discourse are considered.
In this sense, if one claims a relative autonomy and practicality for comparative law, 
one is usually referring to a strongly instrumental socio-legal community, for example to  a 
regional and international organization, which is instrumentalizing comparative law in its internal 
and external discourses. Genuinely, however, as we have seen, the autonomy of these practical 
comparative discourses is relative. Furthermore, these types o f comparative discourses usually 
reflect the values of an "particular institutional form of life".734
It must be asserted that genuine discourses are always normatively superior, in 
general or in particular. However, an institutional discourse cannot be decisive from the point o f  
view of value decisions and legitimacy as such.
The study of comparatively reasoning as a  study of argum entative strategies. As explained 
above, in comparative law legal systems are often used instrumentally with the aim to persuade 
and convince, and not with an objective of establishing any legal norm in the genuine sense o f  the 
word. The comparative adaption is not in the adoption o f legal norms and rules, but in the search 
for convincing arguments735.
On the other hand, as we have maintained, reasoning through comparative legal 
arguments does not have to function necessarily in the field o f law. It may be that comparative 
observations only start as legal observations, and end up as extensive analyses o f a social, 
political, economic, or some other type o f situation in general. Afterwards these observations 
may be added to the justification or, as often happens, used in the internal persuasion within 
institutions. The instrumentality of comparative law may accordingly be seen not only in the 
instrumentalization of the legal systems, in the selection of a better legal argument - i.e. in 
persuading of the legal dogmatic audience - but also in providing arguments for the persuasion 
o f the general public or other type of audience, and any distinctive social group it may be 
important to persuade.
This idea may explain, for example, why the attitude towards comparative 
observations and studies in legal institutions is so controversial, and apparently, why comparative 
observations are seen to be so "inspirational" and somehow belonging to the “personal” side o f 
legal considerations. This may explain why comparative arguments are hardly seen in public 
justifications, even if they appear in the work of legal institutions. They may appear in the form 
of arguments, translated via the institutional-heuristic processes, into arguments describing some 
context for the legal decision, but they do not appear as self-evident adaptions of legal norms or 
legal arguments.
One o f the greatest "strategic" functions and forms o f  instrumentality o f
734 This is connected to the question o f  "professionalization".
735 This means that the basic feature o f comparative observations is often its aim  to find legal arguments for certain 
interpretations, and not only to fulfill assumed lacunae.
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comparative law arises in connection with systematic studies internal to institutions. Comparative 
studies, made within an institutional framework systematically strive to eliminate the possibility 
for the decision-maker to explain the law on the basis of his own systematic assumptions. Within 
this type of strategy, national legal systems are objectivised by institutional comparative research 
("restricted”), and the '‘law" of the system is translated into the language recognizable for the 
legal institutional decision-makers and it's target audience. This constitutes the institutional 
comparative discourse, but it abolishes, on the same time, the possibility for comparative law 
reasoning within an open institutional framework and within a general legal discourse. This forces 
the institutional discourse to concentrate to arguments other than arguments deriving from some 
particular legal system(s). It renders the institution capable o f focusing on arguments by values 
instead of analysing values.
One can claim, consequently, that the main purpose of comparative observations is 
to establish certain argumentative strategies736, and that the contemporary study of comparative 
law is, for that matter, a (comparative) study of strategies of comparative reasoning.737
On the other hand, because the question is about the adoption of different 
arguments from other discourses, we do not, in fact, have to necessarily speak of an adoption of 
legal rules or legal norms at all. The question is rather about the comparability of distinctions 
used in “other” systems. Then it must be asked whether these “derived” distinctions “suit” the 
discursive context of the adapting system, and if so, whether they have any analytical quality.
This suitability depends upon the satisfaction o f certain conditions.
5, General conclusions: toward a theoretical framework for comparative legal
interpretation and comparative legal reasoning
5.1, Introduction
As we have seen, it is the philosophical approach to comparative law that has resulted, firstly, in 
the speculations concerning the independence and autonomy o f the science of comparative law738 
and, secondly, its institutionalization. The independence idea was related to the idea that
736 To a  certain extent, comparative law could be more scientific than legal dogmatics as such, and methodologically 
usually it is so. In the application and dogmatization o f law one barely considers political, stylistic o r sociological 
perspectives. However, a good comparative study explicitly discusses these aspects. In this sense, comparative law can 
be m ore discursive on the subject than legal dogmatics.
Comparative arguments seem to function as transcendented considerations. The decision-makers m ove 
to the level o f legal speculation by  taking into account many practical solutions in socially binding systems.
737 Watson, A. (1995, p.335 ff.) has spoken, for example, about practical utility and need o f authority etc.
™ One can easily challenge the nature o f comparative law  as a distinctive legal discipline (Watson, A ., 1974,1 -9).
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comparative law somehow functions outside the law and legal system.739 The independence idea 
is also connected to the fiction that one is really able objectively to "govern" the relevant 
questions of law, and able to close the system by means of interpretation.740
One may claim that in contemporary jurisprudence there is a lack of examination o f  
comparative reasoning in the realm of the legal discourse theory of law. Consequently, its ro le  
has not been seen clearly741. This has necessarily isolated comparative law from its legal social- 
phenomenological sphere. However, because one takes part in some legal discourse, comparative 
law must be seen part of the legal discourse in the legal systems o f systematized rules. To avoid 
the problems of legal transplantation discussed earlier, one has to see comparative transplants o r 
formants as comparative arguments within discourse of law.
Accordingly, comparative law must be understood rather as comparative legal and 
as comparative legal arguments in the realm o f  comparative legal sources. Comparative law 
discourse contributes arguments to the practical legal discourse. This comparative law discourse 
uses legal systems and their systematized rules and seems to be a reproduction of legal arguments 
in context other than the original context of those rules742. That is to say, it takes place in a 
context other than in the social, political, and philosophical context o f the discourse, where the 
legal arguments were originally defined as legal Comparative law "reconstructs" legal arguments. 
In fact, it has also been maintained elsewhere that any "theory" of comparative law seems to be 
a theory of reconstruction.743
The idea o f reconstruction results in peculiar features connected to the study o f 
comparative reasoning in a legal discourse. The study of comparative reasoning is, consequently, 
a study of how comparative law (and the theory o f comparative law), as a description o f how
739 A  good example can be found in David, R., Briefly, J.E.C. (1978, p.5): "The historical classifications known to 
any system, the relative character o f its concepts, the political and social conditioning o f its institutions, all these are 
really understood only when the observer places himself outside his own teeal system, that is to sa\ . when he adopts 
the perspective of comparative law” (underlining, MK).
140 For problems o f understanding foreign law in the traditional sense, see M arsh, N .S., 1977, p.662.
741 One could say that comparative law, which claims superiority over practical usage, takes its political premisses 
too  seriously. This is more problematic in the situation where comparative law has not been able to explain its own 
rationality after its establishment as a legal scientific discipline, and where its political premisses are clearly visible.
742 The reconstruction takes place in relation to the prem isses o f  the comparator and his legal system. N o system or 
rules o f a system can be reconstructed by means other than by legal means of the original system. The legal system, its 
rules and norms should be see in connection to the social, political and philosophical spheres, where the legal system 
is generally constructed and reconstructed. This is the idea o f the "integrity" of law.
Comparative law seems to violate the "integrity" principle of law. This is because the rules are taken 
from its context and interpreted in context other than their "own".
We may maintain that in the study of these reconstructions of law we can identify the basis upon which 
the system  claims to be competent to reconstruct another system, and, at the same time, itself. This means the 
identification of the principles o f rational comparative reconstruction, the rational reconstructions of legal systems.
743 See for instance Watson, A ., 1978. Any theory em erging from  comparative law would be ”about the legal 
change, about the legal structures and rules, and about the society in which they operate" (ibid, p.321).
structures and their change in a society determines a change or maintenance of the legal 
structures, rules, and the normative dimension of a society. On the other hand, this idea of the 
theory of comparative reasoning does not necessarily seem to be a study of legal change but also 
a study of the "maintenance" of law in its present form744.
Now, as has been claimed in connection to transplants and formants, comparative 
observations become attached to a particular system or some legal institutions on the basis of the 
internal principles o f that particular legal system. In other words, comparative law arguments are 
included within the reasoning in cases, if the regulative principles or the institutional rules of that 
legal system so determine. These regulative or basic principles seem to be the principles effecting 
the maintenance or change of the law as such. However, within a choice of a "foreign” argument 
on those bases, they do not function in this way, because they "expand" the legal discourse by 
introducing "non-contextualized" arguments. The contextual validation takes place within the 
practical legal discourse. This seems to result in a kind of autonomous discourse regarding the 
type of change.
On the other hand, we have also maintained that comparative studies, to a certain 
extent, close the systems observed as legal systems.
All the same, contrary to any systems theory, the opening and closing of a system - 
in relation to comparative observations - does depend, as argued, on some rules which regulate 
the form of comparative reasoning. These rules must also be part of the legal discourse.745 These 
rules or premises regarding the opening and closing up of a system become apparent when the 
comparative observations, their restrictions, and their results are examined.
Consequently, we may say that it is the use of comparisons in connection to other 
arguments, which reveals the internal contextual principles and premises o f an institutional order 
or system. Furthermore, we may - from the open comparative reasoning - interpret the 
counterfactual legal choices o f the contextual processes.
In this sense, the study of comparative reasoning is also a study of the limits o f the 
openly discursive law746. Comparative reasoning defines its own limits, and laws’747.
Furthermore, one may start to investigate certain qualitative "types" of comparisons 
related to certain types o f legal structures and norms. Here the study could claim to establish
744 W e have noticed that comparative law functions in the state paradigm of law. In this realm, a  comparative 
discourse is effected. The uses o f  comparative observations are, on the other hand, reflected in the conceptualization 
of each legal system they are used in. In the ultimate sense, it is the conceptualization o f the general jurisprudence which 
is decisive in terms o f  its use.
743 This we may show by the use of qualitative methods o f social sciences.
746 In Dworkinian terms, an attempt to find out the basic principles o f the adjudicative side o f  the integrity (Dworkin, 
R., 1986, p.217).
747 Furthermore, if  the arguer posits the generality and similarity of systems, the adoption o f this generalization 
determines the limits o f the law (what is "general" law). O n the other hand, if  the "generality of law" is neglected and 
another argument chosen, we can observe another side of the legal value, the limit o f law.
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something about the different types of dynamics o f different types of legal rules.748
Next, there is an examination of the nature o f comparative legal discourse in 
relation to other types o f legal discourses. Consequently, the idea is to look into comparative law 
as a source of law and to connect comparative law to other types o f sources (interpretation), and 
to establish some theoretical criteria for the use of comparative law as a source o f law  
(comparative reasoning). In the latter examination, we have to focus upon different types o f  
comparative reasonings in the realm of comparative law as a source o f law, related to the 
interaction between different types of arguments and corresponding audiences.
Finally, some conclusions are drawn to prepare the empirical study of comparative 
legal reasoning.
5.2. What is comparative legal discourse?
Types of comparative legal discourses. Previously we have studied the tradition of comparative 
law based on the traditional distinctions, aims, and ideas concerning methodology. Comparative 
legal discourse seems to be a reproductive discourse having a partly separate function in modem 
legal discourse.
As we have seen, legal discourses can be classified on the basis of the quality o f the 
discourse. This quality has been related also to the general societal discourse in the realm o f  
values. However, on the basis of legal discourse theories we may distinguish three types o f  
discourses: value based, traditional and instrumental discourses. These distinctions can be applied 
to the classification of the comparative discourses as well.
We may say, that every comparative aspects introduced into systemic discourses 
involves a value decision from the systematic point o f view. In this sense, in the introducing o f  
comparative aspects into the discourse, one establishes a genuine relationship with the general 
legal discourse. Furthermore, if the comparative aspects remain only synthetically discussed, the 
adaption is genuinely value based. Here the comparative discourse is not founded on an attempt 
to evaluate analytically the relationship o f the comparative observation and the general legal 
discourse in whatever form the latter appears. On the other hand, a more evaluative comparative
748 This way one could claim that the study concerns legal identities.
Modem comparative law does not seem  to challenge the existing legal identity, but is in modem legal 
discourse a process o f "re-checking" the existence o f  this legal identity, on whatever level it is. Comparative law is 
consequently not law, but a method o f re-establishing the identity o f law. The modem "ahistorical" comparative law 
starts from the presum ption o f a  legal identity.
This is exactly the reason why modem comparative law functions as an argument and not as law as
such.
When com parative legal arguments are taken to be the object o f a study, one steps out o f the idea o f 
re-examining the ahistorical legal values and identities as the m odem  comparative legal studies do (Verheul, J.P., 1994, 
p. 143). One starts to identify the values o f legal justification.
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discourse in the public legal discourse is based on an attempt to "traditionalize" the comparative 
aspects, concepts, rules etc.
The distinction between the value-based and traditional comparative approaches to 
the legal discourse are, consequently, based on the attitude of the comparative approach towards 
general legal theoretical assumptions concerning sources of law. The traditional type o f 
comparative discourse seems to evaluate its relationship to the general discourse by focusing on 
the legal-sociological, legal-cultural, legal-philosophical, and legal-political connections of 
comparative observations. However, this takes place, as may be seen, not at first hand, but via 
the relationship to the value-based discourse o f law, i.e. in the realm of legal sources.
Moreover, the instrumental type o f comparative discourse is available, when the 
comparative formant is adopted within a discourse not in order to sincerely establish discursive 
coherence but with instrumental purposes concerning the legal discourse. This type of com­
parative discourse uses the formant for purposes other than indicated by its legal nature as a 
source o f law Basically, all uses o f comparative reasoning are like the same, as we have 
maintained. Nevertheless, the difference lies in the type of traditionalization which takes place. 
In an instrumental comparative discourse, the formant is intentionally given an independent 
context in a separate discourse, for example, by strongly “sociologizing” it. On the other hand, 
instrumentalization may take place by not revealing the observations in the legal discourse in 
general (i.e. by the maintenance or creation of a separate audience). This does not "traditionalize" 
comparative discourse on a larger scale, and maintains possibilities for critical evaluations other 
than that of the particular "value" discourse. This indicates an abandonment of the principle o f 
the discursive integrity o f law749.
The relationship between the comparative law discourse and the general legal discourse.
As we have indicated, the general legal discourse refers to the "genuine" practical legal discourse. 
The comparative discourse - which serves to conclude the genuine legal discourse - is a 
secondary discourse,750
On the other hand, there is a dynamic and interactive relationship between these 
two types of discourses751. Where the comparative discourses take place, for example, to
749 In this type of reasoning and comparative discourse, comparative reasons are used in order to maintain the 
internal institutional coherence or consensus between the participants within the closed discourse. One also attempts 
to  form ulate a convincing justification only towards the public audience. The rationality is based on the value o f the 
institutional actors as such. A t the same time, the direct relationship of the comparative discourse to the general legal 
discourse is not established. Indirectly this may take place, for example, a posteriori, between different actors within 
the sam e institution. There is no sincere relationship between the institutional comparative discourse and the legal 
discourse in general.
750 Klami, for example, maintains that the generalizations of comparative law have a  wider scope than those o f  a 
general theory of law (lUami, H.T., 1981 ,p .l25 ).
751 Analogically - in relation to general and legal discourse - see Alexy, R-, 1989.
establish the generality of a norm, the results of such comparative discourses may be used in the 
general legal discourse. Here comparative law seems to function as a legal source, however, 
although regulated by the terms of general legal discourse theories (the ideas of sincerity and 
saturation, for example). On the other hand, the adaptation o f the results of comparative 
discourses can take place on the basis o f different conceptions o f sources (allowed, obligatory, 
etc.). As we will see, the fundamental conceptions o f legal sources are the connecting elements 
between these two types o f discourses.
In reality, adoptions seem to be based on the legal conception o f the sources o f  law 
o f the particular legal system making the adoption.
This idea applies also to the functional situation in which the influence o f the 
comparative discourse is internal to the legal decision-making institutions. Namely, if comparative 
law has a role in a particular closed institutional discourse, and this is legally accepted, the 
comparative discourse would be a permitted (allowed) source (even as a closed operation). In 
this form, it has a relationship to the general legal discourse. All the same, in modem legal theory, 
this, nevertheless, does not seem to be the case (the idea o f open legal discourse).
This seems to indicate that open comparative discourse has only dialectical and 
interpretational value a priori, and it may be relevant, as an open discourse, only in terms o f  the 
history o f law, legal philosophy, legal sociology and legal dogmatics.
In this sense, one could claim that the role o f comparative discourses in a genuine 
legal discourse is increasing, where the relationship between the general legal discourse and 
comparative discourse has been established a priori in the general legal discourse. On the other 
hand, where the socio-legal systems seem to differ radically from each other, and it is not 
accepted in the general discourse comparative law as a source o f law as such, the comparative 
discourse tends to emphasize the analysis o f fundamental differences and possible similarities in 
the legal discourse without any qualitative analysis - or remain a matter o f closed interpretational 
value. On the other hand, if the general discourse is emphasizing common, ideal or factual 
features based, for example, on the history of law, comparative law may comprise only a 
confirmation of the general legal discourse.
Some remarks on the comparative law discourse and the legal theoretical discourse. We
have maintained before that law is not really capable o f “observing itself’. Only the theory of law 
may do so, and even then, it has to be based on some values. We have proposed that the basic 
value may be in the ability to be communicative (the so-called discursive integrity of law).
In the theory o f law, as a part o f the general legal discourse, we can "close" the 
legal systems to a certain extent (in terms o f sources o f law), whereas in applied practical "law" 
there are only relationships, priorities and hierarchies of legal norms, and different discourses 
concerning them. Shifts from law as applied in practice towards a concept of a legal system
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involves shifts towards theoretical, political or socio-philosophical arguments of law.752 753
Comparative law discourse is in this sense an eccentric phenomenon. It claims to 
have as one of its central concepts the idea of a legal system and general theory of law. 
Nevertheless, it does not, as does the legal theoretical discourse in general, reflect its results and 
abstractions traditionally. However, it strives towards theoretical explanation by liberating itself 
from the value-based attitude towards tradition. On the other hand, it takes legal systems for 
granted, where, in its contemporary form, as we have maintained, it is strongly connected to the 
modernist state paradigm. At the same time, however, it moves away, in various ways, from any 
theoretical, sociological, or political considerations, even if the theory of comparative law 
recognizes this connection733.
It seems as if comparative law discourse really seems to be a special case within the 
theoretical legal discourse. In its "descriptive" sense, it claims to be a special case within any legal 
sociological or philosophical study. It seems to move "between" all the possible sciences and 
disciplines of law.754 However, this seems to be a value-based idea.
What could this value behind comparative law be? How could comparative law 
discourse be feasibly separated from the legal theoretical discourse? What could the 
communicative character o f comparative legal discourse be?
The value o f  the comparative legal discourse seems to be related to some kind of 
natural law and political thinking. However, it has also a strong modem positivist flavour because 
of its "single methodology" and because o f its established ideas upon sources of law (the idea of 
legal system). On the other hand, because it seems to accommodate itself easily within many 
alternative perspectives and an discourse concerning them seems to be eternally interesting and 
flexible, there must be some qualities to it, which make it quite neutral from the point o f view o f 
any a priori classifications.
Comparative law seems to be an empirical, but theoretically oriented, perspective 
on law, not aiming, and being incapable of aiming, at a universal discourse on law. It remains
752 It has been claimed that the 19th century idea of hierarchy was based on statutory positivism, where the legal 
system was monolithic, system o f norms of the same rank, and found at one and the sam e level (Paulson, S I* , 1990, 
p .143). This corresponds strongly the ideas o f nation and sovereign, which were the only ways to determine the 
hierarchy in a practical sense. This may be related to the idea of the will of the legislator. Also the form of legislative 
acts during that period corresponds to this type of idea. They w ere constructed so that first the purposes were explained. 
T his w as followed by the explanation of the norms (rules). Interestingly, this is the sam e structure, within which 
contem porary European norms are  constructed.
The alternative means o f viewing the hierarchy is related to  the idea according to which norms are 
hierarchically related as forms (as a system, Kelsen, H., 1992, §3la).
753 An example of a strongly "nationalist", cultural oriented, point of view, and the depth o f the roots o f the national- 
lingu istic  approach has, see Legrand, P., 1996, pp.284-286. For the importance of this to European integration, for 
exam ple, see ibid., p.286.
754 For some problems, Brusiin, O., 1953, p.440.
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somewhere "between'* legal theory and practical (positive) law.755 However, because it does not 
fully relate to the “total preliminary system** (in this case, to the theory o f legal discourse), it does 
not maintain the same level as the legal theoretical discourse in general.756
Some implications: the comparative legal discourse and national dogmatic discourses. A s 
we have seen, the comparative discourse appears functional from the point o f view o f the 
socially, culturally, and/or economically contextualized dogmatic discourses757. The functionality 
of comparative law is not, however, related only to its "fresh approach" in the genuine dogmatic 
discourses, but also to the fact that comparative reasons must be evaluated from the point o f view 
o f the national dogmatic discourses.
This can be explained in the following way. The comparative legal discourse is 
usually designed for some discourses other than the particular system discourse. National legal 
systems are instruments in that discourse. At the same time, in order to be convincing in that 
comparative discourse, comparative observations have to be presented in a form which ensures 
that the law itself is functional. This is why comparative reasons do not only appear in a form o f  
systematic sources (traditional legal discourse), but are usually always supplemented by 
comments on social contexts, or, by reference to "national lawyers" (professionals) representing 
the legal cultural knowledge of that particular system758.
More may be said about the "closed** comparative discourse in this connection.
An institutionally closed comparative discourse is based on the normative self- 
referentiality of the legal institution. In this case, an institution can be considered open, when we 
speak of the "cognitive" adoptions deriving from the dogmatic discourses, but, at the same time, 
it is normatively closed. It does not reveal its premises within the comparative discourse, and nor 
does it openly declare its premises to the general legal discourse. In this case, however, "compar­
ative" reasons may perhaps be reconstructed a posteriori.
One may ask, whether this phenomenon results in a kind o f a general normative 
closeness of legal systems and their dogmatic discourses. Namely, the fact that comparative 
observations are not revealed means that solutions, which are based on these comparative 
observations, are "order from noise". Without an accessibility to the context of the institution,
733 Sec similarly, Tolonen, JP ., 1974. He argues that it has an intermediate position. For some analysis, Klami, H .T., 
1981, p. 126. These authors, however, speak of this characteristic in  a different theoretical context than to that discussed 
here.
756 On the idea see Brusiin, O ., 1962, p.44.
737 On ideologies, see Kokkini-Iatridou, D., 1986, p.181.
731 It is especially this "double” functionality, which the regional and international systems, using comparative 
observations, attempt to  avoid. T hey exhort national lawyers o r international institutions to  make comparative studies. 
T his way they may claim  certain "objectivity" from the point o f view of the second type o f functionality, though the 
phenomenological functionality is still there. The second functionality is avoided by the qualitative approach to these 
systems as authorities (being represented by highly qualified persons).
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the observer cannot be in the same situation as the original interpreter of the norms, and she is 
not able to openly evaluate the premises which form a part of national legal systematization. This 
also generates, to a certain extent, instrumentality of the systematization discourses (i.e. they also 
have to make a distinction between different audiences). In this type o f situation, we cannot be 
sure, whether the genuine dogmatic legal discourses really interact with institutional discourses759 
or whether the proposal regarding this point are merely suggestive.
5.3. Comparative law as a  source of law
The na tu re  of com parative law as a  loci of arguments within the state-paradigm. One 
should keep in mind that comparative law is not a jurisprudential source or an argument as such 
(causae iuridicaks) because the issue does not seem to be about a selection of a criterion for the 
evaluation of the legal correctness o f an action in a genuine sense. Nevertheless, we are still 
dealing with some kind o f formal legality.
In terms o f  modem legal discourse theories, comparative arguments seem to 
comprise value-based and traditional arguments instead o f being neither of these types o f 
arguments.760 This strange phenomenon is due to the fact that even if the comparative loci as a 
source is external, for example, to any particular state-legal system, the state-legal system is its 
only loci in the abstract sense. There is a kind o f a state paradigmatic circle here.
Because o f  this, one may speak o f the comparative loci as a reproductive 
phenomenon from the point of view of the state paradigm, for example. We may also say that it 
is this state-paradigmatic circle that must be broken up on the basis o f generality (traditional), 
value (value based), or intuitive (or affective) rationality, or that it has to be instrumentalized (be 
hidden) to avoid circular explanations. This seems to be also one of the reasons why comparative 
law has been attempted to establish as an independent discipline outside the traditional legal 
framework. The independence claim is kind of a ’’self-purifying" operation of legal discourses.
Furthermore, this seems to be exactly the reason why comparative law has been 
maintained as part of jurisprudence, and as part of the general framework of legal dogmatics. 
This can be done, because comparative discourse has reproduced the state-paradigmatic law as
759 In this sense, we may ask w hether European norms, based on comparative perspectives examined institutionally, 
are really a contribution to the genuine legal discourse and to the development o f the discursive European law. 
Something from the dynamics is missing. This may cause a fundamental problem  for the communication of laws.
760 O n the definitions used, see Maclean, L, 1995, referring to several authors (for example, M artin, J., Antike 
Rhetorik : Technikund M éthode (München) 1974 p .2 9 ,36-37,44).
Causae legates deals with questions o f the spirit as opposed to the letter o f law, conflicting laws, 
ambiguity, definition, ratiocinatio (argument from similar laws), and translatif) (arguments on process, jurisdiction, and 
the appropriateness of a given law for a given case). (M aclean, L, 1995, p.78). These m atters involve interpretation and 
further argumentation.
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a valid paradigm of law, and because comparative jurisprudence, on the other hand, has repro ­
duced state paradigmatic law by providing a source of inspiration and invention for dogmatics 
and decision-making in difficult cases.
The comparative jurisprudence is, however, asymmetric to the general juris­
prudence of the state paradigmatic law. Comparative jurisprudence does not aim at 
systematization of the law o f socio-legal systems. Its basic aim is, accordingly, achieving general 
consensus (at the level of general principles), and the maintenance of the systematic autopoietics 
o f modem law.
The "other" legal system and its discourse as a  source of law. The question of whether com ­
parative law is or can be a legal source results insoluble problems.
The principal problem is that in considering comparative law as a legal source, one 
actually declares, in the context of a state paradigm of comparative law, and in the realm o f  the 
discursive concept of law, that state legal systems and their discourses are legal sources. This 
creates immediately some communication problems, and the idea of comparative law as a source 
o f law becomes obscure.
We have already mentioned the foreign law and otherness in previous chapters. In 
the case of otherness we came to the question o f what comprises the basic and decisive 
distinction between legal systems?. We instinctively abandoned the theoretical perspective and 
identified, instead, the need for a concrete description of the distinction between different legal 
systems and their discourses. The theoretical and general descriptions o f a legal system were not 
enough. We also spoke about different state-paradigmatic divisions. These seemed to function, 
at the same time, as common connectors and disconnectors of culturally oriented comparative 
law. The idea and distinctions o f comparative law became unclear.
In this connection, we can make the following remarks.
In reality, state legal systems and their discourses do function in relation to each 
other as reserves o f justificatory reasoning, and even as alternative justifications in certain 
situations. Even if any formal source theory of comparative law should not exist a realist would 
say that comparative argument is a legal argument deriving from comparative law as a source o f 
law, simply because it is used in the institutional and dogmatic legal discourse, and it has, a 
priori, certain legal characteristics. Namely, a person undertaking a legal comparison - whether 
a scholar or a legal decision-maker - is working within a legal system. He is taking part in a legal 
discourse. By making comparisons to another system, or by taking comparisons tailored to his 
own use, and by deriving ‘'essential" information from a system other than the one in which she 
is working, she is treating the other systems as relevant material for the interpretation o f the law 
o f the system in which she is working. She is treating the other system as a source of legal
arguments761, which has some kind o f a legal quality. Consequently, the comparative law 
discourse, from which the comparative arguments derive, could be classified as a practical legal 
source. However, it seems that one could make a distinction between legal and nonlegal 
arguments deriving from another legal system only on ad hoc basis.
On the other hand, a legal idealist may claim that comparative law is a source of law 
if it satisfies the rationality demands o f general legal discourse theories and theories of legal 
reasoning. In this sense, it does not seem to be capable of being a legal source. It does not satisfy 
the requirements o f legal sources. That is to say, it does not assist the achievement of clarity 
within the law, but, on the contrary, seem to confound matters further.762
We are in a paradoxical situation. An argument, which evidently derives from the 
context of comparative law seems to be ’’legal", though agreement on the legal nature o f 
comparative legal studies and the nature of comparative law as a genuine source of law cannot 
be reached. Consequently, one could say that the nature of comparative law as a source of law 
must be examined on the basis of the nature o f comparative reasonings, in addition to the 
examination of its source nature according to traditional comparative law theories, which we 
have already done. Then we may question the reasonableness of comparative law as a legal 
source, evaluated on the basis of the nature of the arguments deriving from that source763.
In this sense, it seems that only practical reasoning can be presented in support o f 
the idea of comparative law as a legal source. The nature of comparative law as a legal source 
seems to be, consequently, a "non-systematic" source, in the sense, that no general theory looks 
possible concerning its source nature, at least at this stage. Comparative law appears to be a non- 
systematic and autonomously practical source o f quasi-legal arguments, based on the prudential 
considerations of the legal actor. Comparative interpretation is a "legal choice" rather than a 
"legal interpretation", a kind o f an interpretation by a legal authority.
This has certain consequences. It seems that when one is considering comparative 
law (other systems) as a source of law, one does not have to, and usually one does not, attempt 
to treat that particular system and its rules as generally binding and as correct systematic rules, 
but instead, as in the case o f legal sociology, one may describe them as a source o f patterns o f 
intentional behaviour in one social system. There is no need to stress the relationship between all 
the rules and discourses (general systematic integrity or coherence). This is the reason why
761 W ithin the idea o f comparative argument it is interesting that it is not completely removed from the social 
environm ent, i.e., sociological knowledge as such, but it is  already legally rationalized in some systems. Even if  we 
could claim information used in the interpretation is some sense rational, the comparative information is legally rational.
This refers basically to two features o f comparative legal information. Theoretically, it has a  legal 
quality, but no systematic character. It is information within the law, law in genera], but not within the legal system in 
particular.
762 "If all the constitutive rules are lacking, the interpretation is not a legal one fundamentally. ... In this sense, at 
least some procedural rules of interpretation are necessary for genuine legal reasoning. ” (Aamio, A ., 1986, p.96).
763 See Watson, A., 1974, p .l 8.
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comparative law arguments are extremely weak arguments by example. They are not necessarily 
supported by systematic connections.764
The difference between comparative law and legal dogmatics as a source of law, for 
example, seems to be connected to this feature. One is unable to establish the generally binding 
nature of the normative systems studied. This seems to be, both scientifically and philosophically, 
problematic from the point of view of the legal discourse in general (sincerity problem)765.
Com parative law and  dogmatics as sources of law; a  comparison. As we have maintained, 
comparative law is, in a way, comparable with the legal dogmatics (scholarly opinions) as a  
source of law. It looks actually to be continuation of the legal dogmatic discourse. As in 
dogmatics, we have different possibilities o f interpretation. One presents hypothetical suggestions 
for rules and interpretations. All the same, in the comparative "dogmatics" the interpretation is 
more imbedded in the process, and the justificatory aspect is needed due to legal, political, and 
cultural reasons, and because of the lack o f systematic connections.
How does comparative legal dogmatics, then, differ from traditional dogmatics, and 
what is the principal characteristic of this relationship?
The basic idea is that both the comparative and the traditional dogmatist use the 
idea o f sources o f law. However, the understanding of these and their use can differ, especially 
in the case of an ordinary legal academic or practitioner, who does not have a theoretical 
“comparative” legal education. In practice, comparative arguments are usually presented by a 
person, who is not educated in another legal system. He is, a priori, considered not to have 
knowledge of the social rules existing in that society. This makes a difference also to the "socio­
political” validity o f the dogmatic argument.
Furthermore, a comparativist may be unfamiliar with other types of arguments and 
rhetorical and non-rhetorical elements which may be somehow relevant elements (even if non- 
legal) within a (discursive) system
These are some of the reasons, why the comparative lawyer is not considered to be 
an authoritative expert. There seems to be an idea that one cannot be a master of many social 
systems. This is based on the assumption of "life formative" homogeneity. The stability o f 
interpretations is not backed up by firmly established ideas deriving from societal discourses, but 
the comparative dogmatist is considered as one who is doomed to compare constantly different
764 Comparative law, on the o ther hand, as a systematic method to achieve information from other legal systems, is 
not a  real a priori method o f law. Because comparative law includes also considerations o f  the factuality, context, and 
the functionality of the law, com parative argument m ay be an explanation o f the law of a  social system without being 
necessarily  an attempt to  have any normative impact upon i t
763 O ne can claim that the discourse theory assumes two ideas that are taken seriously: the rules studied must be 
considered binding. On the other hand, the claim of the bindingness cannot be based on the description of the particular 
features o f a  another system (or a  discourse), but has to  have general normative status.
IlM I l llUPH B M B M B — B B W M i
173
societal forms of behaviour. This might render his statements unpredictable and unreliable766, and 
problematic from the legal point of view.767
One o f the characteristics of comparative dogmatics is that when the political, 
genera] and legal dogmatic contexts cannot be strongly emphasized, one has to rely more on 
practical legal statements on the interpretations o f certain types of situations rather than upon 
general statements concerning the meaning of particular rules. This may be one of the reasons, 
for example, why comparative dogmatics is oriented more to case law and concrete decisions as 
sources o f its interpretation, than to statements in the traditional legal systematic dogmatics.
Consequently, socio-cultural expertise is the main argument which distinguishes the 
comparative and traditional dogmatics from each other768.
We return to this question in relation to theories on audiences in comparative
reasoning.
Comparative law and “custom of the land’* as a  source of law. Comparative law seems to be 
related to the ‘‘custom of the land” as a source of law. Namely, these two spheres seem, in 
theory, to qualify each other. This custom seems to be also a “substantial source of law”769. In 
some situations, it can also be an “unprivileged” source770.
Custom of the land seems to relate to comparative method of interpretation, 
because essentially, it seems to need some “reasonability”.771 *This reasonability may be provided 
by comparative observations. This may be motivated also by the fact that custom of the land is 
sometimes more general (or also restricted) than the borders o f modem state legal systems. In 
this sense, the criteria of “the legal convictions o f citizens” (presented by the historical school) or
** This is definitely also the problem  in international and regional organizations. The phenomenon is related to the 
polycentric qualities of the institutions. In other words, matters concerning some states and legal systems are dealt with 
by the persons coming from those "systems". This is seen as the solution and actually one o f the major characteristics 
of the daily functioning o f regional and international organizations.
Towards the outside, however, this polycentrism is manipulated to look homogeneous (as we can see 
in justifications of the European Court of Justice, for example). The question is a matter o f the combining specialist 
knowledge and institutional authority.
In this sense, traditional comparative law seems to be more universal in nature, because, as a scientific 
approach, we cannot recognize strong cultural distinctions as in legal institutional arrangements.
767 Values in legal dogmatics, see Aamio, A., 1997, pp.83-86 (especially, pp. 83-84).
m  This is reflected in the instrumentalization o f national lawyers in international legal interpretation. (For some 
analysis, see below.)
7W See Aamio, A., 1986, p.93.
m  Aamio, A., 1986, p.98. This m eans that if the question concerns only the “gap" in a statute, other sources o f law 
become decisive, even if  the “custom o f the land" is given strong priority in general and in filling the “gap” in the law.
771 Aamio, A., 1986, pp.80-81, referring to the writings o f Alanen, A., Jurisprudence and private international law, 
[Yleinen oikeustiede ja kansainvalinen yksityisoikeus] (Vammala) 1965, and to the Finnish Code of Procedure, Chapter
1, Section 11.
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o f the tacit acceptance by the legislator do not apply.772
Custom of the land, on the other hand, seems to counteract the arbitrariness o f  th e  
comparative observations to a certain extent.773
The binding character o f comparative source of law. The pertinent question within the id ea  
o f  legal source theory is the principled obligatoriness of the use o f a  source and arguments 
deriving from it774.
In the case of comparative law, there does not seem to be such an obligation. T h e  
obligation is based on a practical discourse in the comparison itself. On a contrary, one could say  
that there are even systematic and practical obstacles to the use of comparative analysis as a basis 
for a justificatory decision, as we have maintained. On the other hand, if the exception is m ade, 
it should be explicitly justified775. This is due to the fact that if the comparative derivations w ere 
to  become the central issue of the system, as one may imagine in some situations of legal 
transplantation776, comparative law would no longer function as a rational source o f law, but as 
a  source with no a priori defined possibility for a rational choice. The increasing use o f  
comparative aspects abolishes the possibility of achieving a balance in a legal discourse, which is 
fatal to the rationality of the system, as explained.
We could thus maintain that there cannot be a general obligation to use comparative 
law in legal reasoning. We may say that if comparative law would be capable of being a source 
o f  law, it belongs to the category of “allowed” legal sources.
T h e  choice of com parative arguments: the "in ternal"  doctrines o f sources o f law a n d  
com parative law as a  source of law; the  structu ra l determ inants. Within the comparative 
considerations and interpretations, one may recognize the structures of the sources of law 
embedded in the process. Some type o f higher-order rules of recognition are reflected in the 
choice o f comparative reasons.
Whenever, in an interpretation, one is considering relevant comparisons for the 
interpretation o f certain positive rules, one usually uses automatically the same criteria o f  
relevance for the choice o f the rules or norms from the other system as in a "normal” choice o f  
relevances. As we have maintained, for example, the comparator is likely to use legal judgments
773 O n the idea that the custom has been instrumentalized in order to govern the native cultures, see P5yh5nen, J., 
1992, p .67  (referring to Said, E., Orientalism, 1978).
773 A s we will see later, the “customary* borders o f law seem  to correspond strongly to  the scope o f comparative 
observations.
774 See Aamio, A., 1986, p.89.
773 T his can be seen in connection to many legal systems.
776 T his is so also in some international legal systems.
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as relevant material, if this would most likely have occurred in his own system. In the same way, 
if the interpretation is made only with reference to the positive rules of that foreign system, this 
is usually due to the fact that the sources of law and structures in interpreters* system stress the 
importance of written statutory law.
This type of structural determinacy is, however, only one example of the influence 
of the form of the adoption of comparative reasoning. One may recognize also other structures 
which determine choices. All the same, the source o f law ideas are the basic legal determinants.777
As noted previously, the adaption may be determined also by substantive systematic 
problems. However, the filling up o f lacunae-idea seems to be due to systematic gaps. The gap 
is determined basically by social problematization, which determines the substantive nature of 
how the lacunae is to be filled778. The adaption may be also determined by the linguistic and 
conceptual translatability. This is due to the fact that it is impossible to adopt statements which 
do not have any cultural-linguistic meaning in that system. In this sense, any adaption is based on 
a minimum nominalist correlation.779
What this means, theoretically, is that it could even be possible to adopt statements 
from discourses o f other social systems, which, in that "transferring system", do not have the 
status of a legal source o r which are not seen to be legally relevant material for the interpretation 
o f a positive rule within that system. This means that the logical structure of the foreign system 
(i.e. for example the hierarchy of norms) does not necessarily have an influence within the 
cognitive adaptions from other systems780.
In conclusion, structural determinacy seems to reflect the systematic nature o f the 
adopting system. The adaption of arguments from another system of law is basically determined 
by the systematic relationship between structures in the adaptive system781.
These examples show how the systematic structures (and discourse) may influence 
the selection (and use) o f comparative material. The legal system, being determined by its own 
structures for determining the relevance of norms, does not adopt norms of another system in a
777 For some discussion on the structure of law and comparative law, see David, R ., Briefly, J.E.C., 1978, p p .l 4-16.
771 In this connection it is interesting to note that the lacunae has to be "systematic". Namely, unless there are no 
"systematic gaps", no gaps can be reasonably be assumed to  ex is t Some systems, like the European U nion system and 
the European system o f Human Rights, seem not to be based on empirically verified systematic gaps.
This is actually one reason for the problems in speaking about gaps in a  legal order (which claim  has 
been presented in the context o f “Community legal order** by the European Court o f Justice). (For som e analysis, see 
below.)
779 O n the problem s of translation, see de Groot, G.R., Problems o f legal translation from the point o f view  o f a 
comparative lawyer. In: Netherlands Reports to the XII International congress o f Comparative law (The Hague) 1986.
710 For example, if  one system is using the norms o f  another system dealing with the regulation of bioethical 
questions, it does not necessarily consider the validity of the source of these norms as related to the structure of the legal 
system but considers only the material questions dealt within these systems.
711 The systematic relationship between the arguments are considered in the adaptive system's regulatory framework, 
i.e. the legal consequences (adaption questions) are determined by the characteristic o f  the adopting system.
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form of complete systematic rules, but rather as cognitive models or types of law, w h ich  
interpretation remains open. This is the reason why comparative reasoning can be said to  o p e n  
the structures of the legal system, as we have explained above.
This is also reason why one must compare not only normative statements as su c h  
but also legal theory related to the idea o f sources of law.
Recognition rules for com parative legal considerations? As we have already maintained, 
comparative law is based upon the identification of legal rules and legal systems, but th is  
identification, as with the identification o f legal norms in general, is not necessarily based u p o n  
secondary norms in any general sense, due to internal structural determinants and practical 
considerations.782
It could be claimed, however, that strict forms o f recognition rules could be found  
in the form of secondary norms of application783. This means, that some generalizations could b e  
made concerning the basis o f the study o f justifications for these restrictions ("comparative 
dogmatics"). Furthermore, some directives for the choice of a norm of comparative law could be  
found within the ideas of the study of the methodology of comparative law784.
We may note that in comparative law justifications, traditionally, the ru les 
governing the choices were justified with reference to ideas such as generality, relative generality, 
or the goodness or badness of the example, which have descriptive and normative, qualitative and  
quantitative dimensions. These ideas are, nevertheless, strongly based upon the values o f  the  
decision-maker and rules o f rhetoric. In this sense, it does not seem very likely that we could  
found any general regulative principles within the justificatory sphere.
Choices based upon generality, relative generality or goodness/badness should be  
based, consequently, on some legal ideals, if it is to be assumed that the comparative legal rule 
is to comprise a rational legal normative argument. On the other hand, the criteria for the choice 
o f comparative legal rules should be based also upon their quality as legal rules as such (clarity 
etc.).
In this regard, what could these secondary norms be? How could "generality", for 
example, be regulated?
782 O n the rule o f recognition in an  theoretical context. H art, H.L.A., The concept o f Law  (1961). Some analysis o f  
the problem s, Raz, J., 1971, p.805 ff.
7.3 The recognition of com parative arguments is not necessarily based on rules o f recognition, but rather on  
"custom ary recognition. The other system  tends a  legal identification o f other system. Furthermore, because this takes 
place in the realm o f the integrity principle, it m aintains the legally integrative nature o f  that system.
Furthermore, it also appears as if the legal quality of the legal systems does not disappear following this 
recognition. On the contrary, this recognition creates a custom ary legal status for the system as a practical source 
o f law  in general.
7.4 As we may note, comparative law is a secondary stage o f legal identification, not necessarily regulated by 
secondary legal norms o f identification. A t the sam e time that choice of laws restricts the scope of law, it also creates 
legal possibilities within the law.
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The answer to the question could be found directly in the theories of legal 
discourse, albeit in an altered form. The rules o f legal discourse can be applied to the choices of 
comparative arguments for the legal discourse. Consequently, we have to examine how the rules 
of discourse could be applied to the use of comparative legal arguments783 *85, taking into account 
their peculiar nature o f these types o f arguments.
Conclusions: the  rationality  of com parative law as a source of law; why comparative law 
is an  acceptable source of law? As we have seen, it is difficult to imagine the role of 
comparative law as an a priori established legal source in systematic decision-making context786. 
Even the basic ideas on comparative law as an argument for integration, understanding, etc. do 
not appear convincing.
As has been maintained, in practice, arguments deriving from comparative law seem 
to be merely some unsystematic arguments without any a priori status as legal, used in the legal 
discourses for any purpose, with the ultimate aim of establishing a connection between legal 
systems and in confirming the authority of legal systems and orders, in general, as a source of 
law. In this sense, comparative reasoning could be seen as a symptom of a one-sided practice o f 
adaption of a legal statement within relatively autonomous legal systems (and discourses). 
Furthermore, the comparative discourse does not seem to exist, as such, in the discourse on the 
discourses, but it only seems to be a process o f learning which takes place in a one-sided 
fashion787.
Nevertheless, the comparative argument could be defined as a relatively consistent 
(and even quite static) argument because of its political-traditional context788 *. This is so despite
783 However, these types o f secondary rules o f application contain certain problems.
If discourse principles should be applied to the choice o f a comparative arguments as such, the
secondary rules of application could be easily violated. A  certain efficacy is demanded from legal argumentation and 
justification. This is why "comparative legal rules or arguments" are mainly constructed in realm of the legal sciences.
716 Basically the legal system functions as a ultimate source o f legal norms. All these’legal" arguments derive from 
this legal system based on the '"’Grundnorm"". The law, de lege lata, is traditionally interpreted by legal arguments 
based on systematization discourses. Comparative law does not basically systematize anything, at least not traditionally, 
if we do not consider it systematizing tradition as a  subject in the discourse itself. Then the comparative argument seems 
to be  capable o f systematizing anything connected to  the discourse, also the discourse itself. This seems to be 
problematic.
787 In this context, we should actually speak o f  legal learning instead of legal transplantation. The learning processes 
takes place internally within the law, and there is no other instance, which would be capable o f "transplanting" legal 
institutions into a legal system than the one-sided legal discourse itself.
Transplantation refers to a political-authoritative process o f  adaption o f  legal ingredients, and to  the 
relationship between political and social systems in general, which is only reflected in legal systems. It does not refer 
to the relationship between legal systems (comparative law).
7,8 T he question concerns rules and interpretations o f  rules, which have been openly argued and justified in one 
system, and then adopted within another system. Comparative arguments, despite their nature as learning processes or 
external systematic arguments, have, in other words, gone through a democratic process, and interpretations on the 
validity and correctness have been tested in a legal audience. They belong to some discourse, though they would not be 
part o f the particular discourse in which they have been used.
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of the fact that one cannot ignore the legally non-systemic and autonomous nature o f c o m ­
parative law as a source of law. Comparative law gives discursive dynamics to the law and leg a l 
systems, by still keeping the discourse in certain limits of rationality.
It also makes legal discourse more general. It is strongly connected to  th e  
internationalization and régionalisation of law, which, in contemporary society, seems to be m o re  
law than any other form of law. Furthermore, the use of comparative law may be even extrem ely 
important, because it is used in the cases, where one has to react "to serious needs o f  th e  
community"789.
Thus, one could suggest that comparative law is, at this stage, an additional sou rce  
o f  law790 - with qualifications. Because comparative analysis is difficult to classify as a norm al 
source of law in domestic legal systems, one could make a hypothesis that it is a critical source 
in law. It reflects certain aspects of the "common law" of more general legal community, and it 
serves as a reflective, unsystematic and critical model of argumentation in decision-making, 
requiring, however, also constant critical reflections regarding itself.
In conclusion, nevertheless, we claim that comparative law should be considered 
more seriously as a source of law than any other form of legal source in the contemporary 
discourse of law. Indeed, we assert that it’s “source” nature is more evident than that o f any  
other types of legal sources because “comparative” observations and arguments, theoretically, 
assume an “existence” o f an (institutional and positive) legal system. In other words, where there 
is a strong assumption of an existence of a legal order that is applying rules and creating norms, 
we can justify a need of a possibility for an alternative and affirmative argumentation (relating to  
the need of clarification and criticism). In fact, in the application of comparative observations in 
legal discourses we are speaking about qualitative systematization of a legal system and its rule 
and norms, contrary to a “quantitative” idea of creation and institutional ordering (by institutional 
authority) without any motives for systematization.791
This is why the application o f comparative rules and norms have to be justified by 
some “qualifying” criteria. When studying comparative law as a legal source, we have to observe 
the motives for their application in particular context and focus upon the discursive nature o f  
these arguments.
Comparative law as a  source of law and o ther sources. In the realm o f discourse theory, one
™  W atson, 1978b, p .522.
7,0 A s Koopmans, T ., 1996, p.550.
791 In fact, we could claim  that comparative law is already a  legal source by definition. In  the history o f legal positive 
law it seems to be - in addition to "jurisprudence" - a “primary” legal source, whereas in contemporary state-paradigm 
it is a secondary source due to the institutional-contextual discourses which have transferred "finer" distinctions for our 
legal-analytical stock o f  instruments. However, in the discursively democratic system there does not seem  to be any 
obstacles for its use except some qualitative restrictions.
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has spoken of interpretative standards.792 These standards refer to the order of preferences of 
legal sources, and to the applicable standards for legal reasoning. Here we concentrate to the 
former idea.793
In the context of comparative law and the order of preference of sources of law, 
one could propose the following:
Authority (sovereign)
Direct reference/ binding 
(and weakly binding) material:
- supranational norms
- laws
- precedents
- preliminary documents 
(textes préparatoires)
- customary law (custom law of the land)
Indirect reference/
"non-binding" material:
a) material recognized
by authority in precedents 
or in draft documents:
- policy statements
- analysis of economic and 
social data
- international or foreign 
material referred to
in drafting
b) material recognized as part 
o f legal culture and general 
development
- opinions of scholars
- opinions in the realm  o f comparative law
In a concrete sense, comparative law, as a source of law, has been merged into 
different interpretative methods in the following way.794
It has been claimed that if a court cannot rely on express statutory law or 
unanimous judicial interpretation, the interpreter may look to traditional methods o f 
interpretation and to the law developed prior to the codification o f  the subject-matter. If  a 
historical interpretation does not provide an answer to the question, it is also possible to use
792 Aam io, A., 1986, p.97. Discussion on them, see idem., pp.95-107.
793 The latter will be discussed in the chapter below.
794 Kisch, 1 ,1981, p.262 ff.
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methods of teleological interpretation, and to consider the reasonableness and rightness of resu lts . 
I f  the result does not seem to be reasonable, there is the possibility of using com parative 
analysis.795
In comparative interpretation, reference may be made to foreign laws w ith o r  
without links to that legal system. This reference may support a solution by giving substance to  
the solution (norm-content) or by illustrating solutions, and in this way giving support to  th e  
interpretation made by the court with other interpretation methods. Comparative interpretation 
is usually not the sole substantiating method796 (such as is the case with other methods o f  
interpretation); it is "transcategorical".
As mentioned before, a distinction can be made between the comparative historical 
interpretation method and pure comparative interpretation.797 What is typical for both m ethods 
is the use of a plurality o f legal systems. In the former model, comparative considerations fo rm  
apart of historical interpretation and describe the relationships between legal systems (historical 
evolutions etc.). In the latter case, there is a use o f foreign law beyond a historical analysis. H ere  
one is more free to choose the systems to which refer. These two methods can be mixed. W hen 
there is a historical connection and this is analysed, this may lead to the use of the contem porary 
case-law of foreign systems (mostly the parent system).798
Integrative or unifying reasoning in interpretation can be based on historical 
interpretation, but also for that matter, upon teleological interpretation. The former takes in to  
account the will o f the legislator and history of the legal system, and this leads to an integrative 
or unifying result. The latter takes into account the possible differences between the results o f  
decisions in different legal systems.
These ideas may be connected also to  the application of provisions of international 
agreements by national courts.799
795 Kisch, I., 1981, p.262 ff.
756 Kisch, L, 1981, p .62.
797 Kisch, I., 1981, p.162 and 168.
798 Reasons for the use o f com parison are different in these approaches. Historical interpretation emphasizes h isto ry  
and pure comparative argum entation the "instrumentality" o f  foreign solutions.
799 Kisch, L, 1981, p.163. See concerning disparity of interpretation, Gutteridge, H .C., 1971, p .l 11 ff.
O ne o f  the problem s connected to the study o f  legal system(s), comparative law and com parative 
argumentation is the extension o f  the analysis. How far should we go in analyzing different systems. Some prelim inary 
rem arks can be made.
In examining legal systems we evidently arrive at some differences. The first question is how far these 
differences determine the nature of the legal system or a norm as a whole. A  second question has to do with the ro le  o f  
the interpreter; how com petent is the comparative interpreter to  explain the nature o f a  legal system or its norm? F or 
exam ple, how com petent is an international judge (o r an adm inistrator) - as a  normative actor • to interpret national 
lega l systems? W hat kind of possibilities does a legal scholar have to draw extensive conclusions on the nature o f  a 
particular legal system?
T he first question is more interesting, because it has to do with the ideal character o f the discourse. 
This has to be explained more thoroughly.
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Some consequences. What would be the result of the fact that comparative law would be 
classified as an acceptable legal source as described above?
Firstly, one could maintain that the dogmatic "obstacles" its relevance would 
disappear. On the other hand, it could be used more in justifications and legal reasoning. This 
could lead to more vivid comparative dogmatic discourse. In this sense, the question of the 
source nature of comparative law is connected directly to legal rationality.
However, even if we could claim that comparative law may be, in some situations, 
an acceptable legal source, and that it may be used as an argument in legal interpretation in 
relation to some “rules o f priority”, we do not know how this should be formulated in an open 
reasoning.
In the next chapter, the idea is to make some summarial remarks on the nature of 
comparative arguments and reasoning in critical terms, to analyse the connections between other 
arguments and comparative arguments in "comparative reasoning", and to connect these ideas to 
consultation of different audiences as a regulative idea of legal discourse. This way one may 
come to some ideas on the “rules of comparative reasoning” (in the realm of the standards 
governing reasoning procedure). This examination attempts to identify why it is insufficient to 
look only to the “rules o f interpretation” and accept comparative law as a legal source, and also 
to find some regulative ideas of reasoning. It is argued that only in this way can the discursive 
integrity of law be maintained.
5.4. Comparative legal reasoning
5.4.1. The analysis of the structure of comparative 
reasoning
Preliminary remarks. As we have seen, the use o f comparative law arguments in the realm of 
"general legal considerations", as system-analogical arguments internal to law in general, is
An interpretation o f a  norm and a  legal system could be determined also by the "integrity* o f the legal 
system and its norms in general. This means that the interpretation of norms o f a  legal system are not maintained on the 
basis o f the "internal” systematics o f the legal system, but their interpretation can be attached to the common core and 
general considerations also from the point of view o f the development of law  in general (national law, European law). 
In this case, a comparative lawyer is not, necessarily, able to  maintain the "content" o f the norms of a system only by 
observing the internal determinants of a  some land o f a  "autonomous" legal system. The relationships of the system with 
other national and supranational legal systems has its relevance. These features, on the other hand, are strongly attached 
to the systems "legal" ideology. This way the systematic study o f a  legal system does not necessarily tell us all the truth 
about laws truth in that particular legal system, and the interpretation of it may be extremely difficult
Consequently, the fact that there can be various and changing "audiences" for the interpretation o f a 
legal system results in difficulties for the traditional national paradigm of comparative law, and for the construction o f 
a comparative argument
characterized by value rationality. Comparative arguments are ''external*', and their choices a re  
determined by relative contingencies. The use o f these observations is determined by the legal 
value rationality, and the general type o f rationality. Comparative considerations fit within legal 
arguments as "special cases", as special arguments800, but not within the traditional sphere o f  
sources of law. Comparative reasons can be composed of legal theoretical, dogmatic, system - 
structural and norm application (case), legal-historical, legal philosophical, legal sociological e tc . 
observations. They may belong to the context of discovery, or to the factual closeness o f  the 
system (or the order). Comparative considerations may serve as "inspiration" for legal actors.801 
In a open comparative discourse and reasoning, on the other hand, one uses comparative 
observations as illustrations of acceptable or non-acceptable norms etc. The critical analysis o f  
different types of norms is the discursive means to argue comparatively.
These forms of uses takes place so as to achieve some specific aim.802
Both aspects of comparative reasonings can be studied in the realm o f legal 
discourse theories803. We can apply in the legal analysis certain regulative ideas o f discourse 
theories.
In the value-based theories we find rules based on idea o f saturation804, demands o f  
principled and special arguments presentation in every hard case, special justifications in relation 
to canons of reasons (for example, comparative methodology)805, openness of the justification 
(when used in interpretation), demands of the analytical approach, etc. However, because we are 
examining the use of traditional "legal discourses" as instruments o f reasoning, these rules of legal 
discourse should be applied to legal reasoning rather than to different types of arguments.
800 See, A lexy.R ., 1989.
801 As maintained above, the uses of these different sources can vary considerably from  one legal system to another. 
Foreign systems can be used in many ways:
by referring to similar legal development in other systems, as evidence; 
as a confirmation of the results achieved by the primary system,
when filling a gap in the primary system (with unsystematic and systematic knowledge) (W atson, A. 
1974, p. 18).
102 The problem o f comparative research is the non-explicitness o f the aim concerned. This way the comparative 
research seems not to be value-loaded. However, the "aims" o f the comparative research can  be reconstructed also by 
considering the "reproductive" features o f the comparative research, which function as "autopoietic" aims o f the 
scientific system as such.
How conscious these aims are is not a matter o f legal research. However, the identification o f the 
features of this "self-understanding" reveals the characteristics o f the legal cultural and basic values embedded in law.
803 W e could claim that the national legal systematic dogmatics, judges'justifications, and comparative lawyers’ 
reasoning should all function according to the theory o f the legal discourse. In this systematization o f law based on the 
practical legal discourse, comparative lawyers function in the realm  o f the same dem ands as the other legal arguers and 
actors.
804 Alexy, R., 1989.
805 This is connected to the fact that the presumptions o f the tradition of com parative law are included in the 
contemporary forms of comparative reasoning.
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This would suggest, as the traditional theories of legal reasoning maintain, for 
example806, that the consistency of discourses at different levels must be respected, and that a 
certain degree of "transitivity" of auditories must be assumed807. On the other hand, no linguistic 
disagreements can be assumed (efficiency) At the different levels of discourses (audiences), every 
level of discourse must be taken into account, no authoritative justifications are allowed, contrary 
discourses can also be presented, and most essentially, no contradiction between discourses can 
be allowed in justification, or if this would be the case, further justifications must be presented.808
We will deal with these ideas more closely below. In the end of this chapter, the 
idea is to examine the relationship between the standards of the traditional theory and the theory 
of comparative reasoning presented in this work. The rules of the value-based theory are taken 
up in the end of this work, after the examination of the value-based reality o f the European law.
Different types o f com parative reasoning and  the ir relationship. Comparative reasoning, as 
the all discursive legal instrumentalizations, as we have already maintained in connection to the 
comparative discourse, can be divided into the instrumental, value-based, and traditional instru- 
mentalizations according to the quality of the reasoning as a social communicative action. The 
distinction between these different types of uses can be associated with interests (or principles) 
of interpretation the user is having.
By traditional comparative reasoning we mean the use of comparative legal 
information in an analytical way. This means consideration of all elements which may be relevant 
according to the tradition of comparative law. Traditional comparative reasoning entails the 
analytical presentation o f general and particular features of the legal phenomenon in question. 
These types of presentations are traditionally analytical (legal or legal-sociological) studies, which 
refer to all systematic features relevant to the legal audience. Traditional comparative reasoning 
can be claimed to be a neutral use of comparative observations, an attempt to maintain the legal
106 Aamio, A., 1986.
107 On the diversity o f  audiences and different arguments, see Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L , 1969, p.474. In 
legal context, Bell, J., 1986, pp.53-65, esp. p.56 ff.
This is one o f  the questions connected to the modem legal systematization discourses and the 
comparative legal discourse. One could be considered to be p a rt o f the legal systematization discourse o f a  system if  one 
uses rules, norms, and interpretations deriving from  the comparative legal discourse.
The distinction has to be made on the basis o f the aims of the argumentation, reasoning and 
justification. Practical legal reasoning (also in its dogmatic form) aims always at a  justification of a norm 's 
interpretation or a decision. In this sense, the argument o f the comparativist may be connected to the legal systems o f 
norm  under consideration.
All the same, comparative reasoning can have relevance, as comparative law itself shows, also in 
various legal systems. It is not clear that each argument and justification is connected only to  a particular interpretation 
etc. Comparative reasoning in any discourse can have effects in the historical discourse on law.
In this sense, the distinction between different comparative reasonings has to  be made according to  the 
audience it is directed to.
** For example, if comparative discourses (comparative opinion) generally state something, institutional reasoning 
and the general principles cannot be contrary to  this.
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"balance” and the existing structural arrangements. It also reveals the basic values of the legal 
decision-maker in the comparative legal discourse and legal discourse in general. It functions as 
a basis for further discussion (the idea o f discursive integrity). It is based on communicative 
rationality.
By value-based comparative reasoning is meant the use o f comparative information 
in a non-analytical, strongly principled way. Comparative information is determined *'auto- 
poietically”, Le. only by reference to the "internal" conceptualization of the legal system (o r 
order) concerned, which is assumed to be understood by the audience.809 Value-based compara­
tive observations are characterized by disregard o f comparative generality or disparity as 
premises of the discourse.810
The instrumental approach means the use of comparative information in the internal 
reasoning processes of the institution in a manner which is invisible for the general legal 
(dogmatic-scientific) audience. This instrumentality of comparative law can be related to the 
search for forms of argumentation a priori by way of justification. This is why one may call it, in 
the ultimate sense, institutional reasoning. In various ways, comparative legal studies help the 
decision-makers find persuasive and convincing forms of reasoning (arguments), and to achieve 
aims which are not directly part of the interpretation of a rule (“system maintenance”). The 
instrumental use o f comparative law leads to instrumental reasoning in general.
This instrumentality is apparently connected to the teleological intentions or to the 
internal coherence o f the institution. By looking into individual systems, in particular and general, 
one may design such norms and reasons, which make flexible interpretation of law possible. In 
this way the system may implement its norms in a prudent way, depending on all particular 
circumstances.
The aim of internal comparative reasoning is the justification as such, not the 
adherence of the legal audience in a value based or traditional way. In this case, the premises o f  
reasoning are based on the aim of achieving the adherence of the "internal" interests of some 
audiences, which also means, in fact, that a distinction between different comparative and general 
audiences is reproduced.
The instrumental use of comparative law and instrumental reasoning can be divided 
into following concrete types.
The first type o f instrumental (comparative) reasoning is the individual action type, 
which is connected to the contextual heuristics of the individual decision-maker as a person. This 
can be defined as an inspirational type of comparative reason search and reasoning. It is basically 
the comparative interpretation as such. It is determined by the personal qualities, characteristics,
809 Generality, etc. This type o f  "internal" value based distinction seems to be based on "good/bad" distinctions as 
criterion  o f relevance, instead of the legal/illegal distinction used in the systems theory.
110 This value-based reasoning can be called the restructuralization of a comparative argum ent
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interests, and the social context of an individual. These types of "reasons" could be found only by 
interpretation of the heuristics of a person811, but also by examining different internal discourses.
The second type instrumental argument is the affective one, where comparative 
observations are used extremely situationally within a closed discourse. The basis o f this use is 
rather the emotional affection toward certain arguments. In the same way as the former type o f 
use, it is strongly connected to the basic values of the user, and argumentation is characterized 
by argumentation "ad hominem”. These types o f instrumentalizations are not rationally directed 
toward any genuine audience.
Both these forms may include extensive analytical observations and be "traditional" 
from the point of view o f comparative law.
The third type o f instrumental (comparative) reasoning is systematic institutional 
reasoning. This takes place in the internal, institutional, and contextual discourse. It is connected 
to the context of the discovery of the justification by the institution. It is usually made in the form 
of systematic research internal to the institution, resulting in the systematic formation of the legal 
justification. This can also be made in the traditional or value based comparative law form.
Instrumental uses of comparative law lead usually to argumentation and justification 
by means of general features or disparities without any analytical quality. On the other hand, 
instrumental comparative reasoning can depart from strict general features, or disparities, and 
remain on the traditional level of reasoning. Here the method for analysis of the generalities or 
disparities is related to traditional methods of legal sources and arguments.
Furthermore, if one goes to the deep analysis of systems by stressing the particular 
features and problematizing the whole idea of the comparability (strong systematic 
“polycentrism” as its ultimate form), we are dealing with strongly value-based forms o f 
comparative observations in the instrumental sense812. Here the general reasoning usually results 
in coherence - or similar kind o f - reasoning.
In the case o f traditional analysis, legal theory and comparative law meet in the 
concept of legal sources. With reference to legal systems as general o r disparate, comparative 
reasoning implies values o f  the legal system as a basic form of value.
It can be maintained that an explicit reference to a particular legal system as a 
source of legal argument is not a necessary condition for the rationality o f comparative reasoning 
(an original source).
A special type of phenomenon must also be mentioned.
Instrumental reasoning takes place also in a case, where reasons are revealed in an 
open justification, but only as institutional "additional" material (value based or traditional way).
1.1 For certain problems in this regard, see A am io, A., 1986, p.22.
1.2 From the general legal theoretical point of view, deep analysis is instnimentalization o f  the legal system as a form 
of legal argument.
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Many "opinion" types of comparative observations are of this type. As we will come to see, they 
may function in guaranteeing the convincing force of the "main" reasoning. This type o f  
instrumentalization, as a kind of contextual justification, may also attempt to guarantee the 
integrity of a legal order and an institution. However, from the point o f view of value based and 
traditional reasoning, these additional comparative observations may be relevant also to  the 
development of the system.
C om parative reasoning and  the discursive integrity of law. Comparative reasoning 
traditionally consists in descriptions of law, whether general or disparate. As maintained, genera­
lity can be absolute or partial. Disparity can be absolute or relative, or may entail a type o f special 
case, whereby the legal system is, on the basis o f its internal structure, considered as a special 
case (coherence or integrity). Absolute disparity maintains also the coherence or integrity o f  
different legal systems in terms of comparative law.
Description, on the other hand, has, as its counterpart in reasoning, a prescriptive 
(critical?) part.813 The prescriptive part differs according to different types o f descriptive parts. 
W here the descriptive part of (comparative) reasoning consists o f the generality o f the legal 
systems or their norms in a value based or analogical sense, the prescriptive part can either be an 
acceptance of a corresponding norm or principle, or it can ignore this generality as a basis o f the 
decision. The first type of reasoning is related to the openly value-based comparative reasoning, 
the second to the openly instrumental use o f comparative law (comparison by opposites).
The value based and the instrumental uses of comparative law do appear 
normatively integrative in the realm of the state paradigm of comparative law, but in a strongly 
adjudicative sense.
Traditional comparative reasoning is characterized by the working hypothesis o f 
comparative law, namely, the disparity o f legal systems. However, it is legally analytical. 
Traditional comparative reasoning maintains the traditional integrity o f  legal systems in a 
discursive way. It reveals the basis of the prescriptive evaluation. In this way the integrative 
discourse can proceed.
Sincerity, efficiency and  linguistic conventionality. In traditional comparative reasoning, one 
starts always from the "external" vantage point to the legal system. This "externality", on the 
other hand, does not mean the point o f view o f  each foreign law under comparison, but a "third"
11J Schmitthoff M. (1941, p.99) for example maintains that “th e ... problem connected with the descriptive phase 
o f a comparative legal study is the question howfar critical analysis should be applied at this stage. Even the pure 
description o f  facts cannot, it is believed, achieve a scientific standing [MK: legal scientific standing] without 
methodological classification
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point of view, the legal point of view.814, as we have maintained.
This third point of view, the legal point of view, reveals the value based (normative) 
choices on the limits of one's conception of legal system (and law in general). This is due to the 
fact that, in this case, the legal point o f view comprises a bunch of choices, which have to be 
articulated and reconstructed. The legal point o f view operates in the open space (context) of the 
tradition of comparative law. Even if it moves inside some kind of tradition, it reveals the choices 
inside this open tradition quite clearly.
In this sense, it appears interesting that traditional comparative reasoning seems to 
be, in point of fact, sincere from the point of view of the legal discourse theories. This is due to 
its open-endedness. Furthermore, it also seems that there is no room for real instrumentality, even 
if the legal systems and national legal discourses are instrumentalized in a particular reasoning. 
The justification moves in some ways within the legal sphere, but is characterized by elements o f 
so-called "deep-justification"813.
On the other hand, because in comparative reasoning one refers to rules, decisions, 
etc. which frequently are claimed to have a "transcategorical" nature, there is a strong assumption 
of a "common sense" understanding of these rules (or, in other cases, they are used 
authoritatively).
Conclusions. What follows is an attempt to undertake critical analysis of the nature of value 
based, traditional and instrumental comparative reasoning. Furthermore, the idea is to consider 
the relationship between comparative arguments and other arguments, and the interaction 
between arguments in relation to the consultation of different legal audiences.
5.4.2. Analysis of the types of comparative reasonings 
(argum ents)
5.4.2.I. The value based nature  of 
comparative reasoning
Its homophonie nature, and the idea of a  minim um requirement. Comparative reasoning (as 
well as analogical reasoning) seems to be a "minimum requirement" for the legal meaningfiilness
114 Tut, R.H.S., has explained how comparative Jaw m oves between the mechanical jurisprudence and judicial 
intuitionism (1977, p. 247).
1,3 T his is exactly the reason why comparative considerations are left out from the justification. They are hidden 
within the generality and disparity statements, which give only a sign of what has been concluded 
in the internal discourses o f a system, or what might be the values of the decision-maker.
All the same, because in comparative considerations, as we already maintained, are genuine legal 
arguments, one may conclude that the "contextualization" instmmentalizes law o r is at least a sign of the instrumentalist 
approach to law.
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of a legal sentence. Namely, comparative legal reasoning looks to create meaning for a legal sen ­
tence by a reference another legal sentence. In this sense, it constitutes an ultimate meaning- 
creation process in law.816
We may say that comparative legal reasoning is legally a “homophonic sentence” . 
It provides the ultimate "correctness conditions" (meaning condition) to another legal expression. 
Comparative reasoning is a confirmation of a meaning in the legal paradigmatic context. 
Argumentatively, it is a form of "linguistic systematic" meaning-creation instead of a phenomeno­
logical (or, for example, an ethical) one.
In legal terms, it is the ultimate form o f  use of state-paradigmatic positive law. This 
feature is connected to the legal "qualitative" relationship, which comparative reasoning 
establishes between arguments within a legal sentence. The qualitative aspect is based on the fact 
that legal arguments are arguments from "legal systems" or more from general "legal arguments".
Here we understand, why the demand for further argumentation applies to  
comparative reasoning. A conditionalization a legal sentence by another "similar" argument leads 
to demands for further conditionalization. Consequently, the qualitative relationship assumes, in 
its explanation and reasoning, also the quantitative aspect. We have to prove the similarity o f the 
two "legal" arguments in the absence of a theory o f  intensional dimensions (meanings) of these 
sentences. This absence is due to the fact that even if the comparative argument has a legal 
"quality", this legality does not itself prove its legal practicality.817
In this way the "application context" becomes emphasized.
116 For these ideas and concepts, see, Davidson, R., 1984.
The nature of a comparative argument, as an ultimate argument, can be looked at from the point o f  
view o f the studies on general m eaning and use theories.
A typical feature o f all analogical and com parative statements seems to be that they are somehow "on 
the border" of the system. They com e into play every time the system  is incapable o f resolving the legal problem  in its 
own terms. There seems to be a “gap” in the system in a case comparative (or analogical) arguments are used.
817 The interesting feature of these "system-border” argum ents are, in certain sense, the minimum requirements o f 
the "meaning" of the system so that the system still remains a system, a separate identity. Comparative arguments are 
hom ophonic sentences, by which the system explains its own meaning. They are the minimum requirements for the 
meaning of the systems norms and texts. They are the minimum "explainers" in the reasoning, where the reasoning still 
has a  "legal" character.
The meaning comes from the idea that a com parison borrows the systemic quality of a sentence from  
ano ther system. This quality com es from the systemic nature o f  that sentence as such. Because the "other" has been 
already been recognized "in tradition" as a legal system, it is possible to "borrow” this sentence by thinking of it as 
having already legal systematic quality. It has "legal intensionality".
It is not very convincing to use "adaption", like homophonic sentences, in the legal rhetoric. This is 
why comparative considerations have to be "transformed" to be general features o f another form in order to be 
convincing and persuasive, but on the same time explanatory.
W e m ay say  that the absence of the intensional theory, on the other hand, is based on the fact that 
interpretation is needed in general, i.e. the legal sentence seems not to be sufficient in itself.
One can connect this to  the idea of audience. W e could claim that the lack of the intensional theory is 
due to the heterogeneity o f  the ideal audience. To be able to convince the audience one has to  use all arguments which 
are relevant for convincing.
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Its inspirational nature. As we have seen, the design and substantive content of foreign legal 
rules and the rules of ones own system is based occasionally on an intuitive and spontaneous 
comparison. This is not considered to be part o f comparative law as such, as it is understood as 
a scholarly work. Nevertheless, one can include this type of use o f "comparative law" within the 
idea of comparative legal reasoning. In this "inspirational" sense, comparative reasoning is loaded 
with values and affective attachments.
One could claim that it is the unsystematic nature o f comparative law and compar­
ative alternatives which provides the decision-maker with the intuition of inventio. This inventio 
seems to be the basis of the self-reflective certainty of the decision-maker arriving at a solution. 
This may also be an explanation for the basic and general idea of the persuasiveness of the 
comparatively "invented" legal solutions. These types of solutions seem often to be compromises 
between parties in a difficult dispute.
This "inspirational" nature is a problem from the point of view of the legal discourse 
theory. The question arises, for example, as to what extent "inspirations" can be allowed, and to 
what extent one should reveal the sources of inspiration818. This is connected also to the 
explanatory quality o f the comparative argument.
Its situational nature. Comparative reasoning seems to be, consequently, situational (topical). 
This seems to be related to the fact that situation which put "law against law" or "legal systems 
against legal systems" situations, in the realm o f comparative observations, lead to choices or 
confirmations; to a necessity for legal selection. Where in the "descriptive" comparative law one 
is not obliged to draw any conclusions, in a case of comparative reasoning, on the other hand, 
one is closer to having a choice of law. However, it also appears as to, in comparative reasoning, 
one only confirms the choice o f a particular normative solution in a extremely restricted context.
Comparative reasoning thus seems to a matter of situational confirmation.
Its marginality, complete nature, and explanatory function. It is rare that a lawyer constantly 
refers to the texts dealing with foreign law or comparative legal method in order to find a 
solution to a legal problem, though there would be the possibility for an "inspirational" use o f 
comparative material. On the other hand, if this is done, it is rarely acknowledged. This makes 
comparative reasoning quantitatively marginal.
Whenever the “inspirations” are revealed, however, this seems to lead to a  
"complete” phenomenological consideration of the issue in general. This, on the other hand, leads 
to qualitative marginality819. Nevertheless, we have to remember that there is always the
111 This has been asked, for exam ple, in the context o f Community law by Pescatore, P .t 1980, p.358.
1,9 Also in its analytical form this could be called "complete" rather than closed. Com parative reasoning seems to  be 
self-referential in the sense that comparative legal information is complete from  the systematic point of view.
190
possibility that it is exactly this complete “phenomenological” characteristic, which is the basic 
idea which guarantees the "integrity" of the societal and legal discourse820. However, one could  
say that comparative legal reasoning is usually, also from the point o f view of its "explanatory 
force", an extremely weak and marginal legal phenomenon.
Moreover, comparative reasoning seems to be directed toward a professional and 
uniformly educated social group of lawyers, which have extremely dogmatic point o f  view  
regarding law. Consequently, from the point o f view of the legal discourse, comparative 
reasoning seems to be reasoning for the maintenance of the internal discourse of law, in which the 
basic principle is self-persuasion concerning the coherent professional rationality and the ideal 
phenomenon o f law as a form of legitimation. This “self-persuasion” may be associated w ith  a 
kind of marginality of the "unknown sphere" of legal possibilities, which functions as a 
reproductive element of the socio-organized law. Comparative reasoning in a legal discourse 
seems to be "cryptic" reasoning, which is, nevertheless, important for that particular socio-legal 
audience821.
In this sense, comparative reasoning seems to be directed toward the adherence to 
the legal audience or, alternatively, to the general audience in the socio-political and socio- 
scientific discourse, which is oriented to support the social and institutional status o f lawyers or 
their argumentative abilities.822 Comparative reasoning is the heart o f the value-based self­
maintenance of institutionalized law.
This idea could explain, for example, why comparative reasoning does not seem to 
be relevant to the "genuine" and general social discourses; that is, to the legal dogmatic or 
political discourses of social systems. Where the relevance of value-based comparative reasoning 
is in the maintenance of legal possibilities, in these types of discourses, explanatory force and 
communicative abilities are more relevant. Comparative reasoning seems to  be irrelevant to them. 
However, as we have maintained, the genuine legal discourse is, in the final analysis, socially and 
not merely legally-oriented.
This may be the reason why lawyers, taking part in genuine legal discourses, 
hesitate to use comparative observations.
Comparative reasoning may be important whenever the reasoner is ready to 
undertake the difficult task o f translating comparative observations and o f integrating them into
120 In this sense, "dogmatic" com parative reasoning, for exam ple, seems to be always extremely mechanical.
Cl In this way it seems to be one o f the most important o f all materials or arguments from  the internal point of view 
of law. This is connected also to the use of the “gap” argum ent in law.
1:3 The characteristics o f any translating system appear interesting. The idea seems to be that one should not 
necessarily translate well, but convincingly. All the sam e, the characteristics of the conceptualizations deriving from 
these translations is abstract, and their convincing character is based on their abstractness. The more abstract they are, 
the b e tte r  they can be utilized in a  discourse. Their character as "order from noise" is  the basic condition of their 
potentiality as legal arguments aim ing at the legal regulation within other systems.
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the internal discourses prevailing in the genuine discourses. Here we may find the socio-instru­
mental role of the comparative dogmatists, and value-based comparative reasoning.
The contextuality of values. Comparative reasons seem to “keep up appearances”, to function 
as a "cover” for value (or even morally) loaded issues.*23 This idea may be explained in a 
following way.
One may claim that different types of "cognitive" arguments enter into legal 
reasoning, whenever the question concerns value issues. In value-based comparative reasoning, 
the traditional forms are tested. The “value-loadedness" tends to "expand" the considerations, and 
in reasoned form, to reveal more and more basic assumptions embedded in the thinking of the 
decision-maker.
Comparative reasoning is one type o f cognitive expansion, even if it is a "legal" 
type. Here problems may arise, for example, concerning the rationality of the reasoning, as we 
may see. The "sensitivity" o f the issue often causes the closeness of the comparative reasoning, 
or a tendency towards greater abstraction. Comparative generality and disparity are these types 
of abstractions.
Consequently, whenever comparative closeness is revealed, by analytically stating 
the comparative observations or by neglecting any comparative "generalities", we may enter into 
the realm of the study of the basic (legal) values824.
"New situation", and  its practical nature. Because the role o f comparative reasoning in law 
does not seem to be related to its a priori acceptability as a legal argument, but rather to its 
practical relevance (i.e. to its factual acceptability in a legal discourse) comparative legal 
reasoning appears whenever the situation seems to be new and when no traditional normative 
guidance is found.823 In this sense, traditional legal analogical arguments and comparative 
arguments seem to be, in a way, alternatives. Where analogical arguments operate in the 
systematic framework of a legal system, the comparative argument is based on the idea o f a legal
m  Comparative reasoning, as a legal systematic generalization, is an extremely effective way to "cover" the m ain 
value standpoints and aims in a "referential” form. It takes p lace by reference to  the legal quality and status o f law.
04 As we have claimed, comparative arguments seem  to function as solutions for the value-loaded questions o f legal 
systems. However, the fact that their internal and external prem isses are "legal" (referring to  the premisses o f the legal 
actor, but also to the premisses o f  external legal systems) m ake them "legal" arguments.
Despite their legal nature, one can identify the value issues by observing the questions, in which 
comparative legal arguments are used. By observing the different types of criteria connected to the comparative legal 
argument, one can identify the value premisses o f the decision-maker in relation to the "legal questions”.
rJ  This phenomenon may be associated with, for exam ple, the legal activism of courts.
It is interesting to note how the academic objection to the activism o f courts seems to be connected also 
to the activism of comparative reasoning. The objection may be explained by the fact that the academic approach to the 
law is often based on a more historical approach (emphasizing different sources o f  the rules o r principles) (W atson, A ., 
1974, p.96). However, one should, consequently, concentrate, in an academic objection, upon to the extensions o f the 
reasoning, and not upon the activism as such.
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framework in general. However, we may ask, if this is so, why then to tum  to another system  and 
learn from that system new ways of reasoning in relation to a particular situation?
This resort to another system may be due to the fact that in a particular observed 
system, a particular legal and political discourse has been already effected with regard to  a 
particular problem. In addition, the problem may seem to be relatively comparable, as a factual 
problem, within the observing system This may be the result o f the idea that the factual nature 
of the social world is considered relatively similar in general or that the process of rule-creation 
and application, in historical terms, for example, ensures that certain issues have been discussed 
and that some kind o f discursive rationality has been achieved. In this sense, a comparative 
argument may be preferable to an analogical one.
Two factors arc connected to this issue. The system which works as a transferring 
system is, to a certain extent, to be trusted. It is considered authoritative in the sense that the 
discourse which has taken place in it is considered meaningful and rational a priori. Even if  the 
rationality of the rule or the norm is not established by the social discourse in the receiving 
system there seems to be some rationality guarantees.
On the other hand, the observance o f another system may be associated w ith the 
idea that there are some problems in the rationality of the political discourse or ''informal 
channelling" in that society. On the other hand, the explanatory force o f the systemic analysis may 
not satisfy, as such, the needs of the reasoner in particular decision-making826. The legal decision­
maker may find it necessary to regulate and clarify certain issues at the moment o f decision­
making.827
The legal system may interact with other legal systems also because it finds it 
necessary to stress its relative autonomy from the political rale constructing, or because political 
decision-making is considered relatively autonomous from the legal system in general. In this 
case, there seems to be no general discourse relationship between the legal and the political 
system. As a result, the legal discourse or learning process is considered to be more rational.
As we may see, it is possible to find many common elements between comparative 
and practical(-finalistic) reasoning. As practical(-fmalistic) reasoning, comparative reasoning 
should not have a decisive role in legal justification because o f its ingenuine nature as legal 
justification. We may say that if comparative argument should be used in these situations, it 
should be used as a final consideration after all the genuine legal reasons, after the arguments 
deriving from prima fa c ie  legal sources have been considered. This way the decision will 1267
126 This may be a reason for the adoption of reasons of fact rather than reasons of law.
127 This is typical o f  highest courts, for example.
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facilitate the internal coherence of the legal system828.
Comparative reasoning also differs in many ways from pure practical reasoning. 
Namely* it is reasoning by certain legal systems recognized as political-legal systems. 
Interpretations by foreign law, on the other hand, are based, for example, on a valid body of 
statute law829.
Its "ultimate*' character. As we have maintained, comparative reasoning has a tendency to 
stretch the legal system and law to its limits. Some remarks have been already made on this issue. 
In traditional international private law and criminal law, for example, the ultimate limits can be 
seen in the form of "ordre public”, which is the expression of the limits o f the system, and which 
calls for a return to the norms o f one’s own system of law. Here the "comparison" of laws has a 
role. The legally rational relationship with other systems is defined. In these choice-of-law types 
of regulatory acts it is usually explicitly mentioned that the ultimate premise for the choice of the 
public order rule should be determined on “moral grounds”830. Consequently, comparative 
reasoning seems to be connected to the questions o f the ultimate foundation of legal rationality 
in a formal sense.
As we have maintained, the fact that it is exactly comparative legal reasoning that 
is used in the hard cases instead of practical and moral reasoning means that attempts are made 
to resolve these cases via traditional forms of law, not by new forms of arguments. Indeterminacy 
in general is solved by some kind of traditional form of legal security.
In conclusion, one could claim that the value based (and also instrumental)
,2g This idea is interesting, if one thinks about the persuasive nature o f the comparative reasoning in the legal 
discourse. Where comparative reasons are usually seen as ultimate and final reasons in the decision-making of national 
discourses, it is no wonder, why som e cases where the supranational systems use comparative observations appear as 
"hard cases" from the point of view of the national discourses.
However, in supranational regional systems the comparative observations are everyday practice. The 
attitude towards comparative perspectives appears different From  the point o f view of the supranational systems, these 
cases are not necessarily "hard cases".
929 Nevertheless, many problems exist. Comparative reasons are legal, and not only cognitive. Comparative reasons 
are part o f  another social discourse.
It is quite interesting to note, empirically, that comparative arguments are used in justifications more 
or less the opposite way than an analogical argum ent
This can be explained in the following way. W hen the legal systematic rationality is at its limits (i.e., 
the in ternal system arguments are exhausted with an internal analogy) one has to go beyond the system, and use 
arguments (and considerations) external to the system. This takes place via comparative considerations. The whole 
system o f  legal decision-making, from legally internal point o f view, turns out to be a reflective attitude towards its 
environment. This way the system constructs "itself* as a normative system in the internal processes of the system o f 
decision-making.
The comparison creates, in other words, context for the system itself. The context is then the linguistic, 
procedural, jurisdictional, and sometimes even the rule con tex t This context helps the legal system to construct itself 
as a kind of a legal teleological system.
130 This is often seen in the order public clauses.
The same applies to regional organizations when they determine the content of the concept o f
subsidiarity.
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comparative reasoning - established via an unanalytical generality or contextual translation o f  the 
traditional conceptualization - cannot prevail in hard cases in general. Hard cases should be 
justified by traditional analysis. A hard case must be approached in an analytical and intensive 
manner. Only by means o f  convincing reproduction of this tradition one is able to establish the 
acceptability of the solution.
T he pathological potentiality. One of problem in comparative legal reasoning, as well as in 
comparative law itself, is the loss of the social context of the systems studied and the arguments 
used. This may take place for many reasons. It may lead to the "isolation" of the interpreting 
system, and, in the end, comparative reasoning may appear pathological. This is connected to  the 
"equalization effect" discussed earlier.
This phenomenon is a problem of legal interpretation in general, but the problem 
emerges more clearly in the case of comparative reasoning, where the starting point is a strongly 
generalized form (or well established methodological status of comparative law), and where one 
does not necessarily have any attachment to any contextual factuality. In comparative reasoning 
the problem is extremely complex, because the final results of comparative legal considerations 
are also generalized legal forms.
Here the problem of legal reasoning becomes a communicative problem in a highly 
uncovered manner. There seems to be no possibility, especially if the reasoning is non-analytical, 
to find out the ideas prevailing in the context of the discovery o f the arguments used. The com ­
municative act seems to be acceptable, but the real problems do not emerge or their resolution 
is postponed.
5.4.2.2, The trad itional nature o f com parative reasoning
G enerality , "openness'1, and  the secondary na tu re  of com parison. The generalization 
contained in comparative reasoning can be considered almost always to  be implicit831. On the 
other hand, the comparative argument may be also an explicit generalization.
All the same, even if comparative reasoning may be explicit, the comparative 
argument remains an "open" argument in the sense that it leaves open different possibilities. This 
type o f open argument is an argument, whereby the authority often replaces the reason, and 
where values enter into the argumentation832, as we have seen. 132
131 For example, Abel, R .L , 1978, p.221.
132 O n open arguments, Honoré, A.M ., 1974.
C om parative considerations confirm decisions belonging to a  larger context than to the systematic 
c o n te x t  Having a  nature o f  being a  combined argum ent reflecting many dimensions o f social activity (sociological, 
philosophical, legal etc), it refers also to  spheres other than legal systems (and discourses). Comparative considerations
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On the other hand, because o f its character of"generality”, comparative reasoning 
is "secondary”. Its legal premises derive from secondary sources833. This is so especially in cases 
where no traditional analysis (comparative argument) is used.
These features must be balanced with the analytical approach to comparative 
reasoning (traditionally).
The supportive and practical legal nature . Comparative reasoning is mainly a supportive 
illustration in justification. It helps the interpreter to transfer practical considerations, already 
taken, into legal language. As mentioned, this may take place in cases where no satisfactory legal 
solution is found ("gaps"). In this sense, comparative reasoning is not a practical statement as 
such, but a practical statement in a legal form. This latter phenomenon could be explained more 
thoroughly.
As we have maintained, the function o f comparative law may be understood either 
as a ’’widening of an intellectual horizon’’834 (kind of a "self-conviction”) or/and, in the social 
sense, as a search for a reasonable (legal) argument for purposes of a legal audience. As we may 
see, comparative reasoning is, in this sense, related to the general practical argument, but is a 
kind of a "mirror’’ reflection of it. However, comparative reasoning seems to function also in 
testing the basic rationale of the legal interpretation, in the hard cases within legal systems833, and 
furthermore, as a premise for the evolution o f legal cases (legal language as such, or even 
common language)836. In this sense, it may be, and many times is, more easily understood in the 13
do, accordingly, open up the system in many ways.
This is the reason for comparative reasoning being extremely problematic: it causes insecurity not only 
legally, but in the general systematic thinking. It reflexivizes the system. Consequently, it forces the system to maintain 
strongly formal closure to be able to be opened up cognitively. This causes also the factual closing up o f the system in 
an argumentative (justificatory) and discursive sense, as we have claimed. T o  maintain its systematic nature, the 
discourse cannot open up the external and unsystematic features. If this was so, it would be incomprehensible as a form  
of a social discourse, and it would break the self-productive features of the system (and legal discourse).
w3 Brusiin, O., 1953, p.437, Koopmans, T„ 1996, pp.548-550.
134 M arsh, N.S., 1977, p.661.
133 See also, some analysis, M arsh, N.S., 1977, p.650.
w  It is interesting to note, how the analogical, or comparative argument, functions in this sense.
For example, one takes up a comparative observation ("in system S: if one maltreats a person, one has 
to pay compensation and ñnes X”). Then one identifies the legal system relationship (F, S), the norm in a second system 
and the comparability (F: "causing physical injury an individual, leads to compensation" is a same as S "if one maltreats 
a person, one has to pay compensations and fines X"). Then one extends or restricts the interpretation o f the norm as 
much as the comparative observation allows, makes the transformation ("actually the interpretation in F  should be that 
the 'maltreatment' is 'causing physical injury, and the consequences should include the fines”). Afterwards, the applica­
tion of this transformation to a case can take place. Subsequently, the change, taken place in the reinterpretation o f the 
rule in the comparative process determines the interpretation o f  the norm (for example, m ore consequences: fines X).
Now, consequently, one starts to define the similar situations this way too - based on the idea o f 
systematic coherence. The "maltreatment" enters into the legal vocabulary, and a conceptual change takes place, and 
the case, where it has been used, starts to determine the legal discourse.
Furthermore, if in a system F there would not be a concept o f  "maltreatment", the adoption of the 
concept would be determining not only the legal conceptualization, but also the common language. This becomes more
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general practical legal discourse, though it is a legal systematic argument.
Comparative reasoning seems to move, accordingly, both within the border o f  legal 
systems, but also at the border of general practical rationality and legal rationality in general.
The inter-systematic n a tu re  and legal linguistic conventionality. Comparative reasoning is 
reasoning by arguments deriving from systems o f arguments, i.e. general conceptions o f lega l 
systems. Comparative arguments are adaptable, not on the basis o f general philosophical 
conditions of discourse, but on the basis o f their inter-systematic nature. Comparative reasoning 
starts, or at least should start, from the legal (systematic) linguistic conditions, just as th e  
tradition of comparative law starts its research, and not from the general linguistic conditions 
prevailing in the general normative discourse or the legal systematic conditions prevailing in a  
legal system. Legal linguistic conventionality is assumed.
The comparative argument in this sense has two sides: it is an independent legal 
argument as an argument within that system, but at the same time, it is an argument which has 
lost its systematic nature, and is taken from the actual and concrete legal discourse of another 
system. It serves its legal and social explanatory aims in one legal system and it is claimed to  be  
doing so also in another legal system, even if in disparate way. This way the comparative legal 
reasoning refers, basically, to two socio-legal systematic coherences. It has to do with a general 
normative social consensus and legal consensus in two systems and it connects, in a peculiar w ay, 
two systems together: if it is successful in both systems, it actually integrates these two systems 
at the explanatory level, even if not necessarily on the level o f legal order.
On the other hand, the fact that comparative argument has been adopted within a 
system as explanation may encourage another system to do the same. The comparative argument, 
in other words, may be an argument in some discourses between legal systems, valid as an 
explanation, but not as a binding normative argument.
T h e  horizontal and vertical nature. Comparative reasoning has been seen traditionally as 
horizontal legal reasoning. This suggests that it does not function in relation to the hierarchical 
vertical structure o f the system using it. This is why it usually requires the establishment o f the 
comparative relationships to the whole system, or a stress upon the importance and centrality o f  
the "common" aspects. This is also why it is taken under a critical and practical evaluation in the 
realm o f both the factuality and validity o f a  system.
effective when the reconceptualization is connected to  cases w hich have a strong general social interest, and affective 
nature. The legal language starts to  strongly determine the com m on language. T o  a  certain extent, the idea seems to  be 
also that the more abstract a  legal rule (" a principle") with a strong normative pow er ("validity") we have, the more it 
starts to  determine the legal system to which it is com pared, and the common language v ia  the legal language.
This is connected to  the professionalization and the idea o f integration through law, and to the tradi- 
tionalization effect o f law.
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However, it seems that the comparative legal reasoning is often composed of two 
traditional comparisons. Firstly, a comparison is made between different legal systems. On the 
other hand, the generality or disparity, which results from this comparison is compared to (re­
flected with) the systematic presumptions, the internal principles, o f the system, especially within 
"institutional" principles. On the other hand, if the question involves the application of these 
generalities to the factual situation, there would be a third type o f  comparison. However, because 
of the "external" nature o f  the comparative observations, they usually function as supporting 
arguments in the interpretation of the legal norms o f the system.
We could say that comparative reasoning can be either one or two of these 
processes and analogies in an explicit form, or it can consist of all o f these. Nevertheless, whether 
we are speaking about comparative reasoning in education, legislation, negotiation, or any form 
of legal decision-making, we may claim that all of these elements are embedded within the 
reasoning process, in one form or another.
The interactive nature (I. Legal principles, II. Legal sources). Comparative reasoning seems 
to reduce the importance o f the question of the independence o f legal systems and comparative 
law in general, as we have maintained. On the other hand, if comparison is not related to any 
basic "systematic" and principled arguments, one may begin to  see the legal system as a self- 
evident legal construction o f legal institutions. Here, however, the ground seems to be clear also 
to different social determinations, as we have seen.
There is a connection between legal comparison and legal principles, as the 
inclusion of the vertical dimension to legal comparison has already suggested. It can be claimed 
that the connection between analogical (horizontal-comparative) reasons and legal principles is 
based on the idea that it is the basic legal principles which give the analogical and comparative 
arguments their "internal" connection to the system. These principles transfer the pure modelling 
or imitation process to the internal aspects of the system, in which process the external arguments 
become modified by some basic internal premises.
In a more value-based form, the interaction consists only in the "positive” principles 
of a system. On the other hand, a "discursive” principle of legal sources transfers the comparative 
reasoning to more traditional and analytical spheres, as we have explained above.
The "self-restrictive” and m aterial nature, and the effectiveness. Comparative observations 
and transformation processes are determined by the idea of a "suitable legal curiosity”, which the 
arguer and his audience (can) explore. The choices reveal also the idea o f what may be assumed 
to be the legal audience. In the choice o f the extension of the reasoning one is faced with a 
problem of, how far one thinks it is reasonable to go in the study o f socio-Iegal systems in
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general837. This determines the practical legal reasonability.838 Comparative reasoning is strongly 
related to the daily life o f socio-legal systems and their existing structural conditions.
On the other hand, because, in the argument transformation, one is investigating 
enormous amounts of possibilities, choices have to be made also in the realm o f time and 
resources. This may be associated with the effectiveness problem of comparative legal reasoning. 
“Effectiveness” is determined by the internal principles of the arguer and the institutional and 
systemic determinants. They may have a normative role.
Restrictions on time and resources make the comparative argument a "material" 
argument. It is bound to material conditions. This relates to the fact that comparative reasoning 
is empirically inductive.
The identity and  conservative nature. We may maintain that behind every comparative legal 
argument there is an idea o f an identity. In legal terms, this means a kind of a theory of legal 
identity, or, in practical modem terms, tertium comparationis and the state paradigm o f law. This 
identity (or tertium comparationis) is related to the idea that every trans-systematic comparison 
must function in a transsystematic conceptual framework.
All the same, this is not sufficient. Because of the controversial nature o f  compar­
ative reasoning, the identity is not only an a priori identity. It is also an attempt to reestablish an 
identity for law in concrete legal terms. This is connected to the comparability in substance. This 
identity-seeking is translated into the terms of the legal discourse as far as possible839. The 
internal and external interests of stability come together. For example, the filling up o f lacunae 
is connected to'the stability o f the system as a stable system among other systems.
In this sense, where the comparative reasoning involves the revelation o f  lacunae, 07
07 W here the comparative legal argument, as a practical generalized and applied argum ent, only assumes the social 
context and generalizes the scope o f a linguistically explained norm, it becomes only a  norm  in a practical context 
without any general application. Consequently, it does not have any general legal quality beyond its application-context. 
Its scope in analysis has to be restricted to that particular context it has been used in, unless it consists in explaining the 
social context, where it is applied in general.
This type of comparatively reasoned norm rem inds us of moral norms in the social sense, because it 
has no other specific context bu t the application context (on the context of moral norm s, see Aamio, A., 1986). 
However, because it has the legal quality of being legally restrictive, it remains a  comparative legal abstraction based 
on the context and choices and reflections of the legal institutional actor. In other words, as long as the social context 
o f the com pared norms are not connected and used as elements within this comparative abstraction, it rem ains only a 
heuristically (or perhaps "culturally") interpretable legal abstraction. It seems to  be strongly connected to the believe 
systematic reasoning ami to institutional authority, and it assumes a  strong instrumentalist idea of language. A t the sam e 
time, and because of its poor discursive quality, it is part o f an oppressive language, and in  the long run, it may reduce 
the authority o f the system.
,31' The arguer "can never transcendent society's self-image or go beyond its own concepts" (Tur, R .H .S., 1977, 
p.245).
139 T h is can be seen in different evaluations concerning the relevance of com parative law. Where the traditional 
balance, in legal terms, is broken up, the comparative argum ent loses its legal relevance, and it turns out to b e  a  matter 
of a sociological or political approach to  comparative law. In the ultimate sense, it becom es a  matter o f philosophical 
speculation.
f
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the systematic identity is also involved. On the other hand, this type o f lacunae-filling seems to 
be also a matter of general interest, and is of interest of not only the dogmatic discourse. Open 
reasoning is a sign o f the intention to persuade the audience of the general stability of the system. 
In this way it is directed to  all possible legal "audiences".
This type of open comparative reasoning is part o f a general and traditional theory 
of law. It is an explanation o f the global legal structures in a traditional way. In this sense, it also 
tries to confirm prevailing attitudes o f the global level on the structure o f the legal order*40. 
Consequently, it has a conservative nature.
Conclusions on the traditional and analytical nature. Analytical comparative reasoning relates 
to traditionally from two different perspectives, as we have previously maintained. First of all, 
the deep analysis emphasises the contextual features of the system, and secondly, the values o f 
the actor (who argues within some discursive sphere (to an audience) o f a system) are visible in 
the contextual choices she makes. In both these ways the traditionally o f the system prevails.
The objection against comparative reasoning* s emphasis is usually the impossibility 
of adopting a norm from another system because o f  systematic differences. This objection claims 
that systems are not alike. The objection is based on the claim o f a priori understanding of the 
differences between these systems. In this sense, it fails to recognize the value of comparative 
reasoning in the legal discourse.
Consequently, in reality, the evaluation of comparative reasoning is connected 
rather to its rhetorical force than to its nature in a legal discourse. One does not usually concen­
trate on the "correctness" o f comparative reasons from the point of view of the theory o f 
comparative law, for example, but one is interested rather in its persuasive quality, that is to say,
M It is in new fields o f law, where one makes use of comparisons.
One could approach this issue from two perspectives.
First o f  all, by comparison systems create their identities with a help o f same types o f  functional 
systems in the global sphere, instead of traditional legal systematic validity considerations. On the other hand, the 
traditional state-paradigmatic prem isses force the com paring system to maintain its legitim acy The solution is the 
closing up of comparative considerations to the internal processes. If these comparative sources or premisses would 
become part of the open justification, as sources o f legal arguments, this would reveal the comparative identity o f a 
socio-functional system, and it would seem to be outside the basic control over validity. In this way, the normative 
closeness serves, for example, the functional purposes of state legal systems (and supra-national systems as state- 
paradigmatic systems as a  such).
The second feature seems to be, that by too analytical comparative considerations these functionally 
differentiated systems could fall out o f the premisses o f the ethno-state paradigm. In other words, comparative 
considerations, whether we are speaking about the comparisons o f  state systems in reasoning o f national or international 
courts, or the comparison o f separate functional fields (systems) o f law, would reveal the contextuality and the social 
connections embedded to the legal issue in question. This would make it a matter o f the general discourse and con­
troversial considerations in general, and the professional expertise o f law would lose its legitimacy to more open social 
considerations. As a consequence, the reproduction (interpretation) o f the system itself could end because o f the shift 
o f importance.
These considerations reveal interesting way, how the argumentative closeness functions as a means o f  
maintaining the reproduction of the importance of the legal system.
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how well it can achieve the adherence o f the hearers. .'
Accordingly, one can concentrate on the distinction between analytical and non- 
analytical approaches to comparative reasoning.
In its extensive and analytical form, comparative argument also refers explicitly o r 
implicitly to the general environment it is functioning within. Contrary to systematic and positive 
normative propositions, it is obliged also to say something about the society within it functions. 
The discursive quality of comparative reasoning is in its analytical quality, and in the quality o f 
the additional arguments used with it and their interaction. The quality o f comparative reasoning 
is based on its ability to explain deviations from the clear wording, traditions in other discourses 
etc.
The analytical form stresses the importance of the isolation of the reasoning in 
concrete cases, whereas the non-analytical approach takes for granted the systematic connections 
in the legal cultural and legislative sense, and may be oriented towards instrumentalism.841 On the 
o ther hand, where this cultural approach stresses the importance o f an idea of culture, and the 
"institutional" facts of law, the analytical approach a stresses more "inspirational", open, and 
affective side of comparative law and comparative reasoning. On the other hand, in the legal 
cultural approach to comparative reasoning, it is the cultural nature o f  the arguments, which 
establishes the "persuasive" nature of arguments. In the more analytical approach the idea o f 
"culture" is connected, by and large, to decision-based reasoning, to the comparative and general 
legal discourse as a dynamic process.
Different types of comparative reasoning relate also to the way in which the legal 
system is seen as a professional system, as we have already maintained. The cultural and non- 
analytical approach stresses the importance o f a professional type o f legal system; a legal system 
as comprised of lawyers. This type of system creates a fa9ade argumentation. This 
professionalization, on the other hand, refers also to the transfer of political law into the system 
of closed "contextual" politics taking place within institutional interpretations and interpretational 
processes of law. This may result in a dysfunctionalization of the law at the primary level, where 
by the reasonings (and interpretations) are not understood. The other side o f this phenomenon o f 
the closed interpretation is the closed application o f law.842
The practical persuasiveness o f a value-based and unanalytical comparative
M1 O n the analytical approach (evaluative comparison), see Drobning, U., 1984, p.243.
For exam ple, different European legal systems and their main '’identity*’ could be typologized, to  a 
certain  extent, according to this distinction.
This is the basic problem o f the non-analytical nature of comparative arguments. Even if comparative 
studies could be attached to the dogmatic writings, they may appear in rather non-analytical form. Just as in the case o f  
using, for example, precedents as sources of law, reference to comparative law have only the quality that the original 
studies carter.
141 See also Shapiro, M ., 1980, p .537. Professionalization can be associated with the passive acceptance of the
system.
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reasoning is quite obviously connected to the fact that it can "hide" the counter-factual choices 
of the normative argument, and in this way it is seems to be more "objective". It refers to a law, 
even if to "another" type of law.843 Furthermore, its persuasiveness may be also based on its 
"actuality". In comparative reasoning one is choosing traditional authority, but, however, by 
doing it in a quite affective or value-based manner844.
All the same, this "objectiveness" seems to be a fallacy. A reference to "legal 
systems” (in general) and their general features do not have same connotations as a genuine 
reference to the "legal system". The reference to  "legal systems" avoids all objections in a 
discourse situation, because it assumes certain "considerations" beforehand. Only further 
argumentation can reveal the nature of these considerations843.
The reference to "legal systems" indicates also professional or other types of 
"knowledge" on the basis o f reasoning, as we have maintained. The comparative argument, in 
other words, is inclined to reproduce the authority of professionalist correctness, and is directed 
to an audience, which is believing more on the professionalist capability than to common sense.846
As we will see next, the persuasiveness o f the instrumental use o f comparative law 
may be associated also with the interaction between different institutional actors, in open and in 
closed form. Advisory comparative reasoning may emphasize the compact nature o f the main 
justifications. The mere knowledge of the existence o f contextual studies may give, on the other 
hand, institutional expertise to the legal decision-maker.
S.4.2.3. The instrum ental nature of comparative reasoning
The self-referentiality and the "evolutive'* nature of non-analytical comparative reasoning.
As maintained, where one reasons on the basis of "generality or disparity in legal systems", one 
refers to  the legal systems concerned, but also to the criteria o f comparability, to the tertium  
comparationis or systematic principles. In this sense, the tertium comparationis or principles, 
attached to the acceptance o f the comparative arguments, is determined, whether in a closed or *
MJ Tur, R.H.S., 1977, p.239.
***Tur, R.H.S., 1977, p .2 4 1 .
MI O ne could claim that the comparative legal argument is instrumentally the most rational argument from the 
rhetorical point of view (only). It cannot be analyzed or used a priori similar way, so the dogm atic discussion is not able 
to  criticize i t  On the other hand, it uses the ultimate validity basis o f modem positive law, legal system, as a  basis o f 
the argum ent It is, in this sense, never open for discussion on a  priori basis yet still it is an ultimate form o f  generality, 
which can be substantiated ad hoc basis.
One could also think, that this is the basis o f its real and value based substantive rationality. It may 
reveal the values for one which are embedded in i t  In this sense, it leads the analyzer to the basic value decisions, and 
makes it for one possible to reconstruct the values o f the decision-maker. Consequently, one is able to enter into a value 
discussion in the realm of law.
m  The emphasis upon the judicial audience in comparative law.
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open way, by the comparative reasoner.
Comparative reasoning is basically self-referential legal reasoning; the criteria o f  
selection are internal to the system, while the selected generalities derive from the external 
premises to the legal system. This fact makes the legal actor relatively "autonomous” in his 
reasoning. This phenomenon is also connected to the fact that comparative premises have to  be 
reconstructed and checked all over again. We have already analysed this phenomenon.
This is the reason why comparative reasoning does not seem to be genuine "legal" 
reasoning. Legal arguments demand relative stability in order to be capable of being legal 
arguments. The comparative argument does seem to satisfy the internal premise of law - 
predictability - because o f its value-loaded and self-referential nature. This type of comparative 
argument has the character o f  being "evolutive” and instrumental.
T h e  "legalizing" nature. Comparative legal observations may enable their user to "legalize" 
some existing norms in a social system. In other words, comparative legal observations may give 
a legal quality to a social norm, which is based on one's own observations or on a general type o f  
observation regarding a societal norm. Moreover, legally systematic, intransitive, transfers can 
also take place. Comparative reasoning can be, in other words, a method for the "legalization” 
o f  a  social norm or a social argument within a legal discourse847.
On the other hand, as maintained, as and when a legal institution uses comparative 
aspects in its decision-making, it does not derive the reflective elements necessarily from the 
systematic nature of the "original” legal system. The comparative aspects do not derive from the 
dogm atic and substantial systematic discourse internal to any legal system. In this sense, the 
adaptor of comparative aspects functions as an ultimate systematizer of the legal system in which 
he is acting. A court, for example, takes part in the legal discourse by way of arguments, which 
could not be classified a priori as legal arguments. In this sense, by using comparative legal 
arguments, the arguer may also "legalize” his justification in general, though the premises o f the 
institution would belong to a sphere other than the sphere of legal discourse.
847 This is one o f the reasons, for example, why com parative law  is difficult to  explain as a legal norm, but is rather 
a  m ethod o f law.
The use o f comparative arguments, as a  sole m eans o f justification, seems to be typical o f  socio-legal 
systems where no real principled discussion and tradition of value-based discourse occurs. The comparative discourse 
fills this gap, and provides occasional possibilities for the legal and political decision makers to fill up these discursive 
lacunae by some means o f justification. Comparative aspects are adopted so as to abolish the insecurity in historical 
in terpretation , where the legislative integrity does not appear integrative, but rather based on peculiar pathological 
decisions contingently reflecting societal interests, or where in term s o f legal integrity in general, legal decision makers 
or the legal sciences are unable to  identify basic principles from  the law.
Here we may note why one should demand "sociological and analytical" observations in relation to 
comparative arguments. This makes it possible, a posteriori, to establish a connection between the "comparative" and 
the social norm, or to study the legal nature of the equalization effect and the "formant”.
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The contextual nature. The nature of comparative law, as a study of similarities and differences, 
takes one to the context o f justification, as has been argued before. The strongly subjective 
elements and phenomenological deepness o f the analysis of the legal systems involved tends to 
stress the particular features o f legal systems. This is why comparative reasoning tends to be 
included in the institutional framework, and to be absent within public justifications'49. The reason 
for this bracketing could, however, also be due to the fact that the substantive analysis is at the 
core, whereas references to comparative sources may be considered irrelevant.
The “inspirational transformation” takes place when the comparative observer 
excludes from comparative reasoning any indication of the sources o f  the arguments. Any 
indication to the legal analysis (inspirational or systematic) is veiled and we are left with a purely 
intellectual analysis, which is connected, in the end, to prevailing ideas of the internal legal 
audience of that system.
This transformation (in facade) can take place also at an institutional level. The 
reference to other legal systems may be consciously or unconsciously left out of open 
considerations. These considerations can be, however, admitted later, or they could be previously 
known, as notorious professional facts, by the audience. This idea applies also to organizational 
transformations of the comparative law information.
These instrumental transformations take place on the basis o f some prior relevancies 
prevailing in the minds o f the audience, whose adherence is sought.
w  The use of comparative observations in non-argumentative ways is a matter o f a "self-convincing" concerning the 
correctness o f the solution. Here the normative solution itself functions as a  persuasive p a rt This way o f using 
comparative law is one form of a strongly value-based idea o f  law.
Comparative reasoning in the internal institutional framework, on the other hand, is an attempt to 
convince internal audience of the stability o f that institutional arrangement and other connected institutions.
The problem of deep analysis is naturally connected to the nature o f the comparative audience. If one 
goes into particular features o f one system, which one knows extremely well, there is a danger, that one steps out from 
the comparative perspective, and enters into the discussion o f particular features in a particular audience.
In other words, the problem of the comparative arguer is the determination o f the extension o f the 
argumentation in relation the audience, the determination on what one is able to  speak about However, this 
determination is not, as in the traditional discourse, based on the question o f how far one can go in analysis, but how 
far one can go in comparative analysis. There is a  difference. It means that the nature o f  the comparative analogy has 
to be examined at the same time. This is due to the fact that one, presumably, is not moving in the same social sphere. 
One has to  take into consideration that values might be fundamentally different and that the political integrity of the 
social system  (audience) may differ. The traditional legal discourse is based on the fact that the values and political 
integrity is more or less the sam e. In comparative reasoning one has to maintain not only the coherence o f the 
argumentation in positive way, but also in negative way. O ne has to be more careful in the choice of the lines o f argu­
ments and check constantly as to w hether the line o f  argumentation is understandable. One searches, at the same time, 
for an extension of the political integrity and substantial argum ent which can be accepted as common. One has to 
determine which inductions are politically and socio-philosophically correct, and which n o t
Usually this leads to a step out from the comparative perspective, or a t le a s t argumentatively, as will 
see, a support o f the argument by other legal means.
We can make following conclusions. When we recognize pure comparative arguments, we are moving 
in a sphere o f political integrity. The comparative arguments com bined with other types o f  arguments such as principles 
are "hard cases" of the law on its limits. The step out o f the comparison by neglecting it is a  step out o f the political 
integrity, and aims to achieve the adherence and acceptance o f the decision by means o f socio-philosophical and 
institutional authority.
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The use o f comparative material seems to be directing the analysis to a larger 
audience than to the more restricted (formally conditioned) one. In the instrumental form, 
however, one departs from legal generality as a main aim of the analysis, and the reasoning may 
be conditioned by extremely particular forms o f rationality.
If the arguer sees the reference to comparative law as unnecessary, even if there 
could be such a contextual examination (of generalities or disparities), the reasoning is 
increasingly defining the institutional idea of coherence of law, based on the presumptions 
prevailing in the institution. In this type o f legal reasoning, one goes beyond the systematic 
coherence of law, and the reasoning is determined by socio-philosophical premises. At the same 
time, because the justification calls for an alternative general point o f  view, it gives rise to 
demands for the examination of the rationality of the institutional system using them. 
Consequently, we arrive - in the examination of this type of institutional reasoning - to considera­
tions o f the general functions and methods of an institution.
T he institutional and contextual analytical quality. It is a fact that one of the indispensable 
motive for using comparative observations is the search for a necessary level of analytical quality 
in legal justification. This is so even if the use takes place in a limited form. In other words, 
comparative observations seem to be devised every time there is a need to deepen the analysis,, 
Le. in cases where traditional analytical means and concepts do not seem to result in a sufficiently 
analytical justification.
This can be linked with the choice o f countries and legal systems for comparison. 
In the practical use of comparative law, countries and legal systems are not chosen on the basis 
o f quantitative demands, but based on some a priori knowledge on the analytical qualities of 
these systems as legal systems. Furthermore, this explains also, why comparative arguments are 
not necessarily included in the justification. The contextual analysis forms the counter-factual 
context for the decision; material for the further discussion on the subject, after the decision has 
been made (i.e. to be used in connection with subsequent judgments, o r to be taken up within 
further interpretation of the related questions etc.). From comparative observations knowledge 
is derived to such an extent, that material irrelevant for the case under consideration, is included. 
When this material remains behind the scenes, the decision-maker is, in future cases and 
situations, able to change his approach (“evolution”)- On the other hand, no counter- 
argumentation based on the counter factual material produced by the decision maker can be 
referred to. That is to say, the closed institution is beyond reasonable criticism, and it maintains 
its self-referential integrity.
C onclusions; the indirect nature of value-based and instrum ental comparative legal 
reason ing , and the  validity of comparative legal reasoning. Where comparative arguments
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may be used in reasoning concerning the interpretation of a rule of a system, this does not seem 
to create any discursive qualities in the realm of the original systems’ values or norms, as we have 
maintained. Furthermore, this cannot, in a legal sense, directly create tradition in the applying 
system either. This is also connected to the value-based and situational nature of comparative 
legal reasoning. On the other hand, we may notice that the more comparative reasoning is 
"untraditionalized", the more useful it is.
Consequently, the context for the use of comparative reasons, the situational 
context, determines the direct nature of the value-based and instrumental argument. In this sense, 
its legal nature seems to remain indirect. This means that no prior legal evaluation, apart from the 
quality o f the “institutional rewriting”, can be undertaken. Moreover, the legal solutions 
associated with this kind o f reasoning appear "weak".
One may thus question the basis upon which the comparative interpretation of 
systems could be done. It seems to be clear that in closing up the interpretations of a system - 
without an attempt to take part of the interpretative systematization discourse - comparative 
reasoning is not based directly on its legal discursive validity. Furthermore, one does not seem to 
be able to make real legal evaluations concerning the nature of comparative reasoning, because 
it does not seem to involve genuine statements concerning the content of a norm in a particular 
legal discourse. It only instrumentalizes law.
The question on validity o f the comparative reasoning seems to be quite difficult 
and problematic to formulate and to answer. However, we may proceed to the examination of the 
instrumental dimension of comparative reasoning in relation to interactions between arguments 
and legal auditories849.
5.4.3. The interaction theory of comparative legal reasoning; the 
factual persuasive na tu re  and the ideal persuasive quality of 
comparative legal reasoning
Prelim inary rem arks. The structure of comparative reasoning in relation to other legal 
arguments may be described in the following way; 149
149 In this sense, the use of comparative arguments in supranational institutions, for example, must be based on an 
acceptance of comparative, general, or institutional opinions, but not directly on national opinion.
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argument context coherence
strict
principles
institutional
premises
institutional
coherence
(+) generalities and
disparities
in legal systems
value based 
premises
comparative law 
coherence
(+) legal sources 
with legal norms
traditional
premises
general legal 
coherence
legal norms with 
socio-legal deep 
analysis
institutional
premises
legal order 
coherence
H ow  should one see the consultation of different opinions? The rationality of comparative 
observations should not be connected only to the openness of the sources o f inspiration and its 
formal and traditional quality, but also to the rationality of the audience.850
The problem for comparative lawyers (and arguer) is the following one. In 
comparative reasoning, one does use arguments already established within a systematizing legal 
dogmatic and legal theoretical discourse. Comparative law is not an independent legal source, 
but, in practice, as we have maintained, is subordinated to the legal systematic discourses851. On 
the other hand, comparative reasoning does differ from the traditional dogmatic discourse to the 
extent that it does not aim, as such, at taking part in the national discourse. It seeks to make 
generalizations on the basis o f these national discourses.
However, in the same way as practical reasoning in national discourses has to be a 
systematization of a conflict (a decision) or of a legislative norm (an interpretation of a statutory 
rule), the comparative lawyer may also be oriented toward the systematization of legal systems. 
This idea can be associated with the function of comparative law, as maintained by comparative 
law theory, of increasing knowledge and understanding as some kind of a subordinate 
systematization in general (education etc.).
The question arises: how can the lawyer, in arguing comparatively in relation to a 
particular normative decision or a dogmatic proposal, be considered also as a systematizer of 130*
130 A s it has been maintained, to  the legal argumentation is taken forms, which are to  b e  shared in the discourse on
law  (W atson, A., 1995, p.471)..
Ml W e can make a distinction between systematization audiences and legal order audiences.
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legal systems or a developer o f legal theory?852
As we have seen, he is not oriented toward any systematization in any general 
sense. All the same, these features can be reconstructed from her comparative reasoning. In the 
study of this comparative reasoning, we can reconstruct ideas, how the lawyer "conceives" the 
relationship between legal systems, and o f legal systems individually, though his aim is to 
convince a particular legal audience. We may also see certain theoretical assumptions emerge in 
connection with the comparative reasoning.
On the other hand, it seems that the explicitness of the comparative reasoning can 
be based on an attempt to take part, to a certain extent, within national legal discourses. This is 
characteristic, for example, o f supranational orders, to systems normatively connected to national 
legal systems. The abstractness o f the reasoning, on the other hand, may be an indication of the 
reluctance to get involved with systematization processes. Also, the absence/presence o f these 
types of arguments in different cases can be an indication of the approach. For these reasons, one 
could say that comparative reasoning, presented by institutions, can be seen as aiming at 
convincing different national legal audiences in some situations.
However, we can maintain, in the end, that usually comparative reasoning is 
directed at a separate comparative legal audience in the realm of the legal discourse, and its 
relationship with the national legal discourses may be seen only as transitive853. This is so, 
because general comparative observations are, as general observations, based on the empirical 
analysis of different systems, but to a more limited extent than the analysis o f a national system 
according to all specific features appearing in doctrines of the sources of law854. In other words, 
general and comparative opinions differ because their sources differ. General legal opinion is 
based more on socio-philosophical and legal theoretical observations, whereas comparative 
opinion is more interested in national opinions in a compact form, and it is limited in professional 
sense.
Consequently, in its relationship to general legal opinion, the comparative view has 
distinctive features. We may say that their relationship is transitive. The audience of the 
comparative reasoning is included in the general legal audience, but not necessarily vice versa. On 
the other hand, it can be said that the relationship between national and general legal audiences *154
412 See, MQssner, J.N., 1994, pp .212-213. In the inductive argumentation by comparative arguments the search for 
the correctness of premisses and problem  solving in general get muddled.
m  This is related to the hard cases o f law. It means that the national opinion is assumed to be on the basis of the 
institutional comparative framework, but that the observations are made in the cases where problems occur, where the 
adherence of the national opinion m ust be achieved.
We could say that the consultation of national opinions are related to the use o f linguistic, systemic, and 
teleological evaluative arguments (“in the genuine sense"). Some analysis of these arguments in statutory interpretation 
as the basic arguments, see MacCormick, N.D., Summers, R.S., 1991, p.531.
154 The discursive relationship between national and comparative generalities is transitive. The national generality 
is not a necessary condition of an "ideal" comparative rule, but the question is characterized by qualitative analysis. This 
way the automatic comparative modeling is not correct expression of comparative rule.
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must be identical. Theoretically, general and national opinions have to be logically the same, even 
if they may get materialized in different types o f forms. This is due to the genuine nature o f the 
national legal discourses according to the contemporary paradigm of law.
To conclude, one may say that the best situation seems to be the situation, in which 
the arguer, using comparative reasons, attempts to maintain the adherence o f all possible 
audiences by referring to the coherence o f general principles (and concepts), and where he uses 
limited analytical observations of the national systems in accordance with the comparative 
opinion (tradition of comparative law). We will come to this idea and the idea of transitivity later 
on, after examining some rhetorically technical ideas of persuasive comparison.
Convergence in com parative reasoning; the horizontal interaction between state legal 
systems and their rules. One may make some observations on the interaction between different 
types o f arguments defined as "comparatively legal"855.
It is clear that state legal systems and their rules are used when they lead to 
relatively same conclusion in the same type of situation,, i.e. where there is convergence. On the 
other hand, in a case where the interpretation is supported by comparative considerations, even 
the argumentation by one system and in terms of its rules is more persuasive.
Furthermore, it is more persuasive to use shorter examinations than extensive 
studies, and to use only some, and not all the examples. Furthermore, too explicit argumentation 
would be rhetorically counter-productive. This can fragment the argument too strongly.
One feature o f comparative reasoning is the grouping together of arguments (i.e. 
legal systems). This includes features such as: in what order arguments are used, what are the 
main and what are the "supportive" legal systems etc.
It may also be possible that, in some comparative reasoning processes, one legal 
system  functions as a source of a principle, and other systems as sources of comparative legal 
mles, even if in the open justification the systems may be compared and analysed with the same 
legal method and terminology. A principle may be derived or supported by one system, and other 
systems have been used as additional material.
Because the backgrounds o f the decision-makers do in many ways determine the 
"principled" opinions, it might be difficult to determine the source of the principle. However, 
ideas such as "coherence", "morality", "necessity", "aims", "culture", and "substance" give 
indications where the principles deriving from the arguer* s background are at stake.
The interaction between argum ents and audiences. As we have seen, the reasonableness of 
a comparative argument is not dependant only upon "additional" arguments, such as the 15
155 See on this issue, Perelman, C h, Olbrechts-Tyteca, L ., 1 9 6 9 ,  p .4 7 1  if., 4 8 7  if .  The interaction between different 
argum ents is examined m ore closely in connection with empirical studies.
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analogical argument depends upon, but for the whole range of additional arguments based on the 
prevailing doctrines o f legal sources. In this sense, the question of reasonability is related, for 
example, to the legal theoretical discourse in the realm of "general legal opinion".
Where comparative observations are combined with general principles, the 
inteipretative system links the horizontal and vertical dimensions of comparison, and the logical 
step of interpretation is made. If the system uses only horizontal comparative observations, it 
considers it possible to reflect these observations within the basic ideas o f the system itself. In 
these cases we are dealing with a logical interpretation o f the system with the help of comparative 
analysis.
Where comparative reasoning is explicitly combined with principled argumentation, 
there seems to be a search for the adherence of the general legal audience. On the other hand, it 
seems that reference to general principles is made sometimes so as to avoid a more analytical 
approach towards "national opinion's and "general opinion" in that sphere (which we have 
considered to be identical). One may seek to satisfy the criteria o f transitivity of discourses this 
way.
The general principles - to which we refer to here as genuine principles - must be 
the principles deriving from the legal systems, in other words, they cannot be general principles 
forming part of any institutional framework. If  the generality is derived from comparative 
observations, it must reflect some principles, which are relatively general in these observed 
systems. Namely, there is a difference between the institutional principles described above, and 
legal theoretical principles. Legal theoretical principles are measures attempting to guarantee the 
communicative character of the reasoning (legal sources, standards o f their uses), whereas 
institutional principles refer directly to distinctiveness o f institutional opinion from any other type 
of discourse. We may claim that usually, in practice, general principle type of reasoning is always 
based on an institutional principle.
It appears as if every time one argues on the basis o f comparative arguments, one 
has to support the justification by principled argumentation of some type (whether general or 
institutional). This may be due to the fact that comparative law considerations do modify, to a 
certain extent, the traditional law. This transformation must be supported by some internal 
principle of the interpretative system. This is the reason why comparative reasoning looks many 
times like "constructive” argumentation.
The disparities between the “legal” (law of legal systems) is often asserted on the 
basis of non-existent comparative studies, or on the basis of socio-philosophical arguments and 
observations. Socio-philosophical arguments are used also in connection with the rejection or 
abandonment of comparative legal opinions. On the other hand, where some principles are 
applied in connection to socio-philosophical arguments, this seems to be a matter of a radically 
autonomous interpretation by that institution (this way it is a type of disparity argument, but in 
vertical sense). In this sense, socio-philosophical argumentation seems to be used in testing also
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general legal opinion.
Every form of disparity argument seems to be related to the "institutional" principle. 
Namely, there is no possibility to base the disparity upon any "legal" principle common to  the 
national systems, except on the state paradigmatic assumption o f the separation of legal systems, 
which, on the other hand, cannot be analytically stated by the comparativist. In those cases, no 
generally accepted principles are there in that particular field of law. The principle must be either 
a matter of principle for institutional opinion, or it must be based strongly on the principle o f a 
particular system influential in the interpretation (and in this sense, on the general traditional 
comparative law principle stressing the plurality of systems). Nevertheless, the interpretation o f  
this principle seems to be exclusively a matter of interpretation by the institution.
One could claim that where principles are combined with comparative observations, 
the systemic decision-maker sees the fragility and the arbitrary character of the comparative 
observations as a problem to be avoided. Strong institutional opinion is used to persuade one as 
to the acceptability of the solution. On the other hand, one could maintain that the lack o f 
principled argumentation, in connection with comparative observations, does represent some kind 
o f strong agreement in the context o f the justification. Namely, because the principled 
argumentation does represent the institutional "general opinion", the lack o f an argument for this 
"general opinion" does reveal the fact that no generality have to be discussed, and that one is 
able, in terms of national positive law, to determine the solution for that particular case (based on 
a comparative consensus internal to the institution, institutional opinion).
These types of cases are interesting, because one could predict, a priori, that the 
lack of principled argumentation in connection with comparative observations means the relative 
instability of the case law. Namely, the comparative generality has to be examined all over again. 
Furthermore, one should take into account comparative aspects in determining the nature of this 
type o f judgment, and in analysis of that particular judgment, one should analyse carefully the 
use o f legal sources or general principled opinions prevailing in national systems.856
On the other hand, the (institutionally) principled comparative opinion means that 
the comparative observations are weak, though the institutional opinion seems to be discussed on 
“general basis”. This is especially so where the genuine, non-institutional, opinion has not been 
considered in the form of analysis of legal sources and their generality. In this type o f case, we 
may assume that there is a disparity between the general and institutional legal opinion.
A special case I: the relationship between comparative argum ent and the coherence 
argum ent (consistency, cohesion). Argumentation by coherence has a connection to compara­
tive observation. The idea o f coherence refers to the internal "equilibrium" of a legal system (or 136*
136 A t the same time comparative argumentation is connected to "hard” cases o f facts, it is also connected to "weak"
cases o f justification.
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an order) as a legal value as such. Coherence may be connected to comparative law (or has been 
connected, implicitly or explicitly), because, in the cases where it is used, one stresses the "special 
case" nature of the systematic arrangement (in relation to other types o f arrangements). In these 
cases, one usually claims the ''non-comparability" o f this system relative to some type o f tertium 
comparationis.
Furthermore, we may say that comparative observations, in relation to coherence- 
type reasoning, are usually considered irrelevant, because the basic principle, directly determining 
the result o f the case, is the institutional principle. Usually institutionally principled opinions - 
other than coherence type principles - do not appear in connection to coherence reasoning.
On the other hand, in a case o f reasoning by consistency or cohesion of a system, 
the general comparative law principle (separation o f legal systems) and, furthermore, the general 
legal opinion may be satisfied (i.e. legal sources and general opinion are considered from the 
point of view of the particular system only).
The traditional structure of the legal audiences and their consultation processes. The
relationship between audiences and the exclusiveness of their consultation may be summarized 
as follows:
The nature of 
the relationship
disparity
identity
transitivity
The audience consulted Sources
institutional audience <-----------  social philosophy
general legal audience <-----------  social philosophy
comparative legal audience <----------  national opinion
national audience857 <---------- social philosophy
Some explanatory remarks may be made.
Socio-philosophical reasons, which seem to form the basic source of arguments for 
the institutional, general, and national opinion, are reasons deriving from any social scientific 
data. The data for the comparative opinion seems to be consisting o f national law (opinion) only.
On the other hand, the national opinion and general legal opinion are transitively 
identical, which means that the general opinion is taking into account all the generalities existing 
in national and comparative levels, but it differs from the comparative opinion in the sense that 157
157 The a  dogmatic legal audience in comparative stud ies,, sec, Watson, A.. 1978a, p .325.
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it also considers sources other than the national law. The identity o f the national and general 
opinion is in the open character of the sources of reasons. However, even if these both are 
“genuine” auditories, the national opinion is traditionally satisfied only by the dogmatic 
statements, which, all the same, are based on the general legal discourse.
The disparity of the institutional opinion is based upon the fact that the institutional 
opinion is an institutionally restricted - a closed - audience. This way it is necessarily separate 
from general and national opinions, even if reasons in this consultation may derive from any type 
o f socio-philosophical sources.
We may identify certain consequences of this theory.
If  the institutional audience is consulted only, it means that there is a genuine 
conflict with all the other audiences in speakers mind. Namely, if the conviction o f  the 
institutional audience - concerning the acceptability o f the comparative observations or reasoning 
in general - is sought only (as in the case o f closed institutional discourse), the general, compara­
tive, and the national audiences are neglected as a relevant audience858. In an institutionally 
restricted consultation, general and national opinions are necessarily excluded, because, 
according to the general opinion, the reasoning must be open.
On the other hand, if there is only the use o f general principles o f reasoning 
(thorough analysis of legal sources, consultation with general legal audience, i.e. legal theory), 
the assumption is - due to the identity and the transitivity principles - that the implicit consultation 
of the comparative and national opinions is at stake too.
Furthermore, if the user of comparative observations is directing his reasoning 
explicitly toward comparative and national audiences by referring analytically or in a value-based 
manner to comparative legal observations, without any institutional restrictions, the situation is 
the same. The general legal audience is implicitly consulted too.
However, if the arguer is analytical in his comparative reasoning, he evidently 
attem pts to get adherence o f the national audience(s). In this case, where the analysis is solely 
based on the analysis of the legal systems - without reference to general principles, concepts or 
results o f comparative legal opinion - a relationship is sought between the institutional and the 
national audiences, and the comparative and general opinions are identified with the institutional 
opinion, and in this sense, neglected.
The special case II: social philosophy as a  source of argum ents; can there be a  conflict 
betw een different opinions? We start this analysis by examining a genuine conflict between 
institutional and comparative opinion.
*3* O ne could claim that this disparity is autopoietically recognized by the institution in its internal observations. 
Com parative argument is used exactly because of the basic problem  between the legal systems. The basic distinction 
o f com parative law between legal systems is taken as a basic "method" of argumentation because of the identified 
differences between the representatives o f these legal systems in the decision-making institution.
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We have noted, that pure institutional comparative law observations have to be 
supported, at least, by some legal analysis (i.e. o f the basic legal sources). We may say that the 
pure institutionally centred comparative rule interpretation is not sufficient (institutional 
comparative law). One may demand a deeper analysis in relation to the national opinions.
On the other hand, if the institutional opinion is casting off the comparative law 
opinion explicitly, without including this analysis of the systems on the basis of legal sources or 
on the basis of comparative law opinion, the interpretation seems to be based on socio- 
philosophical reasons. Here we may face a genuine conflict between national and institutional 
opinions (including the general legal opinion)859.
One may claim, however, that in this type of genuine conflict between comparative 
law and institutional opinions, national legal systems are actually not considered generally to be 
in conflict with institutional opinion (and, accordingly, not in conflict with each other or general 
in any sense). This is related to the idea of transitivity. If the legal (source) analysis of the 
comparative opinion is not made in justifying the general conflict between institutional opinion 
and the comparative law opinion, the general legal opinion is not considered either, and 
consequently, the conflict seems to be only a matter of a conflict between institutional 
comparative law and institutional socio-philosophical opinions. In other words, here the general 
legal opinion, transitively identical to the national opinion, is dissociated from the comparative 
opinion (even if there is a claim of generality of/in legal systems). The fact that general legal 
opinion is not consulted in these cases (lack of source analysis) means that the institutional 
opinion prevails. Consequently, the conflict between institutional and national-comparative law 
opinion becomes actually a matter conflict between general legal and national opinions in relation 
to the institutional opinion.
Rule I: the  “ ideal” rule o f open consultation of all legal audiences. The procedural and 
persuasive nature of comparative reasoning seems to be connected. This idea can be explained in 
the following way.
Comparative reasoning is as persuasive, as the ability of its user to create a bridge 
between the system from which the argument is deriving and the system in which it is used. This 
is related to the reasoneds ability to apply the idea of the “discursive integrity of law”. In this 
sense, the original context of the rule, including the sociological, historical or other socio-political 
"bridges”, are, or should be, stated in the reasoning860.
In this sense, we may parallel "normal” legal reasoning and comparative legal 
reasoning. In traditional legal reasoning the context is taken, in many ways, for granted because *
,w This is why the analysis of these types of hard cases can be made by concentrating on the nature o f these socio- 
philosophical arguments.
**** This assumption is extremely holistic.
o f  social systematic assumptions, or because the context is a possible source of fu rther 
distinctions within a discourse. The context seems to be part of socio-legal systematization 
directly. In the case of comparative legal reasoning, this is not necessarily so. This discourse h as  
to be explicitly reconstructed.
On the other hand, in traditional rule application (as in the com parative 
interpretation as well) the decision maker has to create the link between the decisional n o rm  
statement, and the legal sources deriving from sphere external to that institution and from the  
legal systematic "framework". For example, if socio-political considerations have been  
traditionally seen as valuable for decision-making, by examining them one attempts to connect the  
existing social practice to the norm proposed. I f  the travaux préparatoires, for example, have 
been traditionally considered as a valid source, the reasoning is merely an expression o f  the  
linkage between this material and the norm applied.
In this sense, there seems to be an interesting difference between comparative 
interpretation and traditional legal interpretation.
In traditional comparative law research, the comparative legal sources (foreign law  
etc.) have been seen only as a process of constructing bridges between the legal systems, w ithout 
any a priori idea of systematization or norm interpretation. However, for example in adjudicative 
comparative interpretation, the linkage should be made between two norms in two systems and 
between their contexts.
Now, because we understand that this latter bridge cannot be made in any  
"genuine" sense (because of the different socio-systematic ontologies of these norms), the bridge 
building has to be based on qualities other than in the traditional common (discursive-social) 
system-framework decision-making. It has to be based on the framework of the comparative 
perspective itself, or on a system of systems (a substantive legal theory).
The fact is, however, that these types o f frameworks and substantive theories do 
not seem to exist in the traditional sphere o f law. a value decision seems to be meaningless to  an 
audience, which is not directly involved, and which is not affected by the decision, as in the case 
o f comparatively-reasoned norm. This is due to the fact that the comparative reasoning is not 
reasoning concerning a norm in the transferring system, but rather in the adopting system. There 
is no reciprocal interaction in the legal sense. No systematization takes place, and no systematic 
framework is created, or maintained, as we have observed before.
Consequently, we can maintain that the comparative reasoning cannot be based on 
any genuine value similarity in different systems. The analysis of the comparative reasoning has 
to be seen in its "own" context, i.e. based on its quality as a process. However, at the same time 
we lose any "correctness" dimension, and the formal evaluation becomes a matter of legal 
"aesthetics" or moral perspectives.
The problem could be solved by some kind of ideal legal audience theory. Namely, 
we may imagine, that although the comparative reasoning nearly always lacks, as we have
2 1 4
2 1 5
indicated, the general audience (lack of reciprocal communication, influences, and genuine 
relationships), we can maintain that if the reasoner is using comparative arguments, he has to at 
least ideally try to orient himself towards audiences which do not, in the traditional comparative 
or systematic framework, appear important. In other words, the reasoner has to keep in his mind 
the ideal audiences of the national systems in general (their dogmatic and legal theoretical 
framework), in addition to the situational and systematic audience composed of parties and 
participators in the particular and general institutional processes. Even if this seems to be 
problematic, we have to assume this construction as a  regulative idea of comparative 
reasoning.861 This is the “ideal comparative perspective” of comparative reasoning in legal 
decision-making.
This means, in the end, that, even if the audience of the foreign legal system is not 
an audience in the genuine sense o f the word, the arguer has to approach the foreign legal 
audience mainly on the basis of the “correctness” o f the interpretation of the foreign norms, but 
not by trying to interpret the norms of the system. The audience of the sincere legal interpretation 
is, on the other hand, the genuine audience in the institutional and legal discursive (dogmatic) 
nature. The comparative audience, on the other hand, appears relevant only to the extent of 
“correctness”.
This idea leads to the second rule, to the “material” rule of transitivity.
Rule II: the “m aterial” rule of logical transitivity.862 As we have maintained, the function of 
comparative law, and arguments deriving from it, is to bring into a system an external norm. On 
the other hand, other "external" elements connected to that particular foreign norm, may also 
follow. This makes the comparative argument, as such, a source o f new elements. This means
This discursive opening up means, at a  minimum, that even if the reasoning is not explained the material has to 
be public.
m  Transitivity has to do with the ’large" and "strict" application o f the comparative method. As explained above, the 
more strict one is in the comparison, the more one comes into the field of conceptualization, which is connected to the 
particularities of one's own system. This leads to instrumentality. This is why transitivity is a condition for the existence 
o f a  traditional and value based comparative argument in its modem form.
In m athem atics and logic the transitive law means that if A bears some relation to B, and B 
approxim ates some relation to C, the A bears it to C  (A=B, B = C >  A=C).
This means, in our context, that if a norm B is a comparative law argument in the justification C , and 
if, originally, A belonged to this rule, A belongs (explicitly or implicitly) to C.
We may continue with the analysis. If A  is essential element of B , we may say that it has to be 
considered in C. If it is a  minor point, it may be considered. O n the other hand, if A  is in conflict with C, we have a 
fundamental problem of transitivity.
Intransitivity exists, when, for example, an  element x is attached to  B  (and Q ,  though x does not 
belong to B. This means that the situation is intransitive if  A ’s  relationship to B  is determined by different qualities that 
B:s relationship to C. This kind o f  situation may exist, as explained, if, to the relationship between B=C, is attached x, 
even if it is not in the relationship A=B.
The transitivity can also involve modified transitivity (conditional transitivity). However, from the point 
o f  view  o f  the discourse theory, this is a  matter o f discourse. This brings a  dynamic character to the transitivity
relationship.
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that the comparative argument may open up the legal discourse to the structures, forms, and  
practices of "another system" in general. It actually reveals a new sphere which needs to be to  be 
clarified and taken into account.
As maintained, as much comparative observations create clarification, they m ay 
create confusion and misunderstandings in an explanatory sense. In the context of reasoning, this 
may be the situation where the comparative aspects contain both general and particular elements. 
Contrary to the idea of comparative law as a way o f arriving at legal solutions - in which sense 
it could be even be called comparative Jaw - one should stress the fact that comparative law is 
rather a collection o f legal information from which inventive arguments can be derived. It is, in 
o ther words, a collection o f arguments as such. This is so, however, not in the sense o f the 
traditional doctrine of the source of law, as we have seen. Comparative arguments, as sources o f  
arguments, are heterogenous arguments. As much as there seems to be a  coherence presumed in 
connection to normal legal argument, there may be possible generalities, as well as disparities, 
embedded in a comparative legal argument.
In this sense, comparative law must be considered to be a transitive source o f  
arguments. The nature o f the argument in the transferring and the receiving systems is not 
identical. However, if an element belongs to the "original" argument (original rule or norm) 
which is derived by comparative means, it should be adopted also in the application o f the 
argument (by the “receiver”) or it should be at least be considered. On the other hand, no 
additional elements should be connected to the application o f the argument in the receiving 
system (as arguments belonging to the original argument) if they were not originally part o f  it. 
This concerns also arguments which may seem to belong to the original arguments, but which 
actually are not general arguments at all863.
It seems that transitivity is the logical and formal “material” rule applying to the 
uses o f comparative arguments (comparative reasoning).
The application o f the rules o f comparative reasoning. Comparative reasoning is as analytical 
in as much as it supports certain functionalities. This means that the extension of the argument to 
particular and general features is determined by the functions of the user o f  the argument. On the 
o ther hand, distinctions between irrelevant and relevant features are made on the basis of the 
audience to whom one is speaking. One chooses arguments which are accepted by the reasoner’s 
legal audience. Furthermore, because in the case of comparative reasoning arguments are 
generalizations of legal systems, one can satisfy the legal audience with lesser analytical 
observation than in the case o f genuine national discourses. All the same, the comparative opinion 
concerns the individual systems has to satisfy the national legal audience, and it has to be based,
m  This phenomenon is visible especially in cases, where the "main" generality derives from  many legal systems and 
from one legal system.
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consequently, on national discourse and opinion. It has to be transitive.
In this sense, when one does not use analytical comparative observations as a basis 
of comparative generality reasoning, one could claim that the normative issue is disputable. On 
the other hand, where generality is foresaken absolutely and explicitly, the normative issue seems 
to be very unclear.
The justification for the non-analytical approach can be that one attempts to avoid 
the claims of irrelevancy or inefficacy. These claims are allowed according to the discourse 
theory. When this is assumed, there is lack o f relevant information, or one expects inefficacy 
claims to be made on the basis of a too deep analysis864.
Nevertheless, in case comparative law reasoning is effected, we may say that the 
comparative legal analysis must be supported at least by the traditional analysis based on the idea 
of the main and generally accepted legal sources and standards of reasoning. This way one may 
satisfy the ideas of legal efficacy in the audience, but also maintain the coherence of the 
reasoning. On the other hand, here the general legal opinion and the comparative opinion can be 
reasonably connected.
Because, in this type of reasoning, we also speak of the "method" of comparative 
law ("canons of interpretation"), some consideration has to be given to the issue o f selection o f 
legal sources865. This means that there is a consultation of the general legal opinion. Furthermore, 
if the arguer wishes to depart from the legal sources-approach in the comparative "generality" 
argumentation, for example, by deriving arguments from non-general sources of law, she has to 
justify the departure, if she wants to maintain the approach and to be seen as reasonable866. On 9645
964 In this case, one usually would depart from the idea o f  legal sources. However, the problem o f  the lack o f  
information is not a genuine problem, because the dogmatic analysis could be made, and the comparative and national 
audiences consulted.
The justification by generality approach seems to be only a rhetorical device.
The claim  o f irrelevance o f the information based on the lack o f information cannot justify the 
“generality in legal systems” approach.
The autonomous legal actor and the comparative self-referentiality o f  law  are interconnected. W e can 
identify one with a help of the other. If the legal decision-maker is referring to  the generality or disparity in legal 
systems, it has to have a  tertium comparationis as its premiss. It defines the criteria for common features, and this way 
its prem isses. In this sense the system is self-referential. W here the generality or disparity argument is used, the legal 
decision-m aker is relatively free to determine the tertium comparationis, because it is not legally regulated. This is 
where the relative autonomy of the legal actor is visible.
965 This is where comparative dogmatics comes into play (comparative legal sources). In this type o f reasoning, the 
comparative reasoning is legally self-referential also in the way that it has to satisfy the ideas of legal sources in order 
to be acceptable.
W hat is claim ed here is that if  one uses "generality in legal systems", one should also reason and 
consider also the question on what type of legal comparative generality the substantive generality is based (comparative 
legal sources). Naturally, one could claim that the reference to  an established idea o f  comparative legal sources could 
also satisfy this demand. In dogm atic sense, one can abandon further analysis on the basis of the self-clearness 
("generally accepted opinion").
166 Practice also seems to confirm that these argumentative models are used interchangeably. Namely, one either uses 
the traditional legal sources analytically, or one justifies the non-analytical approach by introducing principles o r 
philosophical arguments (general opinion) in connection w ith comparative observations.
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the other hand, if one argues on the basis o f allowed and non-obligatory sources, one has to do 
it in general, ie . in relation to  all systems used. One cannot use only some systems as obligatory, 
and other merely permitted, etc. One has to  apply the rule of generality also in the choice o f  
different types of sources. I f  departure from this idea occurs, it must be justified. This idea may 
guarantee also the visibility o f the “transitiveness”, which has to be maintained in relation to  
foreign legal systems and comparative law opinions.
On the other hand, we may make some concrete concluding remarks related to 
traditional standards of reasoning867 regulating the grammatical, extending and restricting, 
analogical, and e contrario approaches in reasoning. These aspects seem to be at the centre o f  
comparative reasoning.
It could be maintained that one should interpret comparative law observations by 
taking into account the text as it stands. All elements o f the text should be given significance. On 
the other hand, if the same text appears in different connections, it should be given the same 
meaning, unless sufficient reasons are given to justify a departure from this presumption. This 
applies also to the assumption concerning the ordinary meaning of words. Nevertheless, if  
technical or special expressions prevail, one should interpret the text according to them. These 
are the standards of reasoning which appear also in relation to “normal” legal reasoning.868
However, one can maintain that all “modifying” ideas related to comparative 
reasoning cannot be applied. Accordingly, any extending, restricting, or analogical modes o f 
reasoning referring to the “intemal” systematic interpretation do not seem to be applicable. This 
can be related to the fact that a comparative interpretator may - commonly - lack the idea of the 
“analogical key”869 which prevails in the system.870 This idea applies also to any transformation 
of the sources of law doctrine. One should not be able to challenge the prevailing idea concerning 
the preferences o f the sources.
Nevertheless, in any e contrario reasoning by comparative means one may be able 
to stress the “systematic” coherences and even historical integrity o f interpreted systems and their 
rules. Namely, if one is able to identify the systematic coherences and historical continuity by 
some analogical key, one can do it. This may be related to the stress upon predicability in legal 
decision-making in general. However, this type o f reasoning seems to apply more to comparative 
legal science than to practical reasoning by use of comparative source o f  law.
W7 See Aamio, A., 1986, p.101 if.
161 See Aamio, A., 1986, pp.101-103.
M9 A am io, A., 1986, p.104. "The key is not objective”. Analogical relationship seems to  be a  matter o f  values.
870 This seems to relate also to A lexy's rule that "different speakers may not use the same expression with different 
meanings”, and that “every rule must be universally teachable” , Furthermore, com parative rules, attached strongly to 
value (or even moral) standpoints, may be evaluated by the rule that they must “stand critical testing in the terms o f 
their historical genesis". (AJexy, R., 1989, p.193.) For problem s on formulating these types o f “interpretative”  reasons 
in relation to comparative arguments, see ibid., p.301. In this sense, other arguments take also  “precedence over“ them.
IJH A A J
As far as the technical form of the reasoning is concerned, one could maintain that 
comparative observations should be kept separate from the analysis of one’s “own” Jaws, and the 
other legal systems to be studied in separately.871
In conclusion, we may state that comparative reasoning seems to be justified when 
the question is about quite “new” laws and exceptional rules. This may related to the fact that 
social situations, not supported by internal systematic and integrative interpretations, may be 
balanced by comparative observations.872 We may say also that in introducing interpretative 
methods and rules of procedures, the modes o f  comparative reasoning depend strongly on the 
discursive qualities o f the procedure and legal development in general. This is related more to the 
justificatory dimension o f  comparative law uses, and will be discussed more thoroughly in the 
general conclusions of the work.
5.5. General conclusions: towards the “real nature” of comparative
law and comparative legal reasoning
The audiences and the paradox of weakness and persuasiveness of comparative reasoning.
Comparative reasoning is an extremely paradoxical phenomenon. It seems to be the most 
persuasive form o f legal reasoning and to be connected always to the hard cases, though it is 
clear, in theory, that it is an extremely weak and problematic form of reasoning.
Nevertheless, we know that in every type of reasoning there is always a lack o f a 
syllogistic model as a normative premise in hand - a priori. The choice of arguments takes place 
in some "sphere". The rationality of legal reasoning does not seem to be based on the idea of "one 
possible answer", but there is instead a range of possible reasons for which decision-makers can 
choose and which are, on the other hand, reasonable in relation to a particular context.
On the other hand, it may be correct that comparative argument is one of the most 
powerful and misused arguments in law. As contended, it can be hidden within the institutional 
context without granting any possibility for further development and analysis. If this use is cons­
cious, the system and its actors are communicatively manipulating the discursive audience in the 
most problematic way possible.873 On the other hand, because, in comparative reasoning, one is 
simultaneously referring to the functionality of social institutions and because one is also directly
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171 In fact, however, if comparative analogical argument is used as a “ conclusive”  argument in a legal discourse it 
m ay reveal some problems in the communicative situation, and this sense lead to an ‘V contrario” solution in very 
fundamental sense. On the other hand, by revealing value problem s it may also stimulate the discourse.
Aamio maintains that “as an interpretative doctrine, itfollows the same principles o f reasoning and 
uses same type of source material as the domestic legal dogmatics. The distinction is that comparative study o f law 
considers foreign legal rules instead o f the national legal order** (Aamio, A ., 1997, p.77).
872 This seems to be contrary to the “analogical" interpretation, see Aamio, A., 1986, p .106 (referring to Alexy and 
Petczenik).
m  O n the misuses o f comparative law, see Kahn-Freund, O ., 1974, p.20.
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searching for the acceptance within the legal discourse without prior "relevance" - having been  
accepted in advance - the ’’legality" is searched all over again. Its relevance is, in this sense, 
determined mainly by its "practicality” and "functionality", and its results and aims and 
teleological qualities. Its persuasiveness is related to choices and acceptability, and to  the  
interpretation it produces (or is supposed to produce).
One could also argue that it is actually untrue that comparative reasoning is 
persuasive. The persuasiveness o f comparative reasoning can be a fiction, which will be revealed 
by comprehensive analysis concerning comparative reasoning itself. Furthermore, one could think 
that comparative law considerations do not result at all in "just" and "equitable" solutions in 
relation to state paradigm of law. One could profess that comparative reasoning is directed to  the 
ultimate general legal auditories, for which the national legal systems provide the ultimate forms 
of legitimacy (including national dogmatic, comparative, and general legal opinions). B y 
comparative reasoning, international institutional actors, for example, seem desire the support o f  
this type of legal audience in order to justify only the institutional opinion. However, they do not 
necessarily try to maintain it as a genuine tradition. Comparative reasoning does not really seem  
to be reasonable in social context (a critical “high”-modem argument).
Furthermore, the claim that modem comparative argument is not rational at all 
could be based on the claim that modem society is increasingly segmented through its normative 
systems (a critical “post”-modem argument). Moreover, it seems that when comparative 
observations are employed, in different contexts and within different systems, the discourses on 
legal systems and their rules seem to become ever more differentiated. The homogeneous nature 
of the legal discourse in a legal system gets heterogenized. There is an increasing number of inter- 
pretational possibilities for the consideration of the legal system, its rales, and its processes.
It seems that comparative law fails to  provide, as an autonomous discipline, value 
criteria for the choice among competing alternatives.874 Consequently, comparison in 
contemporary world is highly unpredictable and is forced to rely upon sources o f norms and 
rules connected to systems which have no democratic political character.
Subsequently, this type of postulate would mean, for example, that comparative 
reasoning within international institutions, as some system and sociological theories o f  law seem 
to suggest, actually decreases the legitimacy of these legal arrangements, although the reasons for 
this would not be visible in the legal discourse. On the other hand, we may say that the strongly 
principled and value-based comparative justifications are related to  these questions in 
international and regional law, which comprise the most problematic cases from the political and 
legal point of view. Namely, in these cases one is confronted with question to which one seems 
to be unable to find a suitable solution in regional and international levels - and where many 47
474 Hill, J, 1989, pp. 104-105 criticizing the conclusions o f  Zw eigert and Kôtz in the case of comparative law and 
contracts (1987, H, pp.42-43).
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problems remain in and between different state legal systems o f law. On the other hand, 
‘comparative cases" may be the possible cases causing drastic institutional changes.
Discursive integrity an d  comparative legal reasoning. Reasoning by way of comparative 
argument appears in different levels of adjudication and legislation. What seems to take place in 
comparative argumentation and justification in legal decision-making is the process of moving 
from the legislative integrity to the adjudicative integrity in the context of the general political 
action. Whenever this analoeical move is made, expressed and analysed, the political integrity is 
possible to assume. In concrete terms, only when the comparative analysis is expressed in a 
reasonable way, can one assume that marginal legal systems, not belonging to the general sphere, 
can be integrated into the majority systems.
We may say that if one could argue according to the principle of discursive integrity 
the discursive tradition and evolution would be respected. This would maintain the discursive 
integrity of different levels (adjudication and legislation) of law. Decisions would be made in a 
way that (political) integrity would not be unbalanced. This postulate may be combined also with 
comparative law research.
It is evident that this type of idea of integrity o f legal systems is problematic, for 
example, for an international judge. She is, by making a normative decision, in the process o f 
"developing" the system. Accordingly, a strict application of the idea o f discursive integrity works 
better for a comparative lawyer making a "descriptive" analysis, because its employment results 
ultimately in maintenance o f the system status quo.
All the same, there may be also some room for the development o f law in an 
integrative sense. This would demand, as generally coherent argumentation always entails, an 
extensive of preunderstanding of different national histories, philosophies, styles, and social 
conditions - just as the tradition of comparative legal theory suggests. This involves a move away 
from the phenomenon of institutionalized comparative law.
Consequently, we may ask, why comparative observations are used in 
contemporary legal orders, and why the study of comparative law could be also relevant from the 
non-critical point of view - from the point of view o f  the positive law? Can there be “comparative 
dogmatics” of law?
As we have noted, the use o f comparative arguments has traditionally been justified 
by a need to fill lacunae, integrate legal systems, etc. On the other hand, we have seen also that 
comparative law is an essential element o f regional and international legislations and 
adjudications. However, what are the why's and wherefore's o f its use in contemporary national 
legal systems and orders?
The fact that law has become positively "internationalized" and "regionalised" 
during this and the previous century (ultimately in the form o f  international orders) the role o f
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national legislation has decreased. Parliaments are not presently the sole or the main sources o f  
law, at least, not if one looks at the origins of different international and regional rules.
This has brought national adjudication to a peculiar situation. The national co u rts  
actually have to strike a balance between different valid norms. Namely, regional systems and  
their norms can be a source of valid arguments before national courts (even if national co u rts  
cannot usually interpret the content o f these regional norms!)875. Furthermore, these regional 
norms can be used as arguments, even if they may be contrary to valid national norms (thus 
creating internal conflict). On the other hand, because national norms are a priori contestable and  
can be invalid the substance of the decision o f the court may depend on the "right choice** o f  
norms. In fact, it seems that it is the possibility for a valid interpretation o f a regional norm which 
is sufficient to establish the rationality of the decision.
We could claim that the fact that parliamentary (or governmental!) legislation has 
a  strong international and regional character has forced the courts to seek support from  
"external" sources to enable them to deal with the task they are entrusted with: to function as a 
balancing of power. We may say that courts seek to find the best arguments at the same 
rationality level as the legislator. Only these arguments can compete with the regionalised and 
internationalized national legislation. In this sense, there would be no objection to the use o f  
comparative observations, if we wish to maintain the traditional modem idea of balance o f pow er 
in a political system.
Consequently, it is the breaking-up o f the modem and traditional state system 
rationality, which has brought, and may bring, comparative law into the centre of national legal 
practice. When using comparative law, adjudication can to go beyond the strict formal validity 
of the decision, and, to a certain extent, attempt to find the best interpretation. This way it could 
reasonably persuade the legal audiences by reference to the rightness o f the choice o f a norm.
Nevertheless, as noted, here the adjudication no longer functions within the 
traditional modem rationality of the systemic thinking. Furthermore, the adjudication no longer 
necessarily reproduces the traditional validity o f the system, provided that we think of the system 175
175 See, for example, the operation o f Article 177 (the new Article 234) o f the EEC Treaty, and the EC  system in 
general. On the other hand, national courts do add additional arguments to the discourse by having recourse to 
competent European institution. It balances these European interpretations with other arguments deriving from national 
system s in coming to a concrete decision. To a certain extent. Article 177 (the new Article 234) functions as a legal 
basis for the arguments, but not for norms as such.
The basic idea, however, seems to be that the European arguments direct the choice o f norms in 
national legal systems. Some norms are valid, some not in relation to European law. The European Court extends or 
restricts the interpretation of European law on an ad hoc basis in relation to the national systems and its norms (in the 
national context) depending on what result is desirable. Because this interpretation is o f  an ad hoc nature, i.e, it is 
related to the legislation in that particular system, it m ust usually refer to the basic principles of constitutional type so 
as to legitimate the general application o f law in European context. A t the same time, the decision tends to  reinterpret 
national constitutions (the constitutionality of a norm) in relation to the norms of the system. Article 177 (the new 
Article 234) provides basically for the reinterpretation and “resubstantiation” of national constitutional law in this way.
This one can claim that the European law in many ways functions as a legal basis and an argument for 
a open constitutional control of the legislation by the national courts.
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as a formal coherent and discursively integrated national legal system. This applies also to the 
reproduction of the political integrity etc.876
On the other hand, this sense the adjudication is not absolutely independent o f the 
national legal system. The national legal system and its discourse function as alternative possi­
bilities for the adjudicative system.877 In other words, the question is about, what kind of 
generality one is seeking.
The problem o f the expansion o f all types of legal sources and possible arguments 
is that it may result in communication problems. Functional arguments cannot justify the use o f 
special professional language rules in law.
The ideas presented above seem to be visible in reality. Some courts do refrain from 
public analysis, and use contextual comparative law. Some do demonstrate, via sweeping 
statements, why analytical reasons can be ignored. On the other hand, some use comparative 
considerations as inspirational material and these considerations may be discussed within closed 
discourses. Furthermore, pure "translations" take place between all these methods in some form 
or another.
As we may see, we are inclined, for example, to enter into an institution-centred 
system of, for example, European adjudication, whereby the legal discourses encounter 
difficulties in producing the relevant material and analysis required for reasonably justified legal 
decision. The traditional systematization via the genuine legal discourses is comprehended 
secondary exercise in many ways. This leads to the professionalized and institutional 
interpretation of law878.
Conclusions. Next our aim is to set forth and interpret comparative reasoning mainly within 
"legal” institutions.
This study, henceforth, analyses and connects two types o f knowledge. The first 
type o f knowledge consists o f open comparative reasoning, and the second of comparative 
considerations in context and in some dogmatic opinions in different fields of law. In this way one 
may explain the forms of the use of comparative law in contemporary European legal decision­
making.
Many different institutional "legal actors" and their opinions are taken into account 
in this inquiry. This idea is related to the claim that legal borrowings take place through 176
176 In the light of the doctrine o f sovereignty and the enlightenmentian tradition, we may say that where in the 
traditional doctrine (Bodin, Montesquieu) the governments and courts had functional, if  not even direct, relationship 
with the parliamentary legislator, in the Europeanized taw the separation o f  these spheres o f sovereign powers has 
taken p lace. Courts, by having their relationship with European level, have got more independent, as well as the 
governmental bodies are increasingly attached to the European Council as an “autonomous" bodies.
177 As we have maintained, it is the national legislator, who has produced such a system in contemporary Europe.
171 This is typical of European-level legal adjudication.
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intermediaries in highly complex reflexive processes, and that many of these institutional acto rs 
"play second fiddle" to the final decisions-makers879 and to legal development, in general term s. 
The argumentation by parties, interlopers, individual judges, administrators, judges etc. are ail 
relevant for the study of comparative reasoning within a particular legal institution. Through all 
these intermediaries comparative aspects are filtered, until they appear, if they appear at all, in the 
institutional justification.
Consequently, the next part comprises an analysis of the actual relationships 
between legal systems and orders, different normative solutions, and the role of institutional 
actors in terms of the ideas presented above. The study moves towards the examination o f legal 
reasoning in more a ’’value-based*’ and instrumental sphere. In a legal sense, the question o f  
"how” institutions think is combined with the question "what" they think.880 Finally, some remarks 
are made concerning “how they should” think, both in legal dogmatics and legal adjudication.
m  Sacco, R., 1991, p .395 .
iso "W hat" means here the audience, the solution etc. in the legal context
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III. THE PRACTICE OF COMPARATIVE LEGAL REASONING
L Com parative legislation
1.1. General remarks
The beginning of the  20th century; legislative in tent and the comparative legislation. We
may say that the idea of legislative intent was at the beginning of this century, in many ways, a 
relic of view which saw the head of state as a legislator. The will of the legislator was an artificial 
construction deriving from the idea of personal governance. The idea of “will” remained a 
theoretical construction within legislation and the interpretation of law.881
On the other hand, we may claim that this type of thinking was strongly attached 
to the idea of the rule of law as a method, around which political balancing took place, and which 
one could use as an instrument882. “Intention” and the “will” were attached to the form of 
legislation.883 In the realm of this construction, the ideas on undivided sovereignty prevailed (eg. 
Bodin), and, for example, the idea of political balancing (Montesquieu) was not taken seriously. 
These features may be associated also with the post-enlightenment interpretation of the "bouche 
de la lo is ' (role of courts) and with the concept o f democracy based on the "ethnic" and the
**' For some remarks, see Schmitt, C., 1997, p.76. Foucault, m., 1990, pp.87-89.
The distinction between the government and legislation is sometimes unclear. In the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition the concept of legislation seems to be associated stronger to governance than in so called continental thinking: 
"Basically, the common taw attitude reflects the belief that the legislator is inherently a political 
agent interesting furthering his interests at the expense of true law, somehow related to “natural 
law", o f  which the judge is the guardian, whereas civil law thinking has resigned itself to the 
acceptance o f the legislator as the foremost exponent o f the law", (Akzin, B.,1968, pp.221-231, 
especially p.230).
The theory of comparative legislation may be associated, for example, to the Benthamite idea of the 
sc ience o f  legislation; it is  part o f the "art o f finding the means for realizing the true good o f the community” 
(B entham , J., 1972, p .l, and An introduction to the Principles o f  Morals and Legislation, 1823 (17891, P-311)- The 
B entham ite seem s to be quite close to the continental ideas. A  knowledge of other legal systems and their ways o f 
dealing with certain problems serves as a  model for good legislation (see, analysis o f Bodin, J., 1945). In this context, 
com parative legislation may refer to the phenomena o f legal transplanting.
Legislation discussed in the context o f this work, on the other hand, refers m ore to modem democratic 
legislation in its discursive form (on legislative integrity, see Dworkin, R,, 1986), whereas the comparative 
interpretation refers to the use of comparative law by the courts and other legal bodies (adjudicative integrity).
On the concepts, see Gutteridge, H.C., 1949, pp.1-10. For analysis of continental legal systems, see 
Lam bert, £ ., 1931, p.l 26 ff.
882 W eber, M., 1969, p .301, for some remarks, see Schmitt, C., 1997, p.72-74.
883 For som e analysis o f this, Schmitt, C., 1997.
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spiritual idea of a political nation.
From the point o f view of comparative law, this had certain consequences, as has 
been maintained. The strong attachment to the “democratic” and “positive sovereign” generated 
contrasting and imitative tendencies in the realm of comparative law as comparative legislation. 
Consequently, in the application o f law, it was hard to conceive of the law o f  “another nation” as 
a source o f legal interpretation. Because the transformed will theory idea essentially no 
comparative interpretations could be made. It was difficult to explain the function o f  
interpretation based on something other than the formal and unique source which was derived 
from the legislative will. No other sovereigns could be substituted so as to provide an interpre­
tation o f a positive rule.
Modem comparative legislation.
“Legislators all over the world have found  that on many matters, good law cannot
be produced without the assistance o f comparative law"*M
This statement refers to the ability of modem comparative law to offer “reservoirs 
of solutions” and to act as a critical tool of the legislator.84 85 It is based on the idea that even the 
most imaginative jurist or legislator is unable to find, single-handedly, technical solutions to  
legislative problems. This idea is the basis for comparative legislation.
Comparative legislation may be defined as the utilization o f the experience gained 
in other systems of law for the purpose of law reform.886 The value o f comparative law relates to  
the drafting of legislation de lege ferenda. This applies also to scholarly studies in law.887
We may say, however, that the main importance o f the comparative method in 
legislation is related to the ease o f the adoption of solutions888. Comparative law is utilized mainly
884 For example, see Zweigert, K., Kötz, H., 1987. In general, see Kropholler, J„  1992, p.704.
885 Zw eigert, K., Kötz, H., 1987. See, as well, Hill, J, 1989, p .105, and Wilson, G., 1987, p.833, Zaphiriou, G.A., 
1982, p .71.
886 Gutteridge, H.C., 1949, p.2.
In ancient times, one w ent to the place, where - according to the common knowledge - there were 
certain types of legal institutions (Livius and Cicero have written o f this, see for instance W enger, L , Die Quellen der 
Röm ischen rechts, 1953, p.361. Jolowicz, H.F., Historical introduction to the study o f Roman Law, 1952, p.108).
Comparative legislation, in  the history o f law, has quite evidently been based on the spread o f  social- 
philosophical ideas (Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982, p.80).
887 This recalls the general doctrine o f the 16th and 18th century, according to which the theoretical and practical role 
o f  ju ris ts  w as also to establish the communis opinio totius orb is, consuetudisnes generales or mores Europae, or 
praxis totius Europae, and in this way to prove that municipal law  was not the product o f arbitrary decisions, as it 
conform s the common reason and experience. The "Common Law o f Europe" ("droit commun européeen"), for 
exam ple, is only a neologism of these ideas. On the other hand, this has to be separated from the "ius (romanum) 
commune" o f Justinian’s Corpus Juris. (See, chapter on Bell above).
888 The use of comparative law in legal drafting is part o f the governmental efficiency. Comparative observations are 
a cheap and  easy way of finding good solutions and for achieving easy compromises.
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as a helpful means o f  legal drafting in modem law.
The role of comparative law in legislation differs from country to country, and the 
reality is often difficult to determine.889 This concerns, for that matter, international law890. The 
possibility for determining the scope of its use is different in relation to different types of 
legislative drafting and legislation. The openness of the legislative drafting and its publishing 
techniques also varies.
Forms of comparative legislation. The possibility exists also to adapt legal rules or a larger 
body of rules or systems into another social system, as we saw in relation to the analysis of legal 
transplantation. Furthermore, comparative observations are also used as political arguments for 
convincing the legislator to adopt a piece of legislation. This is perhaps the most common way 
of using comparative law in modem legislation. Comparative considerations serve as a support 
for political proposals. Contrary to the idea of an adoption, this may be seen as a more discursive 
way o f  using comparative law in legislation. Pure adaptions may be related to more strict 
governmental legislative systems, or they are a matter of the history of law.
Consequently, comparative legislation may be associated, in this sense, with the 
“democratic” decision-making processes. In narrowest sense, comparative legislation entails a 
discussion of the alternatives among legislative proposals and committees, and - in a wider sense 
- in the public discourse in the public sphere891.
Comparative legislation may appear to  be a technical and reformatist type. In its 
technical form, it is used to give alternatives for the discussion on technical points of legislative *19
**’ Tur, R.H.R., 1977, p.238, Yntema, H.E., 1978, p.174. For the ancient forms, see for example, byPerikles, XII 
tables from Code of Solon, etc, (M arsh, N.S., 1977, pp.662-663, referring to the Conference of Law Faculties at 
Strasbourg!!, 1976).
In some systems comparative law does not seem  to have any function (Lando, O., 1977).
’’‘’For domestic law, see W interton, G., 1975, p.75. See, for example, Seidl-Hohenveldem, I, for comparative law 
concerning the international protection of the environment (1997, pp. 195-196) concerning international modelling by 
international treaties. This generates an interesting question about the "comparative nature" of the international 
m easures. (See also, Lando, O., 1977, p.643).
It has also been claimed that the American Convention of Human Rights has been modelled on the 
European Convention of Human Rights (Council of Europe Bulletin on Human Rights in the Council of Europe, 1996).
One of the greatest examples of this is the Hague Conference of Private International Law, studies of 
Bureau o f the Conference as the basis o f the different treaties.
Comparative observations have been used in determining the impossibility o f arriving at an agreement, 
or the problem s of implementation (Butler, W.E., 1977, p .l 17).
191 This involves, also, finding common elements and fiising them into the drafted regulation.
It is the political principles which make comparative legal drafting depart, in its argumentative form, 
from direct modelling. Modelling types o f arguments do not tend to be convincing from the point o f view of democratic 
processes.
Modelling is avoided by representing many models at the same time. This pluralistic representation 
transfers the modelling to the level o f generality observation, which tends to be, because o f the idea of integrity in 
international level, more acceptable. On the other hand, there is a possibility of maintaining the comparative 
observation solely as a contextual exercise.
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enactments. This type of use is often seen as a unpolitical and neutral. In the latter case, the 
comparative information can be used for fondamental reforms of the socio-legal system.892
Comparative legal drafting may be also associated with the use of ‘‘external” 
institutions preparing studies on questions relevant to drafting893. Furthermore, comparative law 
may be used in the field o f policy formulation or policy restriction894. For example, many 
parliamentarians may use comparative observations in their arguments within the political 
speeches.
1.2. Some historical examples895
Japan . Although the development of a modem "imitative" legal identity construction was 
familiar in many countries in Europe 19th century, Japan was definitely the country in which the 
adoptions were systematically encouraged and made at the educative, scientific, jurisprudential 
and legislative levels896. The legal discourse in Japan was strongly "foreign" and “western” law 
oriented897. While before 1880 the French system was considered important later the German
m  For different ways of how comparative law functions in legislation, see Mattila, H.E.S, 1979, p.42 ff.
For exam ple the Max Planck Institute of Foreign and International Law has prepared such studies (see, Riegert, 
M., 1973).
m  For diffusion studies, see Karvonen, L., 1981, This does not pertain directly to  legal” considerations.
Examples of these policy formulations are not given here.
Andersson, E. (1986, p.13 ff.) has related these influences in the field o f  private, administrative 
(procedural) law to the “mother country” nature of Sweden. On the history of the “mother country” idea, see M odeen, 
T., 1993, p.783 ff.
In the field o f taxation, on the other hand - which is quite political o r “socio-systematic” field o f law - 
there has taken place a direct modelling (idem.). This modelling was based, moreover, on some internal historical 
examples (ibid., p.13 ff.). In these original modellings - in 1920's - differences between Sweden and Finland seemed 
to relate, for example, to the question that in Finland it was a m atter o f a creation o f a tax system of just established 
national state, and to its economic, cultural, and political peculiarities, and to an attempt to be technically simple. The 
modellings led to dogmatical and jurisprudential adoptions too (ibid., 18 ff.).
Even if in the field of business income taxation modelling has been nearly a customary practice, there 
seems to  b e  tendencies to deviation for many reasons (idem.). These deviations may be related, for example, to 
“Europeanization” in general (ibid., p.27).
m  The use o f comparative law in the British law reform is regulated by law.
Section 3 (l)(f)  of the Law Commissions A ct 1965: ”Jt shall be the duty o f the English and Scottish 
Law Commission to obtain such information as to the legal systems o f other countries as appears to the 
Commissioners likely to facilitate o f performance o f any their functions” (Winlerton, G,, 1978, p.107, M arsh, N.S., 
1977, p.666, Graveson, R.H., 1984, p.l 17). The idea is thus to find new ideas and techniques (Kahn-Freund, O ., 1974, 
P-2).
For comparative legal drafting in Holland, see de Groot, G-R., Schneider, A ., 1994, p.64.
In Germany in the field o f  criminal law, see, Jecheck, H-H., 1974, p.764, and in general, M ossner,
J.M., 1974, p .204, and for comparative influences, Jescheck, H-H., 1974, pp.766-769.
m  Noda, Y ., 1975, part I, p . l ,  16.
m Noda, Y ., 1975, p .l ,  12-13.
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system became influential898.
There were also counter-reactions due to the strange outcomes of these
adaptions899.
Subsequently, the theoretical discussion introduced a distinction between pure 
imitation and self-inspection900.
United States. Comparative aspects have had an enormous impact upon the development o f law 
in the United States. They have given both retrospective and prospective perspectives for both 
to legislation and legal interpretation901.
In some states of the United States, comparative legislation has been effected with 
the help of Law Review Commissions902, which have made use of comparative considerations in 
their reports. They have also utilized certain professional studies of comparative law.903 
Furthermore, national conferences and the preparation of federal "models" and "codes”904 have 
employed ‘‘foreign law”, especially British law, although Civil law systems have also been 
needed905. On the other hand, in certain cases the lack of comparative considerations has been 
severely criticised906.
m  Noda, Y„ p .5 ,19-20. Carbonnier, J., (1991, p. 423 ff.) has claimed, on the basis o f  some studies (Antonetti, G., 
, Sourioux, J-L, Seizelet, È., Okubo, Y., Hoshino, E.), that the reception from France has been “more voluntary”  than 
many other receptions in legal history.
On contemporary Franco-Japanese relations, Kitamura, I., Cultures différents, enseignement et 
recherche en droit comparé. In: Rev.Int.Dr.Comp, 1995
• "  Noda, Y., pp.14-16 ,61 -63 .
900 Noda, Y., p.66. Adoptions in the realm o f criminal law  ( from Germany), Jecheck, H-H., 1974, p.772.
901 Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982, p.94, Schlesinger, 1980, p .10  ( referring to MacDonald, The New York Law Revision 
Commission, In: M od.LRev. 28, 1965).
902 For example in New York. These Commissions exist also in California (Commission for Revision and Reform 
o f the Law), Michigan, New Jersey (Law Revision and Legislative Services Commission), North Carolina (General 
Statutes Commission), Oregon (Law Improvement Committee), and Tennessee (Law revision Commission) (Zahiriou, 
G.A., 1982, p.85).
503 See, Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982, p.83, and for some exam ples. Most interesting is the abolition of the legal effects 
o f a  seal on written documents. Both analytical and critical arguments by way o f comparison were introduced, and the 
idea of adopting the notarized document was abandoned because of the systematic differences between notaries in N ew  
York and in civil law jurisdictions (see, idem, and Schlesinger, 1980, p.19 ff.).
904 For example, in the preparation of the new Federal Criminal code. A t the state level o f the United States, the 
Model penal Code has been "comparatively legislated" (M odel penal Code (Ten. Craft No. 1 -4 1953). This has had an 
impact upon the interpretation o f it also (see, in this regard the chapter on interpretation).
One o f the striking examples o f an extensive comparative legislative process can be seen in the 
adoption of the Field's Code of Civil Procedure in United States in 1800 ( Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982, pp.77-78., referring 
to Friedman, LM ., A history o f American law (N .Y .) 1973 [1985] p.29-41.
For the contemporary situation in the United States, see Winterton, G ., 1975, pp. 107-108.
905 Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982, p.79.
906Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982, p.84, referring to writings of Schlesinger and Stein, E. (1977).
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Some comparative influences o f the legal draftsmen have also been recognized.907
Early comparative legislation seemed to be strongly determined by the political 
structures of the time. In the modem era of federal legislation, on the other hand, there seemed 
to be more thorough searches for information and a variety of comparative considerations. For 
example, in the preparation o f the Criminal code of 1972, the Subcommittee of the Committee 
on the Judiciary of the United States Senate sent questionnaires to academics. Articles and 
testimonies, including detailed comparative studies o f a variety of countries (Continental 
European countries with Albania, USSR, and Yugoslavia included) were considered in the 
hearings.908
In general, this practice is fairly well established in the research services of the 
Congress and in government departments and agencies, based also upon a dialogue with outside 
consultants, and even with foreign experts.909
C entral European countries. Another interesting example concerning recent developments 
concerns the Central European countries.
The newly created constitutions in these countries has led in extensive adaptations 
of law to these countries from Germany, France, United States, Italy, and Spain.910 For example, 
in the realm of this "new constitutionalism", it has been attempted to construct constitutions 
including bills of rights, ideas o f social democracy, welfare state, social solidarity, unlimited 
majority rule, equality, popular sovereignty, legislative supremacy, the separation of powers, and 
constitutional courts in one form or another911. The construction of constitutions was effected in 
different ways in different countries912.
Furthermore, the implementation of market regulation has been "modelled" strongly 
in line with programs agreed with the European Community. On the other hand, for example
907 See, Schlesinger, 1980, p.17.
908 Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982, p.85.
909 Zaphiriou, G A ., 1982, pp.85-87. These kind of services have been used in the case o f revisions o f Acts o f  State 
doctrines (1981), immigrations laws, in the question of the mandatory use of seat belts, in the Sovereign Immunity 
question (1976), and in some bi- or multilateral treaty negotiations (eg. double taxation avoidance, extradition). This 
has been also the case in the field of competition law, although the United States has been definitely the leading country 
in the field o f  Antitrust Laws (idem.).
910 See, Tanchev, E., 1995.
For example Hungarian institutions have been referring, both in the drafting and interpretation of its 
constitutional system, to norms and systems in various nations in numerous cases.
The claim that these countries would have turned somehow “back” to the Romano-Germanic legal 
family, by turning also to “pre-socialist” sources, has been rejected on the basis that this “family” has neither anymore 
steady  foundations, and that many transplants are a mixture of the European-American “m elée” (Ajani, G., 1994, 
p .1088 ff.). M ore simple approach and a contrary argumentation, see Merryman, H., 1995.
911 See, Tanchev, E, 1995, pp. 143-145, Schwartz, 1992, p.741.
912 Elster, 1991, p.447.
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taxation and investment laws have been thoroughly influenced by private "lobbying” investors.
It has been claimed that sometimes poor economic conditions have caused problems 
for the implementation o f these "transplants". This has been the case especially concerning the 
right to work and free health care and to a clean environment. However, dynamic development 
has taken place in the field of political freedoms, though some problems seem to persist, for 
example, in the realm of electronic broadcasting.913
One of the main problems914 of transplantation in the recent development seems to 
be the lack of public sphere discussion915. This is related to the speed o f the adoptions, to the 
variety of sources, and to the context of the implementations916. Furthermore, it has been claimed 
that the context there is a atmosphere of "constitutional nihilism and fetishism"917 characterizes 
the public adoption of these transplants. This may be associated with the historical tradition o f 
public and political discourse, as well to the eagerness of western companies and European 
institutions to "implant” certain rules to these countries. This may have led to a kind of an 
"instrumentalism".918
All the same, it is clear that only a more thorough study of the internal discourses 
in these countries can reveal the success and limitations of these "transplants".
Finland. The value of comparative aspects has been fully recognized in legislative drafting and 
government in Finland919. Especially after the Second World war, models for modem Finnish 
legislation and political argumentation have been openly derived from Sweden and Germany, but 
also other Nordic and some continental (Switzerland, Austria) and American (USA, Canada) 
systems have been considered - at least in reasoning of the proposals.920 This orientation depends
913 Tanchev, E , 1995.
914 O n concrete problems, see Tanchev, E., 1995, p.146.
9li One o f the problems of interpretation o f the new constitutions on a comparative basis in Central European 
countries has been the extreme instrumentalism (Tanchev, E ., 1995, p.159).
916 Tanchev, E., 1995, p.160.
917Tanchev, E., 1995, p.156. He claims that the scepticism regarding law and constitutionalism, expressed both in 
the general public and political sphere, characterizes this adoption (nihilism). On the other hand, in certain social 
groups there is a sincere belief in the almighty of the constitutionalism as a type o f "problem-solver" (fetishism).
9,1 Tanchev, E., 1995, p.159.
919 The use in different stages o f legislation, see Niemivuo, M ., 1996, p.73 ff.
920 See, Karvonen, L , 1981, Svinhufvud, E., 1994, p.638. On the quantitative extension, Niemivuo, M., 1996, p.78- 
79). Form er times some socialist countries w e e  included (ibid., p.79).
For the latest examples of governmental argumentation on a comparative basis, see the governmental 
proposals during the 1989-1994 [Hallituksen esitys]: 2 2 7 /9 1 ,228 /91 ,50 /92 ,63 /92 ,120 /92 ,165 /92 ,180 /92 , 200/92, 
2 0 3 /9 2 ,3 68 /92 ,319 /92 ,4 /93 ,49 /93 ,77 /93 ,311 /93 ,24 /94 ,120 /94 , dealing with a variety o f issues: military service 
for women, tax legislation, private law and company law issues. In 1996: telecommunication, the student grants system, 
a rtists ' scholarships, the prosecutorial system, pharmacies, closing times of shops, regional government, welfare o f  
criminals, medical doctor education subsidies, juvenile punishments, cattle improvement, waterway transport, 
investm ent funds, the waste taxation system, libraries for blind people, working hours, alcohol importing, currency
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on the question involved. Furthermore, the study o f comparative aspects has been strongly 
encouraged and is seen to be crucial to the process o f legislative drafting.921
The contemporary idea of integration in Finland seems to be moving from  the 
comparative approach more and more to the idea o f  integration into the framework o f  the  
European Union922 and international organizations. Consequently, "comparative” aspects have 
been seen to be relevant, for example, in terms of comparative "deregulation”.923 It is clear tha t
value systems, State guaranteed funds, security of electronic equipment, jurisdiction in criminal matters etc.
These "comparisons" means usually quite superficial explanation of rules in some countries c h o se n  
selectively, and sometimes based on expectations of the future changes in these countries.
521 On the internal discussion on the role of comparative law in Finland, see, Kivivuori, A., 1986, On Law d ra ftin g  
tLainvalmistelusta], Julkaisusarja B, nro 43, Valtion Koulutuskeskus (p.50,70,71). The instructions from  1 9 9 2  
(Niemivuo, M., 1996) restrict the scope of comparison to laws o r discussed changes in law in Nordic or E u ro p ean  
(EEC) countries. The audience has been considered too: the argumentation should present the different m ethods o f  
answering to the question. The analytical extension of the comparative argumentation depends on the extension o f  th e  
proposed law. If foreign law is not relevant for the proposal, it can be left out. Extensive studies can be annexed to  th e  
proposal. The need to make a study in relation to the international treaties is also mentioned.
Personal contacts and Foreign Ministry offices abroad are also used (ibid., p.81).
On the traditional, natural, and necessary nature o f the comparison in Finnish legislative drafting, se e  
Svinhufvud, E., 1996, pp.637-638, also Suksi, M., 1993, p.264, and Niemivuo, M., 1996, p .74 , Manila, H .E .S., 1979 . 
The need  for continual consideration o f foreign development in institutions (because foreign changes can  lead  to  
changes in Finland!), see Niemivuo, M., 1996, p.79.
Svinhufvuds claim is that the “central” norms of the legal systems o f the Germanic, Common law , an d  
Romanistic families should be taken into consideration, and that if this is done it should be reflected explicitly in  the te x t 
of the proposal (idem.). In private law issues, comparison should cover the norms o f the "developed and big industrial 
countries"  because there “the pros and cons of different types o f regulation have been already consideredT h is  
m eans that “one could take models from them, of course, by considering own needs as the basic premises o f this 
modelling” (idem.). According to him, the comparison cannot be ju s t a formality. The aim is to find the best p ossib le  
solution (idem.). Niemivuo, M. (1996, p .74) maintains: “In principle, this comparison of laws does not deviate from  
what it is in legal researchThe basic problems seem to relate to the resources (ibid., p.75.) (Perhaps the sim ilarities 
of these spheres of research are related to this lack of resources!)
Although recent governmental proposals are full o f comparative considerations, in the la test 
instructions for the law drafting there was no emphasis on its importance, see, the Instructions for the Legal D rafte r 
[Lainlaatijan opas], Edita, Oikeusministerio, Helsinki, 1996, The Plan of the State Council for the legal drafting. T h e  
M inistry  o f  Justice, 3/1996 [Valtioneuvoston lainvalmistelun kehittamisohjelma. Valtioneuvoston periaate paatos. 
Oikeusministerio].
Comparisons in Sweden during the 1989-1994 in the governmental proposals [regeringens 
proposition]: 1989/90:2,1990/91:73, 1990/91:74 1990/91:77,1990/91:124 ,1990/91:136 ,1991/92:29 ,1991/92:80 , 
1991/92:139, 1992/93:46, 1992/93:75, 1992/93:135, 1992/93:160, 1992/93:161, 1992/93:170, 1992/93:180, 
1992/93:171,, 1992/93:185,1992/93:218. Countries referred are England, USA, France, Germany, sometimes N ew  
Zeeland, Austria, Belgium (see Bogdan, M., 1996, p.3).
922 For this and the idea that there are some problems in moving to the “European Union” analysis only, SvinhufVud, 
E., 1996, p .637 . Svinhufvud notices correctly that sometimes the reference is even to the “non-existence” o f this type 
o f regulation in EU, whereas this “gap” - on the other hand - may be due to the lack of European level competences in 
this field.
923 See, Ministry of Justice, T he project for the Improvement o f the Legal Drafting (Oikeusministerio, 
saadosvalmistelun kehittamishanke], 1995. Concerning the “deregulatory” international pressures in Japan, see, Ito, D ., 
U se and abuse of International pressures for reform o f  the State Machinery. In: Conference Regulation and 
deregulation : Japan and Europe in the Global Economy (European University Institute, R obert Schuman C entre) 
November 1997. Ito stresses how “the exploitation of foreign pressure to divert domestic attention away from popular 
policies is a strategy employed universally..." (ibid., p .9 )... This observation coincides with one given by an American 
observer that 'Japanese authorities have been prone to exaggerate the level o f US. pressure when it suits to their 
purposes to do so. In few cases, they have even resorted to requesting pressure from American authorities”  (ibid..
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through deregulation and regional integration, aspects of traditional comparative law are set
aside.924
In Finland, the "overwhelming interactionism" and the lack of analytical legislative 
discussion, which we will consider more thoroughly below, is visible in the integration by law into 
Finnish legislative practice. Furthermore, this integration is reflected in a quite superficial 
administrative professionalism. The aim of the Finnish legislator seems not to be based upon 
establishing substantial links between societies by presenting alternative solutions in different 
contexts and by critically analysing the aspects o f the appropriateness and "rationality" of certain 
legal solutions for society. The intention seems to be to selectively establish the correctness o f a 
particular political solution despite the social, cultural, and systematic contexts. The selection is 
based on prior selection, and the argumentation is often sketchy, uninformative, and non- 
analytical.
As mentioned, this problem may be also related partly to the implementation o f 
supranational legislation. Because it seems that international and supranational legislation 
harmonizes not only "cross border" practices, but, for that matter, also regulation of the internal 
practices in the Finnish legal-political system (the so-called “equalization effect”), the lack of the 
discourse on the changes in the law of the system may lead (and has already led) to the 
problematization o f these "indirect governmental transplants",925
p .10). H e distinguishes exploitation of foreign pressures to “innovative”, “protectionist”, non-use of international 
pressures (ibid,, pp.10-11).
See also, W iegand, W., 1991, p.245.
9:4 Also, Svinhufvud, E ., 1996, p.637. That at the moment EU  countries have been considered more frequently and 
extensively, see Niemivuo, M., 1996.
ns There has been an interesting discussion on “foreign”  elements entering into the Finnish legal system via the 
implementation of European Community legislation (In: Oikeus Journal, 1998, W ilhelmsson, T., Joutsamo, K., and the 
so called “Jack-in-the-box" theory : som e “foreign” elements seem  to appear in the legal system contingently. They are 
strong arguments, though they do not emerge in the traditional discourse. This prompts the discussion as to the “spill­
over” effect (some discussion on this, see below). Similar types o f remarks in the context o f civil law by Zimmermann, 
R. (1995, p .25 ,28-29) with, however, some denationalization and natural law emphasis, aiming at “European natural 
law ” on the basis of Roman law  (with references to  Koschaker, P., Europa und das röm ische Recht (1st. Ed. 1947, 
p.343 ff.)).
Some informal, but possibly influential, traces o f  comparative discussion may be found also in France, 
d iscussion  d'un projet de loi e t d'un projet de loi organique. Assemble Nationale. 2e seance de 4 octobre 1989. 
Financement des activités politiques, financement des élections. 3103,3016-3018, and discussion d'un projet de loi, 
après déclaration d'urgence, d’un projet de loi organique. Assamble Nationale. Ire  scéance de 29 mai 1989. Condition 
de séjour et d ’entrés des étrangers en France. 1312 ,1314 ,1316 ,1319-1320 . On the comparative considerations in 
legislation, see Legeais, R., 1994, p.347, and on influences in general, Agostini, È„ 1990, p.462 ff. (claiming that 
influences are small in quantitative terms and situational, but qualitatively important (structural and institutional reforms 
like Judicial review and Ombudsman, etc., also in private law, ibid., p.464). Many o f the adoptions derive from the 
European level activity (idem.). (See references in Agostini, È., 1990). That the studies in France are made basically 
in parliament, Niemivuo, M., 1996, p.80. On the history of Bureau de Législation Entrangère and the definition of its 
function 1801,Zajtay, I., 1981 ,p.595.
In Germany, Gesetzentwurf. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/105, 19.02.91. Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes über Spaltung der von der Treuhandanstalt verwalten Unternehmen (SpTrUG), On contemporary influences 
(Code o f commerce, France) Heide, H., 1994, p.730.
In Italy, for example, Proposta de Legge consütutionale. Camera dei Deputat!, il 5 giugno 1986.
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The International level. The comparative legal approach plays an important role in the field o f  
private international law. In every international treaty - the postwar examples coming from  
Bretton Woods and Gatt in the 1950's - comparative aspects have played a significant role. 
Further permanent functions of comparative law considerations also take shape in th e  
conferences on private international law.
In this connection, however, it is not intended to discuss the role of comparative 
law in international organizations.
T he European Community. Comparative law has an established function in European 
Community legislation. This applies especially to harmonization measures and secondary 
legislation* 926. This is particularly so at the drafting level, where the relevance o f comparative law  
is considered especially important927. This leads to certain characteristics of the system as a  
whole, as we will see.
Comparative studies in the Community system can be based on independent studies 
or monographs. Often this includes questionnaires, which a rapporteur collects.928 It is also 
possible to use international working groups. The system employ also internal "institutional" 
expertise929 - studies organized by secretariats and special commissions. These different spheres 
o f comparative legislation can also be combined.930 The persons involved in the activity can be 
academic, but not necessarily.931
It has been asserted that studies in the Commission are based on comparing and 
choosing between competing principles and policies932. Many conceptual questions seem to be, 
however, at the heart of the observations. It has been likewise claimed that comparative
Indizione di un referendum consultivo sulla produzione di energía elettrica da impianti nucleari. 3820. and Proposta 
de Legge constitutionale. Camera dei Deputati. il 4  giugno 1986. Vaccinazione obbligatoria contro il morbillo. 3808. 
etc.
It seems that comparative law is used widely in different legislative systems. However, these 
observations are based on very sketcy study of the issue in these systems. A more thorough study is needed. However, 
this w ould be a matter for a separate work. Here, only Finland and Sweden have been closely considered.
926 Constantinesco.LrJ., 1975, p.154.
W ith regard to competition law (Articles 85 and 86 o f the EEC  Treaty), Trindade, A.A.C., 1977,
p.281.
927 Consequently, the m ost important comparative research is undertaken in the Commission. See also, Beños, G., 
1984, p .251 , Lando, O., 1977, p.647. Loussouam, Y., 1981, p.133.
921 Lando, O., 1977, p.648.
929 Lando, O ., 1977,p. 649 ff.
930 Lando, O ., 1977, p .6 5 2 .
931 C oncerning certain problem s, Beños, G., 1984, p.244.
932 Lando, O ., 1977, pp.655-656.
It is not exceptional in the European Commission to take into account the legal solutions of states other 
than the m em ber states (Kotz?, a., Comparative legal research, U ppsala conference, p.3).
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observations provide help in the formulation o f a text, which is easier or less problematic to 
implement. The examination can also include studies of implementation mechanisms. These 
aspects are important in order to formulate a text, which responds to those various initiatives it 
intends to give effect to. Subsequently, implementation is thus easier to control and to predict933.
An example from European Community legislation. We may look shortly in a more detailed 
way at one of the comparative legislative processes in the European Community, the drafting o f 
the direct tax directives934. The drafting of this piece of legislation took nearly 30 years. Problems 
causing its non-adoption may be found also in the political reluctance of Member States. Indeed, 
it was only deepening European integration which forced its adoption.
Preliminary comparative investigations cannot be distinguished from the quasi­
political debates in COREPER, the ad hoc meetings of different committees, or various drafts of 
the directives. However, in the final stage in 1990, when the final versions were produced, 
extensive comparative studies were made by the national experts before and during 
implementation.935 Without going into the entire structure and content o f these comparative 
studies, some observations can be made.
These studies were produced mainly for the use of experts. They were not public 
"travaux préparatoires" o f Community legislation, and and do not seemed to function as such in 
the public discourse either. They functioned as material for the drafters of the legislation, and 
furthermore, post-implementation, as material for the control of compliance for the Commission. 
They may have had importance for legal practice.936
The studies contained mainly considerations of the problems of the compatibility o f 
the national conceptualization and legal language with the proposed and adopted Community 
legislation. Some incompatibilities were recognized, but no substantial conclusions or 
interpretative proposals could really be drawn. However, they served the Commission, when had 
to give some answers to the informal questions presented by the state officials.
933 Benos, G., 1984, p.246.
One form of comparative studies is the studies concerning the implementation o f EC norms. However, 
it has been asked, whether this is really comparative legal study at all (Lando, O., 1977, pp .650-651).
The nature of these studies is definitely comparative, but they cannot really be classified as comparative 
legal stud ies, because the interest o f these actions is fully determined by the legal interests and the norms of the 
observing system. As a bi-product, lot of valuable information will emerge.
934 Directives: Council directive 90/434/EEC, 23 July 1990 (O EJLL 225/2) on the common system o f taxation 
applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers o f assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies o f different 
Member States, Council directive 90/435/EEC, 23 July 1990 (O E JL L  225/6) on the common system o f taxation 
applicable in the case ofparent companies and subsiadiries o f different Member States.
See, IBFD Publications BV, Original release 1991, especially Thommes, O ., Chapter 5, Commentary 
on the M erger directive, p .6  if  (Thbmmes, O., 1991)
535 IBFD Publications BV, Original release 1991.
934 Thommes, 0 ., 1991, p.9.
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This piece of legislation is a good example of the effects of "comparatively drafted 
legislation". The implementation o f the legislation took place in a seemingly neutral but, 
nevertheless, instrumental way. National conceptualizations are considered more or less to be 
included in the Community act.937
The instrumental idea of the "internal use of comparative material" in legislation can 
be associated with an idea o f  “neutrality”. The comparison seems rather a justification o f  
institutional functioning and drafting in the Commission, the Council, and the Court. Comparative 
conceptualizations will not be treated as "travaux préparatoires”, and in this way the 
interpretation of these acts can easily be transferred on the level of the European Court. The 
heterogenous context o f these acts seems to be covered, and this idea functions as the basis fo r 
the "delegation of power" to the European Court. This idea is supported by the “purposeful” 
form o f this piece of Community law. On the other hand, if the comparative material would be 
material for national implementation, this would lead to further confusion within the system, and 
the texts would no longer seem to be clear “legal” compromises between the legal systems.938
Consequently, we may quite easily claim that the drafting - based on comparative 
research - leads to a relative emptiness of European Community law concepts. At the same time, 
these texts are easy to instrumentalize in legal argumentation, and this results in the functional 
method o f interpretation939.
All the same, it may be claimed that the use of comparative law in the drafting o f  
EC legislation is, to a certain extent, one of the counterparts to the corporativist lobbying and 
political bargaining processes in the legislative function o f the EC. It provides legal arguments to  
enable the EC Commission to attend to the contingencies of the influences it is facing, and 
maintains the relative autonomy of the EC legal order. In this sense, comparative law is an 
extremely important part of EC legislation.940 97
997 For a case illustrating the functional, but seemingly literal, interpretation of concepts deriving from comparatively 
drafted and here discussed Community direct taxation measures, see case 283 ,291 ,292 /94 , Denkavit International BV, 
VITICAmsterdam BVand Voormeer BV v. Bundesamstfiir Finanzen (1996) E C R 1-5063. The Court maintains in its 
decision: “The expressions o f intent on the part of Member States in the Council, such as those on which the 
Governments rely on their observations, have no legal status if  they are not actually expressed in the legislation. 
Legislation is addressed to those affected by it. They must, in accordance with the principle o f legal certainty, be able 
to rely on what it contains
” * See also, 283,291,292/94, Denkavit International BV, VITIC Amsterdam BV and Voormeer BV v. Bundesamst 
fiir Finanzen (see also Opinion of the A dvocate General Jacobs, delivered on 2 May 1996) EC R  (1996) 1-5063.
The government (and interlopers) argued strongly on the generality o f  “comparative implementation” 
in different M em ber States in  order to  show  that a particular national implementation (Germany) is not against the 
directive. The Advocate General made also  a qualitative post-implementation study. The government party claim ed as 
did also the Advocate General, on the basis o f  a  quantitative post-implementation study, that the infringement by  the 
government was not manifest, because the post-implementation comparison shows that this type of implementation is 
shared by other states. This was seen as an indication of a “good faith” implementation.
939 For the method of interpretation, see Bredimas, a., 1978a.
940 In this sense the comparative argum ents function, o r could function, as a critical perspective upon the ever- 
increasing corporatism European legislation.
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1.3. Conclusions
The effectiveness and limits of com parative legislation. One can say that comparative 
legislation in its wide meaning has had enormous establishing and reestablishing functions within 
the state and the state-paradigm of law at the beginning of the century and, furthermore, after the 
second world war. Comparative drafting tends to be, in many ways, an effective way of 
proposing legislation.
At the moment, in those countries (or systems), where comparative observations 
are made, separate bodies are employed. It looks as if in all systems both internal and external 
experts are utilised. As we know, expertise is one of the essential features of contemporary 
legislative processes, especially due to the internationalization of law in general. This is part of 
the institutionalization of comparative law.
One explanation for the differences between different systems in comparative 
legislative reasoning can be found in the different methods of publishing legislative drafts. In 
some systems, comparative observations are published only, when they have had some qualitative 
importance. Here the description of the considered systems and their impacts are scarcely 
mentioned. In some systems, no publishing takes place at all, at least with regard to legislative 
proposals941. In some systems there is a tendency to publish almost all comparative observations 
in a "quasi-analytical" way in relation to legislative proposals, usually, however, in order to stress 
general tendencies. On the other hand, in systems where the “travaux préparatoires” are 
extensively reproduced in every legislative proposal, comparative studies are also always included 
automatically.
It looks like one of the restrictions upon the openness of publication of comparative 
material is the fear that comparative observations would be misleading942 or give a wrong overall 
impression. It looks like in some systems, great attention is paid to the clarity of legislative 
reasoning, and this is why comparative observations are hardly mentioned. However, it seems to 
be clear that in some systems comparative observations are taken out of any systematic context 
in order to establish, in very abstract terms, the motives behind a legislative proposal. Here we 
recognize two different types of systematic approaches; the first approach stresses the 
autonomous nature of socio-political systems, and, in the other, a major importance is attached 
to  socio-political pragmatism. In some systems, the intention is to look over systems on a 
functional basis, i.e. inasmuch as they serve as practical guides for legislative work943. Moreover, 
some systems seem to attach importance to  the general international "tradition" as a value as
941 See for example the British Law Commission, Marsh, N .S ., 1977, p.666 ff.
942 See also Marsh, N.S., 1977, p.666.
943 M arsh, N.S., 1977, p.667.
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such. On the other hand, some systems seem to emphasis the significance of the reasoning by 
reference to alternative solutions, i.e. in relation to the departure from the general tradition. There 
is, o f course, some variation depending on the field of legislation in question.
W hy would one need com parative legislation? Parliamentary discussion cannot be so 
“complete” with regard the proposed legislative details, especially concerning comparative legal 
observations. One cannot spend enormous amounts of time in verifying the comparative 
“correctnesses” of these studies. On the other hand, in the drafting o f the legislative proposals, 
the pressure o f time and resources play an important role also by restricting the extent o f use o f 
comparative observations. However, this situation effectively diminishes the real political 
discussion on the issue in question, or transfers it towards professional legislation944 *.
This is why we have to ask why we need comparative studies in legislation at all? 
Namely, the political discourse appears to be a political discussion concerning "semi-legal” 
arguments.
It is clear that comparative observations gain additional importance in the "new" 
type of legislation. On the other hand, the need for comparative studies is attached to the 
different branches of law also "qualitatively". Furthermore, legislative proposals of administrative 
law, proposals dealing with purely internal matters (local administration, proposals concerned 
strictly with the distribution of money, etc.), are, for example, often the branches of law where 
comparative observations are not used. Moreover, comparative observations have a significance 
for the legislator, which considers features such as international coherence and integration. They 
also seem to be kind of international "travaux preparatoires". This is the case especially when no 
draft documents are available.
This may be related also to the question o f "comparative" studies as post­
implementation data. Namely, one could claim that the implementation of an international 
obligation is usually based on the idea o f "simultaneous moves"943. This means that any 
implementation is made according to the internal principles of each implementing system, and that 
comparative information does not provide any information relevant to implementation. However, 
one could imagine, from the instrumentalist point of view, that "sequential moves" in 
implementation may provide implementators with material for finding the minimum requirements 
for the implementation. Even if the final check upon the correct implementation is at the 
supranational level in general, the "sequential comparative move" may enable the implementator 
to arrive at a solution which is beneficial for the system in general. Fulfilling the minimum 
requirements makes it possible to claim some type o f generality, and at the same time, to apply
w  See also, M arsh. N .S., 1977, p.667, discussing Kahn-Freund, O., 1974, p .l
Mi These concepts derive from ideas presented in the economic sphere, Lorange, B „ Roos, J., Strategic alliances. 
Formation, implementation, and evolution ( Blackwell) 1992.
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it to the system, which is competitive. This may take place especially in systems which consider 
implementation from the point of view of economic competition. Furthermore, post­
implementation comparison may function, within international and regional organizations, as a 
way of planning future actions, but also, as will see, as a  way o f  considering the “good faith” 
nature of the internationally controlled implementation.
Nevertheless, there seems to be a use of comparative material in legislation.
Some analysis of the  problems of comparative legislation. As maintained, comparative 
method and information used in legislation can quite easily present wrongly the political and 
social contexts.946 The use of comparative law in legislative drafting is, consequently, often called 
’'pseudo-comparison".947 Comparisons may be determined according to the desired end, and may 
not reveal the alternatives behind reform. Furthermore, one may, in the legislative discourse, be 
guided by the intent to follow international trends and argue for common international solutions 
o r for one previously selected solution, or one may even argue against culturally "unsatisfactory" 
solutions.948 This approach is determined by the political ambitiousness of the proposer or the 
arguer in the legislative reform.
There are also "internal", informational and communicative, problems recognized 
in the realm of comparative legislation949. Moreover, the comparative approach may, and usually 
does, lead to further argumentation on the basis of other systems950.
As maintained, one of the problems of the "comparative legislator" is that it usually 
does not seem to recognize thorough and critical scientific research as a basis for legislative 
reform. Often it is rather oriented to use successful examples in a simplistic and value-based way 
rather than to evaluate fully the connections between social discourses and the law, “internally” 
and “externally”. It usually undertakes a deep analysis in the sense o f quantitative legal analysis, 
but actually this analysis appears deep only to the extent that it satisfies the expectations o f the 
legally oriented audience, instead of the demands of more general political audience. This is 
characteristic especially of the legalistic socio-political system, where the authority is traditionally 
deriving from the legal form rather than from the societal discourse.
This is effective. Because comparative law, in its modem form, is bound to the text 
rather than to social experience, it seems to remain outside any legal "ideology" and “form of life”
9461 Hill, J., 1989, p.106. A lso KJami, H .T., 1997, p.9. For some analysis of the effects of different basic values in 
relation  to adaptations, see M anila, H.E.S., 1979, p.302.
947 O n this concept, see de Groot, G., Schneider, H., 1994, pp.63-64.
941 Stone, F.F,, 1978, p .2 1 1 ff.
949 Lando.O., 1977, p.648
950 Aubin, B., 1970, pp.458-480, Kamba, E.J., 1974, p.499.
An extremely good example is the adaption of constitutionalism within Hungary and other Eastern 
European countries, see Elster, J., 1991, p .477. On the "expert" assistance, see Bogdan, M., 1996, p.3.
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analysis, and it creates a distance, which generates, on the other hand, the impossibility of a 
critical review. Viewed comparatively, law seems to be based on objective facts.951 The static and 
"binaric" thinking about the social conditioning of law causes the rejection of the social context 
as a discursive process. Modem comparative law seems, necessarily, to understand social and 
economic conditions, because it is based on non-discursive ethnocultural premises.
Consequently, we may labour the point, in connection to comparative legislation 
also - that even if the importance o f the sociological, economic, political and more general 
functional, cultural and humanistic aspects are stressed as basic assumptions of legislative 
drafting, this does not necessarily mean that the approach turns out to be "contextualist". Social 
and economic conditions seem to be ideally static and instrumentally flexible for many modem 
legislative comparativists.952
Furthermore, one of the striking fallacies of comparative legislation, associated with 
this question - is that the extensive use of comparative law - as a justification for a legislative 
proposal, diminishes the value of the travaux préparatoires. In this way it blocks sensible legal 
interpretations and legal systematization processes based on various contextual materials as a 
source of legal arguments. This seems to be more striking in systems where the travaux 
préparatoires are openly acknowledged to be a valid source of law.
Consequently, we may say that the “re-inventing” practice of modem legislative 
comparitivists - in the legal professionalist realm - would not be problematic if it was not 
connected to the superficial political use o f comparative law in a systematic way. The 
phenomenon may be summarized with the help o f the idea o f ‘'cognitive control” presented in the 
comparative law discourse by some authors953. Cognitive control is characterized by a formalist 
ordering and labelling, and the ethnocentric interpretation of comparative information (by limited 
data). It’s claim is “objectivity”, and the starting point is strategic.954 The lack of self-critical and 
methodological guidance leads to comparative legislation, which does not even look like learning. 
In this sense, we should speak about foreign law as a political-instrumental argument. Here the 
use of comparative law in legislation can be seen from the point of view of “legal teaching" rather 
than “legal learning”.
We may ask what kind o f law and discourse this type legislative reform conveys?
The main feature is the idea of extremely formal law. However, this positive law is 
common to all persons and has no contextual or political aspects. This form of law is
951 Frankenberg, G., 1985, p,424,
952 Tanchev, E ., 1995, p .160.
953 Frankenberg, G., 1985, p.427.
954 Frankenberg, G., 1985, p.427. The "strategic,, can be  divided into the categories o f unconscious concealed acting, 
which can be claimed to be systematically distorted communication and consciously concealed strategic acting, which 
can be claimed to be manipulation, see, Habermas, J., 1987, p.332 ff.
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homogeneous and universal. Furthermore, it also conveys a sense o f from where the "good” 
formal models are derived (and should be derived).
Consequently, this type of use of comparative law is often based on the "unknown" 
nature of the environment and, on the other hand, on a "myth" o f culture and universality. It is 
associated with the idea that comparative observations are "deriving" from another society 
"unknown" to the members of that particular society and political audience and to the discursive 
sphere for/to/by/among the discourse is effected. And it is exactly this mythic "unknown" nature 
o f this argumentation which makes it persuasive955.
In this sense, as we may see, even if the study o f comparative legislation is not 
relevant from the point of view o f the question at hands - like from the point of view of a 
particular legal or political question - it may be relevant from the point of view o f the study of the 
tendencies in that society. Even if the form of the comparative argument is only an indirect 
indication o f the intentions of the legal-political decision-maker, it shows something about the 
idea of "relevance" in the mind of the arguer. The study o f comparative legislation reveals, for 
example, facts about the openness or the closeness of the societal discourse in general, or, if the 
analytical approach to comparative law is lacking, it is an indication o f the fact that the decision­
maker and rule-maker attempts to maintain the homogeneous audience for its decisions (legal 
audience, political consensus), and to facade the "real" arguments and motivations behind 
legislative reform. It shows the arguer's intent to establish belief instead of understanding. It hides 
the political controversies behind political law making. And it is exactly here where one can 
conclude that "mythic" comparative argumentation seems to be contrary to open social discourse 
in the sphere of the plurality of substantial standpoints.
“ Political reflexivity” . As we have already indicated, in those countries (or systems), where 
comparative observations seem to be one of the main arguments behind statutory reforms, we see 
reflexive tendencies.956 In other words, the generally open political culture of legislative drafting 
is not the only explanation for the use o f comparative observations, but reasons for the 
comparative reasoning can be found, for that matter, in the internal nature of the socio-political 
system and its principles. Accordingly, the uses of comparative law may be associated directly 
w ith the political reflexivity of these systems. Systems which construct their systems 
comparatively seem to be politically reflexive systems. This is characteristic especially of systems *936
9”  The relevancy of comparative arguments is not derived from the factuality o r positive explanation surrounding 
the discourse, known to the participants in the discourse in the public sphere, but the arguments seem  to derive from 
the "black hole" o f "self-re-invention” of the comparativist as an administrative "artist" or a "shaman", who bases her 
c la im s  and argumentation on the "understanding" o f  legal universality. This claim  o f universal motives "forbids the 
question of the purity of the motives, the objectivity o f the motives, or the correctness o f her results” (Frankemberg, 
G ., 1985, p.426). It also forgets the institutional context, status and, functions w here the comparison is made.
936 This may be characteristic to “small countries” , as in the case o f comparative law education (in education, see, 
fo r example, Stoffel, W„ L’enseignement du droit comparé en Suisse. In: Rev.Int.Dr.Comp., 1988, p.728).
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where there is a systematic use of comparative law. One can maintain that political reflexivity 
may (has?) resulted?) in extensive transfers o f legislative powers in some countries.
Furthermore, reflexivity does not seem to fade away even during the contemporary 
internationalization and Europeanization o f law. As already indicated, the vertical political 
reflexivity may be, for example, related to the non-discursive adaptations of European norms957.
Comparative observations in legislation. A re these possible? The comparative legislator 
should primarily consider the social environment it is functioning within.958 It has been maintained 
that it is the prevailing economic and social circumstances which should determine the choice o f 
the solutions, and, for that matter, the explanation of the comparative alternatives.959 One could 
also stress the importance of the political and legal discursive framework and its “traditionalizing” 
function. It is the social-systematic discourse or the lack o f it which determines the internal 
circumstances o f the comparative adaptions. In other words, if social system is to decide on its 
rules and norms, the question about the use o r non-use o f comparative observations as such is 
not so relevant. Comparative observations are just arguments from among other arguments.
Consequently, the main question seems to be about the analytical nature o f the 
discourse. This reveals the discursive openness of the social system. Here we come to the idea of 
open comparative considerations as a matter o f a possibility for the generation o f discussion in 
society.
The comparative perspective seems to be, in the end, a method for arriving at 
substantial alternatives, if they are taken as substantial alternatives and not as external 
explanations. There is a reason for the use of comparative considerations. The a priori identity 
thinking, with its premise of similarities and differences within the social needs in different social 
systems, is replaced by a sensible analysis and an analytical attempt to discover the reality of the 
social systems and their regulations. The a priori identities o f different social systems and self-re- 
inventory practice are replaced by comparative re-search for political identities in a comparative 
discourse, as a part o f the general discourse characterized by the plurality of substantial opinions.
What would this mean for legal research in general?
In the first place, it means that comparative law, as a form of argument in 
legislation, has to be taken seriously, and that the aim o f academic comparative law is to 
rationalize it. Only in this way does the use o f comparative law not remain a function o f political
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937 One example is the European Social Charter. The characterization o f the reflexive relationship has been described 
by the system itself (Council o f Europe Bulletin on Human Rights in the Council o f Europe, 1996): "When adopting 
new laws in areas covered by the Charter, states often use the treaty and the supervisory bodies' case law as guide... 
In this way the Charter has led to improvements in national legislation and practice in many fields such as family 
law, protection o f children and teenagers, trade union rights and social protection".
931 Zweigert, K., Kötz, H ., 1987 "here and now to the national society as it is" (I, p.22).
959 Zweigert, K., Kötz, H ., 1987, p.12
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and governmental legislation and result in governmental "transplanting".
In conclusion, one could say that a system whereby comparative considerations are 
somehow connected to more thorough academic research is more appreciable. There the 
alternatives are not based on any institutional restrictions.
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2. C om parative law in legal interpretation
2.1. Introduction
Prelim inary rem arks. The objective in this part of the study is to consider the “practice” o f  
comparative reasoning in law from the point o f view o f the ideas developed in the previous 
chapters. This means an examination of the value-based argumentative and justificatory 
restrictions and the determination of the scope of the use of comparative observations in legal 
decision-making institutions. In this way one may be able to determine the limits of traditional 
uses of comparative law in the traditional theory of legal discourse. Only by making some 
conclusions on the instrumental and value-based adjudicative uses on an empirical basis, one 
claim to check the validity o f the premises developed in the previous chapters, and, on the other 
hand, to consider the validity of comparative considerations from the point of view of the value- 
based theory of legal justifications.
On the other hand, the empirical study may raise certain issues for the traditional 
“classificatory” comparative law to be considered, and - furthermore - offer reasoned possibilities 
to rethink the “European” paradigm o f law.
The “ legal” bases o f the use of com parative law in adjudicative reasoning. The interest o f  
interpreters o f law in its comparative aspects has been recognized in legal history, though many 
explicit references are lacking. Comparative law has been used in public law (international and 
national),in private law (international and national), in conflicts o f law, in international and 
national arbitration, in regional and various "issue-based" organizations. Its use is extends from 
legal drafting to interpretation and justification - and to legal education to legal cultural studies. 
On the other hand, there are differences in approaches to comparative legal interpretation, which 
may be depend upon - for example - whether we are speaking about fields of public or private 
law, and that of national or international law.
We may assert, for example, that premises in international systems are - to a certain 
extent - contrary to those of national adjudication. In international and regional legal systems, 
comparability is usually assumed to exist, and the use of comparative studies is considered 
occasionally virtually necessary.960 In the realm o f comparative interpretation of national law, on 
the other hand, the basic premise of the adjudicative function seems to be the non-comparability 
o f legal systems. That is to say, in practice, comparative legal arguments - arguments deriving
960 As we will see, however, to this “rule”  there are both normative and practical exceptions.
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from other legal systems - are not relevant or perhaps not even permitted961. This may be related 
to the idea that in an interpretation by comparative observations, as in legal drafting, the question 
is about the development and improvement of (national) law962. This is puzzling for the national 
adjudication having - as its basic premise - the idea that it is contrary to the concept of a legal 
system to introduce and emerge ad hoc considerations and new rules and interpretations into the 
system in an unsystematic and unpredictable manner.963
On the other hand, in modem legal systems one does not expect judges to know the 
law of another country.964 965Moreover, comparative interpretation may be seen only as a luxurious 
form of legal analysis963.
As we may notice, however, the reality is more complicated than these assumptions 
may suggest.966 We may say that if knowledge exists, there are no principled obstacles to using 
it - or, at least, to consulting it. On a contrary, in some cases, it may even be the case that the 
knowledge of another legal system must be considered positively.
961 In the case o f disallowed sources, a system cannot function as a source o f law  alone or with some other system. 
Usually this leads to the maintaining of existing conditions as they are (coherence, comparison by opposites types of 
argumentation, margin o f  appreciation). On the other hand, a system, for exam ple, a  regional court, gain additional 
importance because of its institutional actors.
962 See, Markesinis, P., 1990, p.5 ff.
90 One may also establish a common denominator to these “legal spheres** of reasoning for the purpose o f this study. 
T his common denominator shall be the idea of "legal order", which can  be described, in general, as a "sphere*' o f 
positive laws and interpretative traditions, which is regulated by the obligation to justify the decisions on the basis of 
legal sources - in a form or another - in order to maintain the discursive integrity o f  law.
964 Markesinis, P„ 1990, p.4.
965 Marsh, N.S., 1977, p.655.
966 Comparative interpretation plays a practical role in many states, see  the rem arks on the use o f comparative legal 
analysis in private law in Greece, Turkish, Dutch, Luxemburg, French, Belgium, Swiss, German, Austria, Czech 
Republic, Marsh, N.S., 1977, p.656, The basic use has been seen in lacunae filling.
Swiss courts refer sometimes to German, Italian, Austrian law. M arsh, N.S., 1977, and references. 
Rem arks on wide use of comparative material in Swiss Courts, see Aubin, B., 1970, p.480.
For uses o f English law in United States, see Winterton, G., 1975, p.73.
For uses in Holland, see Koopmans, T ., 1996, p .545,551. For exam ple, Hoogeraad, Van Greuningen 
v Bessem, 21 May 1943, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, N.J. 1943,455, M ay, 2 1 ,1 9 4 3 ., Advocate General Hartkamp in 
product liability case, material damage, Hoogeraad 9 October 1992, N .J. 1994, p .535 , referring to Supreme Court of 
C alifornia, 607, P.2d, 949 (Cal. 1980), where the Court finally denied the doctrine. Also. Kisch, I., 1981, Supreme 
Court o f Netherlands, Civil division, April 2 ,1 9 4 , Supreme Court of the Netherlands,, Civil Division, p .2 3 ,1950, NJ 
6 0 0 , (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland used in case on ’prom ise as a  gill*).
T he application of foreign law in socialist states has also been discussed (Erezinsky, C., 1978). 
"Modellings” can be identified.
O n Austria, for example, see Schwind, F., 1973.
O ne can make distinctions between the informative function and interpretative function. The 
informative function does not have a  role in the justification as such ("passive comparison"). The interpretative function 
there is a penetration of the comparative observations to the legal justification ("active comparison"). (Boult, R., 1977).
T his idea is problematic in many ways. It assumes that the information as such cannot have any 
norm ative role. It also neglects the analysis o f the contextual discourses, on which the representation of the passive 
information is only a  sign. This idea considers the passive side of the comparison is only declaratory. Furthermore, this 
idea seems to forget system maintenance and systems relationship-creative functions. In other words, it does not take 
into account the discursive nature o f the "declarations".
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Now, it has been maintained that the legal use of comparative law is connected to 
the purpose of filling up lacunae in the law.967 In contemporary adjudication, the practical 
interpretation of law - on the basis o f comparative law - can be also based on common legislation, 
but for that matter, upon the fact that all countries have undergone similar type o f social 
changes.968
The use of comparative law in legal interpretation can also be legally regulated. The 
legal basis for comparison establishes the a priori comparability of certain systems. The legal 
regulation o f comparative law - as a necessary form of consultation in legal interpretation - 
establishes comparative law as an obligatory source of law in a particular system969.
Nevertheless, in adjudication the idea of sources tends to be more liberal than the 
theory of legal sources often suggests. There can be considerations which do not necessarily 
appear in the justification and argumentation, and which cannot be - in a systematic way - 
grasped by the legal sciences. Comparative law seems to be one o f  these “extra” sources. Courts 
seem to use comparative law, though no explicit obligations or permissions are formulated in the 
systematic discourse. Consequently, comparative law is an example o f a legal source where there 
are more controversies and difficulties when it is considered at the theoretical level than when it 
is used in practice970. Reasons for this feature have already been given in the previous chapters.
These aspects give the study two directions: one has to consider the use o f
967 In European legal history, the prevailing theory of lacunae-fiHing has been more or less connected to  the use o f  
Roman law in the absence of explicit rules. This idea derives from the Bologna School's analysis o f medieval practices. 
(Winterton, G., 1975). For examples in practice, see Coing, H., 1973, p.505.
Marsh, N .S., 1977 pp.664-665.
969 There are many questions related to these types o f legally regulated comparative observations. One may ask, for 
example, if there an obligation to explicitly analyse these observations in the justification, and secondly, to what extent 
one has to look into these observations in the internal work of the court?
The Article 1 of the Swiss Zivil Gesetzbuch has been seen a kind o f a normative basis (Zweigert, K., 
Kötz, H., 1977, p.14). It states that
"Das Gesetz findet auf alle Rechtsfragen Anwendung, für die es nach Wortlaut oder Auslegung eine
Bestimmungen enthält
Kann dem Gesetze keine Vorschrift entnommen werden, so soll der Richter nach Gewohnheitsrecht
und, wo auch ein solches fehlt nach der Regel entscheiden, die er als Gesetzgeber aufstellen wurde.
Er folgt dabei bewährter Lehre und Überlieferung".
In Israel the case of lacunae in one’s  own law has been also regulated on legal basis (Friedmann, D., 
1975, pp.350-355).
O ne can find certain legal rules establishing comparative law  as a source o f law from some 
international systems (International Court o f  Justice, Treaty establishing the European Community). In general, see - 
Bogdan, M., 1990, p.33, Zweigert, K., Kötz, R ,  1977, p.7-9„ David, R ., 1950, pp.100-104, Gutteridge, H.C., 1944, 
pp .1-10 ,1949, pp . 61-71. It has been seen also "common for the worlds civilized nations" and part o f the practices of 
some Regional Courts like the European Court o f  Justice (Pescatore, P., 1980, pp.337-359, Lando, O., 1986, pp.101- 
102). See also, for exam ple, Pescatore, P ., 1983, pp.337-359, Bogdan, M., 1990, p.93, and p.34, referring to 
Eustathiades, D roit comparé e t méthode comparative en  droit international public. In: Xenion. Festschrift Zepos, Vol 
2 (Athene) 1973, p .133-139. Also, Schlesinger, R.B., 1968, p.72.
970 Trindade, A.A.C., 1977.
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comparative law both in context and in relation to open justification.971
The m aterial of the study. The "empirical" material consists of interviews of the judges and 
administrators, and some cases. Furthermore, some literature is consulted. On the other hand, the 
idea is also to focus on the roles of different discursive actors in the realm of the use of 
comparative law972. As maintained above, the role of the different organisational actors as 
comparativists can be evaluated by a study o f the interaction between these actors. The role of 
the administrators, reporters and advocates is essential to allocate the different uses o f compara­
tive law. This is necessary in order to understand the role of comparative law in the realm of 
institutionalized law. Because of this, moreover, some remarks are - at times - made upon the 
organizational principles.973
The results of the interviews, on the other hand, have been merged into different 
analyses of the practical phenomenon and the explanations. Interviews are not reproduced and 
explicitly referred to.
Some special rem arks on the interviews. It must be mentioned also that in relation to some 
legal institutions, it was easy to obtain access in order to interview judges974, and that the entry 
to some systems was more difficult. In some systems it seemed to be problematic to interview 
judges, and the interviews had to be made with functionaries.975 This may be due to many 
reasons. Analysis of this is, nevertheless, not made here.
The interviews were based on a questionnaire which included certain question
971 One should be aware o f the problem o f the different types of “openesses", which may exist in different legal 
orders. One should see some legal orders in a “ large” sense by including - to the “publicity” of the judgment - also the 
arguments of the parties and other "players” in the written and even in the oral part o f the procedures. Some systems - 
like English legal system - are discursive and open already in relation to their form o f judgment.
This idea would need, however, further development. Nevertheless, what we may say that the written 
justificatory form is the most decisive from the dogmatic and legal discursive point o f view. Furthermore, it is clear that 
som e systems are argumentatively and discursively more open than the others (see, for example, Legeais, R., 1994, 
257-258).
972 The inquiry as to the "informal" uses o f comparative law requires consideration of two aspects. Firstly, one has 
to study the practice of its use in both internal and external argumentation and justification. This requires two different 
methods; one has to make qualitative studies about the "inspirational" and internal use, and, on the other hand, one must 
identify comparative practical arguments from the justification of different decisions.
973 Comparative arguments may appear - in adjudicative processes - in statements o f the parties, in the oral hearings, 
in personal preliminary considerations of judges, in advisory opinions (before hearings), in advisory opinions internal 
to the institutions, in research internal to the institution, in internal closed discussions, in justificatory judgm ents, and 
in dissenting opinions.
974 Finland, Sweden, Germany, England, European Courts.
m  Italy, France.
related to the subject976. The interviews themselves created further questions. It was not possible 
to ask all the questions connected to the issue. Some questions, which seem to be essential, 
remain unasked977. All the same, the free flowing nature o f the interviews - although structured 
around the formal questions - revealed some characteristics o f the use of comparative law which 
has been used in this study. *1234567890
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976 Questions were:
Introductory Questions:
1. Have you been interviewed before on reasoning in this court and internal research within it?
General part:
2. Could you describe shortly the processes o f  this court?
3. What material is there available?
4. How is internal research made in general? How is it restricted?
5. Do you ask for statements from external experts?
6. Are there external experts used in the course o f the proceedings?
7. How long does the procedure last (on average)?
Comparative law:
8. Is comparative law research part of the work of this court?
9. How do you see the role o f comparative law  in this court in general?
10. How is a comparative study limited, if it is made?
11. What type o f information belongs to a comparative survey (sociological, systematic, cases, rules, etc.)?
12. From which countries are there material available?
13. Do the judges have a general interest in comparative law?
14. How much comparative law (cases, rules etc.) is discussed in this institution?
15. Are comparative studies presented by the parties? W hat is the reaction to these studies?
16. Could you describe the situation where comparative studies are made/reasons for making comparative studies? 
The “internal” argumentation in courts:
17. Are comparative arguments used in the internal discourses of the court?
18. What kind of role do they have there?
19. In what form are these arguments used?
20. Are legal systems discussed “technically” or “culturally” (“systematically”)?
21. How “distant” are the cases or systems used?
22. How do you see the effect of these comparative observations upon interpretation?
23. Could you give some examples of cases, where comparative law has had a role?
24. What countries are discussed in particular?
Specific questions in international institutions:
25. Do judges compare the laws of their own countries in the internal discussion?
26. How could you explain the fact that comparative observations appear usually in dissenting and advisory opinions? 
General questions:
27. Who is the audience o f this court?
28. Do you think comparative law is useful, o r not, necessary or not and relevant or not?
29. Do you think comparisons are made for integrative purposes or for the purposes of the case only? Is it important 
"internally” to the legal system, or “externally” to legal systems?
30. Do you see any obstacles for making comparative studies in this court?
31. What could be the obstacle for using comparative reasons in the course of reasoning?
32. Do the lower courts use comparative observations in their justifications?
33. How do you see the development of databases from  the point of view o f the use of comparative law? 
fSome additional questions:
34. What kind o f role could comparative law have in contemporary law?
35. What kind o f comparative studies would be “useful”?]
M any modifications upon this questioning took place during the interview in order to maintain the 
"coherence" o f the interview.
977 One o f these questions was for example; when are comparative studies made by those, who give dissenting 
opinions? Are these made before or after the internal decision has been taken?
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One o f the basic ideas in the methodology of the interviews was to let the subject 
to define the topic themselves. In other words, the question was defined as a question about the 
"use of comparative law”, but the content o f ’ comparative law* was let open and unexplicated. 
Consequently, an interesting phenomena was observed: for example; many of the interviewed 
connected use of the decisions of some supranational courts to the use of comparative material - 
or at least their “comparative” nature was recognized - even if, however, all those interviewed 
stressed, in the end, the "specific" binding nature of the systems and decision deriving from them. 
This relates to system of “intervening” (by third parties) in European courts.
The interviews played also a role in the selection o f cases.
The presentation o f the information achieved in the interviews is not explicitly 
connected to any particular person interviewed. The idea is to speak about legal systems, orders 
and institutions, and not to give reason for the speculation as to the correctness or wrongness of 
the answers o f those interviewed. The presentation of the remarks is generalized already in the 
explanation.
It is a fact that the interviews represent quite subjective knowledge. Not all 
personnel were interviewed, even if the attempt was made to have at least two persons 
interviewed in one institution. However, one could claim that the conclusions may be generalized 
to  a certain extent.
A phenomenological approach to legal institutions is lacking.
Som e rem arks on the analysis of the case law of national adjudication, and  the 
adjudication in the European Systems of Human Rights and  the Community. Even if the 
tradition of comparative reasoning is strongly connected to the tradition of national systems, the 
reports and analysis of different cases from national legal systems are not * in any way - 
“exhaustive”. This is due to the fact that the intention of this study is more general. The reason 
for this is found also in terms of economic and time constraints.
Consequently, the main focus in this analysis is in the functioning of comparative 
reasoning within the European level institutions. This can be motivated by the fact that in these 
institutions the role of comparative observations is more explicit and easier to investigate. 
Furthermore - in these institutions - the basic question of the use of comparative law is connected 
on a more visible way to the hard cases of law and legal interpretation. On the other hand, it can 
be claimed that the forms of comparative interpretation of law in national systems are reflected - 
in a more open form - at the European level. Consequently, the characteristics of comparative 
interpretation o f law can be more easily shown by way of examples.
The analysis of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human 
Rights, in their relation to each other, however, differ considerably because of the ’’comparative” 
differences. One has to remember that - as far as the structure o f argumentative processes is
2 5 1
concerned - there are remarkable differences between the European Court of Human rights and 
the European Court of Justice. For example, in the former dissenting opinions are allowed and 
preliminary (Commission) decisions are given, in the latter this does not occur.
However, the function of the Commission in the European Court o f Human Rights 
(and, in a way, the expressions of the dissenting opinions) can be discursively identified with the 
role of the Advocate General in the European Court of Justice - even if these remain essentially 
different types of arrangements. The opinions of the Advocate General and the opinions in the 
European Commission of Human rights can be situated within the "context" of legal justification.
2.2. Some national legal systems
2.2.1. General observations
Legal orders in Europe. The philosophies of the European legal orders - or the legal "cultures" - 
differ considerably from the discursive point of view978. As we have already noted, in some 
systems the processes are highly "inquisitorial" (i.e. the continental approach), other systems are 
more passive (especially the English system as an accusatorial system). In the former type o f 
system, one makes the examination of the law and facts (doctrine, social, comparative conditions 
etc.) in a functional administration, and in the latter type o f system, the arguments put forward 
derive mainly from the argumentation presented by the parties. We may say that the basic 
philosophies seem to be remarkably different. One procedural difference is related to the non- 
inquisitorial nature o f common law processes.979
This distinction is not as clear as it seems, however. In both types of systems these 
elements overlap. On more discursive (accusatory) processes, some experts have occasionally 
been used. On the other hand, in the inquisitorial systems the administration may be - occasionally 
- separated from the main "court", and - for example - the opinions o f the Advocate Generals (or 
commissaire du gouvemement in France) are not the "official" part of the decision-making as 
such, but part of the oral procedure.
On the other hand, in some systems the importance o f the parties and expertise is 
recognized, and in some systems there is no "external" research needed. This all, however, 
depends naturally on the type of cases examined, and also on the different levels of the
97S Also, Summer, R.S., Taruffo, M., 1991, pp.508-509. The philosophy may also be related to the philosophy of 
history in these systems, see  Legrand, p., 1996, p ,7 1 ff.
979 The legal process is discursive in the sense that the task of the judges is not to make any preliminary studies or 
ad hoc studies on the correct material for the law. The material is more or less presented in the legal processes. This 
seems to differ - to a certain extent - from the idea in continental systems. (Lawson, F., 1977, pp.365-366.) This related 
to the differences in the significance of systematization (Legrand, P., 1996, p.65 ff.).
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"hierarchy" o f the courts - though the hierarchical status o f the court is not always decisive.
Nevertheless, the basic feature seems to be clear. Some systems* (or courts') ad­
ministration is philosophically constructed so, that there is great use of a priori research before 
the hearing of the case, and this is to be encouraged organizationally. On the other hand, in some 
systems (such as the House of Lords, for example) to be the parties are considered the only 
sources of the arguments, and the role of the administration has - and should not have - anything 
to do with the "substance" and argumentation of the case.
"Anglo-Saxon common law" and "continental" law. Here the interest is not to focus on the 
classification o f different legal systems and concentrate on the analysis of their differences and 
similarities, but to consider the relevance of this distinction from the point of view of the ideas on 
the sources of law and ideas concerning standards of legal reasoning.980
Very generally, continental law can be described as the Roman-Germanic tradition, 
whereas the common law has originated from the English type of legal system.981 Nordic systems 
have been seen as a distinctive “legal group’*.982
Talcott Parson viewed the English legal system as an integrated system of universal 
norms. Max Weber, on the other hand, saw the common law - one may say - as being less 
rational than the law in other European systems983. Weber saw capitalism establishing itself in 
England almost despite the legal system.984
On the other hand, the traditional idea, which seems to indicate something essential
980 See, for example, David, R,, Brierly, J.E.C., 1978, Zweigert, K., Kbtz, H., 1977, Schlesinger, R.B., 1980 and 
1995 (pp.480-481 on reasoning and structural differences in general (for example, law and equity)). Gorla, G. (1980, 
p.308) maintains that what is often forgotten is that the distinction between common law and continental (civil law) was 
being used already in 16th century English legal literature. Furthermore, the return to  this discussion was a  phenomenon 
of the nationalistic English historiography of the modem age. Moreover, this distinction was taken by the continentals 
as an self-evident distinction from the beginning of 19th century.
See also, Gorla, G., Moccia, 1., 1981, p .l 46, and Moccia, L ,  1981, p .l  58-159 on the pre-m odem  and 
m odem  concept o f  civil law '. Ingredients o f differences, see Lobban, M ., 1995, p.34 ff.
For some differences between French and common law, see Koopmans, T., 1991, pp.493-494. One 
o f  the characteristics o f French law is the strict division between private, criminal and administrative law, and the 
deductive method o f reasoning.
981 For some definitions, see Gorla, G., Moccia, L ,  1981, pp.143-144.
982 Zweigert, K., K6tz, H., 1977,284 ff.
983 Weber. M., 1969, pp.294-297, pp.317-318.
984 Weber, M., 1969, p.318.
W eber's idea on the English system can be criticised. W e may say that predictability and flexibility are 
not necessarily the features o f a positive and formal legal system. Namely, if the positive and formal system does not 
m eet the requirements o f social development, the informal system will (Friedman, L M ., 1975, pp.207-208).
I believe that the basic problem  o f W eber’s analysis o f common law was the problem  o f not 
recognizing the "informal formality". This means that he saw the English legal system through the lenses o f his own 
tradition. It can be claimed that formality in the English system is much more formal in the social sense, i.e., the 
authority of law is seen from the point of view of the "ruler". The Benthamite approach to law explains a lot. O n the 
other hand, the concept of property - extremely central to  the Anglo-Saxon legal philosophy - refers more to som e kind 
o f a  ’holistic" approach o f property and capital, which can be seen in the trust institutions and their history.
\to the differences between these "philosophically" distinctive spheres of law - connected directly 
to the traditional problems of comparative law - is the function o f trusts.985 One could maintain 
that the trust is a case in point for more "holistic" thinking about abstract legal institutions in 
common law countries. It seems as well that the regulation of trusts is related to their social- 
economic functions.986 Unlike many "comparable" regulations of the use of capital in continental 
systems, the law o f trusts seem to be an example of "liberal" regulation, which, however, is 
directly related to many dimensions of social life.
This kind of conceptualization would be quite strange for continental regulation, as 
many authors have maintained. In continental systems, these aspects are separate from the 
regulation o f family, contact, property and succession law, and the social functions are not seen 
holistically. This is an example of how different types of regulations take into account the social 
dimension of the regulated objects in modem liberal law.987
Some differences may be found also in relation to meaning o f rights in these 
systems. This may be related to the absence o f written constitutional rights in English legal 
system, for example.988
Interpretative techniques. Historically one could attempt to search for differences in 
interpretative techniques - between common and continental law - from the study of historico- 
political forms of reasoning in different contexts. Here the differences may relate to the emphasis 
o f the natural law in continental and common law countries.989
We may assert, on the other hand, that one o f the common denominators for these 
different legal philosophies seems to be the need for a dynamic, yet coherent, developer o f the 
law. In modem continental countries judges were, historically, mistrusted and provided with 
codified standards, which led to the glorification of the legislature (and sovereign) in this regard. 
Judge-made law had no place in the hierarchy of sources of law. In the common law, on the other
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915 See, Zweigert, K., Kôtz, H., 1977, p.274 ff., referring to Keeton, G.W., Social Change in the Law o f Trusts 
(1958), without, however, a thorough historical-contextual study concerning the “public” dimension o f the institution.
986 Zweigert, K., Kote, 1977, p.278 ff.. See also, Drobnig, U., 1972, p.124.
Basically, people applied to the central power, as requested it to take over the church function o f the 
administration o f bodies o f  property which had been established by a testament o r a will etc.
It is interesting that this type o f explanation is not emphasized by m ost of the comparative lawyers.
987 For some discussion, see Rabel, É., 1978, pp.88-90.
988 See, Legrand, P., 1996, p.70-71. This makes a  distinction - at least formally - between English and the United 
States legal systems.
989 Pollock, F., Sir, The expansion of the common law (South Hackensack, N .J) 1974, p i 11 ff. Maitland, F.E., The 
constitutional history of England : a course o f lectures delivered by F. W . M aitland (Cambridge).
However, the same tendencies can be found in the attempt to "secularize" natural law thinking during 
the modem era - even if the context and forms o f realization of this objective was different (see, Capelletti, M., 1989, 
p p .127-128). For the United States, see ibid, p.130).
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hand, the only possibility for creating law, historically, seemed to be through the judiciary.990 The 
general differences in interpretative techniques between continental and Anglo-Saxon systems 
could be explained, accordingly, by the different (public law) assumptions concerning the 
separation of powers, and by the roles of statutes and precedents as sources of stability.991 The 
strictness of the legal norms in the common law has been contrasted with the broader 
formulations in the civil law systems992.
Consequently, one of the basic differences seems to be - or at least has been till 
now 993 - the idea of a source of law bound to the different emphasis of the case law. In the 
continental countries, or, more explicitly, in civil law systems, case law has often been considered
990 See Herman, S., 1981, p.337.
991 The most important source o f argument is the p recedent This was given in this century, at the House o f Lords a 
horizontal binding force (the so-called “self-limitation”  rule, Case Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co., 1944, KB, p.718.). 
In 1966, however, the self-limitation rule was not considered as an absolute basis for decisions {Practice Direction, 
H ouse of Lords, (1966) 1 WLR p.1234). This has had som e practical consequences. It seem  that this rule is not obeyed 
s tr ic tly  in English courts. The unity of the Common law has been to  be preserved by vertical binding qualities. 
However, there seems to be a  tendency, in the contemporary case-law, to  challenge vertical binding force (See, Prott, 
L .V ., 1978, p.425. Cases Broome v Cassell & Co (1971) 2 QB, p.354, Schorxch Meier v Hennin (1974) 3 WLR, 
p .8 2 3 , Miliangos v Georg Frank (Textiles) Ltd (1975) QB, p.487,and Harper v National Coal Board (1974) QB, 
p-614).
The comity-doctrine, based on the idea o f the unity of Com m on law , has kept this horizontal binding 
force within Great Britain in general terms ( Prott, L .V., 1978, p.425).
Legrand, P. (1996, p.74 ff.) has spoken about the difference in the idea o f the separation o f powers (by 
referring to works of Kahn-Freund, O.). The idea is that in "England the executive cannot justify any course o f action 
unless it can rely on conferment of a power by the legislature”. On the other hand, continental governance is based on 
an  inherent power to govern.
The relationship between executive and the judiciary is also interesting. One can claim, namely, that 
the executive is more independent in English system in relation to judiciary than in continental countries. This is based 
on the observations that the executive branch seems to act quite progressively in English system, being, however, in the 
fu ll control of judiciary, (This observation is based on the study of the cases against England in European Court of 
Hum an rights, and on the cases of Horseferry (1993) and Pinochet (1998), see below). This could be explained by  the 
fact that where the executive’s powers are confirmed by the Parliamentary authority, it m ay play an effective role under 
th e  supervision o f the judicial branch. Interesting is also that where the judiciary is confirming the powers o f the 
execu tive  to act, it also relates strongly the justification to the intention of Parliam ent (Pinochet). This type of 
interaction between politically and legally clearly separate bodies seems to  function as described despite o f the sphere 
o f  law  we are speaking about (European law, international law, or purely internal sphere o f law).
This type o f interaction seems to be really “action” based, whereas in Finland, for example, some 
recen t cases have show (Campoy case, child kidnapping, KKO 1998) that the Suprem e court of Finland decides the 
case strictly on statutory basis, but on the same time tries to put pressure on (and generate discussion in press etc.) the 
P a rliam en t to reconsider the statutory measures (also international agreem ents (Hague Convention)!) in order to 
maintain the systematic solution “politically” correct in general. This Finnish exam ple suits to the description o f Kahn- 
Freund on the role o f judiciary in continental systems. (This case in Finland is, nevertheless, an extreme example o f this 
ty p e  o f  function.)
992 Sacco, R., 1991, p.387. In fact, one could say that there are no legal “rules”  a t all in common law (Legrand, P., 
1996 , pp.67-68). Judicial decisions may occasionally “appear” as a set o f rules (ibid., p.68).
993 The contemporary British system, for example, seems to be precedent-based Common law, but, more and more, 
a lso  based on the modem statutory law. Furthermore, there seem to be less dissenting and additional reasonings in 
justifications. W eber saw this development in a  following way: “As the bureaucratization of formal legislation 
progresses, the traditional position of English judge is also likely to be transformed permanently and profoundly*’ 
(1 9 6 9 , p.320).
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as an “informal” source of law.994 This may be related in general, as we mentioned to the 
historical role of the court in these systems995, and to differences in the professionalization o f  law.
The methods of reasoning are remarkably different between the continental and 
common law courts. The use of few interpretative techniques is not as strongly stressed in the 
common law as in continental countries. In fact compared to the continental systems in the 
common law there seems to be a diversity of accepted modes of reasoning996, whereas in 
continental law interpretation usually concentrates on the analysis of a single legal institution, the 
common Jaw analysis takes into account a bundle of specific problems connected to the plurality 
o f legal institutions997.
On the other hand, the stability o f the common law seems also to be related to  this 
question. In the common law, stability may be based on the strict distinction between making law 
and discovering the law (Blackstone). The former seems to be a complicated process, where the 
establishment o f stare decisis depends on the explicitness, the width, or narrowness o f  the 
reasoning (in substantive sense). We may say that because law-making is more complicated, the 
cases are more “isolated”, and the inductiveness of the law relates to a discursive attitude 
towards new factuality and the establishment o f rules in general.
Now, the biggest difference may lay exactly in the approach to the principles (rules) 
and the facts: while continental judges approach the instances from principles, the Common law 
judge goes from the instances to principles. There is therefore a difference in the need for and 
nature of systematization.998 Another remarkable difference relates to the numerous separate
994 Capelletti, M., 1989, p.144, Markesinis, P., 1990, p.20. See also, Sacco, 1991, p .3 2 1 ,346. For som e historical 
analysis, see Gorla, G., M occia, L , 1981, p .147. For judicial precedents in some continental countries in legal history, 
see ibid. p.lSO.
” s See for further analysis, Capelletti, M ,  1989, pp. 144-146.
996 Prott, L V ., 1978, p .435.
The main methods of reasoning in British systems are: linguistic, philosophical (o r logical), historical, 
traditional and sociological (Cardozo, B., 1947, (ed. Hall, M.E. and Patterson, E.W .,), p .l 17). This appears in the form s 
of precedent based arguments, the development o f procedural substantive law (by examining underlying principles and 
reason), and judicial logical arguments.
Logical argum ents are not formal logical arguments, but consist in a search for basic underlying 
principles. There is a  tendency to use less historical and judicial logical arguments. The doctrinal writings and theory 
o f interpretation are also considered (Prott, L V ., 1978, p.421 and 429). The importance of these writings has increased 
(Cases Broome v Cassell, Sweet vParsley (1970) AC, p . l 32, and Miliangos v Georg Frank (Textiles) Ltd (1975) QB, 
487. (Prott, L V ., 1978, p .430)).
The sociological method has its place in the system probably because o f the nature of the historical 
character of Common Law  (See case Herrington v Brinish Railways Board (1972) AC, p.902), and the influence o f 
academics such as R oscoe Pound (On the latter, see Prott, L V ., 1978, p.430). The application o f these sociological 
arguments mainly supports exceptions to precedents. There is a  tendency to use increasingly sociological arguments.
997 Zweigert, JC, Kôtz, H., 1987, p.34. Goûtai, J .L ,  1996, p .l 17. Legrand, P. (1996, p.65) has suggested that the 
reasoning on common law is analogical, and in continent institutional (referring to Samuel, G., The foundations of Legal 
reasoning, 1994)..
"* Cooper, 1950, p .468 ff. Also, Legrand, P.1996, p .6 5 ,68 ff.
One could claim  that the relationship between numerous similar cases is horizontally reflexive. This 
means that the principles are not self-evidently parts o f the case, but the interpretation of the principles embedded in
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justifications given in a judgment. This seems to indicate also the general discursive 
characteristics o f the English legal system.
In conclusion, it has been claimed that the written judgments of English courts do 
not aim at exposing the motivation, conscious or unconscious of a judge, but rather to reconcile 
an audience with the use of power that such a decision authorizes. It attempts to persuade the 
public to fall in with the court’s activity.999 This may be the reason why judgments of English 
courts are verbose1000; this is a way to avoid giving an impression of arbitrariness to the public1001.
Some conclusions. It is clear that there are also many differences in methods of interpretation 
and justification between so called continental countries. In countries where the travaux prépara­
toires have a role, interpretation may be derived from the preliminary material produced by 
parliament as a legislator in its open publications. In continental countries, the open analysis of 
this type of material does not seem to be as relevant as in Nordic systems.
2.2.2. Is comparative interpretation relevant, when the national court
takes into account the norms of European Community Law, 
European Human Rights law, or International Conventions in 
its decisions?
General remarks. International obligations are in their formal appearance "comparative norms”. 
They have usually been drafted on a comparative basis based on various national law 
conceptualizations. This is why the relationship between these "comparative norms" and the 
comparative interpretation and argumentation appears interesting.
Furthermore, we may speak in connection with regional systems such as the 
European Human Rights system and the European Community system of a practical form of 
subsidiarity. That is to say that the balance between the systems superiority and autonomy is 
sought functionally by the institutions in these systems, mainly by the European-level institutions. 
This means, that the comparative material plays an extremely important role in finding the basis 
for these types of decisions.
Consequently, it is interesting to ask, what types o f interpretative methods one 
could apply in state systems in the interpretation of, for example, case law related to international
the previous judgments is interpreted in a new factual context
999 P ro tt.L V ., 1978, p.428.
1000 Bankowski, Z., MacCormick, N., 1991, p.392.
1001 The main difference, from the point o f view o f the subject can be seen in the method of justification. The free 
style and the affective reasoning, in the common law courts, differs from continental though (Lawson, F., 1977, p .366, 
quoting several authors). Naturally, the system of advocate general lessens the effect o f this difference (ibid, p .369).
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and regional measures, and how this relates to the question o f comparative interpretation, which 
seems to be a priori a possible form of interpretation1002. In other words, the basic question is 
whether one can take into account comparative law aspects in applying international and regional 
norms in national legal systems.
Another remark ought to be made. Comparative interpretation or the interpretation 
of law on the basis o f international obligations may arise in cases which seem to be problematic 
cases. In other words, the national court may identify, for example, a conflict between its 
international obligations or European rules in relation to comparative generality.
The binding nature of the European Community System and the European Hum an R igh ts  
System. Brief observations concerning the basic doctrines of the “bindingness” of the norms o f  
these systems can be made in this connection, in order to assist us to focus on the relevance o f  
comparative law in realm of these systems.
The European Court has insisted on the supremacy o f European Community law 
in its decisions. This has also been recognized by the courts of many Member States.1003
The idea of the use o f European Community Law in national courts has its 
normative basis in the Treaty and the doctrines created by the European Court of Justice. The 
binding effect of Community law and the case-law of the European Court of Justice is based on 
Article 5 o f the Treaty on European Union. There has also been a "customary " basis for the 
application of precedents and provisions in different Member States: principles embedded in Acts 
(England), constitutions (Netherlands), the Constitution and legal practice of the highest courts 
(France), and other somewhat undefmable situation (eg. In Italy and Germany).1004
However, the European Court o f Justice, on a comparative basis1005, has provided 
that to attain the objectives of the Treaty, the role of the executive branch cannot vary from one 
State to another.1006 Thus, Community measures must override national measures. Even the 
fundamental rights o f a legal system cannot provide an exemption from this.1007 This has been 
contested on some occasions by certain Member States, but lately the development in Member 
States has confirmed the Court’s opinion, as mentioned. However, the discussion concerning this 
is ongoing.1008
1002 In this respect, the question concerning the differences between the pre-Community and the post-Community 
periods is also interesting
l00î See Hartley, T.C., 1994, pp.238-264, M athijsen, P.S.R.F., 1990, pp.309-310.
1001 On this, see e.g. M athijsen, P.S.R.F., 1990, p p .3 1 1-312.
1005 See case 9 and 58/65 San Michele v High Authority (1967) E C R  1.
1006 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL (1964) EC R  585.
100,7 Case 4/73 Hold v Commission (1974) ECR 491 .
,oos See, Hartley, T.C., 1994, p.264.
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There is, furthermore, the doctrine of direct effect. This can be understood in two 
ways: the obligation to apply and the obligation to abstain from acting in a particular manner and, 
on the other hand, the rights of these in favour of whom those obligations have been provided.1009 
Directly applicable provisions in the Treaties can be said to be those provisions that do not allow 
addressees of an obligation a discretionary latitude. If the Article cannot create individual rights, 
which the national court must protect, there is no direct effect o f that Article.1010 On the other 
hand, even if no measures are taken, by the Community, to implement such an Article (contrary 
to the obligation of an Article), it could still be directly applicable.1011
The direct effect of secondary legislation o f the Community law is based on the 
Treaty (regulations, Article 189) and certain case law doctrines (directives). Directives can be 
directly applicable under certain conditions. This creates an obligation to directly apply the 
applicable directives, and for that matter, to ask advice from the ECJ if there is doubt on the 
nature of this measure (positive or negative).
The process of determining the direct applicability o f a Community provision is 
covered by Article 177 (the new Article 234) of the Treaty on European Union (referring to  the 
system of preliminary rulings), although courts can also ascertain this through the case-law o f the 
European Court.
Furthermore, the European Court of Justice has created a doctrine according to 
which national courts are obliged to interpret their laws in accordance with directives.1012 This is 
a natural development stemming from the prohibition of acts of national legislative bodies against 
Community provisions.1013
These are the basic doctrines and provisions o f  the Community legal system which 
create obligations on the national courts to take into legal account the Community system.
Regarding the European Human Rights System, Article 1 of the Convention for the 
protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms1014 states:
"The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction
the rights and freedoms defined Section I  o f this Convention"
1009 Mathijsen, P.S.R.F., 1990, p.308. According to current law, states may be penalized for not complying with 
Community obligations (Amsterdam Treaty). On the other hand, States may be obliged to  compensate damage resulting 
from  the failure to implement Community provisions (case 6 ,9 /90  Francovich v. Italy (1991) E C R 1-5357).
1010 Case 10/71 Ministère Public Luxembourgeois v Müller (1971) EC R  723.
ton Case 43/75, Defrenne v Sabena (1976) ECR 455.
1012 Case 14/83 Colson and Kamann v Landnord Rhein Westfalen EC R  (1984) 1891. See also case 79/83 Harz v 
Deutche Tradax (1984) ECR 1921.
10,3 Case 230/78 Eridania v Minister o f Agriculture and Forestry (1979) ECR 2749.
1014 4 November 1950 (European Convention on Human Rights).
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This Article transforms the declaration o f rights (in Section I) into a set o f  
obligations for the States which have ratified the Convention.
Concerning the actual texts, some maintain that this comprises an obligation to  
incorporate the actual text into domestic law, while others disagree. There is, however, an 
agreement that States have to give foil effect to these rights.1015 This has been enforced by 
different legal means, depending on the constitutional practices o f each Party to the Convention.
The most effective method o f incorporation is through national courts.1016 They 
have the primary role.1017 Because states are obliged "to ensure that their domestic legislation is  
compatible with the Convention and, i f  need be, to make any necessary adjustments to this end”, 
courts also play their part within this procedure.
However, court decisions alone, based on national legislation, can achieve these 
objectives and thereby fulfill these obligations. The Convention does not, and nor does the 
Court1018, oblige national courts to formally apply the Convention, its provisions, and case-law 
in their decisions, or to use the provision o f the Convention as "comparative" or analogical 
material in interpretation or argumentation. The use of provisions and their interpretations made 
by the European Court o f Human Rights depends upon the models and practice o f interpretation 
and argumentation in national courts. The provisions are not directly applicable law in the strictly 
formal sense in national courts even if substantially this seems to be the case.1019
The direct formal application o f these rights takes place in the form of the 
enforcement of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, decided on the basis o f a  
petition or a suit, by the governments and parliaments via alteration to domestic legislation.
Now, our basic interest concerns the question of whether one can use comparative 
observations in the interpretation and application of Community law and the norms of the 
European Human Rights System?1020 02
The “autonomy approach". Basically, all disputable interpretations of Community law must be 
taken to the European Court of Justice on the basis of the Article 177 (the new Article 234) o f 
the Treaty.1031 The Community system is an autonomous legal order, and only the Court o f
10.5 See, Jacobs, F.G., 1975, p.10.
10.6 Buergenthal, T., 1965, p.215.
1017 See also, Case Sadik v. Greece (1997) 24 E H R R  323.
I01< For the role o f the European Court o f Human R ights on this issue, see M artens, S.K. 1998, p.8.
1019 On the temporal and territorial scope, see Jacobs, F.G., 1975, pp.12-14.
1020 This idea applies, to a  certain extent, also  to the relationship between national systems and the European Human 
Rights System.
I02lThe Article 177 (the new Article 234) states:
The Court o f Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation o f this Treaty;
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Justice is competent to interpret Community law. At first glance, one could maintain that if some 
comparative aspects become relevant in the interpretation of Community law, they derive only 
from the institutional interpretations in the realm of Community law.
In the European Human Rights System, national courts do interpret European 
Human Rights. The Basic Rights of Germany which form the fundamental premisses of the legal 
system must be in accordance with European Human Rights. Where explicit constitutional rights 
are not provided within the system, such that is the case in English and Finnish legal systems, for 
example, the system must evaluate the conformity of its decisions with European human rights 
principles. National Courts have a relative autonomy in checking this compatibility.
Consequently, national courts are obliged to consider European Human Rights on 
the basis of the above-cited "conformity rule”. In practice this means that in most systems, the 
Human Rights Court's decisions are taken into account in deciding national cases, and it is 
national courts which determine the practical application o f human rights norms and their content 
in the first place. The control by the European Court of Human Rights is a posteriori in nature 
and its processes are triggered by applications to the system. Because no pending of national 
processes takes place automatically1022, no autonomy for the Human Rights Court exists. It is a 
legal order which decides always on the acceptability of material national decisions, not on any 
autonomous interpretation of European human rights principles.
Naturally, one could treat these interpretations as autonomous interpretations. 
However, because national courts also have the possibility o f interpreting the human rights, there 
does not seem to exist any autonomy in the sense of the Community legal system. Furthermore, 
the idea of "functional subsidiarity" is embedded a priori in many Articles in the Convention, and 
the European Court o f Human Rights has constantly developed extensive jurisprudence on the 
"margin of appreciation" doctrine.
Because the application of Community law in national courts, however, demands 
also an interpretation of national provisions in determining the balance between national rules and 
Community rules or to identify and resolve possible conflicts between national rules and 
Community rules, the question arises as to whether one can apply comparative observations in 
the interpretation of national rules, when, in the same case, the matter concerns the application
(b) the validity and interpretation o f acts o f the institutions o f the Community and o f the ECB;
(c) the interpretation o f the statutes o f bodies established by an act o f the Council, where those statutes so provide
where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal o f a Member States, that court or 
tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give a judgment, request the 
Court o f Justice to give a preliminary ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal o f a Member State 
against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter 
before the Court o f Justice.
1002 This is so except in very rare cases like the pending the internal execution processes based on the rule 38 of the 
Court’s procedure.
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of Community rules? In a sense, this would make it possible to interpret the generality in national 
legal systems in order to “fulfil” or to “substantiate” applicable national provisions, and to  
integrate the national rule into the preexisting interpretation of the European rule.
A priori national systems are considered to be in conformity with European rules. 
The interpretation must be determined by the principle o f "Community Law friendly 
interpretation". In this sense, any comparative material cannot justify any deviation from the 
Community rule, even if the national rule is be found, on a comparative basis, to be against the 
prevailing interpretation of the Community rule. If such a conflict existed, the national norm  
would be invalidated, or where the Community rule is also ambitious, it should be submitted to  
determination within the processes o f the Community Court (Article 177 (the new Article 234)). 
The comparative generality in European legal systems cannot justify a deviation from the 
prevailing wording or interpretation at the Community level.
On the other hand, as we will see, comparative generality, because interpreted in 
"qualitative" ways, are not necessarily an indication of the prevailing Community interpretation. 
In this sense the role of comparative law is quite problematic in cases where the question also 
concerns the interpretation of Community norms1023. At least, it does not seem to be the “same” 
at these two levels o f legal systems. The qualifying elements are institutionally attached, and due 
to the superiority of the Community system, Community level comparative interpretation 
prevails.1024
We may say, on the other hand, that in the case of the human rights system, national 
courts could interpret by comparative means prevailing interpretations of the European Court o f  
Human Rights or the decisions by the Commission. Comparative “deviancies” from these 
interpretations could be possible because the courts are able to see this as an indication o f the 
current situation within the "evolution o f European standard", as it is sometimes expressed in the 
European Court of Human Rights decisions.
Nevertheless, as maintained, the final decision is made, in the case of a petition 
brought by a competent person, in the European Court o f Human Rights. An ongoing conflict 
between the European human rights principles and national provisions cannot be sustained by 
national courts, because in the final analysis, identification of this conflict is made only by the 
Court of Human Rights1023. Basically, the application o f human rights principles in national 
Courts is a matter o f systematic interpretation based on the “human rights friendly” 
interpretation. In this sense, there are no obstacles to comparatively interpretation of law in
1023 This is quite interesting because it suggests that the "Europeanization" o f national legislation actually diminishes 
the role o f comparative law  in legal adjudication. This idea seems to be contrary to prevailing opinions. For example, 
judges seem to consider 'Europeanization" as a possibility for the increasing use o f comparative perspectives.
1024 In theoretical term s this seems to indicate that the “analogical key”  or the methods of restrictive, expansive or 
e contrario interpretations can be applied only by the Community Court.
mi Because of the nature o f the "principled" systems, the conflicts are extrem ely difficult to identify a prior.
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national courts, though some European human rights aspects are considered too.
Now, in conclusion, we may note that it is the idea of the “autonomy and 
superiority” o f an order*' which is connected to the possibility of using comparative material in 
legal interpretation and reasoning in national courts when they are interpreting the norms of 
European legal systems. In the case of European Community law, there seems to be a total 
impossibility surrounding the use of comparative material as interpretative material, when the 
norms of the Community legal system are applied in national courts. In case this material is used, 
there seems to be a strong assumption of the “imprecision” o f the applied norm, in which case the 
matter would have been a matter of interpretation by the relevant European-level institution. All 
other sources (the case law of the European Court, general principles etc.) seem to be relevant, 
but in the case where comparative aspects are taken into account, the national decision-maker 
seems to go beyond its interpretational competence.
What is interesting is the fact that when the interpretation goes beyond its 
systematic context, a lack of clarity is assumed. This is based on the fact that the system is 
assumed to always apply always clear rules, and the comparative aspects raise the question of 
imprecision. In this case, for example, there are strong arguments for “non-compliance” with 
European procedural norms, and some doubt concerning the “correctness” surrounding the 
substantial interpretation by national court.
Another interesting idea relates to the fact that only the European Court seems to 
be able to apply qualitative comparative law. The difference between the competencies o f these 
courts seems to relate to the possibility of using “complete” comparative legal method. This, on 
the other hand, transforms this question into a discourse between legal dogmatics and scientific 
comparative law in relation to the competencies of the European Court.
We could claim, however, that comparative considerations may have quite a 
peculiar function in the relationship between European Community law and national law. We 
could imagine that comparative law considerations play a role when national courts are 
considering the question of the clarity or Community law provisions in relation to the Article 177 
(the new Article 234) o f Community law. Namely, in considering the need for a preliminary 
ruling, comparative law studies of disparity or generality in implementation practice may give an 
indication concerning the lack of clarity of Community law provisions. The disparity may lead to 
the conclusion that the Community provision is unclear, whereas the generality indicates that the 
Community provision has been understood in a quite uniform way. In this sense, comparative law 
may “systematize” the premises of the preliminary ruling procedure.
In conclusion, we may note that comparative law as a “complete” source o f law is 
excluded in cases where there is another “superior” and “autonomous” interpreter of the norms 
in question. Comparative law as a source o f law is a source o f  law of the “superior” and 
“autonomous” order, but not for the order which applies these norms in the first instance. 
Furthermore, if comparative material is used in the application of the norms of the Community
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system by national courts» it may be only a matter of “institutional or individual heuristics’" by 
which the decision-maker may convince itself o f the “good faith” application of these European 
norms. In this case, as maintained, their use is instrumental because o f the closed decision-making 
processes because the good faith interpretation cannot be an argument concerning the application 
of clear and unequivocal norms.
This does not seem to be the case when interpreting European human rights.
National courts and international law. The relevance of comparative law in national courts can  
be seen particularly in the field of public international law, especially in the realm of international 
criminal law, procedural and extradition questions, and the questions of enforcement and 
recognition o f foreign judgments1026.
The use of international law (legal material) as a source of law in national courts has 
its normative basis in each national system. It is embedded in the traditional doctrines concerning 
the effects of international obligations and of the sources o f law in each national legal system. The 
implementation of international law is left to the constitutions o f individual states1027.
As is well-known, in dualistic systems international law (principles, treaties, and 
custom) must be transformed into national legal systems by “internal” processes. Usually national 
courts are not able, in dualistic systems, to directly apply international law as such. In monistic, 
on the other hand, international obligations are directly applicable law, i.e. individuals are also 
able to claim rights on the basis of international measures1028.
All the same, the application o f international agreements, and the material directly 
connected to these measures in national courts differs from the application of international 
agreements effected via national legislation or a directly applicable international norm. Namely, 
courts might have to examine the textual and historical meaning and systematic, purposive and 
teleological dimensions of the international treaty and its application when using it as a legal 
material. Even if implementing legislation, in a specific dualistic state system, has been enacted, 
there might still be cases where courts, nevertheless, have to go beyond these formal sources and 
consider the development of practice at the international level. This may be relevant especially in 
cases where an international organ has been established to develop law based on an international 
treaty or procedure.
10M See, Green, L C , 1967, pp.42-66. International elem ent as a basis o f  comparative interpretation, see Schlesinger, 
1980, p.29.
For exam ples, see Schreuer, C.H ., 1971 (supplementary text for determining lacuna and text, the 
normative role, pp.258-261, international law  in France and the processes of interpretation, ibid., pp.260-265). In the 
United States, ibid., pp.265 f f  How could be used, ibid., p.272. The use may be substantiative o r illustrative (Kisch, 
I., 1981, p.160).
,Q!27 Screuer, Ch., 1993, p.457, Reuter, P ., p.17, 21 ff.
1038 On the theories and nature of different types o f systems, see Reuter, P., 1995, p.17
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We come to the question of the use of comparative law in national courts when 
interpreting and applying international norms. As in the case o f travaux préparatoires of 
international treaty rules, the comparative material is also a matter for the internal doctrines 
concerning the sources of law. However, because no international arrangement comprises an 
autonomously superior interpretative order (apart from the European Community Law, as noted 
above) there do not seem to be problems in using comparative material as interpretative material. 
On the contrary, because international law recognizes state practices as a source of law, and 
because international bodies use this material, although selectively, comparative law may be 
source of law for national courts when interpreting international law o f even greater relevance . 
However, many problems remain, as we will see in the case of comparative law in international 
legal institutions. Comparative studies related to the application o f international law are always 
qualitatively selective, and they serve only to support certain conclusions.
In conclusion, we may say that the nature of the normative relationship between the 
international and national level in general determines the possibility for the use of comparative 
material in the interpretation of international law in national courts. However, the basic idea 
could be that the use o f comparative law applies the same “principles” as does to the use of 
comparative material in international bodies. The “a posteriori check” idea regulating the 
relationship between these levels guarantees the final word for the international legal order.
Nevertheless, we may note that some problems may appear in cases international 
and national levels use comparative material as a source o f law. In case both have used the 
material in their interpretation, conflicting interpretations o f comparative law may appear, which 
generates the idea that comparative information may be interpreted differently. This may cause 
problems in the international legal realm, because it introduces arguments by particularity into the 
international legal order. Here the question can be associated with the normative premises o f the 
qualitative comparative interpretation. This problem may be resolved only by referring to 
(functional) premises o f interpretation of the interpreter himself.
2.2.3. Some examples
2.2.3.I. Some courts of United Kingdom and comparative reasoning
In troduction. The legal system of the United Kingdom is analysed here more thoroughly than 
o ther systems mainly because of the openness and the quality o f the argumentative and 
justificatory practice in relation to comparative law as a source o f law. Some examples are
referred to directly in order to give an idea o f the normative issues they are related to .1029
International law an d  com parative reasoning. In the English system we recognize several 
explicit references to international law. One of the most famous formulations of the legal 
obligation to do so is presented by the Lord Denning1030:
" ƒ think we are entitled to look at it, because it is an instrument, which is binding  
in international law, and we ought always interpret our statutes so as to be in  
conformity with international law. Our statute does not in terms incorporate the  
convention nor refer to it, but that does not matter. We can look at it."
Furthermore1031:
>fIfthe terms o f legislation are not clear, however, but are reasonably capable f o r  
more than meaning, the treaty itself becomes relevant. There is a prima fa c ie  
presumption that parliament does not intend to act in breach o f international law  
including specific treaty obligations
The leading case regarding the influence o f “comparatively interpreted” 
international law on interpretation within the British system is Trendtex Trading Corporation L td  
v Central Bank o f Nigeria1032 . Here the Court o f Appeal examined the rules of international law 
concerning the immunity claim of foreign states in a contractual dispute before the English courts 
and, furthermore, it studied the nature of international law as interpretative material in the British 
system.
Lords gave an extensive analysis on the nature o f international law and its 
relationship to British system. According to Lord Denning MR, international law
1029 Some examples from the early history are given by Schmitthoff, M., 1941, p. 104 ff. Civil law, for example, was
used in some occasions:
“The Roman law forms no rule, binding itself, upon the subjects o f  this realms; but in deciding the 
case upon principle, where no direct authority can be cited from  our books, it affords no small 
evidence o f the soundness o f the conclusion at which we have arrived, if it proves to be supported 
by that law, the fruit of the researches o f the most learned men, the collected wisdom o f ages and the 
groundwork o f the municipal law o f  the most countries o f Europe" (Acton v Blundell (1843) 12 M. 
& W. 324,353, Tindal, C.J.)
It was considered as “great assistance**, and admissible, if it was “relevant” on decision on “principle”, 
there were “no English authorities”, and problem had came up in other jurisdictions as well, or where the use was 
technical in character (Schmitthoff, M., 1941, pp.104-105). Later there were some emphasis on American and 
Commonwealth law (ibid., pp.106-107). See also, Gordley, J., 1995, p.558.
1030Court of Appeal, Salomon v Commission custom and exiles (1966) 2 All ER 340.
1031 See, (1969) 1 All ER82.
1032 j rendiex Trading Corporation Ltd v Central Bank o f Nigeria (1977) 1 All ER, 881-911.
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"arise out o f the consensus o f the civilized nations o f  the world. All nations agree 
on this. So it is part o f  the law o f nations".
However,
"the courts o f every country differ in their application o f  it..."
and they define rules by
"seeking guidance from decisions o f the courts o f  other countries, from  the jurists 
who have defined the problem, from treaties and conventions and above all, 
defining the rule in terms which are consonant with justice rather than adverted 
to it."
On the question of the relationship between international law and English Law, 
Lord Denning answered that
"...rules o f  international law, as existing from  time to time, do form  part o f  our 
English Law.... but decisions o f  this court, as to what was the ruling o f 
international law 50 or 60 ago, is not binding on this court today."
When examining the content of the rule on absolute immunity, he referred to several 
comparative decisions, and stated that absolute immunity
"...can no longer be considered a rule of international law. ...Great impetus was 
given to it [restrictive immunity] in 1952 in the fam ous Tate letter in the United 
States. Many countries have now adopted it. We have been given a valuable 
collection o f recent decisions in which the courts o f  Belgium. Holland. the 
German Federal Republic, the United States o f America and others have 
abandoned the absolute immunity and granted only restrictive immunity.... To this 
I  would add European Convention o f State Immunity 1972.... We can and should 
state our view as to those rules and apply them as we think best, leaving it to the 
House to reverse us i f  we are wrong"
"It seems to me that it is the duty o f  the Member States, and o f national courts o f  
those states, to bring the law as to sovereign immunity into harmony through 
community. The rules applied bv each Member State on the subject should be the 
same as the rules applied bv the others. That is by adopting doctrine o f  restrictive 
immunity on the lines I  have suggested".
In this judgment, Lord Denning also developed a construction and legitimation of 
comparative analysis as an interpretative method. The rule o f international law should thus be, 
according to Lord Denning, investigated on a case by case basis and with the help o f comparative 
analysis in the international community. Description of the method o f interpretation seemed to 
comply with the traditional approach to international law. However, strong normative elements
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appear in the recommendation. The analysis was extremely value-based.
When applying comparative analysis to the case under discussion, he made a strong 
example type of comparative statement in favour of his interpretation:
"But it affords strong support fo r  the view I  have expressed, seeing that the
German court [Federal Constitutional Court] decided in just the same way fo r
just the same reasons. "
When examining the nature o f the defendant as an organ of government, he 
examined differences in the methods of defining governmental departments in different countries. 
As a conclusion, supported by this theoretical development o f the comparative method for courts 
interpreting and applying international and English law and the rule founded on comparative 
argument, he found that the plea of sovereign immunity did not assist the Central Bank o f Nigeria 
and consequently allowed the appeal.
Lord Stephenson, on the other hand, legitimated the analysis of international law 
through an attempt to avoid a breach of an international rule. He also relied on an extensive 
comparative (historical-comparative) analysis (factoring in "courts outside this country", 
decisions of the "United States Supreme Court", ”Law merchantH and doctrinal opinions), and 
made an explicit reference to the decisions o f foreign courts. However, he arrived at a normative 
statement and stressed the fact that
"the law sought to be applied must, like anything else, be proved by satisfactory 
evidence which must be sawn either that... recognized and acted upon by our own 
country ... and has been so widely and generally accepted, that it can hardly be 
supposed that any civilized state would repudiate it. The mere opinions o f  
jurists...are not in themselves sufficient. ..express sanction o f  international 
agreement or gradually have grown to be part o f the international law by their 
frequent practical recognition in dealing between various nations... [ref. To Lord 
Russell o f  Killowen] international law is...sum o f the rules o f  usages which 
civilized states have agreed
and that
"But rules o f  international law, whether they are part o f  our law or a source o f 
law,
must be in some sense proved"
This proof occurs, according to him, by presenting material from international and 
national decisions and doctrinal opinions. The reasoning seemed to be basically concentrated 
upon the method of interpretation of international law.
To the question of whether should the English courts should recognize the change 
in international rules or await its recognition by the government or by an Act of Parliament, he 
answered that satisfactory comparative evidence exists and that the court should follow the
2 6 8
example of the German and United States' courts on the question o f restrictive immunity. He also 
referred to Article 3(d) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and to the 
Basel Convention o f 1972 of the Members of the Council of Europe
"which ought to result in the courts o f all the European Economic Community 
countries coming as close to each other as possible in their decisions the law 
which they apply and their application o f  it. I f  the courts o f EEC countries were 
out o f  step with other countries... there might be a conflict".
Lord Sawn U . also relied on this comparative material, but examined the 
recognition o f a change from the "internal" point o f view. However, he agreed with Lord 
Denning that international law does not recognize the concept of stare decisis. The rule o f inter­
national law has to be looked at, on a comparative basis, in each case in which the problem arises. 
He also stated that while the use of comparative argument is the use o f a "group” argument, the 
rule of an individual country is not the same as the result o f an extensive comparative study.
In the House of Lords decision in Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd1033 the 
question arose as to whether the travaux préparatoires o f an international treaty should be used 
in the interpretation of an international convention given effect to by English legislation. There 
was little previous evidence of this practice in English case-law, although some cases were found. 
The question was examined comparatively (by referring to foreign national practices).
It was maintained that the text in question had been incorporated in the Statute. The 
material question was the interpretation of an article in the Convention (Article 26 of the Warsaw 
Convention o f 1929). The Convention was introduced into English law by the Carriage by Air 
Act 1932. In 1955, changes were made to the Convention and they were imported into English 
law by the Carriage by Air Act, 1961. There was a provision in the new convention (incorporated 
into English law) maintaining that if any inconsistency should arise between the text in English 
and the text in French, the French text would prevail.
Thus, there was an obligation to examine the foreign text and its interpretations in 
that particular language and legal system. This was undertaken by the court. However, the most 
important comparative study had already been done in the Court of Appeal between the different 
parties to the Convention, where it had inspected foreign and international doctrines and cases 
from foreign courts. References were made to a number of cases in various foreign countries, 
among which only a few were explicitly cited in the decision of the House of Lords.103 034 This was 
explained in the decision by Lord Wiberforce. The reasons for this were that
"with the exception o f one decision, the decision o f the Belgian Cour de
1033 The House of Lords, Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd (1980) 2 All ER, p.696 ff.
1034 Germany, Switzerland, Argentine, France.
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Cassasion, they are not decisions o f hiehest courts: secondly, the process o f law 
reporting varies from country to country and they may not be exhaustive. ... 
Thirdly, in any event, it was not beyond argument when the facts o f each case 
were carefully examined, on which side the preponderance in quantity, or quality, 
lay. It is safe to say that your Lordships decision in this case will not be out o f the 
line with the balance o f decisions given elsewhere ".
However, in the interest of uniformity, Lord Wilberforce considered the general 
practice in the courts of other Contracting States. He made reference to a comprehensive 
comparative study made in 1975 for the European Court o f Justice.1035 Furthermore, he 
supported his conclusions with references to the case law o f the Court of Appeal of the United 
States on the Warsaw Convention1036 and to the general practice o f the courts of the United 
States. In particular, he made reference to the decision of the French Cour de Cassasion and the 
conclusion of the advocate general.1037 As a conclusion, on the interpretative technique for using 
travaux préparatoires, he maintained that
"the travaux préparatoires ought not to be treated as gospel truth. (However) 
there m ight be cases where such travaux préparatoires can profitably be used 
(cautiously)”.
The conditions for this were, according to him, that
"the material involved is public and accessible and, secondly, that the travaux 
préparatiores clearly and disputably point to definite legislative intention. "
Lord Diplock did reach a conclusion without this comparative material, but he did 
not exclude the use of it in interpretation. On the other hand, he considered the use of these 
travaux préparatoires to be a constitutional question. He referred to the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties of 1969, to which England is party. According to this, treaties should be 
interpreted in "good faith"  and by reference to "supplementary means o f interpretation" which 
include the preparatory work. According to him, it was a constitutional obligation for an English 
judge to interpret English law (enacted following an international treaty) in the light of 
preparatory works. The treaties should also be interpreted using the "writings o f academic 
lawyers... courts o f other European States'. The value o f these depends on their
"reputation and status, the extent to which its decisions are binding on courts o f
Official Report o f the Judicial and Academic Conference, European Court of Justice (1975).
1036 Day v Transworld Airlines (1975) 528 F 2d 31.
1037 Some analyses (and possible personal reasons for Wilberforce’s interest in French law), Jolowicz, J.A., 1994, 
p.751.
270
coordinate and inferior jurisdiction in its own country and the coverage o f the na­
tional law reporting system, "
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton made more cautious use of preparatory works. 
However, he said that with regard to the expressions and definitions in treaties, preparatory 
works should be published to the same extent as the incorporating act itself, and in this respect, 
preparatory works have never been ”reasonably accessible to private citizens or even to 
lawyers
Lord Scarman, on the other hand, stressed the importance of uniformity of 
interpretation in different states. Support for such interpretation should be accorded as it is in 
other countries. This led to a comparative study of interpretative techniques of courts of other 
countries and legal writings. However, he stressed that the use o f comparative material (such as 
travaux préparatoires) depends solely on the individual judge.
Lord Roskill made use of different international conventions (maritime conventions, 
etc.) to interpret the concepts embodied within the Warsaw Convention. He considered 
preparatory works to be non-binding material for interpretation. It did not seem
"legitimate to look at that source [preparatory works o f international convention, 
MK] to solve ambiguities in the legislation which has made those treaty or 
convention provisions part o f the ordinary municipal law o f this countryM.1038
In English law, there has been also a study of the nature (“purpose and structure”) 
o f the European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions concerning the 
Custody of Children by comparison with another legal instrument, the Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.1039 Furthermore, comparative observations have 
appeared in the interpretation o f the Convention relating to the Status of refugees (and 1967 
protocol)1040. In Maritime cases comparative observations appear constantly.1041
'®* Further development. House of Lords, Sidhu v. British Airways (H.L(E&Sc.)) (1997) 2 W.LR., 10 Jan. 1997. 
Here the approach to a ’comparative interpretation* was explained by Lord Hope of Graighead (p.37):
“Parties were agreed that we might have regard to this material [comparative] for such assistance 
as it might give. Clearly, much must depend upon the status o f  each court and o f the extent to which 
the point o f issue has been subject to careful analysis. Material o f this kind, where it is found to be 
of appropriate standing and quality, may be o f some help in pointing towards an interpretation o f 
the Convention which has received general acceptance in other countries. But the value o f the 
material will be reduced o f the decisions conflict with each other or if  no clear line o f  approach 
appears from them after they have been analysed’
The court also rejected the application of the European Human rights Convention to the interpretation 
of this particular Convention. Some linguistic comparisons were also made.
1039 House of Lords, In re S. (A Minor) Custody: Habitual residence (1997) 3 W.LR., p.597. Lord Slynn of Hadley. 
See also, Court of Appeal, Quanes v. Secretary o f  State for the Home Department (1998) 1 W.LR., 30 Jan. 1998.
1040 Court of Appeal, Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex. P. Shah (CA.) (1998) 1 W.LR., 16 Jan. 1998, 
p.8081 (references to Australian, United States, and Canadian case law).
1041 See, for example, Effort Shipping Ltd, v. Linden Management S.a. (1998) 2 W.LR. 6 Feb. 1998, p.212.
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Finally, we may offer an example of the possible different function o f the traditional 
state comparative law arguments in their relation to new types o f “international law comparisons” 
via an analysis of the Pinochet case in the House of Lords1042.
In this case the question concerned the immunity of a person on the basis of state 
immunity doctrine (as codified in the State Immunity Act 1978), (an idea of the Anglo-American 
common law) doctrine of the act o f state, (codified) personal immunity, and residual state 
immunity. The defendant claimed that his diplomatic immunity cannot be breached on the basis 
of alleged crimes because he was acting during the period under consideration, as a head o f State. 
Those acts cannot form the basis for an arrest and extradition proceedings.
Two o f  the judges, upholding the immunity o f the person in their dissenting 
opinions, referred in their reasoning both to different international and national legal orders in 
addition to the traditional doctrines and provisions of the English legal system.
The first judge found a disparity in the role o f the head of state between various 
systems. By using arguments derived from customary international law authorities, an cases from 
France and the United States, travaux préparatoires, comparisons o f international conventions, 
and general evaluation o f tendencies, the judge neglected the idea that there is in this matter a 
general practice, consensus, jus cogens, o r a generally agreed definition of crimes against 
humanity. He pointed out slowness in this development, the absence o f crystallized principles and 
the persistence of uncertainty. Nevertheless, he made some remarks de legeferenda in relation 
to the lifting of the sovereign immunity, definitions, and the role of national courts in this respect.
In dealing with the act o f state doctrine, he made a thorough study o f the case law 
of United States courts. In conclusion, he applied the idea of “judicial restraint or abstention”.
Another dissenting judge discussed the issue based on United States case-law and 
opinions of legal authorities beyond domestic sources. Arguments concerning the risks o f 
endangered foreign relations, put forward by the defendant, were also examined. In examining the 
Parliaments intention, he made the observation that the enactment o f the provision relating to 
“constitutionally responsible rules o f public officials” in the implementary legislation o f the 
Genocide Convention indicated the intention to  maintain sovereign immunity. Accordingly, even 
if, in the Torture and Hostages Conventions, this type o f provision did not exist, it was 
“reasonable to suppose that, as with genocide, the equivalent provision would have [also] been 
omitted”. This was supported by domestic and US case law, and different international texts and 
opinions of international institutions. Interpretation of the State Immunity Act and case law was 
also involved.
The question turned, accordingly, upon the issue of the “intention” of Parliament.
1042 House of Lords, Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner o f Police fo r  the Metropolis and others Ex parte 
Pinochet (on appeal from a Divisional Court o f  the Queen s Bench Division), and Regina v. Evans...), Session 1998- 
99 Publications on the Internet Judgments, On 25 November 1998.
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Two judges, who allowed the legitimacy o f the arrest and extradition proceedings, argued strictly 
on the basis of “international comparisons” and the intention o f Parliament, the latter being based 
on the nature of the implementing legislation (of Torture and Hostage-taking Conventions) and 
criminal law. The third judge maintained that “it must follow  that Parliament did not intend the 
act o f state doctrine to apply in such cases'*. He backed up his argument by observations 
concerning the events immediately proceeding the signing of the Conventions. According to him, 
these formed a part of the fight against international terrorism. The final breach of immunity was 
based on the observation that
“international law does not require the grant o f  wider immunity. And it hardly 
needs saying that torture o f  his own subjects, or o f  aliens, would not be regarded 
by international law as a function o f a head o f the state...
But international law has made plain that certain types o f  conduct, including 
torture and hostage taking, are not acceptable conduct on the part o f anyone. This 
applies as much to heads o f  state, or even more, as it does to everyone else; the 
contrary conclusion would make a mockery o f  international law”
The “international comparisons” were based on quite strictly literal observations. 
The judgments of the Nürnberg trial and unanimous resolutions of United Nations 
were also considered. On the other hand, the study of customary international law reflected in the 
State Immunity Act 1978 did, according to him, not recognize torture and Hostage-taking as 
parts of the function of the Head of the State.
In conclusion, he regarded that England has asserted extra-territorial jurisdiction on 
these matters.
The fourth judge maintained that immunity does not seem to be absolute. On the 
other hand, the idea that the acts belonged to the functions of the Head of the State did not find 
support within international law. Hence, immunity was denied to the arrested person. In finding 
the inapplicability of the Act of State doctrine, he used arguments o f customary international law, 
and also excerpts from the Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.
The fifth judge also upheld the legality of the arrest and extradition proceedings.
This case seem to clearly demonstrate certain characteristics of the use of 
comparative argument. Two dissenting judges relied quite strongly upon comparative 
observations, which supported their obviously conservative views. On the other hand, 
“international” comparison (customary international law) and considerations of the implementing 
legislation in that connection necessitated a careful literal interpretation. This type of 
interpretation was supported by historical considerations and arguments referring to the intention 
o f Parliament. This phenomenon can be strongly associated with the value-based nature of the 
decision.
The case was reconsidered in January 1999 because of the fact that one judge
273
belonged to the Amnesty International and was, consequently, challengeable.1043
Som e rem arks. In the English system, there seems to be a liberal attitude towards the use of 
"extralegal" material in legal interpretation. Although this is mainly so in cases having an interna­
tional nature, there are also “national” cases, in which the courts have gone beyond internal 
sources. This has been legitimated basically by the uniformity o f interpretation within the 
international legal community.
In general, it seems clear that the courts in the United Kingdom look to national 
systems when they are undertaking an interpretation of international law. English courts seem to 
refer to decisions from many countries including those from non-common law countries1044. 
These sources must be, however, authoritative, and they have to be studied carefully and 
generally. The material does not seem to be restricted only to “authentic” comparisons, but 
includes also comparisons made within institutions external to the system. Furthermore, the case 
law considered is not necessarily restricted to the highest courts but lower court decisions can 
also be used.
On the basis of the analysed case law on international law, one can make certain 
remarks. Comparative interpretation seems to be closely connected to the introduction of 
different ideas on interpretative techniques and methods in a value based but also traditional way. 
Comparative observations have supported the use of textual sources and travaux préparatoires 
in relation to different legal (international) measures. Comparative observations have, 
consequently, led, in this sense, to common sense and literal interpretations and interpretations 
o f the presumed intent o f Parliament. These two methods come together in a quite interesting 
way.
On the other hand, the comparative approach can be used because international law • 
has to be proved. By comparative arguments, one seems to be able to make normative statements 
concerning the nature of the method of interpretation of incorporated international law. Here the
1043 In a case House of Lords, Regina v Horseferry Road Magistrates Court ex parte Bennet (1993) WLR 90  (abuse 
o f process) a man a citizen o f New Zealand had committed a  crime in England, and was forcefully delivered back to 
England from South Africa, although there was no extradition agreement between these countries. Several judges 
referred (also indirectly) to foreign cases (i.e. cases from N ew  Zealand, United States, Canadian, Hong Kong, and South 
A frican). C itations were presented by parties o f the case. The questions dealt w ith due process, mutually accepted 
jurisdictions, jurisdictional questions in general, breach o f international law, rule o f law, etc. Comparative observations 
w ere quite “analogical”, but arguments derived from these comparative observations were useful. Common law 
coherence seemed to be one o f the basic reasons for adapting these comparative observations.
1044 Marsh, N.S 1977, p .658.
The Judicial Committee of Privy Council decides all matters o f  N ew  Zealand law as a final court of 
Appeal (Winterton, G., 1975, p.73, in Australian private law matters this used to be so, but the Australia has abolished 
the right to appeal recently). Furthermore, one can say that there is a process o f internal modelling between the 
Commonwealth countries (idem.).
The Privy Council has had a difficult role, because the judges have been obliged in Privy Council to 
apply for example Hindu and Islamic laws in India (Cinkalese and Tamil law in Ceylon, Chinese law in Hong Kong etc. 
(ib id .,p .91).
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“generality” seems to be the main type o f argument. In terms o f the substance o f the decision, on 
the other hand, example-type reasoning seems to be most commonly used.
The basic idea seems to be the harmony between domestic and international law.
Some comparative observations were made also concerning the reporting 
techniques in different countries so as to reinforce the comparative analysis produced.
What also seems to be remarkable is that English Courts “compare” additionally 
international conventions and Treaties in a quite extensive way. The latest cases provide also an 
interesting idea concerning the relationship between the role o f “international law comparisons” 
and traditional state-law comparisons. We will discuss this idea in the general conclusions of the 
study.
It is also interesting to note that the institution o f “stare decisis” was, to a certain 
extent, parallelled in comparative analysis.
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). British courts interpreted the law during the 
last part of the 20th century so as to ensure that the obligations o f protection deriving from the 
protection o f ECHR are met1045. The Convention Human Rights was not initially incorporated 
into the domestic law in England. This was changed by the recent Human Rights Bill. It has been 
maintained that this is a major constitutional change1046, and that it may even give horizontal 
effect to human rights in British legal thinking.1047 It may lead to change from the level form to 
that of substance.1048
A typical example of this is the case of R v Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Depart­
ment, ex parte Doody and others10*9, where Staughton U  used a decision of the European Court 
o f Human Rights to confirm an interpretation concerning the release of a prisoner who was 
sentenced to life imprisonment.1050 The “comparative” approach to the case law of the Human
1045 Bankowski, Z., MacCormick, N ., 1991, p.396.
1046 Lord Irvine of Lairg, 1998, p.221, for the implications of this change for adjudication and legislation, see ibid., 
p.225 ff.
ltM7In the new Human Rights Bill in effect from 1998, interpretation of legislation should “be read and given effect 
to in a way which is compatible with Convention rights** (Clause 3 o f the Bill). This seems to be kind o f a 'choice of 
interpretation’ rule.
See concerning New Bill, Marshall, G, 1998, pp.167-168. See historically, Lord Lester o f H em e Hill, 
Q.C., U.K. Acceptance of the Strasbourg Jurisdiction: What really went on in W hitehall in 1965. In: Public Law 1998, 
p.253.
1041 Lord Irvine o f  Lairg, 1998, p.235. On the legal and moral implications of this, see John Laws Sir, The 
Limitations o f Human Rights. In: Public Law, 1998, p.254 ff.
1049 ƒ? v Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Department, ex parte Doody and other appeals (1993) 1 All ER  152.
1050 On the other hand, in the Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd and others ((1993) All ER 
1011) Lord Keith of Kinkel made reference to a case o f the Court of Appeal, where the European Convention o f Human 
Rights (Article 10) and the jurisprudence o f the C ourt was used to confirm the decision that a  local authority does not 
have the right to  maintain an action o f damages for defamation.
In the case P v Liverpool Post Pic ((1991) 2 AC 370) there was an examination o f the nature of the
2 7 5
Rights Court was also justified on the following grounds:
”... the domestic court will give great weight to the judgments, in particular recent 
judgments, made by the European Court o f Human Rights in cases where the facts  
are sim ilar to the case before the domestic court. That court has unrivalled 
experience in this fie ld  and it would be foolish not to take advantage o f  that 
experience. The tensions which the European Court o f Human Rights has to 
resolve are similar to those facing the domestic court and this will often be the 
case even though a particular case before the European Court o f  Human Rights 
sprang from  the facts in a country other than England. " 1051 1052
It seems, however, that the analysis of different national systems is not extensive in 
connection to the human rights interpretations. Furthermore, at least during 1996-1998, most of 
the cases dealing with the European Convention of Human rights did not undertake a 
comparative examination of issues.
However, the method of incorporation of this type of reasoning has led in some 
cases to comparative interpretation and argumentation in the field of human rights and in the 
indirect application of the European Convention of Human Rights. As in the case of international 
law, the practice of the contracting states is examined. For example, in the House o f Lords 
decision of X  Ltd v Morgan-Grampian Ltd1052 the Convention's Article 10 and case-law was used 
to interpret section 10 of the Contempt o f Court Act 1981 (disclosure of journalistic sources). 
Reference was also made to the "audi alteram partem" rule as a rule at the "root o f  every 
civilized system o f law".1053
One of the most recent examples can be mentioned. Ward, L.J. in the Court of 
Appeal in a case dealing with the alleged nullity of a marriage (between a woman and a 
transsexual, who had kept his transsexuality secret), and ancillary financial relief referred to
m ental health tribunal as a court. Lord Donaldson investigated the question with the assistance o f a definition of the 
C ourt in the European Human Rights system. In the sam e case, there was a question concerning the restrictions of 
broadcasting in English law in the light of the Convention’s Article 10 ("prescribed by law") and the jurisprudence of 
the European Court was also analysed. By parallelling the jurisprudence of the European Court with the law of the 
United Kingdom and by following the changes in legislation in England after those cases - the Court found argumenta­
tive material for the interpretation of the M ental Health Act (1983).
1051 Per M r Schiemann, L.J., Court of Appeal, Camelot group Pic. v. Centaur Communications Ltd. (1998) 2 
W .L.R., 20 Feb 1998 ,379 .
1052 X Ltd v Morgan-Grampian Ltd. (1989 and 1990) 1 AC I.
,0S3 See also, case Attorney General v Associated Newspapers Ltd and others (1992) All QBD DC, p.535 if.
In the Community case Transocean marine ass. v Commission (case 17/74 (1974) ECR 1063) the 
Advocate General W arner maintains, for example, that "there is a rule embedded in the law of some of our countries 
that an administrative authority before without the statutory power to the detriment on a particular person must in 
general hear what the person has to say about that matter, even if that statute does not expressly require it” (audi 
alterem partem, audiatur altera pars).
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comparative observations used in the European Convention of Human Rights. In dealing with the 
issue of transsexuality and matrimonial law, he emphasized the fact that even if the European 
Court of Human Rights previously granted a wide margin of appreciation to state parties in some 
comparable cases because of the lack o f common ground between the member states, the 
disparity of practice (related also to the transitional stage o f law) the recent case law of the 
European Court o f Human Rights has, nevertheless, re-examined the issue.
The legal counsel for the defendant (the transsexual person) had produced also an 
extensive study of comparative law (fro Sweden, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United 
States, Australia, New Zealand). This was taken explicitly into account by Ward, L.J.:
"It is also useful to deal with comparative law aspects and the medical matters to 
see to what extent they impinge upon matters o f  public policy and/or mens rea ”
The case law of the Superior Court of New Jersey and New Zealand Family Court
cases 1054 *were studied quite extensively by this judge. The medical and comparative law
arguments intertwined. Finally Ward L.J. maintained that even if
"...ƒ have been tempted to say, like Potter L.J. and Sir Brian Neill that 
consideration o f them [comparative observations] is strictly unnecessary fo r  the 
purposes o f  this judgment. I  feel, however, that the decision we have to take on 
public policy grounds on an issue as sensitive as this is justifies the [comparative] 
review. Our perception o f public policy must at least be tested against perceptions 
elsewhere even if, in the end result, as Lord Simon o f Glaisdale remarked in 
Vervaeke (formerly Messina) v. Smith [1983] 1 A.C. 145, I64f: ’there appears to 
be no inherent reason why, giving every weight to the international spirit o f  the 
conflict o f  laws, we should surrender our own policy to that o f any foreign 
society**’.
Extensive examination was also made of other arguments. Potter, L.J. referred also 
to  other jurisdictions in his analysis of the case.
Another case dealing with the marital status o f a homosexual deals with 
comparative observations.1035 The question concerned the succession rights of a partner. This 
right was denied, albeit with reluctance. The issue was thought to be appropriate discussion in 
Parliament (and legislative reform).
Associated developments abroad in relation to international human rights measures
1054 M J. v. J.T: 355 A2d. 204 Corbett’s case [1971] 83, and M. V . M. [1991] N.Z.F.LR. 337.
,05S Court of Appeal, Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association Ltd., (1998) 2 W.L.R., 6 Feb. 1998.
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(including the European Convention) were studied by Ward, L.J. in his dissenting opinion. He 
gave particular focus to the Canadian case law concerning “family status”, “spousal rights”. 
Supporting arguments were found. However, the case law of the Human Rights Commission and 
Court was not supportive (i.e. did not grant protection). Legislation in a number of progressive 
countries was also studied (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Greenland, Iceland, Hungary, and the 
Netherlands) concerning the issue of agreements between homosexual couples on property and 
inheritance rights, and remarks were made concerning the idea o f a “domestic relationship” found 
in Australian law. Case law developments in Hawaii, United States, and New Zealand were 
mentioned. Special emphasis was put on a New York Court o f Appeals case1056 for a basic 
interpretation method concerning interpretation of a statutory document in an analogical case, 
taking into account both the minority and majority arguments. In the end, the system and case 
law of the Canadian Constitution (Charter o f Rights) was held to support the conclusion. There 
was also a use of many other types o f analysis (linguistic, case-law, etc).
“there is no essential difference between a homosexual and a heterosexual couple
and , accordingly, I  would fin d  that the p la in tiff had lived with the deceased
tenant as his husband and wife. "
As mentioned, the New Human Rights Bill will perhaps change the way in which 
European human rights are interpreted and used in British courts. However, many problems seem 
to persist1057, and the future will reveal how formal incorporation will, or will not, change British 
methods o f interpretation.
An interesting Commonwealth case can be also mentioned in this context.1058 In 
Matadeen v. Pointu (P.C.)1059, the Privy Council reviewed a case of the Supreme Court of 
Mauritius, where the Supreme Court had on the basis of a comparative between United States 
and Indian law applied a general principle o f equality, and claimed that this also formed a part o f 
the constitution o f Mauritius.
The constitutional issue in question dealt with a regulation issued by a Mauritian 
governmental institution.
The Privy Council examined the idea of constitutional guarantees in an extremely
1056 Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., 544 N .Y .S.2d 784.
1057 M arshall, G., 1998, pp. 167-170.
,w® It has to be rem em bered that decisions of the Privy Council are binding as such.
1019 Privy Council (1998) 3 W.L.R. 19, June 1998.
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broad sense. It used, as arguments, the Mauritaian constitution itself, the European Convention 
of Human Rights, the constitutional systems of United States and India, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the statements o f the Australian Constitutional 
Committee (which referred also to the Canadian system).
The Privy Council maintained that because
“the background o f a constitution is an attempt, at a particular moment in history, 
to lay down an enduring scheme o f government in accordance with certain moral 
and political values...Interpretation must take these purposes into account 
“..Judges are required to give effect in accordance with their own conscientiously 
held view o f what such principles entail”.
However, “in each case the court is concerned with the meaning o f  [the] language 
which has been used”.1060
The Supreme Court of Mauritius had not, according to Privy Council, examined, 
for example, the wording of the “principle of equality” contained in the Constitution, except by 
stating that it was essential to democracy. The Privy Council examined whether the essence of 
democracy is that there should be a general justifiable principle o f equality. The extension of this 
idea was to be used in the interpretation o f the Article 3 of the Mauritanian Constitution.
The Privy Council argued as follows:
"... treating like cases alike and unlike cases differently is a general axiom o f
rational behaviour:.....what accounts a valid reason?. ..who is to decide, whether
the reason is valid or not?... Must it always be the courts? The reasons fo r  not 
treating people uniformly often involve, as they do in this case, questions o f  social 
policy on which views may differ. There are questions which the elected 
representatives o f  the people have some claim to decide fo r  themselves. The fac t 
that equality o f treatment is a general principle o f  rational behaviour does not 
entail that it should necessarily be a justifiable principle - that it should always be
the judges who have the last word...... sonorous judicial statements o f
uncontroversialprinciple often conceal the real problem, which is to mark out the 
boundary between the powers o f  the judiciary, the legislature and the executive in 
deciding how the principle is to be applied.
A self-confident democracy may fee l that it can give the last word, 
even in respect o f the most fundamental rights, to the popularly elected organs o f 
its constitution. The United Kingdom has traditionally done so;... A generous 
power o f judicial review o f legislative action is not therefore o f  the essence o f a 
democracy. Different societies may have different solutions".
The Council proceeded on a comparative basis:
1060 This referred to a South African Constitutional Court decision o f 1995: " If the language used by the lawgiver 
is ignored in favour o f  a general resort to *values’ the result is not interpretation but divination**.
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“The United Kingdom theory o f  sovereignty o f Parliament is however, an extreme 
case. The difficulty about it as experienced in many countries has shown, is that 
certain fundamental rights need to be protected against overridden by the 
majority. No one has not yet thought o f  a better form  o f protection than by 
entrenching them in a written constitution, enforced by independent judges. Even 
the United Kingdom is to adopt a modified form  o f  judicial review o f  statutes by  
its incorporation o f  the European Convention. ”
... It by no means follows, however, that the rights which are 
constitutionally protected and subject to judicial review include a general 
justiciable principle o f  equality... "
Here the Council discusses the Bakke case in the United States Supreme Court, and 
concludes that
“Instead o f leaving it to the courts to categorize form s o f discrimination on a case 
by case basis and to concede varying degrees o f autonomy to Parliament only as 
a matter o f comity to the legislative branch o f government, the constitution m ay  
itself identify those forms o f discrimination which need to be protected by judicia l 
review against being overridden by majority decision 1061
After analysing commonwealth experience, the Council concluded that "these 
observations, coming as they do from  a judge with great experience in the international 
jurisprudence o f human rights, should be borne carefully in mind. "
The Council makes a classification of different types of systems: (1) systems, which 
apply a general principle of equality, (2) the systems, which do so on specific grounds, and (3) 
systems which entrench nothing in this respect.
This classification, made on the basis o f comparative observations, serve as a 
method for in examining the content o f the principle of equality in the Constitution of Mauritius.
In the final analysis, the Council noticed an “analogy** between the European 
Convention formulation and the Constitutional formulation of Mauritius. In both systems, there 
was no specified grounds of discrimination. Discrimination can be identified even if no 
substantive right had been violated. Contrary to the Mauritian Constitution, however, the 
European Convention includes a right to education, for example. This was the matter at issue in 
this case. At this stage, the Council parallelled the Mauritian system to that of the United 
States.1062 However, some differences appear between the United States system (and the Indian
l06' An interesting analysis was also undertaken in Q ueen’s Bench Division, Regina v. Lord Chancellor (1998) 2 
W.L.R., 29 M ay 1998, p .854.
1062 Referring to  Powell, J., in San Antonio Scholl District v Rodriguez (1973) 411 U.S. 1, 35.
f i
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system) in relation to the system of Mauritius. The Constitution o f Mauritius does not explicitly 
speak of “the equal protection o f law“, but “the protection o f law“. The European Convention 
seemed to have a more general conceptualization than that prevailing in the Mauritian system.
The Mauritian Constitution (Article 3) seems not to grant substantive equal 
protection. This is affirmed by the fact that the Article 3 “protection of law” seems to be specified 
only by the provisions dealing with some procedural rights (such as “Article 6 o f  the European 
Convention”). This type of interpretation o f the constitutional mechanisms of Mauritius was also 
confirmed by a historical review.
In examining the impact of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the Council maintained that the Mauritian Constitution cannot be seen to contain the right to 
education. Furthermore,
“The Covenant contemplates a diversity o f  constitutional arrangements, including 
both legislative and 'other measures’ by which effect may be given to the rights 
recognized in the Covenant... it is the legal and political system as a whole and 
not merely the human rights entrenched in the Constitution which must comply 
with the Covenant... a state party is not obliged to incorporate the provisions o f 
the Covenant into its domestic law... Same view o f  incorporation o f the European 
Convention”
On this basis, no general article setting forth the “protection of law” and “equal 
protection” were actually needed in order to review the ministerial decision. Ordinary 
administrative law and the unreasonability principle1063 would have been sufficient.
In this sense, the Privy Council implicitly confirmed that the Mauritian Constitution 
belonged to category (3) among the constitutional traditions. It made a comparative classification 
o f  systems, and applied it to the specific legal system with some normative consequences.
European Community Law. The European Communities Act 1972 introduced the EC system 
into the English legal system. Sections 2(1), 2(2), 2(4) and 3(1) requires the courts to give legal 
effect to it, to allow the incorporated Community law without the need for further enactment, and 
to  follow the case-law of European Court of Justice and other institutions concerning the validity, 
meaning and effect o f any Community instrument. In other words, Community Law is part o f the
1063 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. V. Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 K.B. 223.
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corpus o f  law and has to be applied as such.1064 1065The idea was also expressed by the L o rd  
Denning:
"... we must no longer speak or think o f English law as something on its own. W e  
must speak and think o f  Community law, o f  Community rights and obligations, 
and we must give effect to them... We must get down to it.1,1065
Consequently, in certain cases English courts have applied Community legislation 
(Treaty provisions) without questioning whether or not it was directly applicable in M em ber 
States.1066
The extent to which courts have taken into account Community legislation w here 
there is no legal basis for this consideration is an interesting question.1067 This question w as 
resolved by the European Court o f Justice it relation to directives when it developed the doctrine 
of "directive-friendly interpretation" (Colson). However, in the case-law before 1983 (before so - 
called Colson doctrine), the attitudes o f the courts were at times quite hostile tow ards 
Community Law.1068 There were also cases in European Court of Justice where the question o f  
the primacy of Community directives over UK law was examined with the result going against 
the position taken by the UK courts. After the establishment of the Colson doctrine, however, the  
UK courts subsequently, treated this doctrine as a legal proposition.1069 In certain fields, such as 
Value Added Tax, directives have been used as material for the interpretation of Value A dded 
Tax laws.1070
It was also suggested in English case law that courts should use the European 
Court's technique of teleological interpretation. In James Buckhanan & Co Ltd  v Babco  
Forwarding & shipping (UK) Ltd1071 the issue at stake was the interpretation of English law
1064 In the field o f  Value Added Tax, there was a phenomenon called “anticipatory implementation” o f  the  
Com m unity law, introduced into the U K  system. Here certain directives on the issue were implemented before the  
obligation to  do so cam e into force (Usher, J.A., 1989, p.100).
S similar type of phenomenon has been called in Finland "pre-harmonization" -doctrine. Some aspects 
o f EC-legislation (European Economic Area -legislation) were implemented in  Finnish legislation before the legal 
obligation to  do so entered into force, see Tahti, A ., 1993.
1065 Case Bulmer Ltd. v Bollinger SA. (1974) 3 W LR 202.
1066 Meier v Hennin (1975) QB 416. See also Bridge, J.W., 1976, pp.13-15.
1067 On this, see Usher, J.A.,1989, p.99.
I06* See case Phonogram vLane (1981) 3 All ER 182.
1069 See, Usher, J.A., 1989, p.100.
1070 Usher, J.A .,1989 , p.99.
1071 James Buckhanan dc Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding & shipping (UK) Ltd (1977) 1 All ER, p.521 ff. Some of the 
latest discussion on the issue, see Irvine o f Lairg Lord, 1998, pp.232-233.
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(Carriage of Goods by Road Act, 1965), which was identical to the International Convention on 
Carriage Contracts. Lord Denning not only referred to the international convention, but for that 
matter called for a uniform interpretation in all countries which are parties to the convention. To 
achieve this result he proposed that there should be a  common method o f interpretation, a 
"European Court method* of interpretation (so as to "go by the design and purpose" when filling 
legislative gaps, and a "schematic and teleological method o f interpretation").l<yn
However, this adaption o f teleological interpretation attracted opposition. A 
comparative examination was made in a subsequent case1072 073 to prove that interpretation differed 
considerably from one Contracting State to another. The adaption o f the teleological method was 
seen to be problematic and the argumentation from literal meaning was instead seen to be 
preferable. Nevertheless, the doctrine of "European Interpretation" can be claimed to have had 
a certain effect upon the behaviour of the courts in UK.1074 Both procedural and legal cultural 
changes in the UK could observed followingly.1075
There have also been certain remarks made according to which the essential idea in 
the applicability o f European case law is that the legislation reviewed in the case law of the 
European Court is framed in similar terms to that of the legislation in the United Kingdom.1076
In relation to comparative law in terms o f the interpretation of the European law 
references have been made to United States case law in order to predict the possible direction of 
Community case law.1077
Comparative observations were used also in the case o f ¿A v. WI07K. In this case, a 
couple travelled to Italy to undergo fertility treatment. Because the treatment had not been 
administered by a licence-holder under English law, the English law conferring paternity could 
not apply. Even if the law, which did not recognize the procedure carried out by the Italian 
institute seemed (or was argued) to constitute a restriction to the freedom and derogation to
1072 Latter quotations from  case HP. Buhner Ltd. v J- Bollinger SA (1974) 2  All ER 1226 a t 1236-37.
1073 (1977) 3 All ER 1053, referred cases, (France) Cie L'Helvetia v Cie, Reine et Rhone (1973) in: Bulletin des 
transports, and (Netherlands) British American Tobacco Co (Netherlands) BV v Van Swieten BV (30 March 1977, 
Amsterdam).
1074 Usher, J.A., 1989, pp.108-109. On the contrary, see, Herman, S ., 1981, p.327.
1073 Usher, J. A., 198 9 ,p .l0 9 .
1076 Lord Hoffmann, House of lords, Customs and exercise Commissioners v. Thom Materials Supply Ltd. (1998) 
W .L.R., 3 July 1998, p.1115.
1077 House o f Lords, Strathclyde Regional Council v. Wallace (1998) 1 W .L.R., 6 Feb. 1998, p.266.
I07* U. V. W.f Family Division, U. V. W. (Attorney-General intervening) (1997) 3 W .LR ., 17 Oct. 1997, W ilson, J.
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provide services under the European Community law, it was justified by the English Court based,
for example, on a comparative argument, according to which
“it would be unrealistic to expect an interest in the exposition o f  United kingdom  
law to be served by arrangements in other member states. Whether it would be 
realistic to expect the wide-spread and log-term keeping o f  detailed clinical 
records seems equally doubtful. The European Commission sponsored a recently 
published report entitled Ethics, Law and Practice in Human Embryology. The 
authors found differences across Europe in the regulations covering research on, 
and the storage and use o f , embryos amounting to ’serious incompatibility 
between member states’. The United Kingdom is the only member state to have set 
up a statutory body to control procedures. But only one member state has no  
statutory regulation whatever; as it happens, it is Italy, where the only constraints 
stem from  professional rules. ”
Furthermore, even the declaration, by the male party of the case, to “undertake to  
both acknowledge paternity and not to disclaim it in the future** was invalid, because “it is no t 
even effective under Italian law. ”
There have been various cases dealing with conflict of laws issues where 
comparative observations have appeared in various forms.1079
It looks as if comparative analysis has not had a great role, in the quantitative sense, 
in the interpretation o f European Community law in British Courts. However, when its role has 
been recognized, the question has been, as in the case o f international law, about the methods o f 
interpreting law in general. Substantially, derogations have been justified on comparative law 
“disparity” grounds.1080 Furthermore, it is interesting that comparative arguments have been based 
on European material directly.
It seems that European Community cases serve also as a good starting point in the 
construction of arguments in general. This seems to apply also to the use o f European human 
rights law. They do not appear as self-evident institutional standards, but assist in formulating 
questions, solutions, and in providing extensive and several analytical reasoning.
Strictly speaking, Community law seems to be able at this stage to result in the *3
1079 A good example is provided by case House o f  Lords, Kleinwort Benson Ltd. V. Glasgow City Council (1997)
3 W.L.R., 14 Nov. 1997, p.923. In that case, the reasoning of various judges included reports using comparative 
observations (ibid., p.935), arguments deriving from state interventions made within a Community case (ibid., p.940), 
linguistic comparisons (ibid., p.943), and “ real” com parative observations (ibid., p.933).
,wo Interestingly, in the U. v. W., the contrast w as seen as being between countries, which have organized a  control 
system, and those, who apply a liberal, “practical” , and  professional idea o f freedom.
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suspension, disapplication, or “unlawful” (nullity) declarations o f legislation.1081 However, the 
discussion concerning spill-over effect is, nevertheless, still going on.1082
Com parative observations without binding international "connections". There are some 
albeit few visible examples of comparative arguments deriving from the analysis of an individual 
state and the use o f this as a source of an persuasive analogy for the interpretation of statutes. 
Reference in this regard has been made to Commonwealth precedents on statutory interpretation 
and occasionally to the United States1083.
Comparative observations have been used mainly so as to achieve the common 
interpretation of analogous bodies of statute law.1084 However, comparison does not always lead 
to  uniform interpretation, as legal-cultural differences can lead to a refusal to follow a rule by 
another court.1085 1086
Some examples can be given of the comparative analysis made by the English
courts. A "group" type of argument can be found:
" Even where in the rules relating to jurisdiction, tests o f an exceptionally flexible 
nature are laid down, no room is left fo r the exercise o f  any discretionary latitude. 
It is true, that continental legal systems recognize the power o f a Court to transfer 
proceedings from one court to another. Even then the Court has no discretion in 
determining whether or not this power should be exercised. It seems to me that in 
the light o f these considerations it would be impossible fo r  this Court to... "1<m
Here continental legal systems were used as examples in the course o f the argument 
to enable the judge arrive at a conclusion. Another case also relates to jurisdictional issues:
1081 Lord Irvine of Lairg, 1998, p.229, and the cases mentioned therein (especially the House o f Lords, Factortame 
Ltd. And other v. Secretary o f State for Transport (1989) 2 All ER, p.692 ff. See also, Hartley, T.C., 1994, p.263.
Further, see Marshall v. Southampton and South W est Area health Authority (1994) 2 W LR, 292, 
and /?. V. Secretary o f State for Employment ex p. Equal Opportunities Commission (1995) 1 AC, p .l ff.
1082 Lord Irvine of Lairg, 1998, pp.230-231, also, Gordon, A., 1998.
Jolowicz, J.A. (1994, p.750) observed (19941 that comparative law has not been used in connection 
to European Community law. As we have seen, some references can be found from the contemporary case law..
1013 For American case law in England, for example see Lord Atkin, Donoghue V Stevenson ((1932) A.C. 562) 
citing Cardoza in MacPherson v Peak Motor ko, 217 M Y, 382, 111M.E. 1050 (1916), Cohen L J . discussing Cantler 
v Grain, Christmas & Company [1951) 1 K.P. 164, discussing the opinion o f Cardoza CJ in Ultramares Corp. v. 
Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 1 9 3 1 ,9 7 0 ,174N .E .441 .
l0M Bankowski, Z., MacCormick, N., 1991, p.359 ff.
1015 Case Temple v Mitchell (1956) S.C. 267.
1086 Queen's bench Division (Commercial Court), Assurances Generales de France ¡ART v The Chiyoda Fire and 
Marine Co. (UK) Ltd and Others; UN AT Sa v Rhone Mediterranee Compagnie Francese de Assicurazioni e 
Riassicurazioni and Others; Same v Same (1992) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 325, 1 October 1991, No C 59/97,
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"The idea that a national Court has discretion either territorially or as regards to 
the subject matter o f  a dispute does not generally exist in continental legal 
system s. Even where in the rules relating to the jurisdiction, tests o f  an 
exceptionally flexible nature are laid down, no room is left fo r  the exercise o f  any  
discretionary latitude"1087 *
In the field of contract law, comparative "group" analysis from doctrinal writings 
is often undertaken simply to reveal the situation which prevails in other continental countries:
"Unlike in the majority o f  continental legal systems, in English law contracts 
entered into by public bodies are subject to the ordinary procedures and are 
governed by the private law"1688
In English Courts, the judges have also made comparative references merely to 
demonstrate that certain rules of English law do not exist in other continental systems and that 
such rules can be, and ought to be, criticized:
"..[this sum] .paid would not be recoverable apart from  the section because it was 
paid under a mistake o f law and, on the law as it stands at present (which is much 
criticized, especially by comparative lawyers, since no comparable rule is to be 
found  in continental legal systems (see, in particular, Zweigert and Kotz, 
Introduction to Comparative Law, 1987 vol. 2, pp.260-268), money so paid is 
generally irrecoverable in English law. " 1089
Explicit reference has been made to a legal institution contained within the French 
legal system which does not exist in English Law, but which does, however, exist in other 
continental legal systems. In this case, the institution was not taken as a basis for the decision, but 
the analyses of the contents of this institution, together a comparative doctrinal study, enabled a 
description of the law and the selection o f relevant facts for the case:
"Benjamin's Sale o f  Goods, 2nd ed, par 664 has this passage: Force Majeure is
1W7 Queen’s bench Division (Commercial Court) S & W Berisford pic and another v New Hampshire Insurance Co.
[1990], QB 631, [1990] 2 All ER 321, [1990] 3 W LR 688, [1990] 1 Lloyd's R ep 45 4 ,2 7  November 1989.
I0M Queen's Bench Division, Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council and Others.[l990] 2 
QB 697, [1990] 2 all E R  33, [1990] 2 W LR 17, [1989], RVR 188,1 N ovem ber 1989.
For some contrastive observations with the help o f  legal historians (Goodhart) in case Chancery 
Division, The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales v Attorney-General and another (18 th, 
19th, 20th November, 1st December 1970).
IW9 House of Lords, Tower Hamlets London Borough Council v Chetnik Developments Ltd. N[1988] 1 AC 858, 
[1988] 1 All ER  961, [1988] 2 WLR 655, 86 LGR 321, [1988] 26 EG  69. [1988] 2 EGLR 195, [1988] R A 4 5 ,17 
M arch 1988.
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not a term o f art in English law, but is very well known in continental legal 
systems, e.g. that o f  France, and it has a relatively well defined meaning in 
French law. French writers are agreeing that a failure o f performance will be 
attributable to force majeure if, without any fa u lt o f  the party seeking to be 
excused, ..." 1090
In contract and tort law, German and United States systems (analysed on the basis 
o f comparative law authorities) have been used as analogies, by some judges, in discussions 
covering a possible (and desirable) change in law.1091 Furthermore, in a case concerning actions 
in private nuisance based on interference with television signals, the issues were considered in the 
light of references to New Zealand, German, and North American law, which furnished 
persuasive analogies as policy and tendency consideration.1092
Conclusions. We can make some additional conclusive remarks.
Comparative law has been considered a legal source with qualification1093. 
However, it seems that the role of comparative law is not systematic in the interpretation of 
internal rules by English superior courts, even if some examples can be seen.
One may say that there seems to be a attempt to speak to a more general audience 
than to the national audience only. However, the use of the comparative observations is highly 
value-based, illustrative, traditionally unsystematic. The analysis o f  different systems is strongly 
determined by the internal premises and ideas of sources o f law prevailing in the system. We can 
also note that the use of comparative law is usually undertaken in relation to controversial and 
unstable case law.1094
A quick look at the case law shows that comparative observations occur more 
frequently in the commonwealth context than in European context. This indicates that there are
1090 Queen's Bench Division (Commercial Court), Navrom v Callitsis Ship Management SA (the "Radauti") [1987] 
2  Lloyd's Rep 2 7 6 ,1 0  February 1987.
1091 See, judge Steyn LJ. Court of Appeal, White and another v. Jones and others (1993) 3 All ER, p.481 ff. (501). 
A lso Australian cases used as an example by several judges in their reasoning. Furthermore, House of lords, Walford 
and other v Miles and another (6,7 November 1991 ,23  January 1992) (1992) A ll E R  460.
1091 House o f lords, Hunter and others v Canary Wharf Ltd Hunter and others v London docklands Development 
Corp. (1997) 2 All ER.
Very illustrative Conflict o f Law case with extensive comparative argumentation, Court o f Appeal, 
Boys v Chaplin, October 10 ,1 1 ,1 2 , December 6 ,1 9 6 7 .
1095 Jolowicz, J.A., 1994, p.753 (careful evaluation, pressing need, they should be kept separate, etc.).
1094 For some discussion on the role o f comparative law, see Ward, I., 1995 ,24  ff.
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attempts to maintain a unity in this realm.1095 On the other hand, the reason for this orientation 
toward the common law world may be also a result o f the fact that the common law cases are  
often more analytical that those deriving from continental Europe.1096 Naturally, the language is 
a decisive integrating factor too.
On the other hand, those areas of law, which have been created by English sta tu tes 
seem to more likely to be interpreted by other means than comparative information. H ow ever, 
this does not seem to be the case in relation to the statutes which incorporate international 
obligations. The common law cases, on the other hand, seems to be more likely to contain 
comparative arguments.
We may note that the comparative arguments are usually presented by parties. T he  
references to foreign cases can be also indirect, i.e. arguments can derive from earlier case law  
or even from some cases decided in the lower courts. One can also observe that arguments 
deriving from the foreign case law are often arguments which are not directly concerning the  
substance of the “foreign” or the “own” case, but they are arguments which only support the 
analysis of the arguer. They increase considerably the analytical quality of the reasoning. 
Consequently, it seem to be possible to take arguments also from “analogical” foreign cases. 
Nevertheless, many times foreign cases are dealing with similar types of facts and this way they 
can be used for supporting (authoritatively) the “own” solution directly.
Direct quotations are many times extensive. This seems to assist one’s own analysis 
of the foreign case law, and make it also accessible to the audience. In this type of approach, the 
“style” and subject matter of the foreign case is more visible.
On the basis of review o f the interviews conducted one can make following
remarks.
The use of comparative observations is in many ways "inspirational".1097 In order to 
explain the nature of this type of use, some comments have to be made on the procedural nature 
of some English courts.
In the Court of Appeal the ’skeleton" argument is prepared by the parties. If the 
case is justiciable case, a hearing is set. The procedure can be extremely short (lasting between
1095 See also, Legeais, R ., 1994, p.358.
IW* Jolowicz, J.A. (1994, p.753, referring to studies by M arkesis, B .) Suggests that the references to continental 
systems, in cases where there is an international connection, is more contrasting, whereas the references to  common law 
systems are more practical.
1097 On the fact that this use relates often to  personal connections o f  an individual judge with his foreign colleagues. 
Lord Woolf, Foreword. In: Markesinis, B., Foreign Law  and Comparative M ethodology (Oxford) 1997..
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1 hour and 10 days). Each judge can produce his own reasoning, though there seems to some 
departure from tendency nowadays. Furthermore, there is also a tendency towards the 
presentation a written argument.
In theory, there seems to be a role for comparative law as a source of law, even if, 
in the practice, it is used infrequently. However, if there is an EC, ECHR, Hague Rules, or other 
international element involved, the need for comparative material may arise. German, French, and 
Italian decisions, for example, may be referred to French and German courts’ case law (Counceil 
d'etat and Bundes Verwaltungsgericht) have been discussed recently, for example, in a case 
dealing with a European Community element, as instances of decisions supporting a particular 
interpretation. Also United States law has been studied in some cases concerning the right to 
privacy. Furthermore, Commonwealth and Canadian case law can be considered.
The basic idea in the selection o f comparative references seems to be the 
"importance of the court".On the other hand, the use of comparative observations depends, to a 
large extent, upon the lawyers having averted to it in the first place. If  the barrister, for example, 
makes an argument that in the Bundesgerichtshof this matter is decided in this manner, then it will 
be most likely taken into account.
Generally, there is no research undertaken before the case (apart from some small 
notes by the administration). Furthermore, the consultation o f comparative material seems to take 
place on an inspirational basis (“they stimulate the discussion”, “...if there are books on the 
shelf’). Usually the use which made of it is not extremely "academic". On the other hand, because 
judges rarely refer to any arguments other than those presented by the parties, the possibilities for 
undertaking comparative surveys are restricted. This problem is also related to time and resource 
constraints. The improved quality of the reasoning does not always seem to justify an the 
extension of time.
The main interest in wing comparative material seems to be when looking at the 
"philosophical1 basis of a solution ("an intellectual problem"). On the other hand, the distinction 
between the 'internal' interest (interpretation of law) and the 'external' interest (integration) in 
using comparative observations varies according to the nature o f the case. However, where 
international measures are involved, the external interest may be there even if the main idea is still 
to  interpret the English law.
As in the Court o f Appeal, the House o f Lords undertakes practically no
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preliminary research o f its own.1098 Law Lords do not have research assistance, and preliminary 
inquiries are made individually with the possible help of a private secretary. Administration is for 
the technical help. No external experts are used. Exceptionally, medical experts have been 
consulted.
The decision-makers discuss the main lines of the parties’ argument. They rely, to 
a large extent, upon the information produced by the Counsel o f the parties. Individually, they 
may introduce, based on academic or personal experience, information in a specific case, which 
is, however, connected to the arguments presented by the parties. It would be considered odd to 
introduce arguments which had not been introduced by the parties. Parties may make, and have 
made, comparative observations. The information comes also from the cross-examination of the 
advocates when dealing with the questions containing European elements.
Even where sufficient resources (library, own collections of academic literature) are 
available, direct comparative observations seem to be rare. Comparative influences thus seem to 
be indirect. It looks as if the use of comparative law as a source of argument depends on the 
individual law lords, and upon how beneficial the undertaking of comparative reasoning is 
considered to be.
Traditionally, it has been similar jurisdictions and legal systems which have been 
considered (also in the explicit reasoning) such as the United States and European and common 
law countries. Comparative aspects and experience may be influential also where law lords sit on 
the Privy Council as judges1099 10.
In conclusion, we may note that at the moment, general influences thus seem to 
derive from the legal systems of Germany and North America.
2.2.3.2. Sweden
In Swedish legal thought, comparative arguments have been classified as a source 
of law, which may be taken into account. Comparative observations can be used according to 
Swedish doctrine if they are not incompatible with Swedish law and Ordre Public.1,00
1091 On the procedure, see Judicial work of the House of Lords, House o f  Lords, Session 1997-1998, internet 
www.Parliament.the-statione..., p.4-5 of 7.
1099 Though its role has diminished in recent years.
1100 Peczenik, A., Bergholz, G., 1991, p.329.
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Comparative observations can be used to support the interpretation of a domestic statute.1101
Comparative observations can be employed so as to use a distinction made or to
ask a question asked in another system. The solution can be substantiated directly by a decisions,
or by a doctrine. Both empirical (or also moral) reason have been used.1102
The influence may also be based on the perceived authority of a foreign institution.
This authority may be the result of the following circumstances:1103
a historical relationship between systems, 
international law (eg. conventions),
foreign law, which has influenced an international legal instrument,1104
uniform legislation (eg. Nordic Cooperation),
harmonization process (eg. Nordic Council recommendations, 1974),
The authority of foreign materials (rules and interpretations) may exist even despite 
the harmonization of statutory rules. Here the authority is based on its ability to provide good 
justifications, or it is due to the fact that the court in question is highly respected.
Common Scandinavian laws have been interpreted quite similarly.1105 However, 
common Scandinavian case-law has not developed, except in the field of maritime law.1106
From the interviews one can observe that comparative information is not regularly 
used in the Swedish Supreme Court, and that these types of studies are situationally made.
The studies in the Supreme Court is prepared by a research group. The court does 
not use external experts. As in Finland, the common Nordic laws may create a need to consult 
comparative material deriving from Nordic states. Here the interest is not only in the material 
law, but also in the grounding o f principles. In some commercial cases, United States legislation 
has been consulted, otherwise these studies are concentrated on major European legal systems. 
Parties may sometimes argue on a comparative basis1107.
1101 Peczenik, A., Bergholz, G., 1991, p.329-330.
1102 Peczenik, A., Bergholz, G., 1991, p.329-330.
1103 Peczenik, A., Bergholz, G., 1991, p.330.
1,04 Case NJA, 1983, p.3, study o f British system, especially the case Sandman v Breach [1927] concerning 
International Convention on Oil Pollution (1969).
1103 Peczenik, A., Bergholz, G., 1991, pp.330-331, referring to Eckhoff, T „ Rettskildalaere (2 ed., O slo) 1987, 
p.256.
1106 Peczenik, A., Bergholz, G., 1991, p.330, referring to Sundberg, J.W .F., Fradda Edda til Ekelof, Lund, 
Studenliteratur/AkademiskForlag, 1978, p. 183.
1107 An interesting case, for example, was the Sami case on property rights (HD, 1981:1, NJA 1,1981). Even though 
the case was decided on the basis of Swedish legislation, reference was made, by the parties, to the Canadian system 
o f treatment of minorities etc.
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In the realm of other types o f "international" arrangements, there seems to be an 
interest consulting the material norms of other systems. With regard to the European Community 
and European human rights system, attention is paid mainly to the law of these institutions. In the 
field of maritime law comparative material has been used.1108
If comparative material is used, the study includes cases and legislation and 
particularly international measures connected to the issue.
The use of comparative observations may be based on the need to interpret Swedish 
law rather than to "harmonization" it with the law of other systems.
The obstacles to using comparative law seemed to be based mainly on practical 
problems (especially time and resource constraints).
2.2.3.3. Finland
As mentioned, in Nordic countries, especially in Finland and in Sweden, there are 
many common statutory laws (eg. family and inheritance law). The legal traditions are similar in 
many fields o f law and legislative cooperation is (or at least was during the beginning o f the 19th 
century) quite active. Swedish precedents and doctrinal opinions are occasionally followed in the 
legal argumentation and in legal science. Court practice aside from Swedish practice has not 
often been followed.1109
Finland is a dualist country. In other words, international agreements are not legal 
sources of law for courts as such. They have to be transformed into Finnish law before they 
constitute applicable law in Finland. International models have been followed by the legislator in 
many fields of law (particularly with regard to ILO Conventions in the labour law field, the Bern 
Copyright convention concerning copyright).
The material was seen to be interesting from  the sociological po in t of view, although the court did not 
see any need to  use comparative elements presented by  the parties.
ll0< Also, Gronfors, K., The Interpretation o f International M aritime Conventions by Swedish Law Courts. In: 
Swedish National reports to the X m th International congress o f Com parative Law (Uppsala) 1990 (199-204). 
Especially English cases have been considered and even the English style of reasoning has been used, thus with some 
difficulties (ibid., p.202).
1,09 Aamio, A., 1991, p.139.
Klami has suggested (1980) that the paradigm  of com parative law  in Finnish legal dogmatics seems 
to  be that foreign law should be taken into consideration, especially Swedish material. However, clear distinctions 
should be made, and foreign cases and interpretative statem ents should not be used as primary arguments. On the other 
hand, when concrete interpretative recommendations are present, foreign legal writers should be used as discussion- 
sources (Klami, H.T., 1980, p .l 15).
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In Finnish courts, the use of international material in other ways is rare.1110 
However, European human rights decisions, databased in the archives of the Supreme Court, are 
used in the context o f justification constantly, and these observations appear occasionally in the 
justifications of Finnish Courts.1111
One example of explicit comparative reasoning can be mentioned. In this case, the 
Supreme Court o f Finland interpreted the doctrine of diplomatic immunity of a person working 
in a diplomatic mission in a case concerning contractual question.1112 The lower courts had 
justified the immunity based on an interpretation of international law, as set out in legal science. 
The Supreme Court produced the following justification:1113
"In international law, it has been maintained... In the legal literature and in the 
contemporary case law o f different countries, there is an established opinion that 
the immunity enjoyed by the state cannot be unrestricted. In the sphere o f the 
European Council, there is an International Covenant.... Finland is not part o f  
this agreement... However, this Treaty - and the basic principles it contains - has 
to be considered as a source o f the prevailing international customary law. 
Consequently,...
The Court examined the provisions of this treaty. After this inquiry, the Court 
maintained that
In the judicial practice o f states, which legal culture resembles the legal culture 
o f Finland, there have been cases, in which this question has been ... [the 
question in the case]... In these cases, states have been able to plea immunity in 
courts.... On the other hand, there have been cases... In these cases, state 
immunity has been rejected on the basis that this activity does not comprise an 
activity which is related to the functions normally associated with sovereignty”
The Supreme Court upheld the immunity o f the person.
It is evident that uses of explicit comparative justifications are rare1114.
On the basis of interviews conducted at the Finnish Supreme Court, it can be
lll0Aamio, A ., 1991, p.139.
1111 See, Scheinin, M., Human Rights in Finnish Law [Ihmisoikeudet Suomen oikeudessa] Jyvaskyla, 1991.
11.2 As we have seen, the comparative method has been associated, also in English Courts, with the idea o f  state 
immunity. On the “comparatively’' developed idea o f state immunity in W estern legal systems (Schreuer, C .H., State 
Immunity: some recent developments (Cambridge) 1988.
11.3 Translation author’s own. Case K K O :1993:120,30.9.1993.
11.4 In some legal systems, there have been explicit provisions prohibiting the use o f comparative law as a source of 
law. (See below).
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observes that in the internal reporting comparative observations can be made. The use is 
situational. These reports are only for the internal use (contextual use). Experts are no t 
used1115.These consultations of comparative material are not necessarily visible in the explicit 
justifications. However, comparative observations have an impact upon these interpretations.
The consultation can take place at different stages o f the internal procedure, and be 
discussed in the decision-making realm in an informal way.
It appears as if clerks may look to other systems more extensively. It was claimed 
that the depth of the study depends very much on the knowledge of the clerk working on that 
particular question. This seems to concern also the judges.
It was claimed that the consultation o f comparative legal information seems 
generally to be rare. However, it looks as if it may be done, if a strong link to another system is 
suggested, or where the domestic material is somehow lacking relevant data. This seems to  be 
typical in relation to so called "adopted" laws1116, or where striking formal similarity exists 
between the legal rules within two systems1117. On the other hand, comparative observations m ay 
be made in situations where an international measure constitutes the legal background o f  a 
measure. This is especially so in the case of Scandinavian legal cooperation. Rarely are o ther 
countries than European countries considered.
Studies of European human rights are made constantly. As mentioned, some 
scholars have prepared internal databases on this system1118.
Furthermore, it seems as if those functionaries who have also a academic interest 
in the area may follow comparative law development more. On the other hand, there are many 
"follow up -groups" concerning certain international conventions which result in comparative 
expertise able to be taken into account1119.
The parties rarely produce comparative law material. However, this may occur 
where interest in the subject is considerable. This material is taken into account by the court.
msThe Finnish Com m ercial Center has been consulted in a case involving "general trade practices".
11,6 Reference to Sw eden (property law, trade law ), Germany (especially criminal law), and Anglo-Saxon systems 
(especially arbitration) was made.
In the case o f procedural law, an study o f the United states system was mentioned.
In the case of Sea law consultation may be made.
,m  In France, see the statute dealing with the lim ited housing companies [Asunto-osakeyhtiolakil.
1111 The law  on the United Nations Convention on Civil and Political Rights Convention do not seem to be directly 
relevant.
11,9 Council o f Europe, Lugano Convention, Haag International Private Law, etc.
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Usually this type of reasoning by the parties is based upon the consultation of experts external to 
the institutional system.
As maintained, the idea has been customarily to research developments in 
Scandinavian countries. Studies of this nature are usually not claimed to be exhaustive. However, 
studies of, for example, Swedish jurisprudence are not rare (cases, scholarly opinions) and, in 
some cases, such consultation is even expected. This may be the result of the linguistic and 
historical connections between the two countries.1120 However, the conclusion o f this 
comparative observation maybe also that the legislation o r the jurisprudence differs too greatly.
The interest to make comparative observations may arise also in order to find 
arguments for a concrete case.
There seems to be no principled objections to reasoning and justification on a 
comparative basis. The main obstacles for comparative consultation were resources. On the other 
hand, in Court, there is a lot of material (laws, commentaries) presented from other countries, 
and because of the databases, the available material is ever-increasing.
One could form the view that more extensive comparative studies are needed. On 
the other hand, the "internationalization" o f law was seen a  factor, which may, and which already 
has (Council of Europe), resulted in some comparative legal considerations.
The Court seems to address its arguments mainly to the parties, but also to the 
general public, and to a certain extent to the Court itself for future cases. It was emphasised that 
the Court is mainly searching to establish a precedent.
There has been considerable developments in terms o f increasing the quality and 
range of justifications in Finnish legal system.1121
1120 See, the chapter on the Finnish comparative legislation above.
1,31 See also, Interpreting Statutes, 1991.
An historically interesting development took place in the 1945 proposal for Procedural Law 
[Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle laeiksi oikeudenkaymiskaaren... 24 luvun...muuttamisesta, 1945 vp. N:o 137].
Before that, based on the law  of 1734 (Sweden-Finland), judges were prohibited from referring to the 
‘‘law  of a foreign country” [“men utlansk lag, m& ej therwid utberopas”] o r from using foreign languages ["eller 
framman&e sprdk brukas"] in a  judgment (RattegSngsbalk 1734). This provision was even reenacted in the 1921 law 
(1 9 th  January 1921 [Hallituksen esitys 1921, N :o 31]). In the new 1945 proposal, and the Law on 1948, this was 
changed “because the use o f  foreign law becomes necessary in so called international private law cases, and, on the 
other hand, already the constitutional law fhallitusmuotoj paragraph ¡4 maintains that judgments cannot be given 
in a foreign language” [Hallituksen esitys, N:o 137).
O n English development on issue, Schmitthoff, M., 1941, p. 104.
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2.2.3.4. Germ any
In the German legal system, "general principles o f  international law form  a part 
o f constitutional law", referring to the general principles of international law recognized by 
civilized nations1122. The interpretations o f the German Constitutional Court are much in debted 
to the ideas prevailing in the United States Supreme Court1123.
However, comparative law as a source of law has evidently a limited role. This has 
been also recognized by the German Supreme Court. However, comparative arguments, 
nevertheless, do occur sometimes.1124 The use of comparative law occurs, where there is an
1122 Article 25 o f the Constitution. See also, Doethring, 1987, p.55. For som e cases, see 1 BVerfGE 332 (1952), 
June 13,1952. This case dealt with the question w hether one may enforce criminal law judgment, made in the Soviet 
occupied territories, in the Federal Republic o f Germany. The Court found no obstacles to this in this particular case. 
The Court recognizes the constitutional provisions, according to which this type o f enforcement is not possible, i f  the 
judgment is against the basic principles o r constitutional provisions of the federal legal system ("wesentliche 
recktsttatliche G runs ätze... Grundrechte”) . However, in this case there were no constitutional obstacles. The C ourt 
maintained that the principle o f equality is not touched upon by the judgment. Furthermore, the fact that the judgm ent 
was made in the absence o f the accused did not violate basic principles. This latter observation was backed up by 
observation (presented by the party, Bundcsjustizieministerium) that sentencing in absentia is allowed, in certain cases, 
also in other “Kulturländer”. A  special reference w as made to Austria (347). This reference was clearly made due to  
of the absence of existing domestic case law.
On the use in relation to general principles of international law , Drobnig, U., 1986, p.613 ff.
1123 Stem, K., Der S tatsrecht der Bundesrepublic Deutchland, vol 2 ,1 9 8 0 , p.331.
In general, and for some cases on the concretization o f the constitutional principles, see M össner, J.M ., 
1974, p.228 ff. (for example, cases BverfG, 1 ,154 , B verfG, 5 ,8 5  (135) KPD U rteil on Article 21 of the Constitution. 
A lso Drobnig, 1986,p.630. Aubin suggests that comparisons mainly complete, confirm and control the traditional 
solutions (1970, p.479). Sometimes references are only to the “contextual” use o f comparative law, without any trace 
of analysis (BverfG, 3, 225 (244) equality question).
See also BverfG, 18 ,112 (117) concerning "Kulturstaaten' and udemokratin der westlischen welf\  
BverfG, 20,162 (220-221) and for comparative law considerations of the status of the press, and other issues, BverfG 
1 97 (106), B verf 1 97  (101), BverfG 7, 198 (208). BverfG 7, 377 (415), BverfG 7, 29 (40, Austria and France 
considered).
See also, Aubin, B., 1970, p.458. Zweigert, K., Rechts Vergleichung als universale interpretazione. In: 
RabelsZ 15,1949/50, p.5-21.
Markesinis, B (1993, pp.632-533) has suggested that the English style of judgments and handling o f 
cases may be expected to have influence to Germ an legal system in the future.
1124 BGHZ, 86,240; Foreign judgments due solely to the fact that they are based on different laws are only o f limited 
relevance for German law  (Markesinis, B., 1990, p.4). On the rareness, see Drobnig, U., 1986, p.629. The court has 
given explicitly the preference of domestic arguments over comparative ones (“negative application”), and it has 
rejected foreign solutions (Aubin, B., 1970, p.471 ff. (480)). Comparative method is proposed as applicable (ibid., 
p.480).
BGHZ 101,215 (223), 30 June 1987 the Bundesgerichtshof has used some arguments from the United 
States and United Kingdom (eg. rescue doctrine) in justifying a non-liability role in the medical technology (see also, 
Markesinis, B., 1990, p .5 ). In the beginning o f  19th century, references were mainly to Austria (corporation law). In 
30’s, references were m ade to France, England and Switzerland. During the N azi regime, no references can be found. 
After the war the US system  has played an essential role (Aubin, B., 1970).
For 30  cases of jurisprudence of m ajor trading countries and international arbitral tribunals, examined 
by Langen being based upon comparative law  (Langen, Transnational commercial law (Leyden) 1973 p.214-215, see 
Mädl, F., 1978, p.9).
The Bundesgerichtshof has also maintained that courts are not entitled to use the techniques employed
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international connection. This connection is related to the existence of an international convention 
or to adoption in general or to the prevailing crossborder situation (conflict of laws, extradition, 
maritime law).1125
From the interviews one can observe that the use of comparative law is basically 
derived from the experience of judges in both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court 
in Germany. On the other hand, in the German Supreme Court, the opinions of the professors of 
some faculties or institutions of law may appear in the reasoning of some parties.
In the Constitutional Court, the preliminary research differs from case to case. 
There are sometimes comparative studies made. Research can be undertaken in the Court by the 
parties, especially by the federal government (mainly in cases pertaining to the private law 
sphere), which may use it also in reasoning. The Court can also ask academics or an institute to 
produce a study by an external expert1126.
Comparative studies are included in the memorandum of the reporting judge. 
Usually comparative studies deal with the systems of European states. Considerations based upon 
the United States system may sometimes appear as well.
Often aspects of human rights documents (European and United Nations) are 
presented by the parties.
Comparative studies consist only of statutory law and case law. Sociological 
information derives usually only from the domestic sphere. However, it seems to be useful for the 
court to follow developments in other European countries. This seems to concern especially 
French and English law and social discourses.
There are private collections of political, legal, sociological material which may be 
used individually, and foreign newspapers may be looked at as well. Furthermore, active links 
exist with foreign courts and visits to courts in other countries may take place.
in the interpretation of German law in interpreting international agreements (BGHst 12, (36)).
See also, Alexy, R, 1991, p.73. He refers to a following type of argumentation by the German 
Constitutional court:
"A look at foreign regulations shows that in the same or nearly the same version of the text o f the 
statute the wide interpretation o f the concept of dwelling predominates (compare for example for 
Switzerland BCE 811,U9ff.; for Austria the constitutional Court's decisions o f November 22nd, 
1932, Nr.I486, March 14th, 1949, Nr. 1747, July 2nd 1955, Nr.2867. and December 16th, 1965, Nr 
5182, as wellasErmacora, Handbuch derGrundfreiheiten und der Menchenrechten, 1963, 241; for 
Italy: Encyclopedia del diritto XIII (1964), 859ff.; and Faso, La Libertà di domicilo, 1968, 34 ff„ 
for the USA the Dissenting Opinion of the Justice Frankfurter in the case of Davis v United States, 
June 10th, 1946 - 328 US 582,596f -  and see v City of Seattle, June 5th, 1967 - 387 US 541).
1123 Drobnig, U., 1986, p.629.
1126 Studies has been produced for example in some family law cases. See also, Heide. H.. 1994, p.732.
UThe comparative material seems to be relevant when circumstances change» and the 
factual events in question are unprecedented. In these cases it seems to be important to know 
what people may think1127. Comparative reasoning appears when there is a need for an 
"adaptation to a new situation", a need to show that "in other states such an idea does not exist", 
to demonstrate that "other systems have hesitated in adopting such a solution", or merely to  
show that other solutions exist. Comparative interpretation seems to be aimed mainly at domestic 
interpretation rather than "harmonization".
The main obstacles for the consultation o f comparative material seem to be 
procedural economic (i.e. time and resource constraints). However, unfamiliarity with 
comparative sources may also cause some hesitation.
The European human rights system is considered in many cases due to its similarity 
to the German system of basic rights.
The systems within the various "Länder" can also be compared1128.
One gets the impression that the Constitutional Court seems to address its 
arguments to the general public and politicians. This results in an attempt to be transparent and 
comprehensible.
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2.2.3.5. Italy
The rules of “other legal orders” are applied in Italian courts when this is necessary 
according to the principles of international law. The European Declaration o f Human rights is 
also occasionally referred to when interpreting Italian statutes.
Interviews seemed to indicate that the use of comparative law in the Supreme Court 
is not extensive. In fact, the interviews seemed to show that systematic use of these observations 
do not occur at all. Explicit references to comparative observations are also not made. The 
possibility of making comparative observations was recognized, however, especially where the 
facts are new, or when an legal institution is adopted from another legal system.
The main obstacles may be due to language problems and impediments may also 137
1137 In this context the reference was made to the question of homosexual m arriage, where the Danish situation was 
examined, for example.
u:* Reference has been made, for instance, to a  case dealing with com pulsory fire protection for men.
t
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arise due to historical factors and legal cultural considerations. If comparative influences do occur 
this is seen as a matter of comparative law education.
In the Constitutional Court, by contrast, the use o f comparative information seems 
to be a matter o f systematic study. In 1987, there has been the Autonomous Section for 
comparative Constitutional Law (Sezione Autonoma di Diritto constituzionale comparato) 
established, consisting of foreign lawyers (two groups of eight persons). They studied 
constitutional systems for two years."29 This generated 1989 the establishment of a relatively 
permanent department for the making o f comparative studies for the Court. Even if this 
department appear to be extremely small, it, nevertheless, publishes comparative information for 
the internal use of the Court.
In the beginning o f its existance this section made studies concerning questions 
related directly to cases before the Court, and since 1989 it began to study jurisprudence and 
doctrine of foreign and comparative constitutional law. It also arranged some visits to  foreign 
institutions.
The department making comparative studies has been producing material, for 
example, concerning difficult cases in fields as diverse as human rights, criminal law, and family 
law. The studies seem to be directly related to a particular case before the court. These inquiries 
often contain an examination of the political context of the law in each the system (for example, 
a  newspaper review). The material from which the information is derived is sometimes included 
within the internal report. No sociological or cultural aspects are examined.
The information is used differently according to the preferences of each member of 
the court, and the attitude towards this comparative information seems to differ considerably 
between different members.
These studies do not necessarily have a direct impact upon the explicit justifications 
o f the court. They usually belong to the context of justification and in this way may influence the 
functioning o f the C ourt."30
In the argumentation of some cases before the establishment of the department 
(1980-1987) one has used expressions such as "other states o f  the European Community...**, “the 12930
1129 The source also thè document Servizio Studi. Sezione Autonoma di diritto constituzionale comparato. Elenco 
de i quaderni e di lavoro della Sezione Autonomade diritoo constituzionale com parato del Servizio Studi, dalla sua 
instituzione - giugno 1987 - al dicembre 1992 (CORTE CONSTITUZIONALE, Segreterìa generale, gennaio 1993. 
Prof. Sandulli, S., Consigliere preposto alla Sezione Autonoma di diritto constituzionale comparato del Servizio Studi)).
1130 Pegoraro, L., 1987, p.607.
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experience o f other countries*..., *\..the solution in European states does not differ substantially  
from  the solution in Italy...”, "... the Supreme Court o f  the United States maintained..”, ”In  
most countries...”, ”... in various foreign legislations..."  etc.1131 It seems that the most interest 
is in the systems of France, Germany, United Kingdom, and the United States.1132 In some cases, 
many diverse countries have been mentioned.1133
There are also informal channels of communication administrations of different 
courts in Europe, which are used for informal consultation.1134
2.2.3.6. France
In the Supreme Court of France (Cour de Cassasion), the administration makes a n  
independent study o f the legal question submitted to the court. One may claim, however, th a t 
there is no considerable and systematic use o f comparative law in the Supreme Court of France 
(Cour de Cassasion).1135 These observations do not appear neither frequently in the opinions o f  
the Advocate Generals of the Supreme Court (Cour de Cassasion).1136 However, in som e 
administrative cases (Counseil d’Etat) the commissaire du gouvernement has given comparative 
consideration to certain aspects.
There seems to be some enthusiasm in the Conseil Constitutionnel to consider o th e r 
constitutional regimes in Europe.1137
In a particular case, the administration often examines the law of the European 
human rights systems. This is noticeable also in the conclusions of the commissaire du  
gouvernements.
1,31 For a list of cases and some analysis, see Pegoraro, L., 1987, pp.601-612. A part from finding elasticity, the C ourt 
seems to search for rational and more permanent tendencies (ibid., pp.612-613). For some analysis, see de Vergotti, 
G., 1993, pp.12-15.
,m  Pegoraro, L , 1987, pp.609-610.
1.33 Pegoraro, L , 1987, pp.603-605.
1.34 No interviews were made with judges.
These observations are supported also in the light o f  the doctrinal discussion which exists concerning 
the use o f comparative law  in Italy, see Pizzorusso, A ., 1983, pp. 109-113.
1135 Also, Legeais, R ., 1994, p .3 4 8 ,354 ff.. T his does not mean that comparative law should not be used (idem.).
1,36 One may see some comparative argumentation in some opinions (such as M . Dontenwille; L*article 1384 alinéa 
1 du Gxle Civil: source résurgente (Germany, Quebec, Algeria, Egypt, Japan) (Rapport de la Cour de Cassasion, 1991 
pp.82-84),
1137 Legeais, R., 1994, pp.356-357.
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Legal sources are mainly the texts, doctrine, precedents and fundamental decisions, 
and some reasoning by analogical.113* Comparative law just does not seem to have a direct role 
as a legal source. Influences may arrive via conferences and other types of discussions, or via 
some kind o f internal use, which is inspirational and may be observed only indirectly.* 1139 This is 
so even if in the travaux préparatoires there are references to the legislation o f other countries.
In private international law and some other types of cases, having an “international” 
connection, the consultation of foreign law may be, however, obligatory. This type of use is not 
very developed.1140 External experts are not usually used.1141
The lack of comparative observations seems not to be the result o f procedural 
economic obstacles, but, in general, there does not seem to be any great interest in this type of 
material, not even in internal discussions.1142
Nevertheless, attitudes seem to be changing.1143
2.2.3.7. The Netherlands
There has been some use of comparative observations in the Supreme Court o f the 
Netherlands:1144
'7/i accordance with what has been accepted in that country and with what was 
then accepted in neighbouring countries (France, Belgium, Germany and 
England) under statutory judicial law", the damages fo r  nonmaterial damage must 
be reasonable and ju st ".
There was also a case in which the Court applied comparative information and 
based its decision (using also other interpretative methods) on uniform rule of civil law. In this
,m  Tropcr, M ., Grzegorczyk, C., Gardies, J -L , 1991, p.171 ff.
1,39 Legeais, R ., 1994, pp.355-357.
1,40 Comparative observations may be made, to  a certain extent, in cases o f  private international, maritime, 
administrative, and criminal law, having an international connection. There are however, some difficulties to observe 
this (also, Legeais, R., 1994, pp.353-354 ff.).
tu> On the development o f the legal informatics in France, see Linant de Bellefonds, X., U tilisation dun “systeme 
expert” en droit compard. In: Rev.InLDr.Comp., 1994, p. 703 ff.
1.42 See also, Bdzard, O ., 1994, p.776-777. Reasons seem to be procedure econom ic and cultural. Documentation 
exists. European integration is conceived strictly institutionally (ibid., p .778-779).
1.43 Legeais, R ., 1994.
1144 See, Kisch, I., 1981 and his analysis.
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case, there was extensive citation from the decisions of some other European countries (A ustria, 
France, Germany and Switzerland)1145.
The argumentative constructions were not based on historical connections betw een 
different legal systems (i.e. combination o f historical and comparative method), but, rather, th ey  
viewed foreign solutions as a model.1146
2.2.3.8. United States
Before the revolution, English statutory principles were not applied in American 
courts obligatorily. There was a relative freedom in terms of their treatment. The statutes w ere  
considered, if they were considered suitable to the prevailing conditions1147. There were a lso  
"reenactments" o f certain statutes by the provinces.1148
After the revolution, they gained, in general, an interpretative value1149. In the 18th 
century, English law lost its normative value, and its use was even prohibited in certain states.1150 
However, the trend revived in the 1950’s .1151
Comparative interpretation seems to be a “legally” accepted method o f  
interpretation in the United States.1152
In the states of the United States the drafting o f the Model Penal Code has resulted
n4S For a similar case in the Supreme Court of N ew  Jersey, see Greensban v Slate, 12 NJ 4 2 6 ,97A .2T 390 (1 9 5 3 ).
1146 For an example o f  how comparative law is used in the Netherlands (see Koopmans, T .t 1996, p .5 4 5 ,551). F o r 
analytical and example type of reasoning, see Advocate General Hartkamp, Hooge raad, 9 ocl 1992, N.J., 1994, p .2474  
if. (ibid., p.535) referring to the Supreme Court o f  California, 607 P.2d 949 (Cal.1980) in the matter concerning the  
market shared product liability. The court rejected this reasoning. The Code Civil was used as the basis. On case law , 
see also Koopmans, T ., 1996, p.555. See also Hoge Raad 7, Mei 1993, nr. 8152., p. 1175 if. (N.J. 1995).
See, furthermore, Kisch, I., 1981, and another example, Hooge Raad, Van Kreuningen v Bessem, 21 
May 1943, Nederlandse Jurisprudence N J . ,  1943 ,455 .
1147 Gray, J.C., 1972, p.197. For some history, see Gordley, J., 1995, p. 558 ff.
,,48South Carolina, year 1712 (Gray, J.C., 1972 p.197).
1149 Gray, J.C., 1972, pp.244-245. Especially French and Dutch influences.
MS0 Gray, J.C., 1972, p.243. On developments in general, Hug, P., 1932, p.1068.
1151 Schlesinger, R .B., 1980, p.9.
,IJI See, Schlesinger, R.B., 1980, p.6 ff., mentioning cases, for example, concerning the working hours o f women, 
etc.
Schlesinger identifies some evolution and diverse elements o f  the doctrines o f comparative law from 
the applied comparative law in common law (ibid., p.45 ff.):
- foreign law as a fact (based on Lord M ansfield 's idea from the 18th century);
• comparative law treated as a  modification o f a statute o r a source of innovation;
- the techniques o f proving and studying foreign law.
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numerous references and considerations to comparative law aspects, particularly regarding its 
application. In this context, comparative interpretation has been claimed to be either indirect or 
direct. By the indirect comparison is meant comparative references to foreign textbooks or law 
review articles which, in turn, themselves use comparative material.1153
The direct use of comparative interpretation has been seen, for example, in cases 
dealing with certain contractual questions1154. In certain negligence cases, a combination of 
interstate and indirect international comparison has been employed.1155 The need for comparative 
analysis in these cases was based on the fact that the legislation was an example o f the common 
law.1156 The court seemed to deal basically with question concerning change in the doctrine, and 
whether this could established by the court before the legislator. Furthermore, the question was 
also about the evaluation of a new and the old doctrine and their definitions1157. The solution 
adopted was that judge made law can be changed by the courts. The code was considered only 
to be a declaration o f the common law. Apart from comparative reasoning, the “new” doctrine 
was adopted on the bases of fairness and equity. The court also maintained in its reasoning that 
similar legislative practices existed in 25 states of the US. The content of the doctrine was based 
on an interstate comparison with a critical review of the alternative practice in one particular 
state1158.
In the United States, comparative references have taken place constantly in the field 
o f maritime law. In some cases, comparison has been undertaken because, on certain points, there 
was no regulation on that point by the national legislature. These references have concerned 
Roman law as codified in Spain (Consolato del mare), the Amalfitan Code of Naples, the Laws *1356
1.33 Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982, p.87. This practice concerning the use o f  law review references has turned the system 
closer to continental practice than to the English common law practice (ibid. p .88).
An extensive study of the use o f comparative law has been presented by Schlesinger (1980).
1.34 The supreme Court o f New Jersey used, in its argumentation, the French, Germ an, Italian and Swiss Civil Codes 
(Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N J .  426 ,97  A.2d 390 (1953).
1135 For example, U  v. Yellow cab Co. o f California, 13 cal. 3d 8 0 4 ,5 3 2  P.2d v l2 2 6 ,119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) 
(see, Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982, pp.88-89). The interstate and international comparisons can be claimed to  be 
methodologically quite sim ilar (Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982, p.95).
1136 U v. Yellow cab Co. o f California, pp.8I4-815 and pp.855-856. The reference was made to the Lousiana Civil 
code, Code Napoleon, to New York and English cases referred already in the drafting, and the relationship between the 
Field Civil code and the history of French conceptualization (Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982, pp.89-90).
1,37 Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982, pp.89-90.
1131 Li v. Yellow cab Co. California, p.875.
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of Oleron from France, and the Hanse Towns Laws, o f Germanic origin.1159 The application o f
these laws was considered acceptable because of the "wisdom and experience, evidence in the
particular maritime institutions o f other commercial countries..". Furthermore, these laws were
"guides", and in similar cases had a "high and exemplary im p o r ta n c e This was due to the fact
that it was "safer to follow them than to trust entirely to the varying and crooked line o f
discretion".11*0 This application was based also on adaption of the common law to America.1161
This type of comparative interpretation has had a considerable impact upon the
maritime law of the United States.1162 These references have been based on the fact that a great
number of countries (indeed, most countries) have ratified or acceded to the rules. Fairness and
flexibility seem to be main ideas behind the interpretation of maritime law.1163
The development of commercial law, the law of contracts, and the law of bailment
in United States has been also interpreted in the light o f the civil law influences.1164
Interstate (American) comparative interpretation is also commonly practised. The
restatement of law, for example, serves as a basis for this interstate comparison.1165
One interesting concept appearing in the discussion concerning comparative
interpretation in United states is the concept o f "rational s e le c t io n The opinion of the Supreme
Court of Texas explains the nature of this idea:
" The rules o f  the Common law have never been considered obligatory, as matter 
of absolute principle, on questions o f practice; but our court have either adhered 
to their former practice, or have adopted such rules o f their own as seemed 
dictated by considerations o f  policy and convenience, rather than pursue the 
common law practice, where the rule which is afforded was found to be unsuited 
to our system, or inconvenient o f  application.1166"
1159 Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982, p.77 ff., referring to Thompson v. Catherina, 23 F. Cas. 1028 (D. Pa. 1795) (No. 13, 
929).
1160 Case Thompson, p . 1030.
1161 Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982, p.79.
1162 Cases, US Suprem e Court, Moragne v. States Unes Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), and United states v. Reliable 
Transfer, 421 U.S. 397 (1975) (Maritime Torts, referring to the Brussels Collision Liability Convention of 1910).
nH See also Zaphiriou, G.A., 1972, p.79.
1164 Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982, p.81. Schlesinger, R .B., 1980, p.6 ff.
,lH Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982, p.82.
This restatem ent of law was prepared, by commencing with the establishment o f the American law 
Institute, 1923 and w ith the association w ith many legal institutions in the United States, to be the restatement in the 
field of private law, judgm ents, the conflicts o f law, and the law of international relations as a orderly statement o f the 
common law o f the U nited States (ibid., p.82).
1166 Grassmeyer v. Beeson, 13 Tex., 524, 531 (1855) (referred by Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982).
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By means of this ’rational selection’ doctrine the Texas system was influenced by 
both common law and civil law traditions1167.
Another interesting directive for comparative interpretation can be found in a case 
of the Californian Supreme court which decided to interpret the applicable law (Civil Code) in the 
light of foreign common law influences
"except in those instances, where its language clearly and unequivocally discloses 
an intention to depart from, alter; or abrogate the common law concerning a 
particular subject matter1168".
It has been claimed that this led, to a certain extent, eclecticism in the adoption of 
law. The same phenomenon is visible in many states of the United States.1169 It has been 
suggested that states tend to form groups in following one technique.1170
The American experience seems to indicate that it is in the nature of the subject 
which determines the "rationale'1 of the comparison. Furthermore, it seems to  be clear that the 
common language and the reliability of the information encourage a comparative approach and 
comparative interpretations.1171
Comparative interpretation, interstate and international, in United States courts 
seems to consist of the examination of the antecedents of a legal principle or rule, its functioning, 
its economic and social justifications, its suitability for the general and procedural framework of 
the adaptive system, and the "philosophy of the system". This philosophy relates to the 
conservative or progressive character of the system.1172
The decline of the use of comparative law in United States courts may be associated 
with the rise of the Anglo-American science of law, the increasing dominance of the historical 
jurist, analytical jurisprudence, and the growing emphasis upon local sovereignty and 
nationalism.1173 *
1167 Zaphiriou, G A ., 1982, p.76.
1161 Case Estate ofElizalde, 182 cal. 4 2 7 ,4 3 3 ,1 8 8  P. 560,562, (1920) (referred by Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982).
1,69 Zaphiriou, G A ., 1982, p.77.
1170 Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982, p.93.
1171 Zaphiriou, G A ., 1982, p.91.
1,72 Zaphiriou, G.A., 1982, p.91.
1173 This was related to  the "judicial doctrine" orientation in the study and the teaching of law in the United States 
(see Capelletti, M., 1990b.
The development of comparative law was connected to the establishment o f the nation state 
(Koopmans, T ., 1996, p.548, Coing, H., 1978, p .31).
It might be that the practice of comparative interpretation, for exam ple, is due to the rise o f nationalism
2.2.4. The internal conflict of laws
It is quite evident that comparative law does not have the same meaning in the 
practice of all countries. Furthermore, in relation to some systems, some functions could be easily 
considered as "comparisons", whereas in relation to other systems they do not necessarily appear 
to be comparisons or comparative law at all. For example, a ‘‘comparison” of English, Canadian, 
New Zealand, Australian experience has not been unambitiously seen as a "legal comparison" and 
to belong to the realm of comparative law ll74. However, these types of references would be most 
likely be classified by a continental lawyer as comparative law. This fact is related to different 
conceptions of law.
This also concerns the phenomenon referred to as internal conflict of laws.
The idea of the internal conflict of laws refers to  the possibility o f looking into 
conflicts between normative (legal) systems from within one legal system.1,75 These divergences 
can be territorially, culturally, or personality based* 1176. This type of decision-making is strongly 
public policy oriented, and the comparative method is used in a  study of local legal systems in 
their own context (eg. ideologies, stages o f technical development, etc.)1177. Problems, on the 
other hand, occur in examining questions such as, what really is “proper law” what are the 
connecting factors between identified systems (of norms), and what really is the "tertium 
comparationis".
An idea has been proposed that comparison, in this context, should proceed by 
examining what is compared, identifying differences and similarities, explaining differences and 
similarities1178. In this sense, the whole process of comparison is an extensive comparative 
discourse on all problems of comparative law, and, for that matter, on the systems themselves as
and the criteria presented by Pound. However, another perspective m ust also be taken into account. W e are also 
speaking about open and closed comparative influences.
For an extensive study on the comparative law in the Courts o f  United States, see Schlesinger, R.B.,
1980.
1.74 Hazard, J.N ., 1973. In Australia, see Bates, F., 1981, p.259 ff.
1.75 Sanders, A.J.G.M ., 1990, p.57.
1176 See, Benet T.V ., 1985, p.65. The criteria for application are related to  expectations, life styles, secondary 
agreements, nature of transactions, forms used, situation o f action and property etc.
1,77 Sanders, A.J.G.M ., 1990, p.6.
ll7g Sanders. A J.G .M ., 1990, p.62.
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such (a “formative” process). This idea does not, however, explain the particular distinctiveness 
o f this phenomenon or provide an approach to it.
The possibility of moving from ethnocentrism in this type of internal conflict o f laws 
may be possible, if one applies a discourse principle, and lets the parties, to a certain extent, 
“speak for themselves" and for their legal system1179. Here we come, however, quite close to 
questions o f political integrity.
2.2.5. Com parative law in mixed courts
Comparative law has been of great use in so-called mixed courts1180. In 19th century Egypt, for 
example, there was a mixed court interpreting Egyptian private international law and some other 
legal questions. The court consisted of judges from different countries and they discussed legal 
questions with the help of comparative observations, often based on their own experiences.1181 
The mixed court had an enormous role in establishing and defining the law of that system.
2.3. The case of private international law
G eneral observations. Contemporary private international law is based on the primary rule 
which claims that national systems have their own private international law rules and rules 
concerning the conflict of laws1182. The legal basis rests, in other words, upon the private 
international rules of each system, though many "general" principles can also be applied. Here the 
idea is not to go into details regarding this question. The main focus is in the role of comparative 
law in the choice of law situations1183 *.
1179 Sanders, A.J.G.M ., 1990, p.64. This could be called some kind o f “functional legal multiculturalism and 
pluralism”.
1,80 Baxter, L G ., 1983.
By m ixed legal systems one can understand systems derived from two or more systems generally 
recognized as independent o f others (Mcknight, J., 1977, p.77),
1181 Hill, E., 1978, p.299. They were abolished 1949.
11,1 This seems to be so, even if  one can say that private international law is a branch o f law, or a legal
discipline, within a system o f municipal law (Kahn-Freund, O., 1976).
1113 The terms private international law and conflict of laws seem  to be used interchangeably, the former in
continental European, and the latter in the English speaking countries (Kahn-Freund, O., 1976, p.2).
In private international law  there are three central problems: the choice of law, choice of forum, and
the choices of the extent to which the substantive rules o f the "foreign" law will be considered and applied (ibid., p. 3).
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In terms of choice o f law, there are basically two approaches. One is the strict 
selection approach, and the other is the functional-instrumental approach1184. The first seems to  
be based on the idea that divergences between rules are relatively few, or that it is quite difficult 
to establish an intelligible study o f  another system.1185 By contrasts, the functional-instrumental 
approach appears to be concerned with relevant policies and general expectations.1186
Now, it is evident that comparative law has a role in matters of private international 
law. This is due to several characteristics. Basically, because in private international law we are 
dealing with many laws, some kind o f comparison is clearly needed1187. Furthermore, the idea 
behind the application of conflict rules is clearly to evaluate whether there are material differences 
between systems.1188 The conflict rules do not result in clear rules which enable a solution to  be 
found. One requires comparative processes. If comparisons are not made, the justification is a  - 
"facade" justification o f the solution1189.
On the other hand, according to some conflict of law rules, the foreign law can even 
be an obligatory source of law (with the exceptions of public policy).1190 In this case, foreign law  
has to be applied to the case. To be able to determine the applicability and content of those rules, 
one has to study, comparatively, foreign law in relation to the law of one’s "own" system.1191
Some w riters have envisaged a quite extensive the role for comparative law in conflict situations 
(“Agreement must be reached so that one and the same international relation will everywhere be subject to the same 
rule in all national systems”, David, R., Brierly, 1978, p.10).
I, M Von Mehren, A .M ., 1975, p.751 ff.
II, 5 Von Mehren, A .M ., 1975, p.752.
m6 Von Mehren, A .M ., 1975, pp.755-756.
,1S7 De Boer, Th.M., 1994, p.16. See, Valladao, H., 1961, p. 108.
,1M De Boer, Th.M., 1994, pp.18-19. Com parative law is used in these processes for finding genuine conflicts o r 
similarities between systems.
m9 Von Mehren, A .T., 1975, p.752.
The solution to the interpretation o f the international private law may be determined by the quality o f  
the decision, not only by the institutional authority (M id i, F., 1978, p.9, referring to Langen, 1973). The judge can be 
called a mediator between systems).
The choice o f law needs com parative method in terms o f substantiation of the choice of law question 
and justification. The choice - based on national rules - does not lead to any conclusions concerning the relationship 
between these systems, and in that sense the com parative analysis may be seen - to a certain extent - to be unim portant
The comparative argumentation is institutional, unless there is a rich comparative law tradition in the 
national discourse. Even foreign authors can be of importance.
1190 For example, Sw iss Federal International P rivate law Code, Article 16.
m i Some analysis, Erecinski, C., 1978, p.208. On the relativization, Schlesinger, R.B., 1962/63, p .7 I.
Comparative law gains im portance in  the situations o f  ordre public, where the basic principles o f the 
lex fori seem to conflict with the law of the foreign system.
The basic difference between comparative law as such and comparative law in private international 
law can be seen in their obligatoriness. C hoice o f law  rules generate obligatory and allowed uses of comparative law,
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The most favourable solution may exist in terms of the choice of law, if the 
comparative analysis reveals unclear, non-acceptable or otherwise problematic solutions. Within 
choice of law, preference is given to the national system, and this is justified in terms o f national 
public policy. However, often the use of public policy is based on non-consideration of 
divergences1192. It has been maintained that the choice of law approach, which neglects 
comparative law, can become unpredictable and neglect the idea o f decisional harmony. This may 
increase the use of the public policy exception.
A approach known as non-choice, i.e. that no choice has to be made because no 
differences exist, is also connected to comparative observations.1193 In these cases, comparative 
law is a method for arriving at a solution. This leads usually to the law of the lex fo ri, but also to 
the so called "cumulative application of systems”.1194
The role o f foreign law in private international law can be also contrasting. 
Although comparative law is used, the justification can be "translated" into the terms of the 
system.1195
The comparative method can be used also in shaping the conflict rules1196, and in 
their study and dissemination1197. One can attempt to find common solutions1198.
Some remarks on the nature o f comparative law in private international law. In private 
international law, there seems to be two possibilities with regard to the possible approaches to
whereas comparative practice as such can practically never be obligatory, unless som e internal rules o f an organization 
so determine.
1.92 Von Mehren, A.T., 1975, pp.752-753.
However, the difference between comparative law (as such) and comparative law, related to the choice 
o f law rules, is that no prior idea o f better or most favourable law exists in the realm  of the choice of law. In the choice 
o f  law  the national law is the premise, and even if foreign rules are applied, this takes place in the realm o f national 
private international law rules.
There are some national rules - for example, in Swiss international private law rules, as we have seen - 
w here preference is given to the solution, which refers to the "most favourable result” (Swiss Statute on Private 
International, EC  Contracts Convention, Article 5 2 ,6 1 ).
An example of the restrictions upon the considerations o f the foreign law (20th century, BGB Article 
30): "Die Anwendung des ausländischen Gesetzes ist ausgeslossen, wenn die Anwendung gegen die guten Sitten oder 
gegen der Zweck eines deutches Gesetzes verstossen würde".
1193 De Boer, Th.M., 1994, p.19, D ’Oliveira, H .U .J, 1981, p.51 ff.
1194 D'Oliveira, H.U.J., 1981.
1.93 De Boer, Th.M., 1994, p.18.
I196Loussouam, Y., 1981 ,p .l31 .
1,97 Kahn-Freund, O ., 1976, p.2.
119*Loussouam, Y., 1981,p,133.
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foreign law: it can be considered as a question of fact or o f law.1199 If it is considered as a  
question of fact, it does not have a "legal” status. In this case, the rules of evidence, and not only 
the legal analytical tools, seem to apply to the phenomena. If, on the other hand, the foreign law  
is seen as a "legal" feature, the legal analytical approach applies1200. However, the distinction 
between pure fact and law is not so clear cut1201.
The phenomenon of the burden of proof is related to the application of the rules o f  
evidence. Here the idea prevails that the content of law has to be shown. This recalls the 
comparative law principle that, should foreign law be taken into account rationally, the decision­
maker has to establish a certain degree o f legal analysis.1202
Comparison within decision-making can be made explicitly. However, foreign law  
is often not analysed. This may be relate to the idea that when the decision not to apply foreign 
law is based on explicit analysis, there exists a possibility o f consisting the solution on the basis 
that an improper analysis o f the foreign law took place and that an inadequate understanding o f  
it existed. Consequently, the use o f comparative law analysis is clearly connected to the question 
of persuasiveness. This may also be the reason why foreign law may is treated as a fact. As the 
question concerns the rejection o f foreign law as applicable law, this can be more easily 
accomplished when one can refer to the analysis, and not to the substance of the foreign law as 
such.
On the other hand, it has been maintained that comparison in private international 
law must be extremely nominalistic. This may be associated with its strict nature based on  
substantive principles o f civilized nations, good faith, equality and good conscience, pacta sund
For example, in principle, Germany as law, England as fact (Hartley, T .C ., 1996, p.273, Fentiman, R., 1992, 
p.142, on the history since Lord Mansfield (1700) in England and United States, Schlesinger, R.B., 1962, p.56 ff.). 
Comparison with different approaches to proof, see ibid, p.274 ff. The question is related to ex officio application and  
to the status o f the court (Hartley, T.C., 1996, p,273, Fentiman, R., 1992, p.149) or the use of statements made by (o r 
requested from) authoritative institutes (Fentiman, R., 1992, p. 145). However, in English courts, the foreign law is not, 
as such, treated "in equal footing” (Fentiman, R., 1992, p .l 43). For the process of proof (experts and judges 
considerations, etc), see Jolowicz, J.A., 1994, pp.748-750. For the history, practicality, and current "threats" by idea 
of "voluntary pleading”  by  Rome Convention, and on the role of already examined foreign law questions expressed in 
the Civil Evidence A ct, see ibid, p.143 ff., and pp. 155-156). The testimony o f  foreign law is, however, qualified by  
“demeneour, clarity and persuasiveness... [and] practical experience” , and, in  the end, by judges’ considerations o f 
analogy or ignorance (ibid., p p .146-148). For practical problems (solution itself, mistakes, unpredictability, costs) and 
policy issues (some degree o f predictability, general effectiveness and time-saving, flexibility - discouraging, however, 
access to courts and resulting unpredictability in general) (see ibid., p. 150 ff.).
1200 Ereciriski, C., 1978, p.206-207.
1201 For some analysis o f this and problem, see Kahn-Freund, O., 1976, pp .279-281. “A question o f fact of a peculiar 
kind” (see Fentiman, R ., 1992, p . l45 ff. A nd the English cases referred).
1102 In general on the p roo f o f foreign law, see Hartley, T.C., 1996, p.271 ff.
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servanda, etc.1203
It seems to be clear that in choice of law situations foreign law is treated as law 
more than merely as fact, even if certain ideas concerning the burden of proof may be applied. It 
also seems that because foreign law is treated in an "integrative manner'* (eg. by considering its 
basic principles to be applicable) and because, consequently, the conflict really seems to be a 
conflict of legal principles rather than conflict of legal rules, there is also a general legal integrity 
principle applied (adjudicative integrity). Furthermore, it looks like the tertium comparationis, 
in this case, is the legal system itself1204.
The differences and  similarities between com parative law and choice of law 
interpretations. We may claim that “comparative law” in private international law questions is 
not really comparative law in discursive sense. Namely, choices are usually justified on the basis 
o f national rules concerning conflict o f laws, although, sometimes, general principles are used. 
However, there is no attempt to justify any general principles for the international discourse, but 
the solution is determined not on the basis of generality or disparity in any scientific sense but on 
the basis o f public policy disparity and institutional premises. Using the terms of the discourse 
analysis, national and institutional legal opinions are decisive. The audience is not any 
comparative law opinion or opinion of any external institution or the general legal audience.
This difference can be explained also from another point o f view. In comparative 
law, as such, one does not have to make any choice o f legal norms or rules except before the 
comparison is undertaken, and not always even then. Comparative considerations, in choice of 
law interpretation, on the other hand, aims to identify the choices of the one best interpretation. 
However, it is basically the internal rules o f the system which are interpreted1205. The limits come 
from the "ordre public" of each o f the legal systems. In comparative law, on the other hand, there 
are only a few methodological instructions governing the choice o f "suitable" material for the 
comparative survey, if any at all.
In this sense, we may say that even if the method o f comparison is used, one cannot 
speak of a genuine comparative interpretation. Nevertheless, there are also some similarities in
1203 For some analysis, Kahn-Freund, O ., 1976, p.279.
1204 For example, if the acceptability o f  foreign rules, as applicable law, is contested, the metarule o f "public policy" 
can  apply. This concept makes it possible to maintain that the law o f another country is law at the same tim e as it is 
rejected as applicable law.
1205 The comparative process is restricted to the legally regulated extent o f comparison.
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approach. The comparative interpreter, using comparative law as a source of law, restricts, in  
general, the possible considerations by reference to some subjective criteria which do n o t  
necessarily differ greatly from the "ordre public" considerations. However, both choice o f la w  
and the comparative interpretation have their specific practical purpose, which thoroughly  
conditions the process. In the choice of law, there is no need, for example, to increase know ledge 
and understanding o f legal phenomena as such.1206
International commercial arb itration . The role o f comparative law, in the international 
commercial arbitration, is extremely practical and elementary1207. In fact, it is the primary source 
of practice in this sphere. This applies to the drafting o f the rules, to the arbitration itself, and to  
the choice of the place and law of the arbitration.1208 Comparative law determines the possibilities 
for all these elements of the arbitration, and, by determining those "strategic" choices, it has an  
impact to the outcome itself1209.
In international commercial arbitration one usually departs from the rules of o n e  
system, takes into account general principles, and makes a comparative evaluation of certain 
aspects of the laws1210.
The comparative legal aspect is connected to  the international nature o f th e  
disputes, and, moreover, to the fact that the parties are often o f different nationalities. On the  
other hand, the applicable law may not be referred to at all in the contract. In such cases, the 
comparative aspects are usually considered at the end o f the decision-making, where the 
applicable law is determined.1211
In cases o f "Lex Mercatoria" comparative law seems to be the only source1212 *. The
1206 Schmitthoff, M . (1941, p. 107 ff.) Has maintains that “applied comparative law begins just where the Conflict 
o f laws end\ namely in examining the contents o f the different legal systems and submitting the transaction to that 
system which is the most appropriate to it”.
1207 Valladao, H ., 1961, p .l 12. It has even been claimed that the interest in comparative law in commercial law is  
a result of the “universal” nature o f the latter ib id .,, referring to Jaeger, P.G., Comparazione e  diritto commerciale. In: 
L 'apporto della com parazione alia scienza giuridica (Milano), 1980 , p.303.
l2M Gaillard, E ,  1988, pp.283-284, 288.
1209 Gaillard, E ,  1988, pp.285-286.
12,0 See, for exam ple SPP Middle East Limited and Southern Pacific Proprieties Limited v Arabic Republic o f  
Egypt and the Egyptian General Company.,., ICC Arbitration N r YD/AS nr 3493, International Commercial Code
of Arbitration, 11 m arch 1983 (International Law reports Vol 86, 1991, Cambridge, p.435-458). Studying the 
governing law, para. 49*51. See Jolowicz, J.A., 1994, p.754 ff.
12M Gaillard, E ,  1988, p.287.
12,2 Gaillard, E ,  1988, p.288.
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interesting feature is that one can include all comparative aspects, comparison of the rules of 
international conventions, national laws, practices of different level institutions etc., within the 
idea of "Lex Mercatoria" comparison.
However, the role of comparative law in international arbitration does not differ 
considerably from the premises found in relation to private international law.1213
2.4. Public international law in international organizations
General rem arks. It has been claimed that the process of interpretation in the International 
Court of Justice is not a process bound by rules. On the other hand, it is agreed by many authors 
that in the interpretation of multilateral treaties, especially treaties establishing international 
organizations, the historical will o f the parties is not decisive but rather the most important 
element is the objective content of the rule.1214
The doctrines o f sources of law are fairly underdeveloped in international 
"systems". These systems* sources of law are in international treaties, in their interpretations, and 
in doctrinal discussions.
In historical terms, “comparative law” in public international law was determined 
by quite practical forms of cooperation and conflict resolution1215. However, international custom
1215 A case illustrating the choice o f law can be mentioned. In the case SPP (Middle East) Limited and Southern 
Pacific Properties Limited v. Arab Republic o f Egypt and Egyptian general Company for Tourism and Hotels (ICC 
Arbitration no yd/as no 3493, International Chamber of Commerce, Court of Arbitration, 11 March 1983, pp.435-459) 
describes the applicable law as follows:
“The Agreements do not provide specially for the law, which is to govern the contract... the relevant 
domestic law... is that of Egypt... The claimants, however, contend that no rules and/or principles 
drawn from the body o f domestic Egyptian law should be allowed to override the principles of 
international law applicable to international investment projects o f this kind... The defendants refute 
the claimants argument in favour of the so-called 'de-nationalization 'o f the applicable law... “
By referring to the literature (doctrinal contributions, resolution by international organization, judicial 
and arbitration precedents), the decision-making body makes a distinction between the “de-nationalization”  doctrine, 
and the doctrine that domestic laws can be referred to within the realm  of the principles of international law, which 
“ensure the protection to the contractual rights o f the private party vis-ä-vis the sovereign state". The law governing 
is, consequently, the “law of Egypt only in as much as they do not contravene the said principles" (o f international law).
12,4 Bleckmann, A., Die Aufgaben einer Methodenlehre den Völkerrechts. Probleme der Rechtsquellenlehre im 
Völkerrechts (Heidelberg) 1978, p.75.
1215 For example, in early international relations and in the international system, as Watson explains w ith regard to 
early Roman public law, the comparative perspectives were determined by the similarity o f religion. Public law was 
identified, to a  certain extent, with the public religious institutions. T hey were two sides o f the same coin. The highest 
lawyers were priests, and there was a  difference between the legal relationships between the "Latin" people and the 
others having another religion (Watson, A ., 1993).
For many reasons, mainly because o f the increasing interaction, this type o f thinking (system) broke 
down, and public relations were determined by more nsecular”and perm anent actors (diplomatic missions etc). Public
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has been the oldest source o f international law, dating from the period o f non-positive  
international law1216.
In contemporary public international law, comparative law is a necessary y e t 
neglected element in interpreting law by international organizations1217. We may say th a t  
nowadays the internal laws of the members of the international community are relevant m ate ria l 
for international justice and for law-creating functions. On the other hand, comparative o b serv a ­
tions have been seen as a source o f analogy for the development o f international law 1218. 
However, at the moment, one can consider that it is a direct source for both the interpretation o f  
custom and treaties.1219
It has been claimed that the aim of the use of the comparative m ethod in  
interpretation is not to replace the judicial function, but only to clarify and inform it .1220 
Comparative law can be seen as a supplementary source of law differing from pure legal tran s ­
plantation1221. It seems that the idea o f the legal basis is not to directly aid in interpretation, b u t  
to make it possible to use certain legal materials in the interpretation. The aim is to avoid lacunae
relations were created in the form of treaties rather than in a one-sided processes. Public law became “horizontal” . T h is  
was the basis of m odem  European public law.
1116 M enon, P.K., 1986, p.186 ff.
1217 In international law we can identify many types o f decision-makers. T here are the law o f the Sea T ribunal, T ra d e  
organization tribunals, Iran-US tribunal. There have been also the A d Hoc Criminal Law Tribunals etc . T h e  
international “order” has been defined as a "disordered medley" o f  law (Jennings, R.Y., 1996, p.5).
In the Nürnberg decisions based on the Agreement for the prosecution and Punishment o f the m a jo r  
War Criminals of the European axis (N ürnberg W ar Crimes Trial 1946, London, 8 August 1945) it was stated tha t th e  
"law of war is to be found not only in the Treaties, but in the customs and practices of the states which gradually 
obtained universal recognition, and from the general principles o f justice applied by jurists and practised by military 
courtsMany “treaty comparisons” were made too (“The prohibition o f aggressive war demanded by the conscience 
of the world, finds its expression in the series o f Pacts and Treaties to which the Tribunal has just referred’).
im  See, Haraszti, G., 1978, p. 318.
O n the general binding force and "law creative" inabilities o f the decisions, see Article 59  o f  th e
Statute.
1219 Lauterpacht, H ., 1987, pp.65-95.
In international custom  we can make a  distinction between old custom, and the new custom  
(McWhinney, E., 1979). It is found in the practice of states.
C erta in  criteria is required to  establish a international custom. It has to  be ancient, invariable, 
continuous and uniform, reasonable, not immoral, certain and definite, compulsory, and consistent (ibid., p.186).
There seems to be some coniusion about the idea o f “com parison” in international law, and in relation  
to  interpretation of international treaties. Some w riters refer, when speaking about “comparison”, to com parison o f  
‘Tactual situations” and comparison of “treaties” (B os, M. Theory and Practice o f Treaty Interpretation. In: N etherlands 
International Law Review , 1980, p.140). This is different from the traditional comparative law comparisons.
1220 Cruz, P . de, 1993, p.21.
mi The idea that the "comparative" interpretation o f a  treaty is not a priori in conflict with any other international 
treaties has been expressed for example in the Council o f Europe (European) Charter for Regional or M inority 
Languages, Article 4  (with international agreem ents, charters etc).
314
in the system and to guarantee a reasonable administration of justice1222.
Some legal bases and their analysis. Some legal bases for the general approach to inter­
pretation on the basis of different legal systems can be found also in the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties1223. Article 27 may be considered with regard to the use of comparative 
observations. According to this article, for example, municipal law cannot provide a justification 
for the failure to perform an international obligation1224 *.
The International Court of Justice applies "general principles o f  law recognized by 
civilized nations"1125 and, furthermore, the judgments of the courts of different natiorii26 . In 
determining the applicable principles, one can also use more restricted international and regional 
agreements as a source of rules1227. It has been claimed that these generalities are identified by 
means of a comparative study1228. The idea in these both approaches is to compare existing legal
1222 The lacunae are results of the ambiguousness of the system in the beginning, Davis, F., 1969, p.626.
1223 The Treaty sets out, inter alia, the ideas o f  “good faith", "ordinary m eaning” , "context” , “object” , “purpose”, 
“ non-retroactivity”, the historical relations between treaties, “supplementary means of interpretation” , relationship 
between versions, third states, and role o f later development, etc.
1224 UN A/conf. 39/H ad. 2 (1971).
1223 Article 38 of the Statute of International Court o f Justice (Annexed to the Charter o f the United Nations, June 26, 
1945, l.c. similar to the Statute of the Perm anent Court of International Justice):
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, 
shall apply:
tL International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized 
by the contesting states;
b. International custom, as evidence o f a general practice accepted as law;
c. The general principles o f law recognized by civilized nations;
d. Subject to the provisions o f Article 59 (uThe decision o f the Court has no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect o f that particular case"), judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination 
of rules o f law
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power o f the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree 
thereto.”
(See, Asylum, ICJ Reports (1950) 149.)
On the development o f the "civiIized,, criteria, see Menon, P.K ., 1986, p.192, W atson, A., 1993. See 
also, Gutteridge, H.C., 1944, p.2 flF, and pp.9-10.
The criteria refer to the "rationality of the system", "peace loving", "able and willing".
After the collapse of the Eastern European regime the criticism o f this source has ceased, M enon, P.K.,
1986, p.195.
1228 See also, Graveson, R.H., 1958, p.657.
1227 Case Asylum, ICJ reports (1950) 94 . See in general, Fitzmaurice, G., 1986., p.16-19. Legal systems as a source 
o f international law, (analysing the case ICJ Reports (1954) 54). Schlesinger maintains that "the general principles 
fin d  their expression in municipal laws o f  each nation”  (1980, p.37).
,2a Menon, P.K., 1986, p.192, Friedmann, W ., 1963, pp.282-283. In the context o f law of nations, some scepticism 
by Guttendge, H.C., 1944, p.8-9. Gutteridge sees some, but little, function o f comparative law mainly in constructing 
the “principles” (methods?) o f interpretation (intention idea, generalia specialibus non derogant, etc.) (idem.).
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systems.1229
Consequently, it can be asked whether rules of municipal law really are sources o f  
public international law? We may say that this is the case. International custom, which is in m any  
ways reflected in domestic law, is constituted by "evidence o f  the general practice accepted  a s
law".1230
However, as already maintained, it is a subsidiary means for the determination o f  
rules of law1231. On the other hand, comparative analogical argument or the generalities have to  
be supplemented by other subsidiary means, which are judicial practice and the teachings o f  
highly qualified publicists1232. The mere practice of states does not automatically become part o f  
international law. One has to prove that a custom was established. Comparative observations as  
special arguments thus require supporting arguments.
This means that a certain legal quality has to be attached to the custom. This quality  
requires proof that the alleged custom has become binding on the other party1233. Basically, n o  
"uncertainty, contradiction, fluctuation, discrepancy, or inconsistency, from  constant un iform  
usage" may exist1234.
This suggests also that one may concentrate upon the "main systems" o f  law in 
order to determine the existence of a customary rule. It has been suggested also that the  
application of this rule application cannot be, however, in absolute contradiction with any o f  the  
other systems or against its fundamental concepts1235. According to some moderate writers, the  
practice of some systems can constitute evidence of a "preexisting customary rule" or can even
1229 See for example, Zweigert, KL, KOtz, H., 1977, pp.7-9. David, R., 1950, pp .100-104, Gutteridge, H .C ., 1 9 4 4 , 
p p .1 -1 0 ,1949, pp.61-71.
1230 Article 38(1).
1131 Example, case Nicaragua (1986) ICJ reports 98. Case North Sea Continental shelf (1969) ICJ R eports.
1232 Article 3 8 (l)(b ). Menon, P.K., 1986, p .1 9 6 ,198-199, on the critical value, p.198. Some analysis on th is type 
of consideration, Gutteridge, H.C., 1944, p.9.
It m ust be general practice, but for that matter accepted as law  (McWinney, E., 1979, p .l 97).
The latter aspect is related to the opinio juris. This is not specified in any other way. It m ust re fe r to  
the Article 38 definitions. However, the idea is based on the observation that the states were acting as fulfilling legal 
obligations, Menon, P.K., 1986, pp.190-191 (cases Lotus, Asylum, Noth Sea Continental shelf).
1233 Case Asylum (1950) ICJ Reports.
1234 Case Asylum (1950) ICJ Reports.
1235 Gutteridge, H .C., 1949, p.65, ibid, 1944, p .4  ff. Menon, P.K ., 1986, pp.196-197. The idea in A rticle 38 o f the 
Statute of the International Court o f Justice does not mean that the "recognition by the Civilized nations" w ould m eans 
all civilized nations (For example, Man, Reflections on commercial law  o f nations. In: British Yearbook o f  International 
Law, 1957, p.38-39).
The fact that the analysis of the state systems is qualitative is related also to the neglect o f  any "state 
will" theory in international law. The analysis is m ade in relatively autonomous basis.
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have an influence upon the creation o f subsequent international custom.1236 No reference to any 
state, however, can be identified in the work of the International Court of Justice*237.
The generality can be achieved also by showing that it would be absolutely absurd 
to not have such a principle within the system.1238
In this sense, customary international law deviates from a mere comparative law 
analogy, even if the comparative observations do play an important role in the examination of 
these international norms. The legal quality of such norm, one may say, is established by the insti­
tutional authority o f International Courts or authorities.
To conclude, one could say that, in public international law, comparative argument 
is basically a qualitatively analogical argument. On the other hand, the International Court of 
Justice has not been extremely enthusiastic in applying the Article 38(1) and comparative law 
method1239.
The latest development o f the WTO also seem to be interesting from the point of 
view of this topic. The structure of the sources of the WTO systems are related to the WTO 
agreement itself.1240 It mentions, on the other hand, (annexed) additional agreements. The main 
method o f interpretation is “textual interpretation” (Article 17 of the Dispute settlement 
agreement). It has been maintained that the sources consist on GATT dispute settlement panel 
decision, WTO practice, particular reports of the dispute settlement panel and the WTO 
Appellate Body, custom, the teachings o f highly qualified publicists, general principles of law, 
and, finally, other international instruments (similar to Article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court o f Justice).1241
1336 Lauterpacht, H., 1929, p.78, and p.80 ff.. See also Menon, P.K., 1986, p.197. For a good examination o f the 
concept of customary international law, see Encyclopaedia of International law.
The Vienna Convention restricts the possibility o f taking into account implementation material as a 
comparative source.
See, however, Permanent Court o f Justice, 12 PCJ series B  nos 2-3, p.40, 12 August 1982 
(competencies o f International labour organization, advisory opinion) Court m ay take into account measures taken on 
the basis o f the Treaty, comparative studies within an extremely wide sphere.
1237 See, Jennings, R.Y., 1996. Gutteridge sees the function o f  comparative law as correcting from 
the tendencies o f “single system” application (referring to Lauterpacht).
In general, in international systems one could recognize an idea o f the "respect for national legal 
systems", which functions as a  basic legal tenet o f comparative legal observations.
1238 O’Connell, D.P., 1970, p .l 1.
1239 Bredimas, A., 1978a, p . l24, referring to various authors.
1240 Final Act, 15 April 1994.
1241 Article 3.2. of the new agreement refers to the "customary rules o f interpretation in public international law”. See 
also Article 7.
For a general analysis, Palmeter, D ., Mavroidis, P.C., 1998, p.400.
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Article XVI: 1 of the WTO agreement maintains that the “WTO shall be guided b y  
the decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the contracting states to G A T T  
1947*. This seems to indicate that comparative law is a relevant source. However, this is so only 
to the extent that the observed countries were part of the GATT 1947. Furthermore, it seems to  
include only practice which is related to the application of the GATT agreement.1242
The interpretation o f general principles o f law and other international instruments, 
however, could bring some comparative observations into the work of the system.
3. Comparative law in the European level case law
3.1. European Community
3.1.1. General rem arks
The European Community legal o rd er as a  subject of research from the point o f view o f  
comparative interpretation and  reasoning. One can say that the European Court o f Justice is 
a good object o f  study from the point o f view of the subject of comparative law. This is so 
because no basic doctrine of sources really has been established. There are no strict rules o f  
reasoning such as those occasionally presented in connection to the national traditions, especially 
within continental thinking. This feature may be related to its “self-formative” stage or nature in 
general.
The Community system consists of many types of legal traditions. This is one of the 
reasons why one can note forms o f expressions and interactions of arguments which do not 
appear in national legal systems.
We may say that European level law is justificatory in nature, whereas state systems 
have, as noted, created formal and mechanical approaches to legal argumentation. Because it is 
open according to its sources, one can recognize also normative or value-based limitations upon 
its argumentative style.
This feature is related also to a different conception of law at the European level.
,M2 For som e problem s in the interpretation o f this provisions, see Palmeter, D ., Mavroidis, P.C., 1998, p.407.
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It is more "principle" oriented, and linguistic interpretation seems to be more o f a problem.1243
Comparative law influences (and adoptions) in the reasoning on European law have 
been studied mainly from the “constructivist” point o f view. This is the basic approach o f many 
scholars and judges. However, certain problems exist in this analysis.1244 *
Comparative reasoning has been observed to be a kind of a "natural" basis for 
certain principles. In many of these studies the basic idea seems to be that comparative arguments 
do function as basic elements for these principles. This is part o f the "methodological" tradition 
o f comparative law. Real "rhetorical" functions are not revealed1243. The constructivist approach 
does not consider the principles and different conceptualizations together. These studies have not 
focussed on the relationship interaction of these arguments with other arguments. The 
"substantivization" in the empirical sense also remains concealed.
A different approach would suggest, consequently, a deliberation, not over 
questions such as “what principles are constructed”, but what kind o f connection these principles 
have to substantive questions and to other arguments, i.e. in what situation are they used?
The problem of the constructivist approach is, furthermore, that it considers 
Community law somehow, in empirical sense, to be subordinate to state systems. It is quite 
problematic, in terms of the methodological and traditional approach to comparative law, to 
admit that European institutions use their own powers and are autonomous as legal orders. 
Consequently, one should perhaps see general principles of Community law as being relatively 
separate from general principles in the realm of comparative studies. These principles cannot be 
seen only as a reproduction o f the common tradition o f  Member States, but their application 
context in European law should be studied more carefully.
One o f the problems of the previous studies has also been that they have not 
regarded the evolutive idea behind the function of the use o f comparisons as such. In other 
words, they have not explained why comparative studies are repeated, even within the same types
1243 On interpretation, see Hartley, T .C., 1994, pp.85-86.
1244 See the studies of, for example, Koopmans, Pescatore etc. (judges o f the European Court).
1243 In general, for the relationship between rules and principles, Bredimas, A., 1978a, p .125, principles and 
comparative studies (ibid., p.128). Sources (national systems, public international law and laws o f non-M ember States) 
from which principles are "drawn" (ibid., p.125 f f ) .  The constant integrative force (ibid., 132-133), and the idea that 
in the ultimate form the result is jus commune.
The idea is somehow "evolutionist" in the sense that comparative arguments establish something. One 
could claim that they interpret something rather than establish something. The principles can be also seen as "methods".
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of situations.1246
Consequently, this type o f discursive point of view, the analysis does not exist. 
Furthermore, more recent cases have not been considered.
One o f the interesting features concerning previous studies is, however, that m any 
of the writers are judges themselves. This seems to be due to the fact that the use of comparative 
law is so deeply rooted in the institutional framework that only judges feel able to write about 
these issues. This is related also to the fact that no real dogmatic analysis is made. The ideas 
repeated in those “institutional" analyses are quite similar, and the derived scholarly analysis, o n  
the other hand, often is only a reproduction of that analysis1247 *.
We may emphasise the fact that the European level functions as an example o f  
typical comparativist legal interpretation. In this sense, one could apply the results o f the form s 
of use of comparative law to the study o f national legal systems.
General rem arks on interpretation in Community law. The European Court o f  Justice has
1246 The explanation for this may be as follows: states demand an examination of hard cases from different points o f  
views. The Court protects its own case law in relation to these claims.
The constructivist approach provides very powerful explanation for the use of comparative law (See, 
for example, Bredimas, A., 1978a, also Pescatore, P., 1980, p.339, Jacobs, F.G., 1990, p.107). One can easily see, that 
the studies tend to stress the listing of the principles "constructed” by comparative law without any analysis of the 
phenomena.
However, one could claim that it is not necessarily so that comparative law would be "constructing** 
any of the principles applied. One could claim that the whole process of consideration is "princip-led" in the sense that 
it is the principle, which is decisive for the use of comparative law.
For a more "institutionally" oriented approach, see Demas, G., 1984. See also, Bengoetxea, J., 1993, 
pp.5-6. Use of comparative law as "concrelization", see Mbssner, J.N., 1974, p.218.
The constructivist fallacy can be associated with an "illusion” resulting in the similar "order" of argu­
ments, and the idea of an analogy between the heuristic and the justificatory forms. If comparisons are represented 
before the principled arguments, it certainly looks as if the comparative arguments are somehow "constructing” the 
principles. The constructivist approach stresses the positive results of the uses of comparative law, but neglects the 
"deviations" or "non-applications" of the results of the comparative considerations as part of the systematic discourse 
(negative and positive "konretisierung” (Mossner, J.N., 1974, p.228), stressing of the special features of one*s own 
system (ibid., p.240).
A more fundamental analysis can be made, if one takes into account the relationship between these 
arguments in a more legal-material sense, and treats them as separate methods for the question. Their uses and non-uses 
in comparison with other arguments might tell more about the function of comparative law in the system. The study of 
the constructions of argumentation is a matter of argumentative style. The idea in this study is not to explain the uses 
of comparative law on a constructivist basis, but its uses on the basis of the discourse theory and, in particular, by the 
interaction between the arguments on the functionalist basis. This way one is more able to consider also comparative 
arguments like "comparison by opposites" and subtle forms of uses of comparisons.
1247 The comparative legal studies in the realm of the European Community can be described, also in this sense, as
institutionally autopoietic. This means that they are "institutionally" self-referential studies, which do not really explain 
legal phenomenon. They seem to form part of the self-justification of the institution.
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used different methods of interpretation in its case law1248. One could therefore claim that it has 
not bound itself to only one method. In its case-law, it has stressed the sovereignty o f Member 
States, aspects of competition, general aspects of social security, and free movement etc. It has 
also spoken of the legal security o f individuals.1249 1250*From the point o f view of historical 
interpretation, the Court has underscored future prospects rather than past and original intentions 
of the drafters of the Treaty.1230 In its textual interpretation, the Court has applied the principle 
of uniformity of Community law rather than strictly accepted the literal meaning o f the words and 
concepts as such1231. In these cases, one may say, it has done so in order to use an analogical 
interpretative method. This has been defined as "functional textual interpretation".1232
It has been claimed that the only leading principle or method in the interpretation 
of the Court is the pro-integrative method o f interpretation. This has led to a functional approach 
by the Court, and the result has been that the Court can be seen as a political lawmaker in the 
European system.1253 It has even been claimed that the Court can never be relied upon to stay 
within the limits set by the commonly-acknowledged methods o f  interpretation1254.
However, if some analytical distinctions can be made in the realm of this pro- 
integrative approach, one may claim that the interpretative methods of the European Court of 
Justice are those o f "institutional systematic" or contextual interpretation method, and 
teleological interpretation in conjunction with the idea o f the "rule o f effectiveness" ("La notion 
d'effet utile" "the concept o f useful effect"1255). These ideas stem from the incomplete structure 
and the goal-oriented nature of the Treaties establishing the Community system1256, and from the 
constructive role played by the judges o f the Court1257 *. We have also spoken o f the “emptiness”
124*See, Schermers, G., Waelbroeck, D., 1987, p.l 1 ff., and Millett, T., 1988, p.163 flf., who is making a distinction 
between literal, schematic, teleological, [comparative] linguistic, autonomous-conceptual, general-principled, non­
retroactive, restrictedly deviating, travaux preparatoires, effectiveness (“effet utile”).
,M* Bredimas, A., 1978a, p.l 77.
1250 Bredimas, A., 1978a, p.178, and Gulmann, C., 1980, pp.198-199. Hartley, T.C., 1994, p.86.
,2SI See, for example, starting from case 75/63 Hoekstra (néeUnger) (1964) ECR 177 (see also, Bredimas, A., 
1978a).
1252 On this see Bredimas, A., 1978a, p.177.
1253 See on this, Rasmussen, H., 1986, and Blok, P., 1974, p.355.
1154 Blok, P., 1974, pp.355-356.
1255 Lecourt, R, 1976, p.236.
1236 Pescatore, P., 1975, p.l 76.
1257 Pescatore, P., 1974, p.86, Lecourt, R., 1976, p.235.
One could say that the nature of this type of method is increasing.
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of the conceptual framework o f the European legal discourse.
It has to be stressed that the teleological construction is different in the European 
system as it is within national systems: the aims in the interpretation of an EC rule can often be 
found in the objectives of the EC legislation itself and forms part of the textual and historical 
interpretation whereas in national legal systems the results o f the decisions are seen at a much 
more pragmatic, individual level. The EC’s pro-integrative approach is the decisive element in its 
method of the teleological interpretation, whereas national systems do not have to consider this 
feature. This does not necessarily mean that the European Court of Justice would not consider 
individuals.
It is the idea of levels of interpretations, nevertheless, which seems to produce this 
difference between the national and European systems: the ECJ does not interpret concrete cases, 
only EC law; national systems do interpret concrete cases, not European law. In this sense, the 
system can be defined as rather a unique type of legal order, as the Court has itself claimed.1258 
Thus, the problems it addresses are also different from those faced by national courts.1259
The Court is composed of judges coming from different legal orders with different 
conceptual, cultural and educational backgrounds. Thus, there are necessarily no common 
models, national or international, for conceptualizations. Judges personal backgrounds may have 
a strong impact upon their opinions.1260
Legal texts are drafted in the languages o f each Member State. This generates one 
problem; the problem of the comparability of national and EC conceptualizations. Because o f  
this, the Community rules tend to be quite weak. We may say, furthermore, that the EC 
conceptualization is reflected within the political consensus. The consensus is achieved sometimes 
by including all national systems in a Community rule.1261 This creates dynamism for the 
Community system.1262 It likewise makes it possible for the Court to use different methods o f 
interpretation which have not traditionally familiar to the national legal systems and to consider 
broad political, economic and social developments within society. Furthermore, the interpreting 
institutions have to, as they fairly frequently do, refer to the “filling of gaps” in the system, for 
example by using a comparative approach and by accepting guidance from the national systems
1251 Case 26/62 Van Gend and Loos v Neederlandse Administratie der Belastningen (1963) ECR 1. 
,2M Gulmann, C , 1980, p.191 and 193.
1160 See Usher, J.A., 1976, p.369 and case 37/72 Marcato v Commission (1973) ECR 361.
,26,In the field of tax law, see for example, Legall, J-P., Dibout, P., 1991, p. 1061.
1261 Gulmann, C., 1980,p.l92.
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and their solutions, usually in a contextual form. This approach finds its normative basis also in 
the EC Treaties and in the case-law of the Court.1263
The legal basis fo r the use of com parative law. The Treaty o f  Rome contains Articles, which 
demand for a statement of reasons underlying the decisions reached1264. On the other hand, one 
may also ’’comparatively" establish this kind of obligation in the context o f European law. 
However, the extent of these justifications is not clearly established1265.
The use of comparisons is not only regulated by legal rules giving them legal status, 
but case law has also restricted their use. On the other hand, the publishing of comparative 
studies is restricted by internal institutional rules such as the "principle of confidentiality”.
The use of comparative observations are based, in the European Union system, on 
Article F.2. and Art. 215, for example. Article F sets forth the "constitutional traditions" and 
European human rights as a basis of the European order1266.
Another Article must be mentioned. The legal basis of the application of 
international law in the European Community system is Article 173. International treaties can be 
applied in the interpretation of Community law as though they are not "directly” applicable rules 
within the Community system1267. All the same, because o f their binding nature in the Member 
States, they do appear binding also upon the European institutions as long as the institutions do 
not challenge their validity for some reason.1268
1263 For some remarks on the centrality of the teleological and comparative method, rather than the textual one, see 
Wilmersde, J.M., 1991, p.37.
,264ArticIe 190 of the Rome Treaty does not explicitly mention the Court of Justice. On the other hand, Article 33 of 
the Protocol on the statute of the Court of Justice of the European Community and Article 34 of the Protocol on the 
Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Atomic Energy Community states that “Judgments shall state the 
reasons on which they are based',
A case on this issue, see 222/86 Heylens (1978) ECR 4097.
1265 Naturally the European Community Court studies analytically the system which is a party to the dispute (See, 
Pescatore, P., 1980, p.342).
126« Title i( Common Provisions.
The common tradition idea has been interpreted also as a legal source of inspiration (See, Pescatore, 
1980, p.340. In general, Marsh, N.S., 1977 p.657). The national legal systems are "philosophical, political and legal 
substratumH to Community law (Bredimas, A., 1978a, referring to a statement by the Advocate General Delamonte).
See also, Pescatore, P., 1980, Wilmars de, J.M., 1991, p.39 ff.
1267 See, Schermers, H.G., 1979, pp. 171 -172, see case 21 -24/72, International Fruit Company (1972) ECR 1226.
1261 There are references to general principles, and to the public international law, in a number of Articles of the 
Treaty, see also Article 234 EC. The principles at public international law have been used in filling gaps (Bredimas, 
A., 1978a, p.134).
However, some scepticism has been expressed concerning the possibility of deriving principles from 
public international law because of the unique nature of the Community law. This has been also the approach of the
1Different institutional actors such as Court and the Advocates General have had 
different ideas concerning the extent o f the argumentation. There are many “institutional” 
structural reasons behind this, as we will see. Sometimes the proposals presented by the 
Advocate Generals do not necessarily coincide with the position taken by the Court1269.
General remarks on the use of comparative law in the European Community legal order.
The use of comparative law in European Community law has not been seen as a scientific project 
and exact role of comparative law in general is not particularly clear for its users either1270. 
However, it has been seen as a method for "lacunae filling" as a means o f revealing all possible 
solutions and as an extremely important part of the Community law1271. In the practice o f the  
European Community system, the first level of comparison is seen as useful and even neces­
sary.1272 It has its justificatory function, even if bit appears often in a highly synthetic form.1273 
European law is inter-state (“inter-etatic”) law1274 not only politically, but also legally.
The use of comparative arguments and their effects are more striking in the 
Community order than in other international systems. This is due to the nature of Community law 
as a more comprehensive legal order.
One can note as in the case o f general international law applied in international 
institutions, that "European custom" does not mean only the customary law of the Member States 
in comparative terms, but, for that matter, also custom in international systems. These norms may
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European Court The use is exceptional (ibid., pp.l 34-135, referring to Pescatore, P.). In the realm of the human rights 
openness is more visible (Bredimas, A., 1978a, p.135).
Some analysis of the bindingness, see Hartley, T.C., 1994, p.l 84.
120 The same phenomenon can be recognized in the European Court of Human Rights. Comparative analysis seem 
to be connected to these dissenting opinions and conflicting points of views, see below.
1270 Pescatore, P., 1980, pp.352-353. Jacobs says that it is "comparative law", which is used (Jacobs, F.G., 1990, 
p.99). Similarly, see Pescatore, P., 1980, p.337, Friedmann, W., 1973, p.227. Concerning the selectivity of the method, 
see Wilmars de, J.M., 1991, p.39.
The emerging experiences of lawyers in the "comparative" sense explains the strengths of the European 
system, but also many of its weaknesses (Hunnings, H., 1996, p.52).
Some analysis, Galmot, Y., 1990, p.255 ff.
1271 Concerning lacunae in the “Community system”, see Wilmars de, J.M., 1991, p.38 ff.
There have been claims that the idea that comparative law would be somehow only a European 
Community issue has been rejected (Koopmans, T., 1996, p.545,549). See also Benos, G., 1984, p.247.
See also Note d ’information sur la division recherche et documentation, Janvier 1995.
1272 Dehousse, R.t 1994, p.13. Trindade, A.A.C., 1977, p.281. Ress, G., 1976.
1273 Pescatore, P., 19809, p.338,352-355.
1274 On the concept, see Herczegh, G., 1978, p.73-76.
Case Lotus (1927) PICJ Reports, p .l9.
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function as an indirect "source". Furthermore, traditional comparative legal arguments in the 
Community system must also be supported by additional arguments.
One could say that the system of intervening by the Member States in the processes 
of the Court may bring a comparative element to legal cases. However, this type of "comparative 
influence" cannot be considered as a ‘\ise of comparative law”. This idea does not really belong 
to the realm of the use of comparative law (comparative reasoning) in the context of this 
study1275. Even if the process in this respect is extremely interesting, it would require a separate 
study. We may say that this process looks more like a process o f  political comparison. It is not 
based on any "systematic" approach, and is in many ways related solely to the interests of the 
parties. However, as we will see, some systematic arguments, provided by parties as well as by 
these "additional actors" in the traditional process, can have an influence upon the court’s 
argumentation1276.
Some general remarks on comparative influences in C om m unity law. It has been maintained 
that there are several national influences embedded in the Community system1277. Some concepts 
and principles can be claimed to  have been adopted by the Court directly from national
sources:1278
Community preferences (the external trade)1279, equality of treatment o f nationals
1275 How parties intervene in the procedure and its nature as a comparative process, see Koopmans, T., 1996, p.548. 
A good example, Case 155/79, AM  etS . (1982) ECR 1575.
1276 One part of the professionalization of legal interpretation related to the autopoietic features and to the practical 
nature of the Community law, is the use of different state interventionislic methods in the Community system. This "po­
litical" comparative process guarantees, that political integrity can be, to a certain extent, maintained. On the other hand, 
the functionalism embedded in this idea restricts the importance of the legal discursive nature of the interpretation.
1377 See, Koopmans, T., 1996, p.50I (from France comes, for example, the misuse of power doctrine, the non- 
expression of the dissenting opinions, the role of Advocate General). See also, Schwarze, J„ 1991, p.4.
It is self-evident that European legal systems have adopted legal styles of different systems (this 
applies, to a certain extent to the national systems too). The adoptions have been visible especially in the realm of the 
European Community system, where the accession of different states has had its impact to the style of the supra-national 
system (For example, de Gruz, P., 1994, p.135, Koopmans, T., 1991, p.493).
It has been maintained that the European legal institutions change their styles in result of the new legal 
cultures entering into it. This "cultural” comparative law seems not to be comparative legal argument, but a kind of an 
adaptation of the system to a new situation. It is quite unpredictable, and cannot included within the idea of modem law. 
It is rather a change in the institutional culture.
1271 See also Usher, J.A., 1976, pp. 362-368. For the types of concepts have been taken, see Koopmans, T., 1996, 
p.547. What is its role, Markesinis, B., 1993, p.634.
1279 Case 5/67 Beus v Hauptzoilamt Munich (1968) ECR 83.
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of other Member States1280, prohibition against elimination o f competition1281 and
the duty of "solidarity" between Member States1282,
proportionality1283,
legitimate expectations1284,
legal certainty1285,
good faith1286,
the right to be heard1287,
force majeure1288,
estoppel,1289
unjust enrichment1290,
legitimate self-protection1291, and
the idea of non bis in idem1292.
On the other hand, the text of the treaty is strongly influenced by French 
administrative law (for example, grounds for annulment (“excès de pouvoir”)1293» forms o f  
judgments, organization of the judiciary, and judicial behaviour in general). German ideas on the 
relationship between the federal and state levels also had their influence upon the thinking o f  the 
Court. Methods o f reasoning, discussion o f procedural questions, and the role of oral hearings
1280 Case 152/73 Sotgui v Deutche Bundespost (1974) ECR 153.
1281 E.g. case 6/72 Continental Can v Commission (1973) ECR 215.
1282 Case 39/72 Commission v Italy (1973) ECR 101.
1283 "Verhaltnismassigkeitsgrundsatz". See also cases 8/55 Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique v High Authority, 
Rec. ¡955, p.199. See later case-law, 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfiihr- und Vorratselle fu r  
Getreide und Futtermittel (1970) ECR, 1125, 5/73 Balkan-Import-Export v Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof (1973) 
ECR 1091, and 63-69/72 Werhahn Hansamiihle and others v Council and Commission (1973) ECR 1229.
i:m "Protection de la confiance légitime" - "Vertrauenschutz". See opinion of Advocate-General Warner in case 
2/75 Einfurh- und Vorratstelle Getreide v Mackprang (1975) ECR 607. The same rule can be found in French and 
Belgium case law (Advocate-General Roemer (1973) ECR 723).
1285 Cases 78/74 Deuka v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle Getreide (1975) ECR 421, and 5/75 (same) (1975) ECR 759. 
In other form, see Usher, J.A., 1976, p.367, and cases 48/72 Brasserie de Haecht v Wilkin-Janssen (1973) ECR 77 
and 127/73 B.R.Tv SABAM  (1974) ECR 51.
The idea of non-retroactivity of acts of legislation has been also recognized, see Pescatore, P., 1980,
p.340.
1284 Case 44/59 Fiddelaar v Commission, Rec. 1960 p.1077.
1287 Case 17/74 Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission (1974) ECR 1063, and the opinion of the
Advocate General Warner. Modifications to this, see case 136/79 National Panasonic (1980) ECR 2033. Some
analysis, Schwarze, J., 1991, p.9 ff.
1288 Case 158/73 Kampffmayer v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle Getreide (1974) ECR 110.
1289 Cases 17 and 20//61 Klôckner v High authority (1962) ECR 325.
12,0 Case 36/72 Meganck v Commission (1973) ECR 527.
1291 Case 16/61 Modena v High authority (1962) ECR 289.
1292 Cases 18 and 35/65 Gutmann v Commission (1966) ECR 103.
1293 On the influences to administrative law, its development, and the problems of comparative basis of it, see 
Schwarze, J., 1991, p.5 ff.
326
and case law have changed gradually based on influences from common law countries.1294 One 
may even claim that the discourse between the “bar and bench” has become emphasized1295.
All these influences derive from the fact that Community law did not emerge in a 
historical vacuum. Legal institutions o f this kind, on the other hand, can be seen as the “hard 
core” of the Community legal system but also as the “hard cores” o f each individual legal system.
Next we will look at the traditional forms o f comparative observations appearing 
in the work o f Community Court.
3.1.2. Comparative reasoning in the realm of 
international law in the European Court of Justice
General rem arks. International law can be seen, from the point of view o f the European 
Community legal system, as an additional source of law. It refers to law which "every court 
would apply"1296. This is the traditional comparative perspective regarding the application of 
international norms in the European Community system.
Some examples on the use of international law in the European Court may be
mentioned.
When deciding the Stoeckel case1297, the European Court of Justice examined only 
the relationship between national law and European Community Law but did not refer to the fact 
that France, the defendant, was a party to the ILO Convention concerning on the same matter. 
This reflects the typical attitude of the European Court o f Justice towards the international legal 
system.1298
On the other hand, there has been a long debate on the direct applicability o f the 
G A TT (General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade) in the European legal system. The direct 
applicability of that agreement could have been asserted due to the fact that the European Court 
o f Justice has clearly stated that it has fulfilled its obligations towards the GATT agreement.1299
1294 See, Koopmans, T., 1991, p.500.
1295 Koopmans, T., 1991, p.505.
1296 Schermers, H.G., 1979, p.169, analysis of the case 41/74 van Duyn (definition of state competencies, 
discrimination based on nationality) ECR (1974) 1351.
1297 Case 345/89, Criminal Proceedings against Stoeckel (1991) ECR 1-4047.
1291 The Advocate General did, however, examine the nature of the Convention.
1299 Case 21-24/72, International Fruit Company{1972) ECR 1219,1227.
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Later, in examining the role o f GATT within the Community system, the Advocate G eneral 
referred also to the practices of the Member States and to the general role of GATT in the legal 
systems of the member states1300 130. In the systems of the Member States it was seen as exceptional 
that the GATT was "directly invoked before the judicial institutions".1X1
However, despite the fact that the European Court of Justice has not explicitly 
mentioned the direct applicability of the GATT agreement, it has used it as source of arguments 
in several cases, and has recognized it as a possible source o f  interpretation1302. One example is  
a case regarding tariff quotas from 19931303:
"As the fifth  recital in the preamble to the basic regulation indicates, the aim o f  
reallocation in the course o f  the year is to enable the annual quota to be fu l ly  
utilized which is in the interests both o f the Community operators affected and the  
Community partners in the GATT. "
Where the case does not derive any the rule directly from the GATT system, the  
Court can use the GATT as supporting materia] in arguing in support of its conclusion. In this 
case, reference was made to the interests o f  GATT Parties as a type of additional “comparative”
observation.
Another example of this "supporting" use o f the GATT agreement can be found in 
an interpretation dealing with anti-dumping measures:1304
"In that regard the Court points out that Article 2(5) o f GATT anti-dumping code 
provides that... and Article 2(6) provides that...
As the Commission correctly points out, the only difference between anti-dumping 
code and the Community regulation with respect to the construction o f the export 
price is that, whereas the code merely lays down the principle that allowances 
should be made fo r  costs incurred between importation and resale "including
1300 Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann delivered on 8 June 1994, case 280/93, Federal Republic o f  Germany 
v Council o f the European Union (bananas - common organization of the market - import regime) ECR 4973.
1301 Case 280/93, Federal Republic o f Germany v Council o f the European Union (bananas - common organization 
of the market - import regime) ECR 4973.
For comparative argumentation by the Commission and counter-argumentation by the Advocate 
General in the field of external relations, see also Opinion of Mr Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 16 December 
1993, case 327/91, French Republic v Commission o f the European Communities (agreement between the 
Commission and the United States regarding the application of their competition laws - competence - statement of 
reasons) (1994) ECR 1-3641.
1302 See case 178/87 Minolta v Commission/Council, 21 January 1991 (1992) ECR 1-1577.
1303 Case 106/90,317/90,129/91, Emerald Meats ltd v Commission. 23 January 1990 (1993) ECR 1-209.
1304 See, case 188/88 NMB GmbH and Commission, 10 March 1992 (1992) ECR 1-1689.
Vduties and taxes", the EC regulation specifies certain duties and other costs,
including anti-dumping duties fo r  which allowances must be made. "
In this way the Court did not find any inconsistency between GATT provisions and 
EC legislation, which, on the other hand, confirmed the EC systems authority over the 
question.1305 The Court looked, in other words, into the content of the GATT agreement, al­
though it did not grant it any superiority over EC legislation; thus, it used the GATT to support 
the superiority of EC legislation.1306
This type of idea seems to apply also to the United Nations Charter1307, certain 
other international treaties, and humanitarian law in relation to the European Community 
system.1308 However, in the case of the Yaounde Convention o f 1963 the Court has held that 
Article 2(1) of that Treaty was directly applicable1309. Treaties and international agreements 
entered into by the Community are binding on both the Community and the Member States 
(Article 228(2) o f the Treaty on European Union). The Member States are obliged to enforce 
international agreements as Contracting parties, but also the European Community has to do so. 
It is therefore the task of the Community to ensure the uniform application of the treaty in 
different Member States.
Furthermore, the ECJ has also used ICES (International Council fo r  the 
Exploration o f the Sea) documents and international law to gain support for its argumentation in 
certain cases1310:
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1305 GATT assisting in the interpretation o f Community norms; and on the rejection of applicants argument, see 
Opinion of M r Advocate General Darmon, delivered on 7 February 1991, case 49/88, Al-Jubail Fertilizer v Council
(1991) E C R 1-3187.
1306 It is possible that the Courts attitude towards other international Treaties is based on the idea presented in Article 
30  of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which maintains, regarding on the application o f successive 
treaties relating to the same subject matter, that
“ When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the treaty but the earlier treaty is not 
terminated or suspended in operation.,., the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its 
provisions are compatible with those o f the latter treaty
1301 Council Regulation 2340/90 of August 1990 (Prevention of Community Trade with Iraq and Kuwait, O J 1990 
L  213/1.
1301 Schreuer, Ch., 1993, p.459.
1509 Case 87/75 Bresciani (1976) ECR 129.
However, the direct applicability o f  this treaty was based on the idea of non-reciprocity nature o f the 
Treaty, and the Community in this treaty gave benefits directly upon the other party. It is hardly possible, that reciprocal 
treaties can be directly applicable. See, on this, Advocate General Trabucchi in this case (ECR 129 ff.), and Hartley, 
T.C., 1983.
1,10 Case 280/89 Ireland v Commission, 2 December, 1992 (1992) ECR 1-6185. See also. Case 279/87 Tipp-Ex 
Gmbh &. Co. V. Commission (1990) ECR 1-261.
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"...that the contested regulations are justified in so fa r  as public international law  
authorizes it to decline to recognize the nationality o f vessels which do not have 
a genuine link with the state whose flag they are flying...
...that under international law a vessel has the nationality o f the State in which it 
is registered and that it is fo r  that state to determine the exercise o f its sovereign 
powers the conditions fo r  the grant o f  such nationality...
...and the Irish regulations cannot therefore be justified on the basis o f  public 
international law"
In this case the examination of international law had a direct impact on the 
substantive decision of the Court. However, the public international law argument was not 
accompanied supported by any comparative observations.
In general, in these types of interpretations, no traditional comparative observations 
seem to be used.
The Court has also been forced to give a statement concerning the argumentative
value of practices o f Member States' trading partners:1311
"In the view o f the fa c t that NHB's European subsidiaries have not shown that the 
system adopted by the Community is unlawful, the fact that the Communities’ 
trading partners adopt other methods does not render that system is unlawful"
The European C o u rt of Justice and hum an  rights. In the field of human rights, the situation 
is somewhat. There are normative bases which justify the use o f extralegal material as a source 
of EC law.
Fundamental rights have been traditionally considered as an "integral part o f  the 
general principles o f  la w ... protected by the European Court o f  Justice'\ and the Court has 
stated that "these fundamental rights derive from the constitutional traditions o f  Member 
States".1312 *However, the interpretation o f  fundamental rights has to be evaluated in the light 
Community law itself.13,3
During the period before the Treaty on European Union, the Court referred
,3M Case 188/88 NMB GmbH v. Commission (1992) ECR M 6 8 9 .
1312 In many cases, the court has examined the compatibility of Community freedoms with these fundamental rights. 
See on this, cases 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle Getreide (1970) ECR 1125, 
25/70 Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle v Koster (1970) E C R  1161,44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland Pfalz (1979) ECR 3727, 
and 46/87 Hoech v Commission (1987) EC R  1549. For some analysis, see W ilmers de, J.M ., 1991, p.37 ff.
The idea o f  fundamental rights has been seen as a program  of comparative constitutional law 
(Pescatore, P., 1980, p.341).
13,3 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (1970) ECR 1125 (17 December 1970). For some analysis, see 
Wilmer de, J.M ., 1991, p.38 ff.
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constantly to the European human rights system1314 and the rights provided in the national 
constitutions of its Member States.1315 The comparative observations have supported the 
interpretation of many European human rights arguments.
In one case1316 the Court asserted that
"Fundamental rights are an integral part o f  the general principles o f law: the 
observance o f which the court ensures. In safeguarding these rights the court is 
bound to draw inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, and cannot uphold measures which are incompatible with the 
fundamental rights established and guaranteed by the constitutions o f these states. 
Similarly, international treaties fo r  the protection o f  human rights, on which the 
Member States have collaborated or o f  which they are signatories, can supply 
guidelines which should be followed within the framework o f the community law"
In terms of the facts of the case, the court explained the general approach to the 
interpretation of these rights:
"If rights o f ownership are protected by the constitutional laws o f  all the Member 
States and if similar guarantees are given in respect o f  their right freely to choose 
and practice their trade or profession, the rights thereby granted, fa r  from  
constituting unfettered prerogatives, must be viewed in the light o f  the social func ­
tion o f the property and activities protected thereunder. For this reason, rights o f  
this nature are protected by law subject always to restrictions laid down in accor­
dance with the public interest. Within the Community legal order it likewise seems 
legitimate that these rights should, i f  necessary, be subject to certain limits 
justified bv the overall objectives pursued bv the Community. on condition that the 
substance o f these rights is left untouched.
The above guarantees can in no respect be extended to protect mere commercial 
interests or opportunities, the uncertainties o f  which are part o f the very essence 
o f economic activity. "I3!7
13,4 Council o f Europe, Rome, November 4 ,1 9 5 0 , into force 2 Septem ber 2 ,1 9 5 3 .
However, this reference took place only after the last M em ber State became a Contracting Party to  this 
Convention (see, Schreuer, Ch., 1993, p.459).
1315 See cases 4/73 No Id v Commision (1974) ECR 4 9 1 ,507 ,36 /75 , Rutili v Minister o f the Interior (1975) ECR 
1219 ,1 2 3 2 ,4 4 /7 9 , Hauer v Rheinland-Pfalz (1979) ECR 3727 ,3745 . For som e analysis, see Pescatore, P., 1980, 
p.341.
Also Commission has adopted a  memorandum on the Accession o f the European Community to the 
European human rights system (Bulletin o f the European Communities, 4 /1 9 7 9 ,1 6 ).
15,8 Case 4/73 Nold, Kohlen- und Bausstoffgrosshandlung v Commission (1974) ECR 491 (14 May 1974).
13,7 The judgment continued as follows (on the "substance"):
"/ƒ rights o f ownership are protected by the constitutional laws o f all the Member States and if 
similar guarantees are given in respect of their right freely to choose and practice their trade or 
profession, the rights thereby guaranteed, far from constituting unfettered prerogatives, must be 
viewed in the light of the socialfunction o f the property and activities protected thereunder. For this 
reason, rights of this nature are protected by law subject always to limitations laid down in 
accordance with the public interest. Within the Community legal order it likewise seems legitimate 
that these rights should, if necessary, be subject to certain limits justified by the overall objectives
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This reasoning was based on the observations o f the Advocate General* 1318. There
was also consideration of Joint Declarations by the European Parliament, the Council, and the
Commission on fundamental rights.1319 This type of interpretation lays down the basic ideas about
the value of the comparative approach in the Community system (substantive generality,
derogations based on Communities'objectives).
The Treaty of European Union codified the development o f the case-law and
sources of law doctrine created by the European Community legal system in Article F.2.:
"2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from  the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, as general principles o f  Community
Law."
It could be claimed that this provision established some kind of normative basis and 
an obligation for the European Court o f Justice to use comparative analysis when examining 
certain legal questions. We may say that this is not only a statement of the static existence o f  
general principles common to the Member States, but that, for that matter, it imposes an 
obligation to follow the development of the case-law o f the European Court of Human Rights 
and argumentation in these cases and to oversee the development of the national constitutions in 
this respect. In some ways, it confirms the position of comparative analysis as a dynamic part o f 
the legal sources o f the European Community legal system.
On the other hand, some changes were introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty 1997
pursued by the Community, on condition that the substance o f these rights is left untouched. As 
regards the guarantees accorded to a particular undertaking, they can in no respect be extended to 
protect mere commercial interests or opportunities, the uncertainties of which are part of the very 
essence o f economic activity.
The disadvantages claimed by the applicant are in fact the result o f economic change and not of the 
contested decision. It was for the applicant, confronted by the economic changes brought about by 
the recession in coal production, to acknowledge the situation and itself carry out the necessary 
adaptations. "
1318 Mr. Trabucchi. Opinion delivered on 28 M arch 1974 is of particular importance. This well argued opinion goes 
through the nature of the fundamental principles, their uses, their purposes, m aking comparative references to systems 
o f the M em ber S tates - in general, and to a certain extent, in particular. On these bases he dismisses the applicants 
claims.
13,9 OJ 1977 C-103, and Bulletin of the European Communities, 3-1977. See also European Council Declaration of 
April 8 ,1978  on Democracy, Bulletin o f the European Communities, 3-1978.
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in realm o f the Article F1320. It remains to be seen what kind of change the inclusion of 
fundamental rights in the Amsterdam treaty will bring into the system. One may predict that 
comparative analysis may lose its importance due to the fact that the basic rights argument may 
become an independent basis of Community law claims. The Community system will define its 
jurisdictional relationship towards both the European human rights system and also towards the 
general constitutional traditions of the Member States, because for the first time, it will be able 
to apply the general basic rights in the context of Community law. On the other hand, there is a 
possibility that comparative law argumentation may become an integral part of the interpretation 
of the relationship between the European Community and Member State levels.
However, the basic doctrine of comparative interpretation seems to be already well- 
established in the case law.
3.1.3. The use of state legal systems in the absence of 
international obligations
3 .I.3 .I. Doctrine concerning the use of comparative 
observations
The types of uses and  users o f comparative law. As we have seen, Community judges are 
guided by the principles derived from national legal systems1321. On the other hand, the sphere of 
use of such generality arguments is not restricted to any particular field of principles. It is the 
nature of the case in question, and the arguments made by the parties, which determines the 
nature of the consideration given to these general principles.
What does comparative law study mean to the European Court o f Justice? This is 
perhaps best understood via some of its case law.
U» « ƒ 7 7 j£ Union is founded on the principles o f liberty, democracy, respect o f human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule o f law, principles which are common to the Member States
2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention fo r the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles o f Community law:
3. The Union shall respect the national identities o f  its Member States.
4. The Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies. ”
(Compare the Rome Treaty and Maastricht Treaty; in them national identity is mentioned in the first
paragraph.)
1321 One of the first cases. Case 1/57,14/57, Société des Usines à Tubes de la Sarre v High Authority (1957) ECR 
105. Referred, for example, in case 137/92 Commission of the European Communities v BasfAC (1994) EC R  1-2555 
(Judgment o f the Court o f 15 June 1994).
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The Advocates General have stressed the fact that in the Community system there
is no attempt to study concepts common to several legal systems and in this way to arrive at
generalizations1322. Furthermore, the Community legal order "does not aim in principle to define
its concepts on the basis o f one or more national legal systems without express provision to that
effect”1323 The Advocate General have maintained, for example, that
"These minimum requirements are based on the provisions o f the common customs 
tariff read in conjunction with regulation no 1259/72 that is to say, on provisions 
o f Community law which do not refer to legal system o f the Member States in 
determining their meaning and scope: the Community legal order does not in fact 
aim in principle to define its concepts on the basis o f one or more national legal 
systems without express provision to that effect. In this case all national variations 
from  such common requirements as to quality tend to distort the uniform effect o f 
regulation no 1259/72 as amended and to use it fo r  purposes other than that fo r  
which it was intended, which is the disposal o f  butter stock sale at a reduced price 
to certain processing undertakings by permitting reduction in the monetary and 
compensatory amounts pertaining to the market o f  products whose destination is 
not necessarily that fo r  which a favourable rate is provided by that regulation. ”
In the context of the concept of the "employee", the Court maintained the
possibility of interpreting the term with reference to the term "common to the legal systems o f the
Member States", but at the same time confirmed, with reference to the Courts interpretation of
the term "worker" in another case, that there is, however, only a "Community" meaning:
"It is common ground that directive no 77/187 does not contain an express 
definition o f the term* employee’. In order to establish its meaning it is necessary 
to applv generally recognired principles o f  interpretation hv referring in the first 
place to the ordinary meaning be attributed to that term in its context and bv 
obtaining such guidance as mav be derived from Community texts and from 
concepts common to the legal systems o f  the Member States.
24. I t may be recalled that the court, inter alia in its judgment o f 2 March 1982 
(case 53/81, Levin, (1982) ECR 1035), held that the term' worker’ as used in the 
Treaty, may not be defined by reference to the national laws o f  the Member States 
but has a Community meaning. I f  this were not the case, the community rules on 
freedom  o f movement fo r  workers would be frustrated, since the meaning o f the 
term could be decided and modified unilaterally, without a control by the 
community institutions, by the Member States, which would thus be able to exclude
1322 Opinion of M r Advocate General Lenz delivered on 14 June 1988. Case Weissgerber v. Finanzamt Neustadt 
(reference for a prelim inary ruling from the Finanzgericht Rheinland-Pfalz, effect of directives - exemption from vat - 
passing on of tax) (1988) BCR 4433.
1323 Case 64/81 De Franceschi Nicolaus Corman et Fils SA v. Hauptzollamt Cronau (1992) ECR 13 (judgment o f 
the Court, 27 January 1982). Also Case 191/90 Generics UK, Harris Phar. LTD v So Klein and French Laborat. Ltd.
(1992) ECR 1-5335 (27 October 1992).
i
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... certain categories o f persons from the benefit o f  the Treaty/’1324 13256
This type of interpretative idea suggests an interaction between the ordinary 
(textuaJ) meaning and the comparative method of interpretation.
Similar ideas have been expressed also in following way, based on a criticized
practice:
’Moreover, the concept could not truly purport to derive from a principle common 
to the laws o f the Member States but would be carrying too fa r  the frequently 
criticized doctrine o f ”act o f the government” whose scope is tending to be 
considerably narrowed in some legal systems where it was formerly most 
rigorously applied.,,li2S
This has been recognized also in the field of social security:
”...elements o f particular benefit, purposes and the conditions on which it is 
granted, and not on whether a benefit is classified as a social security benefit by 
national legislation. "!326
In some cases, the Court has maintained that it is unnecessary to refer to 
comparative law:
"Accordingly, and without it being necessary to examine the different legal 
systems o f Member States, the applicants are not justified in claiming that the 
Commission has failed to observe the above mentioned principles laid down by the 
Court o f  Justice in its judgment in the papiers peints case. "I327
The basic ''doctrine” for the rejection of comparison is based on the impossibility 
o f comparing the State's own legal system with the Community system. This may be related to 
the idea of the “autonomy of the Community legal order”1328. This idea has been formulated, for
1334 Case 105/84, Foreningen afArbejdsledere i Danmark v. a/s Danmols Inventor A/S (reference for a  preliminary 
ruling from the Vestre LandsreL - safeguarding o f employees' rights in the event o f transfers o f undertakings) (1985) 
ECR 2639-2654 (Judgment o f the court, fifth chamber, of 11 July 1985).
1325 Opinion o f Mr Advocate General Darmon delivered on I June 1989 in case 241/87 Maclaine Watson & Co. Ltd 
v. Council o f the European Communities and Commission of the European Communities (1990) ECR 1-1797.
1326 See also, case 98/94 Ckristel Schmidt v Rijksdienst voor pensioenen (reference for a preliminary ruling: 
Arbeidsrechtbank Antwerpen - Belgium. Regulation (EEC) no 1408/71 - social security - national rules against) (1995) 
ECR 1-2559 (Judgment o f the court (first chamber) o f 11 August 1995).
1337 Case 34/92 Fiatagri UK Ltd and New Holland Ford Ltd v. Commission o f the European Communities (1994) 
ECR n-905 (Judgment o f the court of first instance (second chamber) of 27 O ctober 1994).
,M Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL (1964) ECR 585.
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example, in the following way:
"Secondly, it is not open to Member States to rely on the special features o f their 
legal systems by way o f  defence where they have fa iled  to carry out their commu­
nity obligations. It is well established that Member State may not rely upon 
provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order 
to ju stify  a failure to fu lfil obligations arising under Community law : see, fo r  
example, case 254/83 Commission v Italy [1984] ECR 3395. In particular, a 
M ember States may not plead administrative difficulties existing in that state in 
order to justify such a failure : see case 58/83 Commission v Greece [1984] 202 
. Moreover, to allow such a defence as that invoked by the German government 
here would obviously prejudice the uniform application o f Community law: the 
application of Community law would be at the mercy o f  the procedural 
peculiarities o f each national legal system 1329
Furthermore, the "disharmony" between national and Community concepts o f "legal
person" (in Article 173 of the Treaty) has also been recognized by the Court'330.
The same idea has been, on some occasions, explained in a more indirect way with
reference to the functioning of the Community order:
" . . .  finally, it should be pointed out that the Court declared in the Ferwerda 
judgment that no consideration whatever which under one o f the legal systems o f  
the Member States is or may be based on a principle o f legal certainty can in all 
cases constitute a defence against a claim fo r  the recovery o f Community financial 
benefits wrongly granted. It must in each case be considered whether such 
application does not jeopardize the very basics o f  the rule providing fo r  such 
recovery and whether it does not result in practice in frustrating such 
recovery",1331
The basic rejection of comparative law is usually based on a more extensive 
comparative study, which results, in consequence, in some remarks on the disparity o f the 
different systems:
1329 Opinion o f M r Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 15 M ay 1990 in case 217/88 Commission o f the Euro­
pean Communities v Federal Republic o f Germany (Agriculture - common organization o f the market in wine - 
national coercive measures) (1990) ECR 1-2879. The same idea is expressed in the case 140/78 Commission of the 
European Communities v Italian Republic (Agricultural structure policy - submission of statements o f account) (1980) 
ECR 3687 - 3701 (Judgment of the court o f 10 December 1980), case 140/78 Commission o f the European 
Communities v Italian Republic (Failure to adopt w ithin the prescribed period the measures needed to  comply with a 
directive - annual accounts of certain types o f com panies) (1986) ECR 1199-1205 (Judgment o f the court o f 20 M arch 
1986).
1330 Case 135/81 Groupement des Agences de Voyages, Asbl v Commission of the European Communities 
(A pplication for a  declaration of the nullity o f a  decision) (1982) ECR 3799-3811 (Judgment o f  the court (first 
chamber), 28 October 1982).
1131 Opinion of M r Advocate General Darmon delivered on 29 N ovem ber 1988. In case 94/87 Commission o f the 
European Communities v Federal Republic o f Germany (State aids - undertaking producing primary aluminium - 
recovery)(1989) EC R  175.
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"Those examples clearly emphasize that at the Community level the expression 
"public undertaking”, which must necessarily have a uniform meaning, cannot be 
defined by reference to the different legal concepts o f  the national legal systems. 
For the purposes o f  defining the concept "undertaking" within the meaning o f 
Community competition law and the expression public undertaking” within the 
meaning o f directive 80/72, the greater importance must therefore be attached to 
function.. ”tm
The same idea was seen in the case concerning the equal treatment o f men and 
women. The Advocate General rejected the references to the treatment o f the principle of 
equality in different systems» because that would weaken the application o f the "Community 
principle o f  equal treatment” as well as the "uniform application o f  the Community rules".im  
Surprisingly, the reference was made only to Irish, French, Italian, and Greek systems. 
Furthermore, in the same context, the principle of equal treatment has been seen, in general, as 
a "cornerstone o f contemporary legal systems”.13 *334 We will discuss the comparative reasoning in 
this context below in the analysis of the Kalanke case.
It must be mentioned that comparative observations frequently appear in the 
submissions to the Court presented by the parties. These types of references have been 
recognized and analysed, to a certain extent, by the Court.
The Commission has pointed out, in several submissions, the "comparative” 
diversity o f the legal systems. In a case supporting national systems' competence, the Court 
recognized how
"¡a]s the Commission points out in its written observations, the Community 
legislation is largely silent on the respective interests o f landlord and tenant, 
leaving it to the Member States to strike the necessary balance. That this should 
be left to national authorities is logical. given the diversity o f national legal 
systems and implementing legislation and the different circumstances o f  individual 
producers- ”1335
1331 Opinion of Mr Advocate General M ischo delivered on 4 N ovem ber 1986 in case 118/85 Commission o f the 
European Communities v Republic o f Italy (Transparency of financial relations between M ember States and public
undertakings) (1987) ECR 2599.
1333 Joined opinion of M r Advocate General Darm on delivered on 14 N ovem ber 1989 in case 177/88 Elisabeth 
Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor jong volwassenen plus (1990) EC R  1-3941.
1334 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 23 January 1991 in case 63/89 Assurances du credit SA 
and Compagnie beige ¿'assurance credit SA v Council of the European Communities and Commission o f the 
European Communities (1991) ECR 1-1799.
This issue is dealt more thoroughly in relation to the Kalanke case, see below.
1335 Opinion of M r Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 27 April 1989 in case 5/88 Hubert Wachauf v Federal 
Republic of Germany (Reference for a preliminary ru lin g : Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt am M ain - Germany) (1989) 
ECR 2609.
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Also "generality" arguments have been used by the Commission to support its 
Community law interpretation:
"the Commission likewise contends that the termination o f a contract o f  
employment, whether by way o f  dismissal or automatically, is included to the 
concept ’conditions o f  employment’ and does not fa ll within the exceptions to the 
principle o f equality o f treatment referred to in Article 2 o f the directive no 76/207 
or within the scope o f  directive... In that connection it states that in the national 
systems termination o f a contract o f employment also falls within the sphere o f  
labour law rather than o f social security law. ”1336 137
bases.
However, the Advocate General was not convinced of the interpretation on these
Commission reports have been also used by the Court in several cases, and they
may even be referred to by the Court in its justification:
"The information provided by the Commission shows that national systems o f  
assistance fo r  orphans vary considerably. In the view o f this variation and in 
order to avoid arbitrary differences according to the national systems, the term in 
Article 78(1) o f regulation No 1408/71 must be interpreted as referring to all 
benefits intended under the applicable national law" P 31
In this case, the comparative study and its result (the showing of clear disparities 
between national legislation) had a direct impact on the result o f the case.
States frequently attempt to argue on the basis o f their legislation, when there is a 
question of interpretation of EC legislation.1338 Moreover, the parties use comparative arguments 
to support their views:
"In support o f that submission, the applicants claim that in the legal systems o f all 
the Member States the debtor is not entitled to profit from a delay in the payment 
o f sums which are due. The creditor may not be deprived o f interest produced by 
the sums which he could have used to meet his needs from the date on which they
1336 Case 262/84 Vera Mia Beets-Proper v F. Van Lanschot Bankiers NV (Reference for a prelim inary ruling from 
the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden. Equality o f treatm ent for men and women -  conditions governing dismissal) (1986) 
ECR 773-793 (Judgm ent o f  the Court o f  26  February 1986).
1337 Case 188/90 Mario Donguzzi-Zordanin v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben (1992) EC R  1-2039 (19 
March 1992).
,33® See case 78/91 Hughes v Chief Adjudication Officer, Belfast (1992) ECR 1-4839 (16 July 1992).
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were due. "im
There are several examples of the analysis o f the rules o f the directives and
regulations (other than in the field of the Brussels Convention and the competition law) where,
both in the institutional context of justification and in the justification itself there is the use of
comparative observations. One example can be taken up here:
"The difference in question is based on the distinction between residents' and' 
nonresidentw hich is to be found in all legal systems and is internationally 
accepted. It is an essential distinction in the law. I t is thus also applicable in the 
context o f  Article 52 o f the Treaty. "I34°
Indirect comparison. Comparisons, in the Community system, can take the form o f direct 
references, but some indirect comparisons are also made. These "indirect comparisons" can be, 
as we have seen, derived from the material produced by the Commission or from the 
"comparative legal sciences":
"notwithstanding the preparatory work carried out at the Commission behest 
(Eugen Ulmer: the law on unfair competition in the Member States o f  the EEC, 
part I: comparative survey; study undertaken at the request o f the Commission o f  
the European Communities by the Max-Planck-Institut fuer auslaendisches und 
intemationale patent, urheber - und wettbewerbsrecht, Muenchen, in particular no 
432), no harmonization has been achieved with regard to designations o f  origin 
indications o f provenance and so on (see written question no 250/86, 290, 
17.11.1986, p. 36). Designations o f origin exist in the legal system o f  some 
Member States, and to a lesser extent or not at all in that o f others (see in that 
regard: Jean Pierre Cochet: La notion d'appell d'origine en droit communautaire, 
1985, and Klaus-Juergen Kraatz: der Schütz geographischer Weinbezeichnungen 
im Recht der europaeischen Gemeinschaften, 1980).* 1340341
13)9 Case T -16/89 Hans Herkenrath and others v Commission o f the European Communities (Officials - 
remuneration - default interest and compensatory interest) (1992) E C R 11-275 (Judgment of the Court of First Instance 
(second chamber) of 26 February 1992).
1340 Case 270/83 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic (Freedom of establishment in regard 
to insurance - corporation tax and shareholders' tax credits) (1986) ECR 273-308 (Judgment of the court of 28 January 
1986).
See also, case 124/83 Direktoratetformarkedsordningeme v s. A. Nicolas Corman et fils (Reference 
fo r a preliminary ruling from the ô s tre  L andsret Common organisation o f  the agricultural markets) (1985) ECR 
3777-3794 (Judgment o f the court o f 5 Decem ber 1985), case T-275/94 Groupement des Cartes Bancaires “CB ” v 
Commission o f the European Communities (1995) 11-2169 (Judgment of the court o f first instance (fourth chamber, 
extended composition) o f  14 July 1995), and case 49/84 Leon Debaecker and Berthe Plouvier v Comelis Gerrit 
Bouwman (Reference for a  preliminary ruling from the hoge raad der nederlanden. Brussels convention • A rticle 27.2 
- service in sufficient time) (1985) 1779-1803 (Judgment of the Court (fourth cham ber) o f 11 June 1985).
1341 Opinion o f M r Advocate General Van Gerven delivered on 22 February 1989 in case 263/87 Kingdom of 
Denmark v Com mission o f the European Communities (Clearance o f eaggf accounts - export refunds - Grana Padano 
cheese) (1989) ECR 1081.
See also. Opinion of M r Advocate General Van Gerven delivered on 28 January 1992 in case 104/89
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The comparison of language versions. The comparison o f language versions is one of the
"comparative" methods used by the Court. Comparisons of language versions have generated the
idea of a "wide and nontechnical interpretation of concepts":
"Comparison o f the versions in the different languages o f the Community o f the 
text o f  Article 2 o f  regulation no 1788/69 shows that these terms must not be inter­
preted in the strict technical sense which the terms agent' or' concessionaire' mav 
have in the law o f one or other o f the Member States but may be interpreted 
widely and in a nontechnical manner. The terms' sole agent' and' sole 
concessionaire' must not be understood as referring to two quite distinct and  
mutually exclusive legal constructions but as intended to include the different 
constructions in the legal systems o f the Member States refer under the one or the 
other o f  these designations to contractual relationships belonging to the category 
thus indicated ”m2
Conclusions. The relationship between a supranational system and the national systems it 
“contains” is never static. The direct influence and applicability of national laws in the European 
Court o f Justice has occasionally been discussed.
Basically, the rule is that the Court o f Justice does not have the competence to  
apply national laws.1342 343 Furthermore, the Court of Justice cannot decide on the violation of a na­
tional law or interpret national provisions.1344 As we have seen, the ECJ is very reluctant to look 
into the national legislation in the different Member States. However, claims based on the 
disparity between legislation in the different Member States and the absence of common rules as 
justifying discriminatory practices in Member States has been rejected by the ECJ.1345
Nevertheless, the ECJ has to deal with and interpret national systems, at least when 
the Treaty makes explicit reference to the national systems (and its concepts), as in the case o f 
human rights.1346 This also takes place in cases where there are problems with the interpretation
JM. Mulder and others and Otto Heinemann v Council o f the European Communities and Commission o f the 
European Communities (Additional levy on m ilk - non-contractual liability) (1992) E C R 1-3061.
1342 Case 82/76 Farbwerke Hoechst v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt-am-Main (Preliminary ruling requested by the 
Hessisches Finan2gericht. Value for custom s purposes o f trade-marks) (1977) 335-350 (Judgment o f the court of 17 
February 1977). See also, opinion of the Advocate General W arner (also comparative observations in general).
1343 Case 1/58 Stork v High Authority (1958) E C R  17, and 36-40/59 Geitling v High Authority (1960) ECR 423.
1344 See, 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon v M etro  (1971) ECR 487.
1345 Case 191/90 Generics UK, Harris Phar. LTD v S. Kline and French Laboral. Ltd. (1992) ECR 1-5335 (27 
October 1992).
1346 Case 50/71 Wiinsche v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle Getreide (1972) EC R  53. See for example Article 58.
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of concepts in the European system.1347
From the practice o f the European Court of Justice it can be seen that the German, 
French and English legal conceptualizations have had an indirect influence on the practice of the 
Court.1348 However, this can be verified only indirectly, because the Court has explicitly rejected 
this "one-sided adaption". The use o f conceptualizations foreign to the Community system 
derives from the fact that even if a rule is not mentioned in written law this is not proof that it 
does not exist.1349 On the other hand, the fact that conceptualization is used does not mean that 
all ingredients o f particular national systems will necessarily be accepted. In fact, the use of 
national concepts can be extremely “analogical”, and the Advocate Generals in particular have 
developed an extremely broad comparative approach.1350
Because the specific rules in Member States are not directly applicable norms for 
the ECJ, they rather seem to be kind of “facts” o f the case. In other words, they are non- 
normative material of the system. However, they can be used to support certain conclusions in 
cases, and can be used as material for the argument. The use of the results o f these comparative 
studies is not based on the features o f any one specific legal system, but rather on a set of 
"group" features of these systems (disparity or uniformity in an (institutionally) qualitative 
sense)1351.
It seems that comparative interpretation has to do with quite strict textual and literal 
interpretations.
1347 This was mentioned in particular in the statement o f Advocate General Roemer in the case 5/54 Netherlands v 
High authority (1954) Rec. 201. See also cases 17,20/61 Klôckner-Werke AG and Hoesch AG v High Authority 
(1962) ECR 325 ja  159/78 Republic o f Italy v. Commission (1979) ECR 3247.
l34* Cruz, de R., 1993, Chapter 5. T here have been cases, where the Court has explicitly referred to the law o f other 
Member States as applicable law, see 7/56 and 3-7/57 Algera and others v Assembly, Rec. 1957, p.81,114-116. Some 
analysis, Schwarze, J., 1991, p.5.
However, these decisions were made before the Community system had specific provisions dealing 
with those questions.
1349 Case 108/63 Merlini v High Authority (1965) ECR 1,10.
1350 See case 14/61 Hoogovens v High authority (1962) ECR 253 ,2 8 0 -2 8 3  and 13/61 De Geus v Bosch (1962) 
ECR 45 ,58-61 .
1331 One could claim that if  national conceptualizations were accepted as such within the EC  system, one could even 
claim discriminatory treatment among M em ber States. The idea o f referring normatively only to  certain systems in the 
EC legal system would be against the formal legal equality of the national systems. This is why the Court is unable to 
explicitly use direct conceptualizations o f  one M em ber State. The ECJ refers to  all systems. Referring is "recognition" 
type o f argumentation, and not argumentation by  direct normative and legal-instrumental arguments.
It could be claimed, that the EC system attempts, v ia  the adaptation o f certain methods o f  comparative 
argumentation (towards national and other international systems), to achieve coherence and harmony with the other 
systems.
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3.I.3.2. Som e examples of comparative reasoning and its 
consequences
General rem arks. The Court and the Advocates General have used “qualitative” comparative 
analysis and argumentation in several occasions in arguing for the positive content of certain 
concepts, rules, and principles. The list o f examples presented here is not exhaustive. 
Furthermore, the "legal" function of these comparisons is not analysed thoroughly in this chapter. 
The idea here is to present a variety o f examples from different fields of law. The presentation is 
divided into the comparative interpretation of concepts, rules, principles, procedural rules, staff 
cases, and finally, some "constitutional" ideas.
Some conceptual questions. In certain cases, the Advocates General, with reference to case law,
have considered national conceptualizations as a source o f interpretation, particularly when the
matter is about the interpretation of different language versions1332:
"First, the different language versions are all equally authentic and an 
interpretation o f a provision o f  Community law thus involves a comparison o f the 
various language versions (judgment o f 6 October 1982 in case 283/81 Cilfit v 
Ministry o f Health [1982] ECR at 3430, paragraph 18). Secondly, Greece joined 
the Community only a f  the adoption o f that regulation. Thus, in so fa r  as the 
Greek language version differs from the text as published in 1971 and since then 
maintained in the other languages, it can only be a translation error first 
quest ion ."
and that
"Nothing permits the conclusion to be drawn that expression have different 
meaning in Community law than the one it has in the national legal systems... "u53
The concept of "minimum benefit" occurring in a regulation1352 354 was, according to 
the Advocate General, to be interpreted with "reference to the minimum benefits fixed  by the 
laws o f the various Member States''. The study was based on the examination of the concept in
1352 The question at issue was about the expression at the purchasers own r isk ' in Article 15 (a) o f Regulation no 
2960/77.
1353 Opinion of Mr Advocate General M ischo delivered on 11 February 1988 in case 71/87 Greek state v Inter-Kom 
AE  (Reference for a prelim inary ruling from the Hfeteio (court of appeal)) (1988) 1979.
1354 Article 50  of regulation no 1408/71
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those systems Hwhere the existence o f  it is not contested".1255 This study was made under the 
auspices of the Commission.
Moreover, the distinction between "rights in personam" and "rights in rem" was
adopted by the Advocate General on the basis of the ’’indirect’* comparative argument referred
to to in the so-called Schlosser report.3 *1356
The interpretation of the concept of a “legal person * has been supported by
observations based upon observed "tendencies in the national jurisprudence”:
'The fac t that under the second paragraph o f Article 173 only legal (and natural) 
persons are entitled to bring actions and that only such persons are deemed to 
have general capacity - as distinct from  the capacity to bring an action (see 
paragraph 8, above) - does not seem to constitute a real obstacle. There is. after 
all, in many leeal systems, evidence o f a general tendency to interpret the concept 
o f "leeal person" in a pragmatic wav. allowing the courts to decide on the basis 
o f the wav in which positive law structures the legal sphere o f  particular organ or 
institution that within a specific legal relationship that organ or institution has (to 
a greater or lesser degree) legal personality. There is also clear evidence o f  that 
tendency in the case-law o f this court."1357
In the realm o f the Brussels Convention, which is within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, there is an explicit reference to the need for comparative analysis in the interpretation of 
certain concepts. Consequently, there have been several interpretations made on a comparative 
basis. Indeed, the Court has developed a doctrine of "comparative interpretation" in this field of 
law1358.
Comparative interpretation was expressed by the Court in cases dealing with the 
concept of'civil and commercial matters* and ’ordinary ' and 'extraordinary' appeals (Articles 30 
and 38 of the Brussels Convention). There the Court had explained that when one is interpreting 
the Brussels Convention clauses ("especially title III thereof1) the reference is to be made "to the 
law of one o f the states concerned but, first, to the objectives and the scheme o f the Convention
l3Si Case 22/81 Regina v Social Security Commissioner, ex parte Norman Ivor Browning (reference for a
preliminary ruling from the High court o f justice, Q ueen 's bench division, divisional court, London) (1981) 3357-3372
(Judgment o f  the court (second chamber), 17 December 1981).
1356 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Darmon delivered on 8 February 1994 in case 294/92 George Lawrence Webb
v Lawrence Desmond Webb (Reference for a preliminary ruling: Court of appeal (England) - United Kingdom) (1994)
1-1717.
1357 Opinion of M r Advocate General Van Gerven delivered on 30 N ovem ber 1989 in case 70/88 European Par­
liament v Council o f the European Communities (Capacity of the European Parliament to bring an action for annul­
ment) (1990) E C R 1-2041.
1358 Brussels convention, 27 September 1968, renewed, 9 Oct 1978, OJ, 1979 LK 04, p.44. See also on the Brussels 
Convention cases, Pescatore, P, 1980, pp.343-344.
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and, secondly, to the general principles which stem from  the corpus o f  the national lega l 
sys terns. ",359
There the Advocate General had identified a lacunae in the law. The parties had 
been arguing on the basis of international practices. The Advocate General spoke of the different 
possible approaches, and referred to governmental opinions in the context of the case in addition 
to Commission reports and the purpose and the history of the drafting.1359 360 The Commission had 
been advocating the idea of an "ideal solution" {"independent conceptualization'). The Advocate 
General, however, viewed the idea of an independent "comparative" construction as difficult and  
tending toward uncertainty. Consequently, he referred to the "experience o f  the national courts”, 
and came to the conclusion that the matter should be related to the definition provided by the  
court (and the state), where an enforced judgment had been given.
Another good example is the case concerning the “clause conferring jurisdiction * 
in a company’s statutes1361. It shows also how the comparative law method has been developed 
in a "first case" dealing with the issue, and how interpretation may become somewhat dogmatic.
In case, the Advocate General made an extensive study of the idea of the ”clause 
conferring the jurisdiction ' in different legal systems. The Court, based on the report of the 
Advocate General, investigated the question as to whether the jurisdiction-conferring clause 
contained in the statute of the company (expressing the jurisdiction) was an agreement within the 
meaning of the Article 17 of the Brussels Convention.
The Court argued that there was a disparity between the legal systems concerning 
the relationship between a shareholder and a company limited by shares. In some systems "the 
relationship is characterized as contractual, in others it is regarded as institutional, normative 
orsui g e n e r is The Court maintained that the interpretation o f this concept must be independent. 
This idea was explained so as to derive the "objectives and the general scheme o f the Conven­
1359 Case 29/76 Lufttransportuntemehmen GmbH and co. Kg v Eurocontrol (Preliminary ruling requested by the 
Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf) (1976) ECR 1541 -1552 (Judgment of the court of 14 October 1976).
t3® Advocates General have been referring to the absence of comparative information in the preparatory documents 
of the Convention, and the comparative studies produced in the so-called Generate report on the issue (OJ 1979 C 59) - 
including also bilateral treaties (see, for example, Opinion of the Advocate General Gulmann, 20th February 1992 in 
case 261/90 Mario Reichert, Hans-Heinz Reichert and Ingeborg Klocker v Dresden Bank Ag (reference to the 
preliminary ruling, Cour d’appel dAix-en-provence - France) (1992) ECR 1-2149). In this case the Court went through 
also the different language versions of the provision in question, and made other comparative law observations.
1361 The Article 17 o f the Brussels Convention. Case 214/89 Powell Dujfryn pic v Wolfgang Petereit (Reference for 
the preliminary ruling: Oberlandesgericht Koblenz - Germany. Brussels convention - Jurisdiction Agreement - Clause 
contained in the statutes o f the company limited by shares) (1992) ECR 1-1745 (Judgment o f the Court o f 10 March 
1992).
This was based on the Opinion o f  M r Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 20 November 1991.
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tion", and in order to
"ensure the equality and uniformity o f the rights and obligations arising out o f the 
Convention. For the contracting states and the persons concerned, therefore it is 
important that the concept o f  ”agreement conferring jurisdiction” should not be 
interpreted simply as referring to the national law o f one or other o f  the states 
concerned. "
The Court refused to interpret the concept by reference to a set of example or 
model, and instead used the fact that disparity existed between national laws to arrive at an 
independent idea concerning the concept.1362
However, in answering to the question whether that particular clause in the statute, 
as it was expressed, satisfied "the form al requirements o f  the Article 1 7 \  the Court again made 
a reference to national legal systems. It found that there was a comparative "generality" among 
legal systems ("in the legal systems o f  all the contracting states”) regarding the fact that the 
statutes o f a company are in written form, and that they are the basic instruments governing the 
relationship between the shareholder and the company. Furthermore, the way that shares are 
acquired does not have an effect on the fact that every shareholder ought to be informed of the 
binding nature o f the statute.1363
The Court's ruling has been thereafter confirmed by several cases dealing with 
various concepts in the Brussels Convention.1364 In certain opinions1365, detailed comparative
1362 In the Case 3/82 Peters v Znav (1983) ECR 987, the Court interpreted the concept o f the matters relating to a 
contract'.
1363 This was used also in Opinion of M r Advocate General Lenz delivered on 8 March 1994 in case 288/92 Custom 
made commercial Ltd v Stawa Metallbau GmbH (Reference for a  preliminary ruling: bundesgerichtshof - Germany. 
Brussels convention - place o f performance o f an obligation - uniform law) (1994) 1-2913.
1364 This was used as a starting point also in case 9/77 Bavaria Fluggesellschaft Schwabe and co kg and Germanair 
Bedarfsluftfahrt GmbH and co kg v Eurocontrol (Preliminary rulings requested by the Bundesgerichtshof) (1977) ECR 
1517-1527 (Judgment o f the court of 14 July 1977), 133/78 Henri Gourdain v Franz Nadler (Preliminary ruling requested 
by the Bundesgerichtshof. Brussels convention. Bankruptcy and proceedings relating to the winding-up) (1979) 733-746 
(Judgment o f the court o f 22 February 1979).
Furthermore, Case 150/77 Berdhand v OTT (1978) ECR 1432, 814/79 Netherlands state v Reinhold 
Ruejfer (Preliminary ruling requested by the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden. Brussels convention of 1968) (1980) ECR 
3807-3822 (Judgm ent o f the court o f 16 Decem ber 1980), 288/82 Ferdinand M JJ. Duijnstee in his capacity as 
liquidator of b.V. Schroefboutenfabriek (in liquidation) v Lodewijk Goderbauer (Reference for a preliminary ruling from 
thie Hoge Raad der Nederlanden) (1983) ECR 3663-3679 (Judgment o f the court (fourth chamber) o f 15 November 1983), 
Criminal proceedings against Siegfried Ewald Rinkau (preliminary ruling requested by the Hoge Raad o f The Nether­
lands. Article II o f the protocol annexed to the Convention on jurisdiction o f 27 (for example, the distinction between "in­
tentionally and non-intentionally committed crimes"), and the concept 'rights in property arising out of a matrimonial rela­
tionship 0 (1981) ECR 1391-1404 (Judgment o f the court of 26 M ay 1981), 143-78 Jacques de Cavel v Luise de Cavel 
(Preliminary ruling requested by the Bundesgerichtshof) (1979) ECR 1055-1068 (Judgment o f  the court o f  27 March 
1979), Martin Peters Bauuntemehmung GmbH vZuid Nederlandse Aannemers Vereniging (Reference for a preliminary 
ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden) (1983) 987-1004 (Judgment o f the court, 22 M arch 1983), Opinion of Mr 
Advocate General Darmon delivered on 23 Novem ber 1989 in case 220/88 Dumez France and Tracoba v Hessische
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references to the legal systems o f the Member States were not even considered to be necessary, 
particularly where the case is "clear'*.1366
Disparities were found in the idea of lis pendens (Article 21 of the Convention, 
'first seized court')  1367 *. This resulted nin a a fortiori type of reasoning and a ruling, according to 
which the
”the court first seized ' is the one in which the requirements fo r  proceedings to 
become definitely pending were first fulfilled, such requirements to be determined 
in accordance with the national law o f each o f the courts concerned".
The comparative interpretation of some rules. Comparative interpretation undertaken by the 
Advocates General and the Court can be found in several interpretations o f different rules with 
regard to different types of legal measures.
The different language versions and corresponding national "contexts" have been 
considered by the Court in relation to the 'transfer o f an undertaking' in the realm of Article 1(1) 
of the Council Directive 77/1871369. The Court noted1370, that there were discrepancies between 
different language versions regarding the term *legal transfer1 and its applicability:
"A comparison of the various language versions o f  the provision in question shows
Landesbank and others (Reference for a prelim inary ru lin g : Cour de Cassation - France. Brussels convention - m atters 
relating to tort, delict o r quasi-delict (the concept o f  "ricochet”), interpretation o f  Article 5(3), indirect victim, injury to  a  
parent company due to the financial losses sustained by  its subsidiary) (1990) EC R  1-49). In it there is really extensive and  
analytical analysis of the legal discourse and practice on the subject.
1165 O pinion of m r Advocate General sir Gordon Slynn delivered on 17 December 1987 in case 9/87 S. P. R. L. 
Arcadovs. A. Haviland (reference for a prelim inary ruling from the Court o f  appeal, Brussels, referring to the detailed 
study in Peters case) (1988) ECR 1539.
1366 Reference to the case 14/77 de Bloos v Bouer (1916) ECR 1497.
1367 C ase 129/83 Siegfried Zelger v Sebastiano Salinitri (Reference for a preliminary ruling from the 
Oberlandesgericht M ünchen. Brussels Convention - Article 21, court first seised) (1984) ECR 2397 (Judgment o f the 
court (fourth cham ber) o f  7 June 1984).
1361 See also, Advocate General Mancini (Opinion delivered on 11 June 1987) in case 144/86 Gubisch 
Maschinenfabrik v Giulio Palumbo (Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Corte Suprema di Cassazione. 
Brussels Convention - meaning of lis pendens) (1987) ECR 4861 (Judgment of the court (sixth chamber) o f 8 
December 1987), and Opinion of Mr Advocate G eneral Tesauro delivered on 13 July 1994 in case 406/92 The owners 
of the cargo lately laden on board the ship Tatry v the owners o f the ship Maciej Rataj (Reference for a preliminary 
ruling: court o f appeal (England)) (1994) ECR 1-5439.
For further analysis, see Pescatore, P., 1980, pp.343-344 (case 12/76 Tessili (1976) ECR 1473 (6
October 1976).
1369 February 1977.
1370 Case 135/83 HBM Abels v Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalindustrie en de Elektrotechnische Industrie 
[1985] ECR 469.
See a lso , Opinion of M r Advocate General Van Gerven delivered on 30 M ay 1991 in case 362/89 
Giuseppe d' Urso and Adriana Ventadori and others v Ercole Marelli Elettromeccanica Generale spa and others 
(reference for a preliminary ruling: Pretura di M ilano - Italy) (1991) ECR 1-4105.
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that there are terminological divergencies between what regards the transfer o f 
undertakings. Whilst the German ('vertragliche iibertragung'), French ('cession 
conven tionnelleGreek ('snmssatikh ekxvrhsh'), Italian (’cessione contrattualej  
and Dutch ('overdrach krachtens overeenkomst') versions clearly refer only to 
transfers resulting from  a contract, from  which it may be concluded that other o f 
transfers such as those resulting from  an administrative measure or judicial 
decision are excluded, the English ('legal transfer j  and Danish ('overdragelse') 
versions appear to indicate that the scope is wider and that, moreover, it should 
be noted that the concept o f  contractual transfer is different in the insolvency laws 
o f  the various Member States, as become apparent in these proceedings. Whilst 
certain Member States consider that in certain circumstances a sale effected in the 
context o f liquidation proceedings is a normal contractual sale, even i f  judicial 
intervention is a preliminary requirement fo r  conclusion o f such a contract, under 
other legal systems the sale is in certain circumstances regarded as taking place 
by virtue o f a measure adopted by a public authority. In view o f those 
divergencies, the scope o f the provision at issue cannot be appraised solely on the 
basis o f  a textual interpretation. "
The analysis o f these differences impelled the Court to conclude that not only 
textual interpretation was possible, but that one could use also the interpretative techniques such 
as "in the scheme o f  the directive", "its place in the Community system", and "its purpose ".
Accordingly, there were differences noted also in the contexts o f the interpretation 
of the insolvency laws in different Member States, which seemed to be essential for the 
interpretation of the Article of the Directive.1371 1372The disparity found and the specifity o f the rules 
on liquidation and analogous rules led the Court to conclude that the idea of 'transfer o f 
undertakings' does not apply in the context of current proceedings.
The provisions o f the same directive have been interpreted comparatively also by 
the Advocate General. He referred to the "comparative travaux preparatoirés" of the Community 
system in his opinion:
"It is well known that in the legal systems many Member States transfer o f 
contract is regarded as a multilateral contract and therefore requires the 
agreement o f the third party. It should however be noted that, in drawing up the 
provisions o f directive 77/187/EEC, the Community legislature took this fac t into 
account. "im
1371 And as a general conclusion the Court stated that
'*"{ƒ the directive had been intended to apply also to transfers o f undertakings in the context of such 
proceedings, an express provision would have been included for that purpose".
1372 Opinion of M r Advocate General Mancini delivered on 9 February 1988 in case 144/87 Harry Berg and j. T. 
M. Bussckers v Ivo Martin Besselsen (Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden. 
Safeguarding o f employees' rights in the event o f  transfers of undertakings) (1988) ECR 2559.
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In furthering this analysis, the Advocate General found the diversity of solutions 
concerning the legal status of a contract in the transfer of the undertakings in different Member 
States. He referred to the French, Belgian, Dutch, and Italian law.
In the same case, the parties attempted to argue on a comparative basis on behalf 
of the interpretation that a debt may only be transferred with the creditor’s consent. This 
argument was based on the idea that this constituted a principle "generally recognized in th e  
legal systems o f  the Member States" and was a general principle of obligations. The C ourt 
doubted the generality of the rule, and, consequently, rejected the argument, without, however, 
any references to comparative law.1373
In a case dealing, once again, with the Company Law Directive, the Advocate 
General made a slightly more extensive comparative study concerning the question of acquisition 
of legal personality in the Member States. Reference was made to Dutch and Portuguese law, the  
laws of the parties and those prevailing in the system of the Advocate General. They served as 
examples for further studies concerning an acceptable model.1374
The rule that an error in application of the Community law caused by an  
interpretation in good faith by the national authorities does not result in ability to recover sums 
paid due to that error was established by the Advocate General by a justification with reference, 
again, to comparative observations o f the legal systems of the Member States ("most o f the  
Member States'). In different systems, it would have been impossible to commence 
administrative or judicial procedures cases such as these.1375
In a case concerning the interpretation o f the recognition of diplomas1376, there w as 
a dispute between the Advocate General, the Government, and the defendant, as to whether the 
duty of recognition also existed in connection with the freedom of establishment. The "sociolog­
ical" disparity presented by the parties was rejected by the Advocate General on the basis o f  
"comparative" considerations:
1373 Case 144/87 Harry Berg and j. T. M. Busschers v Ivo Martin Besselsen (Reference for a preliminary ruling from  
the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden. Safeguarding o f employees' rights in the event of transfers o f undertakings) (1988) 
ECR 2559.
1374 Opinion of M r Advocate General Vilaca delivered on 8 M arch 1988 in case 136/87 Ubrink I sola tie bv v Oak­
en Wandtechniek bv (reference for a  preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden. Company law - first 
harmonizing directive o f the Council) (1988) EC R  4665.
137518/76 Government of the Federal Republic of Germany v Commission o f the European Communities (1979) 
ECR 343-396 (Judgment of the court o f 7 February 1979), and 11/76 Government o f the Kingdom o f The Netherlands 
v Commission of the European Communities (1979) ECR 245-285 (Judgment of the court o f 7 February 1979).
1376 Established by  Council Directive 89/48/EEC
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"They take the view that a lawyer who wishes to establish himself in another 
Member State must acquaint himself with a wholly different legal system: the 
qualifications and experience acquired by him in his Member State o f  origin or in 
the host Member State are not relevant in that connection. I  am not persuaded by 
that argument because is assumes that no significant aspects o f  similarity can exist 
between the national legal systems in the Community and the manner o f legal 
practice in the various Member States. a supposition which I  find difficult to 
accept in the light o f the historical relationship between a number o f  national 
legal systems o f  the Member States (25) and the wav in which justice is 
administered. Furthermore, and above all, it takes no account o f  the efforts made 
by a lawyer from another Member State to acquaint himself with the legal system 
and the legal practice o f  the Member State in which he also wishes to practice. 
That does not mean that the existing differences between the Member States would 
not justify an admission procedure for lawyers from other Member States: 
however, in my view, freedom o f establishment and the exercise o f a profession 
throughout the Community would be hindered in an unjustified manner if, upon 
application for admission by a lawyer from  another Member State, no account at 
all were taken o f  qualifications already obtained and their correspondence with 
the qualifications required by the law o f  the host Member State.1377
The Court also formulated an interesting “directive” for comparative interpretation
with regard to the authorities of the Member States. Namely, it maintained that there is the
possibility ("may") for local authorities to make a comparative study when applying the principles
of freedom of establishment and rules in the field of the recognition of diplomas:
"In the course o f  that examination, a Member State may, however, take into 
consideration objective differences relating to both the legal framework o f the 
profession in question in the Member State o f origin and to its field o f activity. In 
the case o f the profession o f lawyer, a Member State may therefore carry out a 
comparative examination o f diplomas, taking account o f the differences identified 
between the national legal systems concerned. ,,im
One of the general principles explicitly rejected on the basis of a comparative 
analysis was the principle of "force majeure" (in a particular context). This interpretation was 
based on the fact that "its application presupposes the non-performance o f an obligation upon *137
1377 Opinion of M r Advocate General Van Gerven delivered on 28 Novem ber 1990 in case 340/98 Irene Vlasso- 
poulou v Ministerium für Justiz. Bundes- und Europaangelegenheiten baden-Württemberg (Reference for a 
preliminary ruling: Bundesgerichtshof - Germany) (1991) E C R 1-2357.
Sim ilar types of comparative aspects played an important role also in another cases on the same
subject
1371 Case 340/98 Irene Vlassopoulou v Ministerium für Justiz. Bundes- und Europaangelegenheiten 
baden-Württemberg (Reference for a preliminary ruling: Bundesgerichtshof - Germany) (1991) ECR 1-2357.
See also Opinion o f M r Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 26 February 1992 in case 104/91 
Colegio Oficial de Agentes de la Propriedad Inmobiliaria v j. L  AguirreBorrell and others (Reference for a 
preliminary ruling: Juzgado de Instrucción n. 20  de Madrid) (1992) ECR 1-3003, and the judgm ent
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the individual with respect to the adm in istra tionNo general principle was discovered "in the 
national legal systems where there is no such obligation 
The Advocate General argued that
"Reference to the national legal systems reveals that the force majeure has certain 
effects in criminal law, others in public law and other again in the private law.; 
they are fo r  the most part governed by specific rules... the fa c t that there is no  
uniform view regarding the force majeure... "J379
The Court agreed with this interpretation.1379 380 *
Moreover, in the field of copyright law (concerning the right to restrain the hiring
out of the video cassette) the Advocate General used a comparative "generality" argument
inorder to support the rejection of the argument put by a party that the public performance should
be assimilated to the hiring out o f the cassette:
"In order to understand this it is useful to in keep in mind that, under many 
national legal systems, the pursuit o f the activity o f hiring-out becomes 
unrestricted as soon as the cassette is offered fo r  sale or, as in Germany, entails 
at m ost an obligation to give to the author fa ir  compensation. The determining 
factor, however, is that even in those states the author, following sale o f the 
recording, retains the right to control every other form o f exploitation o f the 
hiring-out o f the cassette... remains a purely commercial transaction, the risk 
which it carries - namely that the persons hiring the cassette may see the film  
several times .... the owner o f  the right to perform it but by the person who has 
hired the cassette. 1,1381
Furthermore, in defining the nature of copyright, the Advocate General used some 
comparative observations:
"In the legal systems o f  the Member States copyright is a typical right o f  
exploitation in the form o f the right o f reproduction on the one hand and the right 
o f public performance on the other (applying to situations where it takes place by 
way o f  a sound recording). The peculiarity o f  French law lies in the fa c t that an 
assignment o f  the reproduction may be restricted to a specific use (private use); 
i f  public use is made o f  the reproduction, the supplementary mechanical
1379 T he d iversity  o f  the rule in different fields of law has been recognized by the Court in case 4/68 
SchwarzwaIdmiIch v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle Fette [1968] ECR 377.
1380 See, the Opinion o f  Advocate General Caporti delivered on 18 January 1978 in case 68/77 Ifg-Intercontinentale
Fleischhandelsgesellschaft Mbh and co. Kg v Commission of the European Communities (Force majeure) (1978) 
ECR 353-0371 (Judgm ent o f the Court o f 14 February 1978).
mi Opinion o f M r Advocate General Mancini delivered on 26 January 1988 in case 158/86 Warner brothers inc. 
And Metronome video Aps v Erik Viujf Christiansen (Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Óstre Landsret 
Copyright - action to  restrain the hiring-out of video-cassettes) (1988) ECR 2605 .
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reproduction fee  becomes payable. ,,U82
Furthermore, comparative observations have also been related to the so-called 
"generality o f the hallmarking o f valuable objects". In Belgium, contrary to all other Member 
States, silver-plated articles were also required to be hallmarked. The Court accepted the Belgian 
system and ruled that the obligation to stamp silver-plated articles can be regarded as necessary 
for the effective "protection o f consumers and promoting fa ir  trading" } m
In the context o f the directive covering technical regulations* 1384, the Advocate 
General adressed to the question of whether it is accepted in Community law (in relation to the 
free movement o f goods) that a public entity involved in the selling of equipment can also grant 
"selling-permissions" for imported equipments.1385 The Advocate General maintained that it 
would not be against Community law if there was a possibility for a review procedure for such 
decision. He noted that this would not "lead to disruption o f the legal systems o f the Member 
States” because
"While in most o f  them the situation regarding the approval o f telephones is 
similar to that in Belgium [the country to which the preliminary ruling pertained] 
in so fa r  as the entity holding the power o f approval is not truly distinct the body 
holding the monopoly fo r  operating the telecommunications network, most o f them 
also allow fo r  a review o f  the legality o f refusal o f  approval which includes a 
check on reasons related to the noncompliance with technical specifications which 
may include the commissioning o f experts * reports. New measures will have to be 
introduced only in Member States where review o f  legality does not extent to the 
merits o f reasons relating to technical assessments, that is to say, apparently, 
Italy, Ireland and Luxembourg. It may be assumed that recourse to experts .. 
enable the national courts concerned to extent their review to technical reasons 
fo r  refusal o f approval which, on the face o f it, should not give rise to major prob­
lems.”
In the case dealing with lotteries and the applicability of rules concerning the
13.2 Opinion o f M r Advocate General Lenz delivered on 24 February 1987 in case 402/85 G. Basset v Societe des 
auteurs, compositeurs et editeurs de musique (sacem) (Reference for a preliminary ruling from the our d' appel, Ver­
sailles) (1987)1747  .
13.3 Case 220/81 Robertson and others (1982) ECR 2701.
See also, Opinion o f  Advocate General Gulmann delivered on 9 June 1994 in case 293/93 Criminal 
proceedings against Ludomira Neeltje Barbara Houtwipper (Reference for a preliminary ruling: Arrondis­
sementsrechtbank Zutphen Netherlands) (1994) ECR 1-4249.
1384 No. 83/189.
1385 Opinion o f M r Advocate General Darmon delivered on 15 M arch 1989 in case 18/88 Regie des telegraphes et 
des telephones v Gb-Inno-bm Sa (Reference for a  preliminary ruling: tribunal de commerce de bruxelles - Belgium) 
(1991) ECR 1-5941.
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internal market to them, the Advocate General based his analytical argument on the regulation o f  
the lotteries in different Member States. This report had been made by the Commission. It dealt 
with the functioning of lotteries, and its relationship to public control. All Member States except 
Italy submitted their observations on the issue.1386
The Court has also relied on comparative socio-cultural arguments in order to  
preserve the competence of Member States:1387 138
"National rules restricting the opening o f shops on Sundays reflected certain
choices relating to particular national or regional socio-cultural characteristics.
It was fo r  the Member States to make these choices."
In the context o f competition rules, the Court has developed, on the basis o f  
comparative considerations, the idea that the principle o f the equality of the treatment o f consum­
ers is applicable in relation to economic rules. This was related to the interpretation of Article 
3(b) of the Treaty on the Economic and Steel Community. The Court claimed, on comparative 
basis, that
"Pursuant to a principle generally accepted in the legal systems o f the M ember 
States, equality o f  treatment in the matter o f  economic rules did not prevent 
different prices being fixed  in accordance with the parties situation o f  consumers 
or o f  categories o f consumers provided that the differences in treatment 
correspond to the difference in the situations o f such persons. I f  there is n o  
objectively established basis, distinct treatment are arbitrary, discriminatory a n d  
illegal. It cannot be at all that economic rules are unfair, on the pretext that they  
involve different consequences or disparate disadvantages fo r  the persons 
concerned when this is clearly the result o f  their operating conditions. ”n™
M oreover, in the context o f Article 93(3) (state aid), the Advocate General 
maintained that the so-calledMstandstill obligation" of the Treaty should have a direct effect, and 
that any interested person should be able to challenge state aid in national proceedings. He made
1386 Opinion of M r Advocate General Gulmann delivered on 16 December 1993 in case 275/92 Her Majesty' s  
customs and excise v Gerhart Schindler and Joerg Schindler (Reference for a preliminary ruling: High Court o f  
Justice, Q ueen 's  bench division - United Kingdom) (1994) E C R 1-1039.
1387 Case 169/91 Council of the City Norwich, Stoke-on-Trent/ B&Q pic (1992) ECR 1-6635 (20 April 1991).
1388 Case 11-57 Societe d' electro-chimie, d ' electro-metallurgie et des acieries electriques d' ugine v High 
Authority o f the ECSC (1958) 357 (Judgment o f the Court of 26 June 1958).
See also case 13/57 Wirtschaftsvereinigung eisen- und Stahlindustrie, gussstahlwerk Carl Boennhoff, 
Gussstahlwerk Witten, Ruhrstahl and Eisenwerk Annahuette Alfred Zeller v High Authority o f the ECSC (1958) E C R  
265 (Judgm ent o f the court of 21 June 1958), 10/57 Societe des anciens etablissements Aubert et Duval v High 
Authority o f the ECSC (1958) 401 (Judgment o f the Court of 26  June 1958), 12/57 Syndicat de la siderurgie du 
centre-midi v High Authority of the ECSC (1958) 473 (Judgment o f the C ourt o f 26 June 1958).
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a reference to the situation in national legal systems and observed that there are
"differences between the various legal systems concerning the conditions and 
extent o f judicial protection granted (for example, limitations on applications fo r  
interim measures brought before the administrative courts)
However, an example was found from the Italian Constitutional Court of decision 
that declared that "regional laws granting aid which were approved by the regional assembly 
before the Community verification procedure had been completed were unconstitutional”. 
Furthermore, the Advocate General took as an example a decision of the United Kingdom Court 
of Appeal1389 390, where it had been maintained that the authorities had to restrain from implementing 
state aid before, and on the conditions that, the Commission had approved it. The Advocate 
General also maintained that there is a general "trend” for developing procedures of such kind.
The Court has also interpreted the principles regarding the severity of the sanctions 
to be imposed against a company which had breached several rules of the EAEC1391 1392. The compa­
ny had argued that the fact that the infringements notionally overlap should be a diminishing 
factor. The Court refused, however, to grant lesser sanctions. The Court argued that
"On the contrary; it is well established, as is apparent from the approach adopted 
in certain national legal systems, that in such cases it is appropriate to impose the 
severest sanction possible nim.
In dealing with the effect of the Directive's provisions in the realm of the principle 
of the equal treatment of men and women at work and its effect upon the third parties, the 
Advocate General made an extensive study of the similar provisions (and their effects) in the 
International Convention on Civil and Political rights, the Convention on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights1393, and especially the European Convention of Human Rights, and referred to the 
academic writings in different Member States concerning these Conventions. He also referred to
1389 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 19 September 1989 in case 142/87 Kingdom o f Belgium 
v Commission o f the European Communities (State aid - state aid for a  steel tube undertaking - withdrawal by way of 
recovery) (1990) 1-959.
1390 24 February 1986 R v Attorney General ex parte Imperial Chemical Industries.
1391 Atomic Energy Treaty.
1392 Case 308/90 Advanced nNclear Fuels GmbH v Commission o f the European Communities (Action for 
annulment - Commission Decision relating to a procedure in application o f article 83 of the Euratom treaty) (1993) 
E C R 1-309 (Judgment of the court (sixth chamber) of 21 January 1993).
1393 Both 19 December 1966.
353
the "constitutional traditions o f  the Member States".lw
Furthermore« in the complex o f cases dealing with the equality of treatment of m e n  
and women and the legislative prohibition o f night-work1394 395, the Advocate General1396 described 
the comparative historical and current practices at both the national and international levels w i th  
a special reference to the practices o f certain states1397. Any derogation from the principle w a s  
seen to be applied restrictively. Furthermore, the application of this principle in the context o f  
transsexuality was also studied in the light of comparative observations of states and of a de ta iled  
study o f the practice in the European system of human rights.1398
There has also been some discussion concerning the "protection o f fam ily life" w i th  
the aid of comparative observations. Here one can note the way in which the interpretation o f  t h e  
applicable principle in Community law has been ’found" within the Community system o f th e  
past, and how it has become a fundamental principle o f Community law and furthermore how i t s  
interpretation still continues to be based on comparative observations.
One of the first cases, in which this principle was discussed was the Bergem ann 
case1399. The Advocate General observed, in the context of the interpretation of the concept o f  
"residence", that this concept has to be interpreted in the context of the protection of family life . 
He observed, how
"marriage and the family enjoy considerable protection both at international le v e l  
and within the legal systems o f the Member States European convention fo r  th e
1394 Opinion of M r Advocate General van Greven delivered on 30 January 1990 in case 262/88 Douglas H a rvey  
Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group (Reference for a preliminary ruling; Court o f Appeal - U n i te d  
Kingdom - Social Policy - equal pay for men and women - compulsory redundancy - early payment of a re tire m e n t 
pension) (1990) E C R 1-1889.
In the case dealing with the dism issal o f a pregnant women, the applicant also referred strongly to  th e  
same international and national measures, see case T-45/90 Alicia Speybrouck v European Parliament (temporary s t a f f  
- dism issal - protection of pregnant employees - reasons) (1992) ECR 11-33 (Judgment of the court of first in s ta n c e  
(fifth chamber) o f 28 January 1992).
1393 Directive No. 76/207.
1396 Opinion of the Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 24 January 1991 in case 345/89 Criminal proceedings 
against Alfred Stoeckel (Reference for a  preliminary ruling: tribunal de police dlllk irch  - France) (1991) ECR 1 -4047 .
1397 Italian Constitutional C ourt Judgment N o 210  of 9 July 1986, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, n o  3 8  
1 August 1986.
See, similarly the easel 58/91 Ministre public and direction du travail et de l 'emploi v Jean-Claude L e v y  
((1993) ECR 1-4287) which also took now into account a recent decision o f  the German Constitutional Court (28 J a n u a r y  
1992).
,39* Opinion o f  M r Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 14 Decem ber 1995 in case 13/94 P v s  and Cornwall 
County Council (Reference to the preliminary ruling: industrial tribunal, T ruro - United Kingdom) (1996) ECR 1-2143.
1)99 O pinion o f  M r Advocate General Lenz delivered on 15 June 1988 in case 236/87 Anna Bergemann v B u n - 
desanstalt fUr A rbeit (Reference for a  preliminary ruling from the Landcssozialgericht fur das L an d  
Nordrhein-W estfalen) (1988) ECR 5125.
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protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which all the Member 
States o f the Community have ratified".
He then undertook an analysis of the European human rights system and observed 
how even the project for establishing the family can be included within the realm of the principle. 
However, this did not mean that all negative consequences necessarily intervene it.
Furthermore, he analysed the provisions in the European Social charter, which have 
been ratified by all Member States except Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal. It contained a 
provision on the social, economic, and legal protection of family life. This Charter defined also 
the scope of the positive measures forming part of the social security (family allowances, social 
benefits, tax legislation and aid to young couples, these being not, however, positive rights for the 
individual). However, the "common political will" and common values could still be recognized. 
Consequently, they could be used, according to the Advocate General, in the interpretation of the 
directly applicable laws.
Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, ratified by all but 
Greece and Ireland, explicitly prohibited measures which penalized or jeopardise the right to 
family life. Measures obliging spouses to live apart was listed as an example of a measure which 
would contravene this prohibition. The family’s special need for protection was recognized in this 
Covenant even if the actual application may differ to a certain extent between the parties due to 
the differences in social, economical, cultural, and political circumstances and traditions.
Furthermore, the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural rights, 
being ratified all Member States but Ireland, recognized also the "widest possible protectionM to 
the family.
The Advocate General also made a traditional, albeit rather eclectic, comparative
study of the laws in the Member States in this area:
"Similarly, the legal systems o f the Member States make provision special 
protection for marriage and the family, even i f  the level o f  protection and the 
manner in which it is applied in practice varies. Special status accorded to the 
fam ily and marriage is reflected in constitutional law in the Federal Republic o f 
Germany, Spain, Ireland Italy and Portugal. In the Netherlands the provisions o f 
the European Convention on Human Rights constitute directly applicable law. 
Under French constitutional system, the conditions necessary fo r  the development 
o f the individual and the family are guaranteed by the preamble to the 1946 
constitution, to which the present constitution refers. In the British legal order, 
marriage and the fam ily are recognized as fundamental values both by ordinary 
legislation and in the decisions o f the court. In Belgium there is in fac t no 
constitutional provision protecting marriage and the family. Under labour law,
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however, a statutory provision declares void any term in a contract o f  employment
(19) providing fo r  termination o f the contract in the event o f marriage o r  
pregnancy. In Denmarkt no express protection o f the family is laid down in the 
constitution. On the other hand, such protection is afforded under labour law and  
social law. The fact that a spouse leaves his or her employment in order to fo llo w  
the other spouse to the latter's place o f  employment does not prevent him or her  
from  claiming unemployment benefit."
Morevover, he examined analytically the relationship between principles concerning
the protection of the family and the unemployment benefits (consistency). In the end, he made the
following conclusion concerning the existence of a general principle:
" A comparative examination o f these provisions does not then disclose the 
existence o f a general principle o f law according to which the spouse is always 
entitled to unemployment benefit, where his or her unemployment is the result o f  
a change o f residence linked to fam ily circumstances. It is to be observed, 
however, that the principle that an employee who giving up his employment in 
order to live together with his spouse or to be to continue living together should  
not be refused unemployment benefit is widely accepted.
The unity o f the family is also a value directly recognized under legal order o f  the  
Community, as is shown by the right to families o f  workers (20) and self-employed 
workers 21) in Community legislation.
In the light o f the foregoing legal assessment, the setting-up o f  fam ily home in a  
M ember State other than the previous state o f  residence also amounts to  
"residing" within the meaning o f article 71 o f  regulation no 1408/71. The decisive 
fac tor in this respect is whether the person concerned has actually taken up 
residence, so that even a relatively short period may satisfy this requirement."
The Court agreed with this argument, and decided that for unemployment benefit 
purposes, the relocated person should be considered as a resident in the state to which he has 
moved.1400 140
This principle did, following this case, play a quite decisive role in the interpretation 
o f the Court. In the case of Reiboltm \  the Court referred to the Bergemann case and to the 
consideration of the "circumstances" in interpreting his residence status. The same idea was
1400 Case 236/87 Anna Bergemann v Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit (Reference for a preliminary ruling from the 
Landessozialgericht für das Land Nordrhein-W estfalen) (1988) ECR 5125.
1401 Case 216/89 Beate Reibold v Bundesanstalt fü r  Arbeit (Reference for a preliminary ruling Bundes socialgericht 
- Germany. Social Security for emigrant workers - regulation no 1408/71 (l)(b )(ii)) (1990) ECR 1-4163 (Judgment of 
the Court (third chamber) o f 13 November 1990).
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repeated in the argument in the Toosey case1402 *. In the case of Joop van Gestdt05 the Court 
explicitly justified the decision by referring to the rule in the Bergmann case, which expressed the 
idea of the possibility of receiving unemployment benefits under the most "favourable 
conditions" for those seeking new employment. This idea applied especially to persons who 
"retain close ties'* in particular o f a personal and vocational nature, with the country where they 
have settled and habitually reside:
"It is reasonable that workers that have such links with the state in which they 
reside should be accorded the best conditions in that state fo r  finding a new 
employment".
Article 215. Article 215 of the Treaty on European Economic Community provides that the 
Court shall use "general principles common to the Member States" to decide issues of non­
contractual liability and damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of 
their duties.1404 Furthermore, the Court shall resolve this problem, where no Treaty provisions 
exist, on the basis o f "reference to the rules acknowledged by the legislation, learned writings 
and the case law o f  the member countries".1405
It can be mentioned that, for example, the general admissibility of claims for the 
payment of interest have been established according to comparative argument.1406 Some recent
1402 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Lenz delivered on 18 November 1993 in case 287/92 Alison Maitland Toosey 
v Chied Adjudication Officer (Reference for the preliminary ruling - Social Security Commissioner - United Kingdom) 
( 1994) 1-279.
U0J Case 454/93 Rijksdienst voor Arbeidsvoorziening v Joop van Gestel (Reference for a  preliminary ruling: 
Arbeidshof Brussel - Belgium. Social security for migrant workers - designation o f the competent state) (1995) 1-1707 
(Judgment o f the Court (sixth chamber) o f 29 June 1995).
1404 See case 106 and 120/87 Asteris v Greece (1988) ECR 5515.
Some analysis o f comparative law and Article 215, see Galmot, Y., 1990, p.256 ff.
1405 See case, 7/56 and 3-7/57 Algera etal. v Common Assembly (1957-1958) ECR 39.
"In the case o f contractual liability the Community shall in accordance with the common principles 
common to the Member States make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its civil servants in the 
performance o f their duties" (55/71 Zukkerfabrik Shoppenstead v Council, (1971) ECR 975).
For a discussion on the drafting o f the liability articles in the ECSC treaty, see opinion o f (acting) 
Advocate General Biancarelli, delivered on 30  January 1991 in case T -120/89 Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter v 
Commission o f the European Communities (ECSC - non-contractual liability o f the Community) (1991) U-279. The 
Advocate General discussed the comparative "constructing" of liability Articles 34 and 40 o f the ESCS treaty on the 
basis of the travaux preparatoires (memorandum o f  28 September 1950) (p .310 ff). At the basis of this provision 
were the "general principles o f law common to all developed legal systems". Furthermore, he discussed the 
interpretation o f the Article on the basis o f  the notion o f direct and special harm  "well known in all the legal systems 
o f the Member States" (p336). Furthermore, comparative observations established fact, "as is the case in all developed 
legal systems", that compensation can be granted not only for lucrum cessans [lost profit], but also for damnum 
emergens [future damage]), "provided that, as in the present case, direct causality is sufficiently established" (p.359).
1406 Joined cases 64 and 113/76,167 and 2 3 9 /7 8 ,2 7 ,2 8  and 45/79 P. Dum ortierfreres sa and others v Council o f 
the European Communities (Maize gritz - liability) (1979) 3091-3119 (Judgment o f the court o f 4  O ctober 1979).
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cases on the conditions of liability have included comparative observations from within the 
systems of the Member States1407.
There are also cases in the practice of the European Court related to the question 
of whether Community institutions can be liable for damage caused by their legal actions. Article 
215 deals with the question of this type of non-contractual liability. It has been used in examining 
whether the legal acts of the institution resulting in damage to an individual can be the basis o f  
liability.
The following analysis attempts to show the role of comparative law in “new 
cases”, and the subsequent development o f the case law on the basis of comparative observations.
In one of the first cases, in Zuckeifabrik Schoppenstedt, the question was discussed 
on the basis of the admissibility of applications for damages arising from legislative measures. 
Reference was made also to analogous articles of the ECSC Treaty (Article 34).
The legal argumentation of the Advocate General began by scrutinizing the 
arguments made in several cases of the European Court. In the context of the admissibility o f the 
claim of liability, the Advocate General discussed firstly the question of whether a legislative act 
can be the basis for non-contractual liability. In this respect, he referred to comparative law. 
Explicit (indirect) references were made also to the conference on state liability based on 
wrongful conduct by its institutions held at the Max-Planck Institute in 1964, and to the 
publication following it.
The comparative examination showed that solutions adopted in different legal 
systems varied considerably. For example in Belgium and France, liability for the breach of an 
was possible. In principle, this was ruled out in Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany. 
However, the differences between the various legal systems were considered to be technical in 
nature.
The Advocate General maintained that the expression in Article 215 "should not be 
taken too literally [''the general principles common to the Member States”]”:
'T o r  Community law the criteria is not only the rules which exist in all Member
States, nor is the lowest common denominator determinative, nor does the 'rule o f
lowest limit' apply1408, "
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1407 Opinion of M r Advocate General Lenz delivered on 16 June 1994 in case 23/93 TvlO sa v commissariaat voor 
de media (R eference for a preliminary ruling: Raad van state - Netherlands. Freedom to provide services - national 
legislation (1994) 1-4795.
I4°* Reference to Heldricht, Europerecht, p.349.
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According to him, one has to likewise refer to the objectives of the Treaty and the 
peculiarities of the Community structure, "and in which perhaps it is appropriate that the 
guideline be in the best elaborated national rules".1409 He made also reference to the ECSC 
system (Article 34) and to the fact that the individual affected can challenge regulations (Articles 
177 (the new Article 234) and 184 of the EEC Treaty). Furthermore, according to him, the case 
law recognized a rule of non-restrictive interpretation in cases, where the protection of rights are 
involved1410. The latter fact can be relevant to the control of the legality of the regulation.
These arguments prompted the outcome, according to which even if the measure, 
as such, is not found in all legal systems, one can, on 'incomplete' comparative basis, recognize 
it as a principle of liability forming part of Community law. The fact that it was widely recognized 
and, in some cases, even included in positive formal laws, supported this conclusion.
Secondly, the Advocate General asked whether it was possible to make the 
(compensation) claim before the European Court based on a measure declared valid, or does the 
measure have to be already declared invalid. Apart from references to the ECSC system and 
analogous discussion in the Courts case law1411, the comparative observations supported the latter 
possibility. French, Belgian and German law recognized the possibility of claiming compensation 
based also on valid administrative measure. In other countries this was not so because of the 
impossibility of the court to review the validity of administrative acts.
After having reflected upon the comparison between the different models of state 
systems and Community system and with the fact that the Community court had accepted a 
possibility to review the validity of administrative measure, he chose the alternative, according to 
which the question o f invalidity was not relevant.
The next question was whether an act, which has not been annulled can constitute 
a wrongful measure. This question had been discussed on the basis o f scholarly opinion delivered 
in at the 46th conference of German lawyers.1412 These opinions had confirmed that there was no 
rule, in the Member States systems or in the EEC Treaty, which imposed the obligation to find 
a prior invalidity. On the contrary, the ECSC Treaty had claimed opposite.
Other claims of inadmissibility were rejected on other bases.
I4W Referring to Zweigert, K., Rabels Zeitschrift, Vol. 28, p.611.
1410 Case 6/60 J.-E. Humblet v Belgium State (1969) Rec. p .l 189.
14,1 Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co. V Commission (1963) ECR 96.
1411 Ule, Borner, Fusz, Bülow, Ganshof van der Meersch, and Goffin.
1In examining the substance of the case, he did not examine the nature o f the 
breach.1413 He discussed briefly, from the point of view of the general principles o f the M ember 
States, the idea of an "additional qualifying factor" which would have established the responsi­
bility of the Community institutions. He maintained that there was no possibilities o f finding
"sufficiently substantial evidence o f the additional qualifying factor o f  m isconduct
necessary under Community law ... and which may probably also be regarded as
a general principle under the legal systems o f the Member States. ”
The Court, on the other hand, upheld the rule according to which there had to  be 
a "sufficiently flagrant violation",
In this case, the Advocate General established a comparative approach as a basis fo r 
the evaluation o f the nature of the Community rule in question.
In the case law on the subject which followed1414, the Advocate General1415 referred 
to the Court rule o f "sufficiently clear violation o f a superior rule o f law fo r  the protection o f  
the individual". Furthermore, the Advocate General accepted the previous opinion o f  the 
Advocate General in the Zuckerfabrik Schoppenstedt case that the Community system imposes 
no obligation to submit an administrative complaint to the Community authorities prior to  the 
lodging of an application to the Court for damages. He upheld the admissibility of the complaints.
In the following opinion concerning the substance of this case, the Advocate 
General repeated the Zuckerfabrik rule on the "sufficiently clear violation
In the following cases, the Court also repeated the "sufficiently flagrant violation
rule" test1416 *.
Subsequently, the question was dealt with, for example, in the case Bayerische
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1413 Opinion of M r. Advocate General Roem er delivered on 13 O ctober 1971.
,414' Cases 9 and 11/71 Compagnie d'Approvisionnement de Transport e td e  Credit SA and Grands M oulinsde
Paris SA v Commission o f the European Communities (1972) ECR 391 (Judgment of the Court 13 June 1972).
14.5 Opinion of the M r Advocate General Dutheillet de Lamothe delivered on 14 July 1971 ((1972) EC R  4 09 ) on 
admissibility, and opinion of the M r Advocate General Mayras delivered on 24 May 1972 ((1972) EC R  415) on the 
substance of the violation.
14.6 Case 23/72 Mercur Aussenhandels GmbH v Commission o f the European Communities (1973) EC R  1055
(Judgment o f the Court 24 October 1973)/ Opinion o f  M r Advocate General M ayras delivered on 27 June 1972 (1973) 
ECR 1076,153/73 Holtz & Willemsen GmbH v Council and Commission o f the European Communities (1974) ECR 
675 (Judgment o f the Court o f 2 July 1974)/ Opinion of M r Advocate General Reischl delivered on 8 M ay 1974, (1974) 
ECR 697, 74/74 Comptoir National Technique Agricole (CNTA) SA v Commission o f the European Communities 
(1975) ECR 533 (Judgm ent o f the C ourt o f 14 M ay 1975)/ opinion of M r Advocate General Trabucchi, delivered on 
23 April 1975 (1975) ECR 543, cases 54 and 60/76 Compagnie Industrielle et Agricole Comte de Loheac and 
Others v Council and Commisision o f the European Communities (1977) ECR 645 (Judgment o f the C ourt o f 31 
march 1977)/ opinion o f  the M r Advocate General Reischl delivered on 10 M arch 1977 (1977) ECR 655.
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HNL,4¡7> where the applicants claimed compensation for damage which they had suffered through 
the effects of a Council Regulation1418. That regulation had been declared null and void by the 
Court in its decision1419.
The Advocate General reaffirmed at the outset 1420 the rule that the legislative 
nature of the regulation does not a priori prevent the examination o f the Communities' liability. 
Furthermore, a specific examination was needed because the declaration of nullity was not an 
automatic basis for compensation.
In connection to the first question, the Advocate General undertook a brief 
comparative analysis o f the different solutions existing in the Member States. Special attention 
was paid to the differences between the systems making no clear distinction between 
constitutional rules and legislative rules (England) and, on the other hand, the systems which 
clearly establish such difference (Italy and Germany). In the context of comparative observations, 
he remarked that in general the liability o f the state for damage caused by unlawful regulations or 
orders is accepted "even i f  the conditions vary from one system to another
Non-contractual liability, based on Article 215, was to be decided on the basis of 
the general principles found in the laws of the Member States. However, first it was to be decided 
what kind of measure the regulation was in relation to the measures existing in the national 
systems. Only that way could one identify, from the national systems, the general principles 
applicable.
Even if it was clear that structural and political differences existed, and that the 
analogy was not perfect, regulation was seen more as a legislative act, as a statute, than an 
administrative act. In this connection, the Advocate General referred to a comparative study
14,7 Case 83/76 Bayerische hnl Vermehrungsbetriebe GmbH and co. Kg and others v Council and Commission of 
the European Communities (Skimmed-milk powder - liability) (1978) 1209-1226 (Judgment o f the court o f 25 May 
1978).
,4,,No 563/76 of 15 M arch 1976. On com pulsory purchase of skimmedmilk powder held by intervention agencies 
for use in feeding stuffs.
14,9 In case 114/76 Bela-MUhle v Grows-Farm (1977) E C R 1211 (Judgment o f  the Court of 5 July 1977), 116/76 
Granaría Hoofdproduklschap voor Akkerbouwproducten (1977) ECR 1247 Judgm ent of the Court 5 July 1977), 119 
and 120/76 óhmühle Hamburg and Hauptzpllamt Hamburg and Hauptzollamt Bremen-Nord (1977) EC R  1269 
(Judgment of the Court of 5 July 1977).
1420 Opinion of M r Advocate General Capotorti delivered on 1 March 1978 in case 83/76 Bayerische hnl 
Vermehrungsbetriebe Gmbh and co. Kg and others v Council and Commission o f the European Communities (1978) 
EC R  1226.
uproduced by the Advocates General in previous case law.1421 He claimed, however, that
“In my opinion, in view o f  the extreme difficulty o f making the hierarchy o f the  
Community legislative measures coincide with that o f the national legislative 
measures, it is logical that more rigorous solution concerning the liability o f the  
public authorities should be adopted with regard to the Council o f  the European 
Communities., which has the twofold capacity o f  legislature and administration 
without having the democratic mandate and the power to express the sovereignty 
o f the people which may justify exempting the legislature from the general rules 
on liability. ”
On the other hand, in discussing the idea o f “sufficiently serious breach”, the 
Advocate General maintained that
"... It seems that since there is no possibility o f  eliciting any other guidance from  
the general principles common to the laws o f the Member States, Community law  
accepts, fo r  the purposes o f  the non-contractual liability o f  the Community, that 
the undoubtedly voluntary nature o f  the acts adopted by the institutions is  
sufficient and that nature gives rise to a presumption o f blame when an unlawful 
measure is enacted. This moreover is the solution accepted with regard to  
unlawful administrative measures in the legal systems o f certain Member States. 
including Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg (see in this connection 
the article entitled “Zur Reform des Staatshaftungsrechts” by the Max-Planck- 
Institut fü r  Öffentliches recht und Völkerrecht, 1975, p .8)”.
On this basis he came to the conclusions that the “unjustifiable” nature of the 
Community conduct had been already established.
Related to the seriousness o f the breach, the Advocate General referred also to the 
decisions of the Conseil dlltat contained in a Max-Planck-Institute study. However, he proposed 
some elements for interpretation, but maintained at the same time that his interpretation was, 
nevertheless, autonomous of tendencies in national systems which seemed to assert, on the 
contrary, that the compensation is not dependent upon the extent of damage. Furthermore, in 
discussing the categories of persons to be compensated, he referred also to German legal theory, 
but wished to avoid these types of analogies. In the end, some distinctions made by the 
Bundesgerichtshof were discussed with a view of extending these principles also to Community 
law. According to this rationale, a wide category of persons should be considered to be able to 
claim compensation.
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1421 Opinion of the Advocate General Roemer on 13 July 1971 in case 5/7J Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt (1971) 
ECR 975 (Judgment o f  the Court 2 December 1971) (opinion (1971) ECR 986).
In order to see the role o f the comparative examination, one has to observe the evolution of this case
law.
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Finally, the Advocate General came to the conclusion that
“Council regulation.... which has been already declared null and vo id ... was in 
serious breach both o f  the superior rules on non-discrimination and 
proportionality conferring rights on individuals and o f  the second subparagraph 
o f Article 40(3) and Article 39 o f the Treaty. ”
The Court restated, on the other hand, the idea o f “sufficiently serious breach” 
prevailing in case law. It regarded the principles applicable in different Member States and 
maintained that liability is a relatively exceptional phenomenon and is incurred only in special 
circumstances. It followed from this that
"Individuals may be required, in the sectors coming within the economic policy o f  
the Community, to accept within a reasonable limits certain harmful effects on 
their economic interests as a result o f a legislative measure without being able to 
obtain compensation from  public funds, even i f  that measure has been declared 
null and void”.
and that
"In legislative field such as the one in question... the Community does not therefor 
incur liability unless the institution concerned has manifestly and gravely 
disregarded the limits on the exercise o f  its powers”
Furthermore,
In these circumstances the fa c t that the regulation is null and void is insufficient 
fo r  the Community to incur liable... ”
In conclusion, we may question why the principle o f ’’serious breach" was discussed 
more thoroughly, on comparative basis, in the Bayerische HNL, a subsequent case to quite 
similar cases. We can say that this was related to the fact that only in this case the claim of 
compensation was based on a Council regulation which had already been declared null and void. 
In the earlier case law, the issues had been concerned compensation claims on the basis o f regula­
tions, which had not been previously declared invalid, or which were issued by other Community 
Institutions. On the basis of comparative observations, the Advocate General tried to apply the 
previous case law in a new situation. Furthermore, it seems clear that the Advocate General tried 
to reach a solution regarding the opinions of two different Advocates Generals concerning the 
issue of “seriousness o f the breach”, basing his reasoning on comparative observations.
However, we may observe that for the Court, which opposed the Advocate 
General's conclusion, the idea of a 'sufficiently serious breach no longer neither provided a clear 
basis of justification. The question was more pressing and concrete than in the previous cases,
Il
for, in this case, one could quite convincingly claim that a "serious breach" had occurred. T h e  
declaration of nullity was a strong basis for that argument. Accordingly, the Court seem ed to  
establish a new rule concerning the obligation of an individual to "accept in reasonable l im i ts  
certain harmful effects on their economic interests", and that liability is “exceptional and in c u r s  
only in special c irc u m sta n ce s It reached this conclusion on the basis o f com parative  
observations.1422
Comparative law in some o ther questions. There are several interpretations o f the p ro c e d u ra l 
traditions of the European Community order which have been accomplished by m eans o f  
comparative analysis.
The Advocates General have recognized national discussions concerning d istinc tion  
between issues of fact and questions o f  law, concerning ideas on errors o f fact and o f law .1423 
Furthermore, the characterization of certain official documents as proof has also taken place b y  
reference to national traditions.1424 Procedural rules concerning the "right to fa ir  hearing '* and th e  
*'confidentiality o f  certain information" have been discussed with a help o f com parative 
references by the Advocate General:1425
"Most commentators on European and American anti-dumping law..."
The idea was to “harmonize” rules via some comparative remarks:
"...However, the Commission and Court should be invited to consider th e  
feasibility o f such rules, and hence o f  introducing in the Community m easures  
similar to those that exists in the United States
Some remarks were made also on European Human Rights.1426
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1422 For some analysis o f Article 215 and comparative law, see Pescatore, P., 1980, p.342. H e m aintains th a t  
comparative law defines, not the basis o f Community principles, bu t rather the limits of the Community leg is la tu re 's  
responsibility.
1423 Opinion of M r Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 10 Novem ber 1993 in case 53/92 Hiiti v Commission o f  
the European Communities (Appeal - competition - abuse of a dominant position - concept o f relevant m arket) (1 9 9 4 ) 
1-667.
1424 Opinion o f M r Advocate General darmon delivered on 7 February 1991 in case 49/88 AI-Juba il fertilizer 
company (Samad) and Saudi Arabian fertilizer company (Safco) v Council of the European Communities 
(Application for a declaration that Council Regulation (EEC) no. 3339/87) (1991) 1-3187.
1425 O pinion o f  M r Advocate General darmon delivered on 7 February 1991 in case 49/88 Al-Jubail. T he 
interpretation related also to the interpretation o f the GATT rules.
1426 The remarks is interesting, if one wants to understand, for example, the recent proposed changes to the European 
Human R ights system (Commission merged to the Court) in relation to the introduction of Basic Rights to the 
jurisdiction o f the Community Court:
"Furthermore, the situation is not really satisfactory in the terms of fundamental rights. If the
i
H
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However, the main argument was justified with reference to comparative law de 
lege ferenda by means of an extensive reference to scholarly writings and cases, particularly to 
the American law:
"ƒ am o f  course aware o f the difficulties inherent in having to reconcile the 
observance o f the right to a  fa ir  hearing with the protection o f the confidentiality 
o f certain information. However, I  will point out that. in other legal systems, 
solutions to those difficulties have apparently been found.
Under American law, since the trade agreements act 1979..."
Further analysis was taken along the following lines:
"... The last point has been the subject o f  much discussion in academic legal texts 
and American case-law. Until 1983 the Court o f  International Trade had refused 
disclosure to "in-house counsels" or "corporate counsels" on the ground that it 
did not wish to place them "under the unnatural an unremitting strainof having to 
exercise constant self-censorship in normal working relations (86). That line o f 
decisions was terminated judgment o f the Court o f  Appeals o f the Federal Circuit, 
establishing that granting disclosure was a matter to be examined... The Court o f 
Appeals proceeded largely on the basis that "in-house counsels" and "retained 
counsels" are officers o f  the court and are bound by the same Code o f 
Professional Responsibility, and are subject to the same sanctions. In-house 
counsels provide the same services and are subject to the same types o f pressures 
as retained counsels...
The question of "modelling” was raised and the answer given affirmed its role:
"Can such a system be transposed to Community law? As noted above academic 
legal texts seem broadly favourable, and the European Parliament hopes that this 
avenue will be explored. The American experience has been declared satisfactory. 
Canada also uses a similar system. As the president, Mr Due, stated: "there may 
be justification in aligning even the procedural rules on those o f the other 
partners" o f GATT....M
Are the legal difficulties insuperable? Advocates, solicitors and barristers are 
required to observe the rules o f  professional ethics in all the Member States, no 
matter whether those rules are imposed by the legislature or by the profession by 
itself A breach o f  confidentiality is, in principle, punished under the domestic 
legal order in every Member State.... It is difficult to see what arguments could 
support the view that, even given the same guarantees, European lawyers are not 
in a position to perform the same function as officers o f the court as their
European Commission o f Human Rights declares inadmissible applications directed against 
national decisions enacted pursuant to Community Act ƒreference: Application No 13258/87 M. & 
Co. V Federal republic o f Germany: Decision of 9 February 1990J the main reason is that, through 
its successive judgments, the Court has established the principle that it reviews the Community 
institutions ' observance offundamental rights. It is therefore fa r from important to avoid conspicu­
ous discrepancies between the construction of this Court puts on the rights to a fair trial and the 
requirements already laid down by the European Court o f Human Rights”.
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American counterpartners”
The Court maintained the conclusion arrived at by the Advocate General that the 
regulation is void in so far as it affects the applicant.1427 It maintained that the role o f  
confidentiality is more important in Community law because o f the lack of such procedural 
guarantees that exist in certain national systems. No other comparative law references were 
expressed.
S taff cases. The Court has also made an extensive study o f  the legislation and case-law o f  
different Member States in order to resolve problems in certain staff cases.
According to "generally accepted principle in the national legal systems” the 
applicant’s claim was well founded "if he had suffered loss corresponding to the alleged 
enrichment o f the other party".142* Furthermore, the exclusion of suicide from compensation 
refers only to voluntary suicide "in accordance with a general tendency in the legal systems o f  
the Member States both regard to accident insurance and social security".1429 The disciplinary 
procedure and the principles of "audi alteram partem" were to be interpreted "in the light o f  the 
rule in the most legal systems o f  the Member States '.1430
The rules for calculating time limits for bringing actions were considered to be in
1427 Case 49/88 Al-Jubail fertilizer company (Samad) and Saudi Arabian fertilizer company (Safco) v Council o f  
the European Communities (Application for a declaration that Council Regulation (EEC) no. 3339/87) (1991) EC R  
1-3187.
,42> Case 26/67 Henri Danvin v Commission o f the European Communities (1968) ECR 315 (Judgment of the 
Court (second chamber) o f 11 July 1968).
1429 Case 18/70 X v Council of the European Communities (1972) ECR 1205 (Judgment o f the court (first chamber) 
o f 6 December 1972).
1430 Case 141/85 Henri de Compte v European Parliament (Official - disciplinary measures) (1985) ECR 
1951-1968 (Judgment o f the court (third cham ber) o f 20  June 1985).
Concerning the statement o f reasons (referring to the situation in Member States), see Opinion o f M r 
Advocate General M ancini delivered on 19 January 1988 in case 319/85 Miss et v Council o f the European 
Communities (officials - disciplinary m easures) (1988) ECR 1861. On time limits for bringing actions, see also the 
opinion of Mancini in case 152/85 Misset (1987) EC R  223 He maintains, for example, th a tMeven two exceptions to 
which i  have referred prove to be more apparent than real; that is to say in substance they are in conformity with the 
rationale o f the calculation prevailing in the Community..." (the reasoning based on analysing and justification on 
Latin terms).
On com parative basis, limiting the responsibility to give reasons, see case T -160/89 Gregoris 
Evangelos Kalavros v Court o f Justice o f the European Communities (1990) ECR 11-871 (Judgment of the court of 
first instance (fifth chamber) o f 13 D ecem ber 1990).
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accordance with this "survey o f comparative law...except in France and Ireland" 
Furthermore, the Advocate General did not agree with the claim that there is no possibility to 
challenge a decision rejecting a complaint, where the decision merely confirms the contested act. 
This was supported by reference to the Italian and French system.143 432
The Court has also explicitly noted certain concepts embodied the Staff Regulations 
as being derived directly from the legal systems of the Member States1433,
"which, under their laws, impose a mutual obligation to provide maintenance on 
relatives by blood and/or marriage o f a greater or lesser degree o f  proximity. That 
concept must therefore be understood as referring exclusively to an obligation o f 
maintenance imposed on an official by a source o f  law independent o f the will o f  
the parties' end as excluding maintenance obligations o f  a contractual, moral or 
compensatory nature. Since neither Community law nor the s ta ff regulations 
provide the Community Court with any guide as to how it should define, by way o f  
independent interpretation, the meaning and scope o f  the concept o f a legal 
responsibility to maintain entitling an official to receive a dependent child 
allowance under Article 2(4) o f annex vii to the S ta ff Regulations, it is necessary 
to determine whether the national legal system to which the official in question is 
subject imposes such a responsibility on the official."
In this case, the Court formulated a new doctrine o f comparative interpretation, by
which it tried to maintain the autonomous character of Community concepts1434:
"The terms o f a provision o f Community law which makes no express reference to 
the laws o f the Member States fo r  the purpose o f determining its meaning and 
scope must normally be given an independent interpretation which must take into 
account the context o f  the provision and the purpose o f  the relevant rules.... in the 
absence o f an express reference to the laws o f the Member States, the application 
o f Community law may sometimes necessitate reference to the laws o f the Member 
States where the Community court cannot identify in Community law or in the 
general principles o f  Community law criteria enabling it to define the meaning
1431 For this in detail, see Opinion of M r Advocate General Mancini delivered on 18 November 1986 in case 152/85 
RudolfMisset v Council o f the European Communities (Official - admissibility - period for commencing proceedings) 
(1987) ECR 223.
1432 Opinion o f M r Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 30 November 1988 in case 224/87 Jean Koutchoumoff 
v Commission o f the European Communities (Official - assistance pursuant to  article 24 of the staff regulations - 
damages) (1989) ECR 99.
1433 For a concept o f "legal responsibility", see Article 67; annex vii, a r t  2(4).
1434 Often comparative arguments are related to the justification o f the autonomy o f  the European interpretation. The 
idea that no generality can be found in legal systems justifies the possibility o f the European Court o f Justice to coming 
to an autonomous interpretation, see also, Pescatore, P., 1980, p.344.
See also, W ilm as de, J.M., 1991, p.38. The autonomous interpretation does not means, however, that 
the interpretation would be absolutely contrary to some interpretation in mem ber States.
1and scope o f such a provision by way o f  independent interpretation."1435
Likewise, rules governing pre-recruitment medical examinations have been 
approved with reference both to the European system of human rights and to the legal systems 
of the Member States.1436 The confidentiality of medical findings was also confirmed by a 
comparative study, which asked by the Court from the Commission. This study had a direct 
impact upon the outcome of the case1437.
Various parties have also presented comparative rationales in these type of cases. 
Retrospective appointment, for instance, was alleged to be unlawful as "generally regarded in  
legal systems" unless there were urgent and compelling reasons for it.1438 The Advocate General 
accepted this reasoning as decisive.
Furthermore, one applicant referred to the "German and Luxemburgian law" in 
order to support the idea of a "tax abatement fo r  taxable persons with a child doing m ilitary 
se rv ice The Parliament, as a defendant, sought to reject the argument on the basis of the nature 
of the Community tax system as "autonomous". The Court ultimately upheld the European Par­
liaments argument on the basis o f its own case law1439.
The court has also used "general principles o f labour law" to examine the right o f  
staff to engage in trade union activities.1440
"C om parative reasoning within constitutional argum ents". One can also speak o f  
comparative reasonings in relation to the fundamental "constitutional" aspects of the European
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M3S Case 85/91 Lilian r. Khouri v Commission o f the European Communities (Official - dependent child allowance 
- person treated as a dependent child) (1992) ECR11-2637 (Judgment of the court of first instance (fourth chamber) of 
18 December 1992). Reference made to the Case 327/82 Ekro v produktschap voor Vee en Vlees (1984) ECR 107.
1436 Case T -10/93 A . V. Commission o f the European Communities (Official - recruitment - person who is HIV 
positive - refusal to appoint - physical unfitness - legality of article 33 of the staff regulations) ( 1994) 13-179 (Judgment 
of the court of first instance (third chamber) of 14 April 1994).
1437 Case 155/78 Mlle M. v Commission of the European Communities (1980) ECR 1797 (Judgment o f the Court 
of 10 June 1980).
l43g Opinion of M r Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 24 January 1989 in case 341/85 Erik van derStijl and 
Geoffrey Cullington v Commission of the European Communities (Officials - implementation of a judgm ent annulling 
an appointment) (1989) ECR 511.
1439 Case T-41/89 Georg Schwedler v European Parliament (Officials - tax abatement - dependent child) (1990) 
D-79 (Judgment of the court o f first instance (fifth chamber) of 8 M arch 1990).
See also, for example, Case 90/74 Dehoeck v Commission (1975) ECR 1123.
1440 Case 175/73 Union Syndicale v Council (1974) ECR 917 and 18/74 Syndicat Général v Commission (1974) 
ECR 933.
For some analysis of staff cases, see Pescatore, P., 1980, pp.344-345.
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order. The Court has used comparative legal observations, for instance, in justifying decisions 
concerning the external and internal relationships of its institutions.
The idea of the separation of powers has been discussed by the Advocates 
General1441 This notion was connected to the discussion o f the Article 178 powers of the Court. 
According to the "principle common to all legal systems requiring clear separation o f  judicial 
function and lawmaking", the courts only decide cases, but do not interfere within the legislative 
choices of the competent institutions.1442
The relationship between different institutions has been also discussed 1443 by the 
Advocate General on a comparative basis. One question was related to the Council’s argument, 
in a case against the Commission, that the matter is not really a "dispute". The comparison took 
place between the countries "having the constitutional court" (Federal Republic of Germany, 
Spain, France, and Italy). In this way the Advocate General came to the conclusion that conflicts 
between the institutions are legal disputes concerning the rights and duties of the institutions. 
Such disputes are not merely political, but are also legal.
Of particular interest was the comparative observations made in the case adopting 
the idea of the "continuity o f a legal system", The Court observed that "in accordance with the 
principle common to the legal systems o f the Member States, the origins o f which may be traced 
back to Roman law, legislation is amended, unless the legislature expresses a contrary 
in te n tio n This will be developed further below.1444
In a case concerning the idea of public access to documentation, on the other hand, 
the Advocate General extensively discussed the context of the legislative acts enacted by the
1441 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 23 January 199 l i n  case 63/89 Assurances du Credit sa 
and Compagnie Beige d'Assurance Credit sa v Council of the European Communities and Commission o f the 
European Communities (1991) E C R 1-1799.
1441 The Court, on the other hand, in its judgment on that case, did not consider the question put forward by the 
Council, see case 45/86 Commission o f the European Communities v Council o f the European Communities (gene­
ralized tariff preferences, application for the annulment of an act, legal basis, obligation to give reasons for Community 
acts) (1987) ECR 1493 (Judgment of the Court o f  26  March 1987).
1443 Opinion of M r Advocate General Lenz delivered on 29 January 1987 in case 45/86 Commission o f the 
European Communities v Council of the European Communities (Generalised tariff preferences - application for the 
annulment o f an act) (1987) ECR 1493.
1444 Case 23/68 Johannes Gerhardus Klomp v Inspektie der Belastingen (Preliminary ruling requested by the 
Gerechtshof, the Hague) (1969) ECR 43 (Judgment o f the court o f 25 February 1969).
A  similar type of case with comparative observations, see Opinion o f  M r Advocate General Gulmann 
delivered on 24 June 1992 in case 187/91 Belgian state v Societe Cooperative Belovo (Reference for a  preliminary 
ruling: tribunal de premiere instance de Neufchateau -  Belgium) (1992) 1-4937.
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Council. The principle discussed was seen as fundamental for "any democratic system".1*45 T h is  
included a recognition that citizens have a "broad rights to be informed", which "all national 
systems" maintain. Certain variation between member states were, nevertheless, observed. T h e  
Advocate General analysed different types of documents, and undertook a short historical 
survey.1446 Furthermore, he referred to the measures adopted by the Council o f E u r o p e 7 
Consequently, certain "tendencies” were identified. On this basis, the Advocate General 
concluded that certain legislative acts at the Community level were "desirable". However, "self- 
regulation" by the institutions was seen to be the rule, and the Council act on "the code o f  
conduct" was not considered to be a legislative act. Consequently, it was not able to form th e  
subject of a process of annulment.145 *7448
The principle of the right to  effective protection by a court1449 and interim  
protection1450, as well as the generalities and disparities concerning the application o f the principle 
of protection of written communications between lawyer and client have also been examined o n  
comparative basis.1451
With regard to the laws governing the budget o f the European Community, th e  
concept o f "commitment" has been based on comparative observations, which have enabled the
1445 Opinion of M r Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 28 Novem ber 1995 in case 58/94 Kingdom o f The 
Netherlands v Council o f the European Union (A ction for annulment - rules on public access to Council documents) 
(1996) E C R 1-2169.
14+6 The Advocate General explicitly m entioned that the comparative survey was produced by the court’s ow n  
documentation service.
1447 Recommendation no 854 (1979) o f the A ssem bly o f 1 February 1979, and Recommendation no r  (81) 19 o f th e  
Committee o f M inisters of 25 November 1981.
1441 Council decision 93/731/EC o f 20  D ecem ber 1993, and 93/662/EC  o f  6 December 1993, and the "code o f  
conduct", 93/730/EC, restricting in certain cases the access to documentation.
1449 Opinion of M r Advocate General Darmon delivered on 27 October 1993 in case 228/92 Roquette freres sa v  
Hauptzollamt Geldern (Reference for a  prelim inary ruling: Finanzgericht Düsseldorf, Germany. M onetary 
compensatory amounts on derived products o f m aize, declaration of invalidity, temporal effect) (1994) ECR 1445.
1450 Opinion of M r Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 17 M ay 1990 in case 213/89 The Queen v Secretary o f  
state for transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others (Reference for a preliminary ruling: House o f  lords - United 
Kingdom) (1990) E C R  1-2433.
The Advocate General discussed the idea o f interim protection (suspending o f the application) as a  
general phenom enon in the legal systems of M em ber States (except the Danish system). He undertook relatively 
analytical study of the French, German and the Italian system, and the doctrinal writings.
On the Courts case, see Judgm ent o f the Court o f 19 June 1990.
1451 Case 155/79 Am and S Europe limited v Commission o f the European Communities (Legal privilege) (1982) 
ECR 1575-1616 (Judgm ent of the court, 18 M ay 1982). Some analysis, Galmot, Y., 1982p.256 ff, and Schwarze, J., 
1 9 9 1 ,p .l0 ff .
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prevailing interpretation to emerge. In this case the Advocate General1452 asked whether 
Community concepts in this matter are different from those prevailing in national legal systems. 
After providing a negative answer to this question, the concept was given a comparative 
interpretation mainly by referring to French budgetary law. Some references to other national 
systems were also made (particularly with regard to Belgium, Italian, Greek, and Spanish 
systems). Overall, it was claimed that under most of the legal systems of the Member States, 
"commitment” goes beyond a strictly financial or accounting operation. It encompassed 
substantive decisions as well. Accordingly, he maintained that the Court should refer to the 
comparative generality of the conceptualizations of the legal systems of the Member States when 
interpreting the Community concept.1453
Many other cases could be mentioned. However, analysis of them is not presented
here.1454
1452 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Darmon delivered on 30 June 1989 in case 16/88 Commission o f the Euro- 
pean Communities v Council of the European Communities (Authorisation conferred on the Commission under article 
145) (1989) ECR 3457.
1453 On the control o f “legality" relating to the balance of interest, proportionality, respect o f confidence etc., see 
Wilmer de, J AI., 1991, p.37. He speaks also about reverse development, where Belgian procedural law seemed to have 
been  m odelled, in the course of fédéralisation, upon European Community law  (Article 177 (the new Article 234) 
system). However, one should note that a  similar system has existed also in Italian constitutional law.
1454 Case 222/86 Heylens (1987) ECR 4097.
Case 81/87 ( The Queen v H.M. Treasury and Commissioners o f Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail 
and General trust pic. (1988) ECR 5483) deals with freedom of establishment.
The Advocate General recognizes disparity "at the point where the company law meets the tax law" 
has resulted interpretation o f Community law "as it stands" (Opinion o f  Advocate General Darmon on 7 June 1988 in 
case 81/87 The Queen v H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenuet ex parte Daily Mail and General trust 
pic. (1988) ECR 5483). However, he uses comparative generality in order to establish the Community interpretation 
( "Generally, in most Member States...). The interpretation left quite extensive powers for the M ember States to 
determine the tax treatment o f companies transferring the central management and control of a  company to  another 
M em ber State.
The C ourt referred to the Comparative observations presented by  the Commission, and it maintains 
that the Treaty recognizes this difference a  prior (Article 220 to be used as a  basis for further acts). Further measures 
w ere  to be taken to include such a cases into the realm of freedom of establishm ent (Judgment of the Court 27 
Septem ber 1988, ECR 1988,5483).
Some cases also: fundamental rights, see Bredimas, A., 1978b, pp .330-331. First cases, 5 ,11 ,13,15/62 
Fer.Ro., Erba, ALMA, & co. (1962) ECR pp.449 ff. See 16/61 Ferriere di M odena (1962) ECR 289 (Articles 85,86 
E E C  60 ECSC modelled. Anti trust law in U S A  71, Sherman Act, Robinson A ct, US case law) (pp.313-315). Also 
O pin ion  of Advocate General Mayras in case 48 /69  ICI Ltd v Commission (1972) ECR 619. Opinion of Advocate 
General Lagrange in case 14/61 Koninklijke Ned. Hoogovens (1962) ECR 277. He takes into account the aim s of the 
treaty, and interprets the comparative material based on these assumptions. One can also check the economic and politi­
cal climate in accordance with the objectives (see, Bredimas, A ,  1978a). Opinion o f Advocate General La Grange in 
case 3/55 Assider (1954/1956) ECR 72 (misuse o f power, Article 33, ECSC, judicial review of administrative action). 
T hat comparative examination is necessary, ibid, and case 28/67 Molgereit-Zentrale (1968) ECR 143 (different tax 
systems).
Also Opinion of Advocate General Lenz 21 September 1995 in case 415/90 Union Royal Belgie de 
Sociétés de Fotbal associasion ASVLM others vJ-M- Bosman and others (1995) E C R  1-4921 (Judgment o f the Court 
15 D ecem ber 1995) compares different rules o f  different social subsystems (UEFA, FIFA rules. M em ber States,
3.1.4. Conclusions
Case law.... Some conclusions can be drawn on the basis o f the case law.
Comparative argumentation has had different results. Comparative studies have 
supported a relatively wide interpretation of EC-legislation. If comparative observations are 
rejected, it appears as if no wide interpretation is applied, but the Court examines the question 
textual-fimctionally. The disparity between systems has supported independent argument solely 
on the basis of EC legislation and general principles (equality).
The use of the conceptualizations and definitions of one legal system have been 
rejected in defining the content o f EC legislation, and the Court has preferred an independent 
"EC" interpretation for concepts. However, it is clear that in some cases certain national
mainly produced by the UEFA, points, UEFA published: can be national em phasis etc.).
With regard to abortion case 159/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd 
vSteven Grogan et others (1991) ECR 4685 (Judgment of the Court o f 4 O ctober 1995) Court maintained:
'Termination of pregnancy lawfully practised in several Member States is a medical activity, which 
is normalty provided for remuneration and may be carried out as part o f professional activity" 
and it concluded that
"it is not for the Court to substitute its assessment for that o f the legislator in those Member States 
where the activities in question are practised legally"
Jurisdictional questions and Convention o f Human Rights A rticle 10(1), opinion of Advocate General 
Van Gerven delivered on 11 June 1991 in case 159/90 The Society for the protection of unborn children Ireland Ltd 
v Steven Grogan et others (1991) ECR 4685 (Judgment of the Court o f 4 O ctober 1995) (1991) ECR 1-4685:
"Indeed, in those Member States where the abortion is permitted under certain conditions there are 
frequently requirements laid down regard to advice and counselling, which are designated to 
prevent abortion become routine and commercialized, or to ensure that the information is provided 
only by authorized persons, and that the decision to carry out an abortion is taken with knowledge 
o f the facts that is to say, with the necessary advice and counselling".
He goes through German, France, Belgium laws. The norm  (restriction on the distribution o f  
information valid) follows directly from this analysis. Interpretation o f Community law is in accordance with Article 10 
of the European Convention o f Human Rights etc. Analysis is assisted by a "moral" argument; the objective is justified 
under Community law, if  it relates to the policy choice o f a  moral and philosophical nature, the assessment o f which is 
a  m atter for the M em ber States and in respect o f  which they are entitled to  be involved on ground o f public policy, 
(A rticle 56 , 66, 36 o f the EC Treaty, "grounds, which can justify discriminatory measures", "A genuine and 
sufficiently serious threat to the requirements o f public policy effecting one o f the fundamental interests of the 
society").
For the review of how the internal principles determine the extension and nature o f the comparative 
adoption, in staff regulations. Opinion o f Advocate General W arner delivered in March 1973 in case 81/72 Commis­
sion v Council (1973) EC R  588:
"The Council, which is responsible for the organization o f staff, may, as part of the means imple­
menting Article 65, incorporate procedures of collective bargaining similar to those practised in 
Member States according to their various methods, and devide up the decision making process in 
the successive phases in accordance with the practice usually in the Community".
For various “comparative”  cases, see Bredimas, A., 1978a, pp.128-134, Jacobs, F.G., 1990, p.109 if., 
Pescatore, P., 1980.
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conceptualizations have had a direct impact upon the Courts interpretation1455. In fact, there 
seems to be a tendency toward a non-autonomy of comparative interpretation.
An extensive study of different systems has resulted in the adoption o f certain 
models which have been found to be common to most o f the Member States1456. There have been 
some “generality” based inteipretations even based on the analysis o f “tendencies”. Furthermore, 
US influences are quite strong.1457 The US systems are studied usually extremely thoroughly, and 
clear “modelling” has even taken place. The “extra-Community” comparison appears especially 
in cases where there is a  general international agreement involved. In general, there is a strong 
interaction between the international rules and national rules in comparative studies. These two 
spheres are often linked together in justification.
Socio-legal and cultural arguments and the "coherence" demands of one national 
legal system1458 (which obviously requires study and an understanding of that particular legal 
system) have supported the independency of a Member State to decide on the issue. This could 
be described as some kind of functional subsidiarity. On the other hand, the demand for this 
special treatment has usually been made by many, if not all, Member States in one particular case, 
which means, on the other hand, that the case has been strongly influenced by the demands or 
objections o f Member States, and the cultural and coherence arguments are function as 
legitimating constructions.
The Court also uses comparative private law analogies in establishing principles 
having a clearly public nature.1459 Legal fields are not necessarily kept separate in constructing 
analogies. More traditional comparisons are clearly effected in the field of the Brussels 
Convention.
Some systems are sometimes studied more thoroughly, while others remaining in 
the referential context. This is connected to the value-based nature o f  comparative reasoning and 
interpretations. Sometimes this type of reasoning appears quite incomprehensible from the legal
1455 See also, Schermers, G., Waelbroeck, D., 1987, p.13.
1456 See Unger, J.A., 1976, pp.370-373, a case-study of the extensive comparative analysis by Advocate Genera] 
W arner and a rule introduction by the Court in the case 17/74 Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission 
(1974) ECR 1963. "The right to be heardM was found to be part of the Article 164 o f the Rome Treaty.
1457 Interest in US law can be also result o f the fact that German and English law  have been strongly influenced by 
it, Bredimas, A., 1978a, pp. 132-133.
l45* See cases 204/90 and 300/90 Hans Martin Backmann v Etat Beige, Commission v Etat Belge (1992) ECR I- 
249 (28 January 1992). Coherence arguments were put forward by most o f the M em ber States.
,4H On this type o f exercise, see Gutteridge, H.C., 1944, p.5-7.
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point of view. The choices of the compared are made in accordance with the “main” or “m ost 
important” systems. We may speak about strongly “institutional” qualitative comparative law  
studies. On the other hand, systems which have constitutional courts are frequently examined 
more thoroughly.
Often the peculiarities of the system of the party to the dispute are examined in the  
light of other systems.
Roman law serves often as a tertium comparationis but also some systems, such as 
the French system, functions like this. Much depends upon the Advocate General in question and 
his background.14*0
Interestingly, sometimes the Court has given a directive to national systems to  
interpret certain provisions based on comparative interpretations. Furthermore, a reference to the  
comparative nature of Community rules is also found.
In general, we may say that the nature o f the comparison differs depending on the 
legal basis which makes it possible. However, no really systematic structure of analytical 
reasoning can be identified. Furthermore, the institutional actors* influences in relation to each 
other are not very self-evident. However, there is a strong idea o f cooperation between different 
Community institutions. On the other hand, comparative studies are many times seen as 
“frustrating** the main interpretation.
In conclusion, it seems that the comparative generality arguments seem to interact 
with common sense textual interpretation. This seems to apply also to the rejection o f  
comparative observations. However, in the latter case we speak about the common sense textual 
meaning of the Community provisions. On the other hand, any disparity identified seems to  
interact with “practical” interpretation attached to ideas of purpose, intention, scheme and a more 
systematic interpretation of Community system.
It also seems that whenever there is a new situation, the comparative situation has 
to be studied again.
... and interviews. The interviews which were undertaken can be used in defining the scope o f 
comparative reasoning in Community law and to explain the context of the justificatory uses.
One can make distinctions between three levels o f informal use of comparative law 
in Community adjudication. Namely, comparative law can be instrumentalized in connection with 1460
1460 For some indications of this type o f  approach, Pescatore, P., 1980, p .350.
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the special knowledge of the staff, special knowledge of the judge himself, or by the special 
knowledge of other judges represented in the internal discourses in the court. The special 
knowledge of each national lawyer functions as a basis o f the comparative information.1461
In 1995, there were at least 20 extensive comparative surveys made in the 
preliminary preparation of a case.1462 The studies seem to have had a tremendous use and impact. 
The studies are not necessarily reflected in the explicit judgments, and they were for internal 
use.1463 Comparative studies, were, however, not routine.
The Court initiates these studies. However, there is also a coordinator of the study, 
who designs the framework for the study.1464 The research made during the proceedings is usually 
only comparative in nature. The reporting judge can ask the research division to make a 
comparative study on a specific legal question. Advocate Generals and judges have their own 
staff, which may be asked to make a study, especially when there are problems in finding a 
consensus.
All states are alleged to be considered. In competition cases, consideration has been 
given also to the Japanese legal system, and some remarks have been made on legal systems of 
other European countries than the Member States1465. In some cases the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court of the United States has been looked over (5-6 studies).1466
The papers produced are usually 50-60 pages in length. The studies produced are 
usually given to the Court in a shortened version, 10-15 pages1467. They contain a description of 
the situation in each Member State. On the other hand, there are usually remarks made on the
1461 See also, Pescatore, P., 1980, p.349.
1463 However, Pescatore, P., 1980, p.358, speaks about "daily use".
On preparation, see European Courts, Hunnings, H., 1996.
1463 Also Note d 'information sur la division recherche et documentation (Janvier 1995), and Pescatore, P., 1980, 
p.338. These explicit references were made until 1980 in 15-20 judgments (25 years of functioning), see Pescatore, P., 
1980, p.338.
1464 Note..., 1995, p.2.
1463 This was so especially in relation to EFTA states. Most of them were not yet Member States of the European 
Community. There may have been also studies o f the Israelian system.
In most recent cases (316/95 Generics v. Smith, Kline <4 French Laboratories Ud, ((1997) E C R I- 
3929) dealing with medical patents. In his opinion Advocate General Jacobs studied also the system of New Zealand, 
because its 'kcase-law is o f persuasive value in the United Kingdom and in I  re land" (in addition to German, Italian, 
United States, and the United Kingdom case law).
1466 For some judges the selection o f countries seems to be Latin centred. Pescatore claims that the original 
Community was based on some kind o f a “bipolarity”  between Latin and Germanic systems, Germanic systems were 
seen as containing “Roman heritage". The extension took place after accession o f new countries. This “continentalist" 
nature is, however, still stressed. (Pescatore, P., 1980, pp.350-351)
1467 A case mentioned, publicity of documents.
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extent to which the systems differ from each other. One of the main interests arises also from the 
need to know, what results the decision will have in different Member States.
Studies are usually only “legal". Databases are available in the Court. This means 
a description of the law in force, and an evaluation o f legislation and precedents, cases from 
supreme and the constitutional courts. However (for example in competition cases) there can also 
be an economic analysis of the consequences. Sometimes the comparative studies include a 
description of a system which is common to all Member States (eg. The European Human Rights 
System). There may also be sociological and political remarks in the conclusions.
Historical descriptions are rare. This was explained to be due to the fact that "the 
Court is already near to the solution". However, some historical "evolution" may be taken into 
account. However, the Court usually takes into account only the minimum common 
denominator1468. Advocates General can take into account more features deriving from these 
studies.
It is not rare that the parties produce comparative studies. The basic argument 
seems to be that some states have a system such as the system in question. Moreover, the 
exceptions are sometimes described. All the same, it is rare that states make extensive studies. 
The studies produced by the parties are taken into account. Mainly the states' studies are 
considered, less so other parties’ studies. The basis is, however, the internal studies of the 
institution. It was claimed that the Commissions’ studies are not used as such1469. It seems as if 
the Court’s own investigations are independent, at least from the legislative preparatory work o f 
the Commission. On the other hand, the Commission’s reports are considered valuable, and they 
are often used also in decision-making1470. The Commission is clearly considered sometimes as 
a specialist on comparative law by the Court.1471
Advocates General make more extensive studies. Their role is to discuss different 
possibilities, and to make a synthesis. The Court's reasoning is more formal. From the interviews 
one gets the impression that usually no special studies are presented to the Advocates General, 
but the same studies prepared by the research division may be used by both instances.
,46i For some analysis, de Wilmars, J.M ., 1991, p.39.
,4W The role of the Commissions studies in the w ork of the Court is quite unclear. The Court refers in many cases to 
the Commission's studies.
1470 Pescatore, P ., 1980, p.348, also Landò, O ., 1977, p.656
1471 Pescatore, P ., 1980, p.348. Pescatore sees this to be due to its connections with permanent representations and 
also because of the material it has due to  its law -proposing function.
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In oral proceedings, comparative studies are not usually discussed. However, as 
mentioned before, in the preliminary ruling procedures, Member States have possibility to make 
oral or written statements (amicus curiae). Basically, the function of this seems to be to inform 
the Court about the importance of the case in relation to a particular system. It is not 
"comparative" in nature, though it is acknowledged by the Court. Each Member State may 
present some conclusions concerning the features of their legal systems.
In general, comparative studies seem to have a clear and even a decisive role. The 
substantive impact of the study depends on its content. If the systems differ greatly, there is a 
different impact than when the systems are relatively similar. Then the solutions have to be 
"created". The comparative studies play a role in cases, where there is no case law on that legal 
question, no clear text is available, or where the Court wants to decide as a matter of principle, 
or if the case is, for example, economically important1472. The role of comparative law is seen as 
"filling the lacunae". Comparative studies can have an effect upon the final decision in many 
ways. However, it can be also o f minor importance for the substance of the decision.
The main obstacles to making extensive studies and examinations, and to using 
them, were seen in the work load etc. No principled obstacles were seen to prevent the disclosure 
o f comparative material in justification. The fact that studies are made in a strict relation to a 
concrete case must have an effect on their analytical quality.
Some documents, such as comparative law studies produced by an institution, are 
not available for external observers such as researchers due to the principle of confidentiality. 
This may be related to the unofficial and draft nature of these studies. However, the studies are 
produced in a quite complete report form within the internal circulation of the institution, even 
if there seemed to be also more unsystematic material produced.
It was claimed that the Court directs its arguments to the parties and the institutions 
o f the Member States, but, for that matter, also to the wider institutions in some difficult cases, 
where their social or economic impact seems to be enormous.
The inclusion of new states within the European Community and European Union 
has led to a greater "comparative" input into the internal functioning o f the Court.1473
In conclusion, it appear as if the use of comparative law in the European Court of 
Justice is extremely instrumental from the point of view o f  the legal discourse.
1472 Reference was made to VAT calculation
1473 See also, Pescatore, P., 1980, p.350.
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3.2. The E uropean  System of H um an Rights
3.2.1. General rem arks
In this chapter we shall provide a few examples and an analysis o f comparative 
reasoning in the European human rights system in different fields of law1474. The list is n o t 
exhaustive. The case law studied is restricted mainly to the freedom of expression principle. 
However, some interesting examples in the realm of other principles are analysed too.
The interpretation methods of the human rights systems vary. The report o f the  
Commission of the European system o f human rights in the Colder case1475 examined the  
normative principles of interpretation of the European Convention of Human rights. The V ienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties can be applied to the interpretation of this Convention. In this 
sense, the interpretation methods can be seen method embodying the principles o f "good faith”, 
"ordinary meaning in context", "in the light o f its object and purpose", and the "intention o f  the 
Contracting Parties"1476. This has also been expressed by the Court in certain cases.1477
These features lead to certain dynamics within interpretation. For example, social 
and political attitudes have to be taken into consideration.1478 Thus, preparatory material is used 
very cautiously1479. This also means that the "comparative context" has to be ascertained all over 
again.
In the earlier case law, the Commission has also used material from o ther
,474 For some other cases: Wemhojf ECHR (1968) A/7 and some other cases 1968-1978, see analysis by van d e r 
Meersch W.J.G., 1980, p.323-324. On the use o f  the decisions of the suprem e courts of some M ember States o f  the 
Council of Europe, and the diplomatic protection o f  companies by International Court of Justice, European C ourt o f  
Human Rights, Agroiexim and others v Greece, A /330 (1995) EHRR 250 (25 Oct 1995), Bryan v United Kingdom, 
A/335 (1995) EHRR 290 (22 Nov. 1995) concerning systems o f judicial control o f administrative decisions, In  
international law, the legitimacy of collective bargaining, Gustafsson (1996) EHRR, Freedom o f association, negative 
right not to enter into collective agreements with trade unions, use of different international instruments (European 
Social Charter, International Covenant o f Econom ic, Social and Cultural Rights, Conventions of International Labour 
Organizations). Sunday times (1979-1980) EHRR 2:245, how contempt of court seems to be only a British speciality.
For some “hard cases*’ dealing with the concept of family, see the analysis by van der M eersch W .J.G ., 
1980, pp.332-333.
On international treaties, see Jennings, R.Y., 1996, p.5
It looks as if some parts o f  the legal provisions o f the system, such as the idea of wnecessary in the 
democratic society" (ECHR) do demand comparative observations in deciding the extension of these definitions 
(Doetring, K., 1987, p.54).
,47S Case Colder (1975) EHRR 1:524.
1476 Article 31 (1 ) o f the Vienna Convention. Com pare also Article 30  of the Vienna Convention and Article 60  o f 
the Human Rights Convention.
1477 Case Wemhojf ( 1968) EHRR.
1471 Jacobs, F.G., 1975, p .l 8.
1479 Golder (1975) EH RR 1:524, Commission, para. 46., and Lawless (1979-80) EHRR 1:1, para. 14.
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international Conventions (eg. From the International Labour Organization) to avoid inconsistent 
outcomes of similar instruments in the international field.1480
Comparative observations appear throughout the systemic interpretation and 
argumentation, and comparative interpretation has been a basic feature in the history of the 
European system o f human rights, even if they have been seen even “dangerous” field from the 
point of view of the system1481. The European Convention is based on the common traditions of 
constitutional law and on the common legal tradition of the Member States of the Council of 
Europe.1482 Consequently, comparative analysis has had an effect upon the interpretation of the 
Convention in the Commission, in the Court, and in dissenting opinions.1483 *In this way, and with 
the help o f the comparative method o f interpretation, the Court has been able to find a strike 
between the international and national traditions.
3.2.2. Some examples of comparative reasoning
Trial within a reasonable time o r release pending trial: “English system and those derived 
from it” . In Kemmance v France1484 the question at issue concerned the duration o f pre-trial 
detention (Article 5(1 )(c), Right to liberty and security of person). The criminal proceedings in 
question had lasted more than eight and half years. This detention had been prolonged on four 
occasions. The Commission argued comparatively that
"With regard to the pre-trial detention provided fo r  in Article 5(l)(c) it is true that 
in certain legal systems, particularly the English system and those derived from it. 
the opening o f a criminal investigation is very closely associated with arrest. The 
Court's case law takes account o f this in accepting that the persistence o f 
reasonable suspicion "after a certain lapse o f time . . . no longer suffices" to justify 
detention [referring to the case LETELUER v FRANCE (A/207), 1992) 14 
E.H.R.R. 83, para 35.],
In the present case the "certain lapse o f  time" had no doubt been exceeded by 
several years. In order to justify further detention, therefore, the Government 
should prove its necessity fo r  recognised reasons, such as the risk o f absconding, 
collusion or repetition o f  an offence.
The Commission has shown that in this case the applicant's detention was not 
necessary on any o f  these grounds."
1480 Jacobs, F.G., 1 9 7 5 ,p.19.
,4g1 Van der Meersch, W J.G ., 1980, p.317.
14,1 Concerning this and the legal basis in general, see van der M eersch, W .J.G ., 1980, p p .319-320.
14,3 Scheuner, Ch, 1968, p.214.
I4M A/218 (1995) EHRR 349.
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Corporal punishm ent in private schools: “W estern European States” , “developments 
throughout Europe”. In Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom1485 the question concerned 
corporal punishment in schools in relation to  Article 3 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or  
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment") and Article 8 of the ECHR..
The Commission justified the alleged infringement o f Article 8 (right to private life) 
with reference to the purposes mentioned in Article 8(2). In his dissenting opinion» a member1485 486 
of the Commission rejected this idea on the following comparative basis:
"l find  it difficult to accept that corporal punishment could ever be necessary in a  
democratic society fo r  any o f  the purposes enumerated in Article 8(2), as no other 
Western European State practices i t  most schools in Britain now reject it and the 
House o f Lords supported its total abandonment since this case corporal 
punishment has been abolished in State schools. Now that State schools are no  
longer permitted to use corporal punishment any proposition that corporal 
punishment might be necessary in a private school will be even more difficult to 
defend. "
The Court’s argument made reference to Article 28 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child1487, which explicitly refers to the maintenance of school 
discipline related to the child’s human dignity. It found, with the help of this reasoning, that 
corporal punishment falls within jurisdiction o f the European Convention. In the end, however, 
the conduct was found not to breach the Articles in question.
In their partly dissenting opinions, four o f the judges1488 1489found that a breach o f 
Article 3 had occurred on the basis of comparative considerations:
"At the relevant time the law relating to corporal punishment applied to all pupils 
in both State and independent schools in the United Kingdom. However, reflecting 
developments throughout Europe, such punishment was made unlawful fo r  pupils 
in State and certain, independent schools. Given that such punishment was being 
progressively outlawed elsewhere, it must have appeared all the more degrading 
to those remaining pupils in independent schools whose disciplinary regimes 
persisted in punishing their pupils in this way"
Non-enforcement of access and custody rights: “situations in M ember States”. In the case 
o f Hokkanenim  the question concerned claims of infringement o f Articles 6, 8, and 13 of the 
Convention, and Article 5 of Protocol 7. The reasons given were that when the applicant had 
given the child to the custody of her grandparents, they refused to give her back, and also the
1485 25 M arch 1993, A/247-C (1995) EH RR 112.
1486 Mr. S chem ers.
1487 20 November 1989.
1488 Mr. Ryssdal, Vilhjalmsson, M atscher, and W ildhaber.
1489 (23 September 1994) A/299-A (1995) EHRR 139.
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police chief officer refused to execute the custody order. Furthermore, the Appeal Court had 
permanently transferred custody to the grandparents, and declined to enforce access against the 
child’s wishes.
The Government had referred to Article 3 o f the 1989 United Nations Convention 
on the Rights o f the Child, Article 19(1 )(b) of the 1980 European Convention on the 
Enforcement of Decisions Concerning Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of 
Children, and Articles 1 and 12(3) of the 1980 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction.
In arguing about the infringement of Article 8 (respect for family life), the 
Commission interpreted the concept of 'respect'according to the Convention:
"The Commission recalls in this connection that the notion o f "respect" enshrined 
in Article 8 is not clear-cut. This is the case especially where the positive 
obligations implicit in that concept are concerned. It requirements will vary 
considerably from case to case according to the practices followed and situations 
obtaining in the Contracting States. When determining whether or not such an 
obligation exists regard must be had to fa ir  balance that has to be struck between 
the general interest and the interest o f the individual as well as to the margin o f 
the appreciation afforded to the contracting States. "
The Court noted the Commission's observations, but maintained that even if the 
boundaries between the State’s positive and negative obligations do not lend themselves to 
precise definition, the "applicable principles are s im i la r However, it came to the conclusion 
that the non-enforcement of the applicants right to access had violated the Article 8 of the 
Convention.
Non-recognition o f paternity: no clear European notion o f respect, differing court 
practices in European countries, reform tendencies and  the ir results, a historical 
comparison. In Kroon and others against The Netherlands1490, the biological father had claimed 
the right to paternity in a court, but his application was rejected, because, according to Dutch 
law, child's father is the married husband o f the mother, and because the legal husband refused to 
deny the paternity. The claim brought was the breach of Article 8 (right to family life) in 
conjunction with Article 14 (discrimination).
The Commission justified its opinion by referring to the comparative observations 
made by the Court in the Rasmussen case1491. There the Court had remarked that "in the 
Contracting States' legislation regarding paternity proceedings there is no common ground, and 
that in most o f  these States the position o f the mother and that o f  her husband is regulated in
1490 27 October 1994, A/297-C (1995) EHRR 263.
1491 Rasmussen v Denmark,A /87 (1985) EHRR 371, para 40.
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different ways”. On this basis» the Court found that the difference in time-limits, applicable to the 
institution of paternity proceedings in different states, was not an argument justifying a 
discriminatory treatment.
The Court in this case, on the other hand, found a violation of Article 8.
In his dissenting opinion, where no violation of Article 8 was found - on the basis 
that the rejection by the court was justified interference - one o f the judges1492 analysed the 
Court's case from the standpoint o f the ideas of ’‘evolutive interpretation" and "living 
instrumenfideas. The Court had previously proposed such an method of interpretation on several 
occasions.
This judge remarked that the dilemma of the creative interpretation is more serious 
in the cases on ”marriage, divorce, filiation or adoption, because they bring the existing 
religious, ideological or traditional conceptions o f the fam ily in each c o m m u n ity He referred 
to the Court’s comparative argumentation in the case of Johnson and Others v Ireland1493 
dealing with the question:
” [E] specially as fa r  as those positive obligations are concerned, the European 
notion o f 'respect' is not clear-cut: having reeard to the diversity o f the Court o f  
practices followed and the situations obtaining in the Contracting States, the 
notion's requirements will vary considerably from  case to case. Accordingly, this 
is an area in which the Contracting Parties enjoy a wide margin o f appreciation 
in determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the Convention 
with due regard to the needs and resources o f the community and o f individuals
On the same occasion, the judge referred to other instruments produced by the 
Council of Europe to harmonize family laws:
"This has led to reforms in fam ily law in many countries o f Europe, from  the 
1970's onwards. These reforms have achieved a certain approximation o f  national 
laws but not their uniformity, particularly in regard to the regulation o f  
procedures fo r  denying legal paternity, which still take many different forms. On 
the other hand, there is a tendency in the regulation o f the use o f  new techniques 
o f  human reproduction towards prohibiting challenges to legal paternity by 
anonymous sperm donors.
Account should also be taken o f  the importance o f the family in many Contracting 
States, o f  the persistence in these countries o f  a social rejection o f  adultery and o f  
the common belief that a united family facilitates the healthy development o f the 
child."
Furthermore, another judge1494 presented his dissenting opinion on comparative and
1492 Mr. Morenilla.
1491A/I12 (1987) EH RR 203, para 55.
1494 Mr. Bonnici.
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historical (Roman law) basis, finding no violation:
”2. Netherlands law, like the legislation o f  some other Contracting States, in given 
circumstances "presumes" the paternity o f  a child, in conformity with the maxim 
o f Roman Law pater is est quern nuptiae demonstrant [L.5 De in jus voc.J thereby 
establishing and ensuring inter alia the rights o f  the child. In matters o f  this type, 
I  believe that it is a principle o f good law to hold that the interests o f the child are 
paramount. "
"4. In conclusion therefore, I  cannot agree with the majority o f  my colleagues 
because, (a) in the legislation o f a substantial number o f Contracting States rules 
similar to those o f  the impugned Netherlands law are principally concerned with 
the protection o f the rights and interests o f  the child (even against the "opportun­
ist'' wishes o f the parents) and this vital and important factor has not been {riven 
sufficient consideration in a matter which mav have a substantial impact as to 
where exactly the margin o f appreciation lies which each one o f the Contracting 
States eniovs in this matter: and (b) there is no "family life" in the instant case, 
even i f  there are biological reasons fo r  holding that there are "family ties". 
Moreover, in paragraph 40 o f the judgment, reference is made to "social reality' 
as one o f the factors which should prevail over the legal presumption o f  paternity. 
In m y opinion, ever mindful o f the frequent appeals avocations made to "social 
reality" in justification o f  certain notorious laws enacted in Soviet Russia [1920- 
1989J and in Nazi Germany [1933-1945], it is dangerous and unsafe to bring 
such criteria into the fie ld  o f  family rights. The approach to those rights should be 
made from steadier and more stable platforms.
5. It follows from the above that I  am against granting any financial relief to the 
applicants under Article 50."
Transsexuality: “ Changing attitudes” , but differences between “M em ber States of the 
Council of Europe” , developments o f legislation and  case law, “no consensus between 
Council o f Europe M ember States” . In the case B v France, dealing with the refusal of the 
government to recognize a changed sexual identity and the change of civil status based on this 
change, the Court supported its argumentation with a relatively extensive examination of the 
legislation in Member States o f the Convention.1495 1496When examining the notion of "respect” the 
Court noted, as before, that "its requirements vary considerably from  case to case according to 
the practices followed and situations obtained in the Contracting States".
When dealing with the former case law on the same subject against another 
Contracting State (England)'496, the Court examined the differences in the legislation of these two 
countries (France and England) and the consequences o f these differences from the point of view 
of the Convention.
When examining scientific, legal and social developments in this area, the Court
%m 25 M arch 1992. A/232-C (1993) EHRR 1.
1496 Case Rees v United Kingdom (1987) EH RR 56, para. 35, and Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) EHRR 622, 
para.36.
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considered (also on the basis of an examination of former cases) that
"attitudes have changed but there are still differences in the attitudes between the 
Member States o f the Council o f Europe"
This was, however,
"counterbalanced to an increasing extent by developments in the legislation and  
the case law o f many o f those States”.
The Court also considered the applicants' references to the resolutions and 
recommendations of the European Parliament.’497 However, the Court foresaw problems in 
uniformity related to many issues: in definitions, in the conditions under which a change of sexual 
identity could be authorized, in international aspects, in the legal consequences of such a change, 
in opportunities for choosing a different forename, in the confidentiality of documents, in 
information mentioning that change, and finally, in the effects on the family-dimensions of this 
change (legal consequences). The Court found that
"there is no sufficiently broad consensus between the Member States o f the 
Council o f  Europe to convince the court to reach opposite conclusion to those in  
the former cases."
The extensive comparative argumentation was not, therefore, a decisive element in 
the argumentation as a whole. The final conclusions o f the Court related mainly to the factual 
differences between the previous cases and to the daily situations o f the applicant and the balance 
between general and individual interests. It found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention (right 
to respect for his private and family life... and the exercise of this right).
Pre-trial detention: average length o f p re tria l detention, comparative scholarly opinion, 
legislation and case law in other countries, com parative law as a source of law. In the case 
of W v Switzerland concerning pre-trial detention and its length, the dissenting opinion of a 
judge1498 devoted extensive attention to the comparative analysis, supported by the opinions o f 
scholars in various States. When referring to comparative criminal law, he found that the
"average length o f pre-trial detention is less than two or three months and that 
with respect to economic offences and bankcrupties the average length is less than 
one year".
Furthermore, he took as a
" typical example o f  the official statistic o f  the French Ministry o f Justice, which 149
1491 These were mainly the arguments put forward by  the applicant based on the dissenting opinion o f judge Martens 
in Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) EHRR 660-661.
,49i 26 January 1993, A /254 (1994) EHRR 60. T he dissenting opinion o f M r. Pettiti.
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could be transposed with similar results o f other European States with similar 
population, the list o f  serious and less serious crimes by category fo r  
1989...shows: fo r  bankcrupties, an average length o f  two months (seven cases o f 
three months, one only in excess o f 18 months); fo r  fraud; extortion and 
blackmail, an average length o f four to eight months. Yet in France parliament 
has often deplored the excessive length o f  pre-trial detention and has attempted to 
remedy this by reforming the Code o f Criminal Procedure "
Furthermore, he referred to legal writings on criminal law and criminal policy in 
different countries and found that
"no academic specialist or practitioner in Europe justifies pre-trial detention 
lasting four years fo r  economic offences, even multiple ones’1...
and that "authors regret the excessive length o f pre-trial detention". Reference was 
made to writers and law in Belgium, England, France and Italy.
A historical comparative analysis supported the observation, that a
"number o f States have enacted leeislation laving down a maximum length o f 
pretrial detention (six months or one year, fo r  example in Czechoslovakia)
and that
"the case law o f the other States” f  than Switzerland] limits the length o f pre-trial 
detention to about six months to two years”. Furthermore, the "comparative law 
shows that no country (other than Switzerland) practices detention for fo u r  years 
in the fie ld  o f bankruptcy and fraud, even fo r  criminal cases which are more 
serious than economic offences”.
Finally, he noted that
"in the Member States o f  the Council o f  Europe which have investigative 
proceedings. practitioners have noted that certain judges have a propensity to 
anticipate the sentence sometimes by pre-trial detention, or to press the accused 
to make admissions by postponing appearances fo r  months while dismissing 
requests fo r  release”
With reference to philosophical, teleological, and case law-arguments, he came to 
the conclusion that the length and the manner in which pre-trial detention was executed violated 
Article 5 o f the Convention (the "preassumption of innocence").
Conclusions. Conclusions relating to these observations are made after the following 
examination of the principle of freedom of expression.
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5.2.3. C om parative reasoning related to Articles 10(1) and (2) 
(“freedom  of expression”  and the “necessity in a  dem ocratic 
society” ) in the European system of human rights
“The common denom inator’’ conception, ‘trad itio n s  of the  Contracting States”  (case E n ­
gel). The case of Engel and Others v The Netherlands1499 dealt with the relationship between the 
publication and distribution of certain prohibited writings by some soldiers in the Netherlands 
armed forces and the Article 19 (freedom of expression) and Article 5 (right to liberty)1500. The 
applicants had been sentenced and arrested on the basis o f the writings’ publication and 
distribution, which was covered by the laws of military discipline.
Although the Court found that the Article applied to servicemen as well as to  
ordinary persons, it was not breached by the penalties which had been imposed because the 
interference was legitimate and justified by the desire to protect the military discipline.
The Court argued comparatively to show that the action taken by the state 
belonged to the sphere of the Convention’s Article 6. It also undertook a comparative 
examination of whether the action by the state belonged to the realm of criminal law or that o f  
disciplinary law, or to both. The Court defined it as an inquiry "in the light o f  the common 
denominator o f the respective legislation o f the various Contracting States".
The Court maintained that
"The seriousness o f  what is at stake, the traditions o f  the Contracting States, and  
the importance attached by the Convention to respect fo r  the physical liberty o f  
the person all require that this should be so [powers o f the supervision by the  
Court o f Human Rights].
It is on the basis o f these criteria that the court will ascertain whether some or a ll 
o f the applicants were a subject o f a "criminal charge " within the meaning o f the 
Article 6."
However, the Court refused to undertake an extensive interpretation of the
provision.
Practice a t the international level, interpretation m ethods, practice in the m ajority of the  
Member States of the Council of Europe, analogical legislation in other Contracting States 
(case Handyside). The Handyside case1501 dealt with a situation where a publisher had been 
charged and convicted under the law by having in his possession obscene books. Books were 
seized, forfeited and destroyed. The book was circulated also everywhere else in Europe, and in
,4” 8 June 1976, A /22(1978).
1500 Article 11 on the freedom of association was also involved.
1501 7 Decem ber 1976, A/24. See for some analysis also, van der M eersch, W.J.G., 1980,p .328-331.
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some other parts of the country of the parties to the dispute. Both the Court and the Commission 
did not find any breach of Article 10, or rather, the Court declared it justified under the Article 
10(2) of the Convention.
The Handyside case has been one of the most influential cases in the European 
system of human rights. In this case the Court established the basis for the idea of the "absence 
o f the general concept o f European morals”.1502 Furthermore, the Court also developed its idea 
on the"marginal appreciation” doctrine, and the idea of "European level supervision" combined 
with this national supervision.
The Court defined the nature of the European system of human rights in its relation 
to the national systems1503. The Court also made explicit its method of interpretation, which is 
related to the idea o f "comparative interpretation":
"It follow s from this that it is in no way the Court’s task to take the place o f the 
competent national courts but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they 
delivered in the exercise o f  their power o f appreciation. However, the Court’s 
supervision would generally prove illusory i f  it did no more than examine these 
decision in isolation; it must view them in the light o f the case as a whole, 
including the publication in question and the arguments and evidence adduced by 
the applicant, in the domestic legal system and then at the international level. The 
Court must decide, on the different data available to it whether the reasons given 
by the national authorities to justify the actual measures o f interference they take 
are relevant and sufficient under Article 10(2). ”
The Court had to take a comparative standpoint mainly because the book had been 
circulated also in other states parties to the Convention:
"The applicant and the minority o f the Commission laid stress on the further point 
that, in addition to the original Danish edition, translations o f  the Little Book 
appeared and circulated freely in the majority o f  the Member States o f the 
Council o f Europe. Here again, the national margin o f appreciation and the 
optional nature o f  the ' restrictions ' and ' penalties ' referred to in Article 10 (2) 
prevent the Court from  accepting the argument. The Contracting States have each 
fashioned their approach in the light o f the situation obtaining in their respective 
territories; they have had regard, inter alia, to the different views prevailing there 
about the demands o f  the protection o f morals in a democratic society. The fac t 
that most o f them decided to allow the work to be distributed does not mean that 
the contrary decision o f  the Inner London Quarter Sessions was a breach o f 
Article 10. Besides, some o f  the editions published outside the United Kingdom do 
not include the passages, or at least not all the passages, cited in the judgment o f 
29 October 1971 as striking examples o f  a tendency to deprave and c o rru p t”
,SH This idea will be observed closely in connection to some other cases.
1503 Referring to the cases (for Art. 5(3)) W emAioj5f(1968)EHRR55,76, para. 12; Neumeisier v Austria (NO, 1)
(1968) , I E.H.R.R. 91, 126, para. 5; Stog-Muller v Austria (1969), 1 E.H.R.R. 155,190, para 3 Matznette v Austria
(1969) , 1 E.H.R.R. 198,224, para 3,; and Ringeisen v Austria (1971), 1 E.H.R.R. 493, para 104.
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Here the Court explicitly rejected the decisiveness of these types of comparative 
observations, which, nevertheless, seemed to indicate a generality of practices.
However, the applicants claim that the seizure was not ’necessary' in a democratic 
society was dismissed on the basis o f comparative observations:
"55.... I f  the applicant is right, their object should have been at the most one o r  
few  copies o f  the book to be used as exhibits in the criminal proceedings. The  
Court does not share this view since the police had good reasons fo r  trying to lay  
their hands on all the stock as a temporary means o f protecting the young against 
the danger to morals on whose existence it was fo r  the trial court to decide. The 
legislation o f many Contracting States provides for a seizure analogous to that 
envisaged by section 3 o f  the English 1959/1964 Acts. "
The United S tates Supreme C ourts doctrine, "U nusual in  a democratic country o f o u r
time" (case Arrowsmith). In the case Arrowsmith v United Kingdom150*, the applicant had been 
delivering pacifist leaflets in front o f an army camp directed to soldiers persuading them to seduce 
from their duty or allegiance in relation to service in Northern Ireland. She was convicted to  
imprisonment. The question in the Commission was about the "necessity o f the interference" in 
relation to the right guaranteed in the Article 10, where the act aimed at protecting national 
security and the prevention of disorder within the army.
Context of justification. In another case before the Commission, the applicant wanted the case 
to be examined comparatively:
" It remains to be examined whether the applicant s prosecution and conviction, 
and the sentence imposed [seven months' imprisonment] were necessary in order 
to secure this aim [protection o f national security and the prevention o f disorder 
within the army].
The applicant has suggested that the ’ clear and present danger doctrine’, as 
developed bv the United States Supreme Court, be applied.
The notion ’necessary' implies a \pressing social need' which may include the 
clear and present danger test and must be assessed in the light o f  the 
circumstances o f a given case. "
The Commission decided that the justification for restrictions, penalties etc. upon 
the freedom of expression (and the concept of necessity in Article 10(2)) "implies a pressing 
social need which many be include the 'clear and present danger' test, and must be assessed in 
the light o f  the particular circumstances o f  the case".
One of the members of the Commission, in his dissenting opinion, made a general 
comparative observations to support his argument that long imprisonment was out o f proportion *
,sw 12 October 1978, Application 7050/75(1981) EHRR 218.
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to the legitimate aim pursued1505:
"Finally, I  consider that the interference by a way o f  a long imprisonment, even as 
it was reduced upon appeal, was out o f proportion to the legitimate aim pursued 
as required by the European Court o f Human Rights in the HANDYSIDE case, It 
is to w v  knowledge, quite unusual in a democratic country in our time to punish 
anyone in this way fo r  non-violent political offences such as those committed by 
applicant, and I  cannot reconcile it with the requirement o f  necessary in the 
present case it leaves me with the unfortunate impression that in this case, because 
o f the serious and violent conflict in Northern Ireland, the authorities have 
over-reacted.
That tolerance fo r  the views o f dissidents which we expect o f  other countries 
should not be abandoned in Western Europe even in times o f crisis. Although the 
applicant’s action remotely threatened public policy, this is not in my opinion a 
sufficient justification fo r  interference under the system o f the European 
Convention whose claim to credibility it is very important to preserve in the 
world-wide debate on human rights. "
O ther international measures (case Glimmerveen). The case o f Glimmerveen v Hagenbeek 
v Netherlands1506 dealt with the question, whether the possession o f leaflets inciting racial hatred 
was to be protected by Article 10 of the Convention.
In this case, the Commission, concluding that Article 10 of the Convention was 
inapplicable, made reference to the other international systems presented (as an argument by the 
Government Party)
"Indeed, the Government have drawn the attention o f the Commission in 
particular in the light o f Article 60 o f  the Convention, to the Netherlands’ 
international obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination 
o f all Forms o f Racial Discrimination o f 1965. to which the Netherlands acceded 
in 1971.
[20] The Netherlands’ authorities, in allowing the applicants to proclaim freely  
and without penalty their ideas would certainly encourage the discrimination 
prohibited by the provisions o f the European Convention on Human Rights 
referred to above and the above Convention o f New York o f 1965.
[21] The Commission holds the view that the expression o f the political ideas o f 
the applicants clearly constitutes an activity within the meaning o f Article 17 o f  
the Convention.
[22] The applicants are essentially seeking to use Article 10 to provide a basis 
under the Convention for a right to engage in these activities which are, as shown 
above, contrary to the text and spirit o f  the Convention and which right, i f  
granted, would contribute to the destruction- o f  the rights and freedoms referred 
to above.
Consequently, the Commission finds that the applicants cannot by reason o f  the
1505 Mr. Opsahl.
1506 1 1 O ctober 1979, appl. 8348/78 and 8406/78 (1982) EHRR 260.
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provisions of Article 17 o f the Convention, rely on Article JO o f the Convention. ”
Sim ilar Legislation in most European countries (case X v Germany). In the case of X  v 
Federal Republic o f Germany1507 dealing with freedom of speech and its "necessary restrictions 
in the democratic society", the Commission stated that
"Moreover; the Commission has had regard the fa c t that most European countries 
that have ratified the Convention have legislation which restricts the freeflow  o f  
commercial "ideas” in the interest o f protecting consumers from  misleading or  
deceptive practices”,...
Taking both these observations into account1508 the Commission considers that the 
test o f  "necessity” in the second paragraph o f  the Article 10 should therefore be 
a less strict one when one applied to restraints imposed on commercial ideas.**
On this basis the Commission came to the conclusion that the injunction granted by 
the Market court o f the Federal Republic of Germany was necessary in a democratic society for 
the protection of the rights of other (i.e. consumers).
Similarities between the systems in some countries, examples of legal decisions (Liberal 
Party). In the case of Liberal Party v United Kingdom1509 the Commission found that Article 10 
does not guarantee the right to vote as such, nor does it guarantee the right to stand for election 
or any other right already provided by Article 3 o f the First Protocol. In this manner the 
Commission found that Article 10 alone was inapplicable also when it was read in conjunction 
with Article 14. In its reasoning, the Commission made an extensive reasoning on comparative 
basis:
"Article 3 requires that elections are being held under conditions which will 
ensure the free expression o f the opinion o f the people in the choice o f  the legisla­
ture. The applicants seem to suggest that the disadvantage existing fo r  the Liberal 
Party, as fo r  any smaller party, does not really assure the free expression o f the 
opinion the people. Although the Commission agrees that this disadvantage exists 
and may be o f considerable political impact it cannot find  a violation o f Article 3 
o f the First Protocol alone or in conjunction with Article 14 o f the Convention on 
that basis. The simple majority system is one o f the two basic electoral systems It 
is or has been used in many democratic countries. It has always been accepted as 
allowing fo r  the free  expression o f the opinion o f the people even i f  it operates to 
the detriment o f small parties.
10. This reasoning is supported by the fa c t that even countries which know of a 
fundamental right to equality o f  voting still admit the simple majority system as
,i0T Appl. 8410 /78 ,13  December 1979. The case dealt with the advertising activities o f religious communities and 
its misleading character.
im  The other observation concerned the jurisprudence o f the Court {Handyside AHA, 7. Decem ber 1977).
1509 Appl. N o. 8765/79 (1982) EHRR 106 ,18  December.
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complying with the requirement. The Federal Constitutional Court o f the Federal 
Republic o f Germany [Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decision, Vol. 34, 81, 100 with 
references] has held that both electoral systems, proportionate representation and 
simple majority vote, are constitutional and in line with the requirement o f 
equality o f voting. The United States Supreme Court controls election laws on the 
basis o f the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution 
[WHITCOMB v. CHAVIS 403, U.S. 124,156 (1971)- WHITE V. REGESTER, 412 
U.S. 755, 766 (1973)]. It accepts the prevailing system with simple majority 
electoral districts, including, under specific circumstances, multimember districts 
although these may be very much to the disadvantage o f smaller groups."
No com parable provisions in  o ther states and in international instruments, similarities 
between the legislation of the state parties, no general practice, evolution in Europe and in 
North America, Supreme C ourt of U nited States (case B arthold). In the case of Barthold v 
Germany1510 the question concerned the alleged breaking of professional rules by a veterinary 
surgeon, who had advertised and published in a manner which contravened the law.
He had also been critical in a newspaper article o f the lack of emergency services 
available at night. Interim and final injunctions required him to refrain from repeating statements 
on the basis of the "non-objective nature" of the statements. The Court found there to have been 
a violation of Article 10.
Context of justification. In the course of its argument the Government attempted to justify its 
conduct on the basis of comparative similarity of competition rules in different national and 
international instruments:
'Y52.)... Finally; in the submission o f the Government, in the fie ld  o f the 
"policing ” o f unfair competition the Contracting States enjoyed a wide margin o f 
appreciation and the legal traditions o f the Contracting States had to be respected 
by the Convention institutions. In this connection, provisions comparable to those 
of the relevant German legislation were to be found in other States o f the Council 
o f Europe, in international instruments and in the law o f the European 
Communities. ”
Justification. The Court refused to accept this argumentation because of the subsidiarity nature 
o f the powers1511, and maintained that the margin of appreciation "enjoyed by the Contracting 
States has to go hand in hand with the European supervision, which is more or less extensive
15,0 A/90 (1985) EHRR 383, 25 M arch 1985.
lSn Som e analysis of the idea o f  “subsidiarity” in the European Human Rights system is provided by van der 
Meersch, W.J.G., 1980, p.328 (Belgian linguistic and Handyside cases).
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depending on circumstances"'512.
However, two members o f  the Court* 1513, who also found that violation of Article 
10 had not taken place responded directly to the comparative argument put forward by the 
Government:
"Although restrictions on advertising and publicity by members o f  the liberal 
professions are well known in the States Parties to the Convention, the combined 
application o f rules from  these two categories ["professional conduct and unfair  
competition "] are not general practice, "
A nother member o f  the Court1314 put forward an interesting “comparative legal 
development” argument in his dissenting opinion. He came also to the conclusion that there had 
been a violation o f Article 10, but he stressed the importance of a wider scope for the 
argumentation:
"As o f  now; however, one cannot ignore the considerable evolution that has  
occurred, in Europe as well as in North America, within the professional bodies 
representing the liberal professions in opening themselves up to certain form s o f  
collective advertising about their activities and even to certain form s o f individual 
advertising, in particular so as to indicate practitioners' specialities. Standards o f  
professional conduct are thereby undergoing development and, fo r  members o f  the  
liberal professions, it is not possible to divorce assessment o f professional conduct 
from  the degree o f  liberty afforded in relation to advertising, which is what 
happened in Dr. Barthold's case. Freedom o f  expression in its true dimension is  
the right to receive and to impart information and ideas. Commercial speech is d i­
rectly connected with that freedom "
He motivated the inclusion o f "commercial speech" within the realm of freedom o f  
expression with a direct reference to the case law of the United States Supreme Court:
"Such was the import o f a decision by the Commission; such is the case law o f the  
Supreme Court o f  the United States under the First Amendment [ VIRGINIA 
STATE BOARD OF PHARMACY V. VIRGINIA CONSUMER COUNCIL 425 U.S. 
748 (1976); BATES V BAR OF ARIZONA 433 U S 350 (1977); CENTRAL 
HUDSON GAS & ELECTRIC CORP V  PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 447  
U.S. 557 (1980)] albeit that the commercial communications are afforded a  
different degree o f  protection to that granted in respect o f the press. "
1112 This refers to an idea o f coherence o f a  national system and to  a teleological derogation.
H ow ever, to maintain the integrity o f the general human rights system, the future observation is 
explained (”together with the European surveillance.... nat this stage...".)
1513 M r. Vilhjalmsson and Mr. Bindschedler-Robert.
15,4 M r Pettiti.
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Sources of law doctrines com pared; other international measures (The Declaration of 
Human Rights and  International Covenant on Civil and  Political Rights), geographical 
position com pared (case Glasenapp). In the Glasenapp case1515 the question concerned the 
revocation of an appointment of a school teacher on the basis o f her unsuitability. It was claimed, 
by the German responsible authority, that she was not prepared to approve or uphold the 
principles of a free and democratic society. Legal proceedings in Germany had upheld this 
conclusion.
Context of justification. In its opinion, the European Commission of Human Rights argued by 
the comparative generality o f doctrines of sources o f law. That established the basis for an 
interpretation o f the "lawfulness o f the restriction' in the following way:
"Since judicial precedent is relied upon by the Government as an additional 
source o f law which added the required precision to the statutory texts, it is 
relevant to refer also to the further dictum in the SUNDAY TIMES judgment 
according to which the word law in the expression 'prescribed by law ' covers not 
only statute but also unwritten law. The Commission regards this consideration as 
valid not only in respect o f the common law but also in respect o f other legal 
systems where the legislation deliberately leaves room for judicial precedent. 
Accordingly the judicial principles established by precedent must be regarded as 
"law" within the meaning o f Article 10(2), provided that they are adhered to by 
the courts in a consistent manner."
On this basis the Commission found that the application o f judicial principles 
comprise valid basis as "law" in this case.
Justification. In studying the nature o f the European human rights system, the nature of the 
rights included within it, and the aims of the Convention, the Court agreed with the government's 
argumentation:1516
"48. The Universal Declaration o f Human Rights o f  10 December 1948 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights o f 16 December 1966 
provide, respectively, that everyone has the right o f  equal access to public service 
in his country and that every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity to 
have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country \ In 
contrast, neither the European Convention nor any o f its Protocols sets forth any 
such right. Moreover as the Government rightly pointed out the signatory states 
deliberately did not include such a right; drafting history o f the Protocols 4 and 
7 shows this unequivocally. In particular, the initial versions o f Protocol 7 
contained a provision similar to Article 21(2) o f  the Universal Declaration and
,5IS A/104, (1987) EHRR 25,28 August 1986.
15,6 S im ilar type o f case, see Kosiek v. Germany (A /105 (1987) EHRR 328, 28 August 1986) where also the 
concurring opinion o f  judge Bindschedler-Robert, Pinheiro, Farinha, Pettiti, Walsch, Russo, Bemardt stressed the 
importance o f "national tradition and the system governing the Civil Service".
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Article 25 o f the International Covenant; this clause was subsequently deleted. 
This is not therefore a chance omission from  the European instruments; as the 
Preamble to the Convention states, they are designed to ensure the collective 
enforcement o f ’certain* o f the rights stated in the Universal Declaration. "
The Court discovered, in other words, that the Convention was in conflict with 
other international instrument. It seemed to find it impossible to interpret the Convention in the 
light of these other instruments, but related the travaux preparatoires and the intention of the 
parties with this contrastive use o f other international instruments.
Consequently, the Court did not find a breach o f Article 10 by the national
authorities.
Comparative reasoning was used likewise by the dissenting judges in finding the 
inapplicability of Article 10 to the case.
In his dissenting opinion, in finding a violation of Article 10, another judge pointed 
out comparatively (in general terms) that,
"While the contracting states did not wish to commit themselves to recognizing a 
right o f  access to the Civil Service in the convention or its protocols, the High 
contracting Parties nonetheless undertook in Article J o f the Convention to secure 
to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the in 
the Convention. It follows that access to the Civil Service must not be impeded on 
grounds protected by the Convention (for example, freedom o f  opinion, freedom  
o f expression).
21. Taken to its extreme, the reasoning o f the majority o f  the Court could 
authorise a State to refuse to admit to the Civil Service candidates who, while 
fulfilling  all the requirements o f nationality, age, health and professional 
qualifications, did not satisfy certain criteria o f race, colour or religion. 
Obviously such a situation is unthinkable for all the Member States o f  the Council 
o f Europe."
The governments comparative argument was rejected by this judge in following
manner:
“36. A  second argument expounded by the Agent o f  the Government to justify 
current legislation in the Federal Republic o f  Germany was the following 
(translation from the German): ... Germany is a divided nation whose position 
bordering on the Communist States o f the Warsaw Pact exposes it to special 
dangers. This requires us to take additional precautions to safeguard our free 
democracy and makes us different from other Council o f Europe States."
In other words, the government had presented a comparative argument based on 
that country’s peculiar national, geographic, and political circumstances to legitimate an 
exception from European human rights. The judge refused to uphold this type of comparative
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argument:1517
"Without wishing to enter into a debate on that argument, 1 consider nonetheless 
that the Federal Republic o f Germany is not the only country in such a geo­
graphical position. Yet it is the only country to have the legislation complained
or
Common principle of law in Contracting States (case M üller). In Müller and others v 
Switzerland1518, the question concerned confiscation of a painting on the grounds the protection 
of morals. Legally it delt with the necessary restrictions of freedom of speech (artistic freedom) 
in a democratic society and the "margin o f appreciation*doctrine. The Court argued 
comparatively concerning the rule of confiscation137 *319:
"A principle o f law which is common to the Contracting States allows confiscation 
o f items whose use has been lawfully adjudged illicit and dangerous to the general 
interest. In the instant case, the purpose was to protect the public from  any 
repetition o f the offence. "
This comparative observation was one of the main arguments by which the Court 
came to its conclusion, that the Article 10 had not been infringed by the Swiss Court.
The practice in o ther M em ber States of the Council o f Europe, hypothetical "non­
reaction" (case M arkt Intern). In Markt Intern and Beermann v Germany1520, the question 
concerned right to publish claims of a dissatisfied client of a company in a newspaper. In the 
specific context, this was found, by the German court, to involve "acts contrary to honest 
practices”. The European Court accepted this finding of the German Court. The restriction was 
found to be legitimate on the basis of its aims.
Context o f justification. In his dissenting opinion, however, one of the members of the 
European Court o f Human Rights1521 analysed comparatively the general discourse in European 
States:
"The problem is all the more serious because often the States which seek, to 
restrict the freedom use the pretext o f economic infringements or breaches o f
1317 Exactly same argument in Kosiek case.
,SI* A/133 (1991) EHRR 212,24 M ay 1988.
13,9 Reference to the Handyside case.
,S2° A/164 (1990) EHRR 161,20 Novem ber 1989, The case must be distinguished from the case M arkt Intern and 
Beerman v. Germany, 18 December 1987.
,HI Mr. Pettiti.
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economic legislation such as anti-competitive or antitrust provisions to institute 
proceedings fo r  political motives or to protect 'mixed' interests (State-industrial) 
in order to erect a barrier to the freedom o f expression.
The economic pressure which groups or laboratories can exert should not be 
underestimated. In certain cases this pressure has been such that it has delayed 
the establishment o f the truth and therefore put back the prohibition o f  a medicine 
or substance dangerous fo r  the public health.
The economic press o f  numerous Member States publishes each day articles, 
millions o f copies o f  which are circulated, containing criticism o f  products in 
terms a hundred times stronger than those in question in the Markt Intern case. It 
is this freedom accorded to that press which ensures the protection o f  the public 
at large. "
Another member o f the Court expressed his dissenting opinion based on the 
generality of "non-existing" law in Europe (the party's laws constituting an exception to this)1522:
"...It should therefore be asked whether it can be necessary in a democratic 
society to restrict the rights and fundamental freedoms o f an organ o f  the press in 
this way solely because that organ has espoused the cause o f specific economic 
interests, namely those o f  a particular sector o f  a specialised trade. I  am in no 
doubt that this question must be answered in the negative. This is clear from the 
fac t that, as fa r  as I  know, such a rule extending the scope o f  the law on unfair 
competition to the detriment o f  freedom o f the press is unknown in the other 
M ember States o f the Council o f Europe, and rightly so because, in certain 
respects, all newspapers may be regarded as partisan, having espoused the cause 
o f certain specific interests."
On this basis he came to the conclusion that such acts by the state were not 
necessary in a democratic society, and consequently, that there had been a violation o f Article 10 
of the Convention.
Rejection of the analogy derived from another international measures, the European Com­
munity as example, tendencies tow ards democracy in  Eastern Europe, scholarly opinions 
in Europe and the United States, the U nited States constitution and its interpretation, the 
factual situation in European countries, o th e r international conventions (case Groppera). 
In Groppera radio Advocate General v Switzerland1523, a company was obliged to terminate its 
transmissions by cable. The Swiss authorities imposing this obligation referred to a new law 
prohibiting transmissions by those stations, which did not comply with international treaties and 
agreements.
Context of justification. Two members o f  the Court stated in their dissenting opinion that
1522 Mr. Martens.
1523 A/173 (1990) EHRR 321 ,28  March 1990, M r Matscher, M r Bindschedler-Robert.
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"I cannot accept paragraph 61 o f  the judgment [o f this Court]. In my opinion, it 
is unacceptable to reason on the basis o f  drafting history o f a later instrument 
drawn up in a different community (the United Nations). not within the Council o f 
Europe...
"...the fac t that the sentence was not included in the International Covenant o f 
Civil and Political rights is o f  no importance when interpreting paragraph (1) o f 
the Article 10 o f the European Convention o f Human Rights, in which it does 
occur. "
The members rejected also the "implicit" adaption o f the European Community 
doctrine on "precision and clarity" o f the publication in the reasoning of the Court.1524 They 
claimed that
"There was no publication in the Swiss official gazette. 1 honestly doubt whether 
what may be acceptable in respect o f European Community legislation included 
in Community's Official Journal. which is regarded as an official gazette in the 
Member States too, can be acceptable in respect o f other international 
instruments."
However, the members came to the same conclusion as did the Court.
The same case also inspired other judges1525 to present detailed example type of 
comparisons of case law in their strong dissenting opinion:
"Recent European cases concerning jurisdiction, copyright (author's rights), and 
tort damages have examined and classified the rules and systems which are 
applicable and are brought out the distinctions to be made by reference to 
different situations:
(a) the transmission itself, or the reception, is contrary to national law [Paris 
Court in case Potasses, "referring to the European Court o f Justice"]..."
In stressing the importance o f the freedom of expression (including the freedom to 
receive information) especially in connection to telecommunications they maintained in rather 
value-based form:
"The countries o f  Eastern Europe have been encouraged towards democracy 
thanks to the transborder broadcasts and wish to jo in  the European Convention on 
Transborder Communication Satellites. Case law and academic lawyers in this 
field . both American and European. agree that this freedom should be extended 
to the fie ld  of telecommunications.
The European Court should uphold this safeguard and promotion o f the freedom  
o f expression in the same spirit as that o f the first amendment to the Constitution 
o f the United States and the work of United nations (16th session). It should be 
remembered what Helvetius said, "it is necessary to think and to be able to say 
everything"- and the Declaration o f Virginia (1776), "freedom o f  press is one o f 13245
1324 Argumentation in para 68 of the judgment (Groppera case).
1325 Mr. Pettiti.
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the most powerful bastions o f  liberty".
Justification. In justifying the decision, the Court examined the general tendencies in Europe1526:
"Since then [signing o f the Convention), changed views and technical progress, 
particularly the appearance o f cable transmissions, have resulted in the abolition 
o f State monopolies in many European countries and the establishment o f private 
radio stations, often local ones, in addition to the public services. Furthermore, 
the national licencing systems are required not only fo r  the orderly regulation o f  
broadcasting enterprises at the national level but also in large part to give effect 
to international rules, including in particular number 2020 o f  the Radio 
Regulations"
Furthermore, the Court, in dealing with the interpretation o f the broadcasting 
licencing system in Switzerland, also compared Article 19 of the 1966 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and maintained1527 that
"[it] does not include a provision corresponding to the third sentence o f Article 
10(1) o f the Convention [o f Human rights]. The negotiating history o f  the Article 
19 shows that the inclusion o f such a provision in an Article had been proposed 
with a view to the licensing not o f the information imparted but rather o f the 
technical means o f  broadcasting in order to prevent chaos in the use o f  
frequencies. However in inclusion was opposed on the ground that it might be  
utilized to hamper free expression, and it was decided that such a provision was 
not necessary because licencing in a sense intended was deemed to be covered by  
the reference to 'public order ' in paragraph (3) o f  the Article.
This supports the conclusion that the purpose o f  the third sentence o f  the Article 
19( 1) o f the Convention [on the Human Rights] is to make it clear that states are 
perm itted to control by a licencing system the way in which broad casting is 
organized in their territories, particularly in its technical aspects. It does n o t , 
however, provide that licencing measures shall not otherwise be subject to the 
requirements o f paragraph (2) [of the Convention], fo r  that would lead to a result 
contrary to the object and purpose o f Article taken as a whole. "
The Court used, in other words, another international agreement as a comparative 
reference. It analysed the legislative history of this convention, and on this basis interpreted the 
content of the European Convention by analogy.
On this basis, it came to the conclusion that the third sentence o f Article 10(1) was 
applicable to this case ("This Article does not prevent states from  requiring the licencing o f  
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises").
However, the scope of its applicability needed also to be interpreted. Accordingly, 
the Court came to the conclusion that the interference by the Swiss authorities was in accordance
,}:6 With regard to tendencies approach, see Schreuer, C.H., 1971, pp.275-277 (Otto Preminger Institute). 
li27 Reference to U N  doc. A /500,16th session o f the United Nations General Assembly, 5 December 1961, para
23.
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with the Article. The question thus concerned only whether the interference was "prescribed by 
law", and had legitimate aims, and "was necessary in a democratic society". In the end, the 
interference was found to be in accordance with Convention’s Article 10.
The practice of states, some states particularly, Council of Europe as tertium  
comparationis, international developments, international measures and their 
interpretation; implementation by parties, questionnaires answered by authorities: no 
general practice, international measures and their objectives (case Autronic). In the case of 
Autronic v Switzerland1528 concerning the applicability of the Article on freedom of expression to 
the receiving of uncoded television programs (an application by a party to get a permission from 
the state to do so), the Court referred to the Commissions report, which included comparative 
observations:1529
'The practice o f several Council o f Europe member States, including France and 
United Kingdom, suggested that the International Telecommunication Convention 
and the Radio Regulations did not preclude direct reception o f signals 
retransmitted by telecommunication satellite where they were intended fo r  the 
general public.1,1530
Furthermore, in looking into the necessity o f restrictions in a democratic society, 
the Court observed, that
"In the legal field, developments have included, a t international level, the 
signature within the Council o f Europe on 5 M ay 1989 o f the European 
Convention on Transfrontier television and, at national level, the fac t that several 
Member States allow reception o f uncoded television broadcasts from  
telecommunication satellites without requiring the consent o f the authorities o f  the 
country in which the station transmitting to the satellite is situated.
The latter circumstance is not without relevance, since the other states signatories 
to the International telecommunication Convention and the international au­
thorities do not appear to have protested at the interpretation o f Article 22 o f  this 
Convention and the provisions o f the Radio Regulations that it implies. The 
contrary interpretation o f  these provisions, which was relied by the Swiss 
Government by the support o f  the interference, is consequently not convincing. 
This is also apparent from  paragraphs 19 and 20 o f the International 
telecommunication Union’s reply to the Governments questions
On this basis, the Court did find that the Article 10 can be applied to the case. 
Consequently, after examining the facts of the case, the Court concluded that the Swiss *130
,3Î,A/178 (1990) EHRR 485, 22 May 1990.
1519 Commission report, 8th March 1989
1330 The applicant company had suggested in its argumentation, comparatively, that other Contracting States had 
m ore liberal rules.
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authorities, in refusing an application to receive the programs, violated Article 10 of the 
Convention.
In their dissenting opinions two members of the Court1531 referred to an interesting 
comparative study made by the Swiss authorities as a basis for some kind of a bona fide  
justification, and argued on the basis of diversity existing between states:
"According to the interpretation prevailing at the time (ad also quite recently), 
Switzerland accepted that this undertaking obliged it to make authorisation for re­
ception subject to the consent o f  the transmitting State, in the instant case the 
Soviet Union, as is clear from the replies by several foreign administrations to 
which Switzerland had sent a request for information (The Soviet Union o f 7 Feb­
ruary 1981. the Netherlands o f  July 1985. Finland o f  8 July 1985. Germany o f 29  
Aueust 1989). It was also in accordance with the recommendation adopted in 
1982 bv the European Conference o f  Postal and Telecommunication 
Administrations. Therefore Switzerland legitimately believed that it was not only 
authorised but obliged to make the authorisation sought by Autronic Advocate 
General subject to the consent o f  the competent Soviet authority, in order to meet 
its international obligations by fulfilling them as they were understood by the 
appropriate international organisations and the other States, particularly the Sta­
te interested in the present case, the Soviet Union. In other words, as the consent 
o f the Soviet authorities was not obtained, the refusal o f  authorisation which is the 
subject o f the complaint by Autronic Advocate General could be regarded at that 
time as a measure necessary to prevent disorder in international telecom­
munications.
Even though in recent years some national administrations seem to have waived 
the condition o f obtaining the prior consent o f the transmitting State, it appears 
from  the replies received in 1989 that this is not vet the general practice. This is 
proved bv the international agreements sinned for the creation o f Entersat and 
Intelsat, which permit transmissions from  satellites to be picked up only by 
specially authorised earth stations. Even i f  this were not the case and although 
ideas have changed, it cannot be used as a criterion for deciding whether there is 
a violation o f the Convention in this case and whether the State is liable, because 
this question must be assessed in the livht o f the levai rules in force (and as 
understood) at the time o f the relevant facts.
The fa c t that the ITU  considers that it is fo r  the administration o f each member 
o f the Union itself to take the ‘necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the 
unauthorised interception o f  radiocommunications not intended fo r  the general 
use o f  the public* and that every national administration is empowered ’to lay 
down the terms and conditions on which it grants such authorisation ' means only 
that, in the framework o f the International Telecommunication Convention and the 
Radio Regulations, States have some desree o f discretion in decidins on suitable 
measures for attaining the objectives o f  those international rules. The grant o f  
such discretion cannot lead to the conclusion that a measure which is taken on 
this basis ad appears to be perfectly suited and proportionate to the legitimate 
objective, viz. in casu the prevention o f  disorder in international
1331 Mr. Binschedler-Robert and Mr. M atscher.
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telecommunications, is not necessary. Furthermore, the contested measure was not 
an absolute, unqualified prohibition, but a reasonable response to the 
international undertakings o f  the State in question and a response which took 
account o f the legal interests o f the transmitting State.
On those grounds we consider that there was no violation o f Article 10".
The comparative observations refer to many different types of comparative 
observations. The government had produced a comparative study in order to discover a "general 
tendency" in different states, and this provided a grounding for good faith implementation.
However, this type of comparative argument by the other judges did not seem to 
persuade the Court. It found a violation o f the Article. In fact, the Court rejected this argument 
by relying on the recent study made by the Commission, referring explicitly to different states 
(France and United Kingdom) from those which the party had examined (the Netherlands, 
Germany, Finland and the Soviet Union). The Commissions study was more recent.
The judges presenting the dissenting opinion, on the other hand, referred to this 
same study, and connected it to the fulfilment of international obligations. However, they refused 
to consider the Commission's comparative arguments to be valid, because the practice in interna­
tional treaty law proved contrary to the claimed "general practice". Furthermore, the claimed 
generality would not be a persuasive argument, because, according to them, the breach should be 
examined on the basis of the "historical context". They also referred to the "subsidiary" nature of 
the provisions in certain international treaties in order to uphold the competence of the Swiss 
authorities to decide the case.
Conditioned by the traditions of the community, political fields o f established democracies, 
in  legal and social orders of contracting states no uniform  conception of morals, general 
discourses (case Oberschlick). In Oberschlick v Austria1532, which dealt with the restriction of 
freedom of expression of a journalist publishing a text “containing criminal information”, one of 
the members of the Commission of human rights1533 made a rather abstract “disparity” 
comparison o f legal and social orders in order to arrive to a type o f "subsidiarity" of systems:
"The borderline between the freedom o f information and libel depends largely on 
the traditions o f the community concerned. In some communities it is quite 
customary to use harsh language, in others one is more polite. In the political 
field many established democracies consider it an achievement that one can say 
almost anything about politicians, in other countries libellous attacks against 
those who perform democratic functions are seen as attacks democracy itself. To 
decide what expressions are defamatory and what are not we have to take into *13
1532 A/204 (1995) EHRR 389, 23 May 1991.
1333 Mr Schermers.
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account that it is not possible to find in the leval and social orders o f the 
Contracting States a uniform conception o f  morals.
He continued with the words of the Court o f human rights:
"The view taken o f the requirements o f  morals varies from time to time and from  
place to place, especially in our area, characterized as it is by a fa-reaching 
evolution o f opinions on the subject By the reason o f their direct and continuous 
contact with the vital forces o f  their countries, State authorities are in principle in 
a better position than the international judge to  give an opinion on the exact 
content o f  these requirements as well as on the 'necessity' o f a 'restriction' or 
'penalty' intended to meet them"1534
Commission’s member dealt in his comparison with the disparity of the legal and 
moral concept o f "libel”, traditions of the social discourse, ideas of "democratic discourse", 
"defamation" etc.. On this basis, he considered the idea o f the "margin of appreciation" to be 
applicable to the case, and he transferred the jurisdictional competence to the national system, in 
particular to its judge. By reference to some other arguments, he did not ultimately find a breach 
o f Article 10 of the Convention.
The European Court of Human Rights, in arguing for the acceptability of the 
journalists publication, stated:
"The Court agrees with the Commission that the insertion o f the text o f  the said 
information in Forum (the magazine) contributed to the public debate on a 
political question o f  general importance. In particular, the issue o f different 
treatment o f nationals and foreigners in the social field has given rise to 
considerable discussion not only in Austria but also in other Member States o f the 
Council o f  Europe."
. . . A  politician who expresses himself in such terms exposes himself to a strong 
reaction on the part o f  journalists and the public".
This argument was one of the basis for the conclusion that
"...the interference with M r Oberschlick's exercise o f his freedom o f expression 
was not "necessary in a democratic society... fo r  the protection o f  the reputation... 
o f others".
There has, accordingly, been a violation o f  Article ¡O of the Convention".
The European Parliam ent as a democratic body (case Castels v Spain). There are many 
examples of references to activities o f other European systems and international systems, in the 
form of a fortiori argumentation.
The question in Castels case concerned a withdrawal of parliamentary immunity
1134 Referred to by the C ourts in Muller and others v. Switzerland, A /133 (1991) EHRR 212, and also, Handyside 
v United Kingdom (A /24) 1 EHHR 737, and the Sunday times v United Kingdom (N o .l)A /3 0 ,2 EHRR 245.
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from one member of the Spanish parliament by the Parliament, because he had written an article 
to press, which contained accusations against the government.1335 This resulted in a criminal 
prosecution and a suspended prison sentence.
A member of the Commission of the European system of Human Rights claimed in 
his dissenting opinion* 1536 *:
"I think that the measure with which we are concerned comes within the margin o f  
appreciation granted to States by the Convention. In addition, this measure does 
not prove to be contrary to what is necessary in a democratic society. The 
European parliament. which embodies 12 well established democracies, withdrew 
his immunity o f one o f the members fo r  having expressed his views in less dan- 
gerous terms and circumstances. "
The European Court of Justice and constitutional traditions, international treaties, 
analysis of case law in the United States (concurring opinions) (Case Observer). In
Observer1537 case the question concerned the legitimacy of the action by the British Court in 
imposing interlocutory injunctions. The applicants, two newspapers, claimed that these 
restrictions upon publishing articles concerning the book "spycatcher" (which included according 
to  the government, confidential information) contravened the freedom of expression.
A member of the European Court of Human Rights1538 1539referred to the decision of 
the European Court of Justice1339, which had held that
"as regards Article JO o f  the European Convention o f  Human Rights...its should 
be noted in the first place that, as the Court has consistently held, fundamental 
rights form  an integral part o f  the general principles o f  law, the observance o f  
which it ensures. In so doing, the Court draws inspiration from constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States and from indications provided bv the 
international treaties for the protection o f  human rivhts on which the Member 
States have collaborated or o f which they are signatories1540. In this connection 
the European Convention o f Human Rights is o f  particular significance. It follows 
that, as the Court affirmed in the judgment o f  13 July 1989, Wachauf measures 
incompatible with the respect fo r  the human rights their in recognized and secured 
are not permissible in the CommunityH.
This member of the Court explicitly referred to another international system (the 
European Community and European Court of Justice), which refers, on the other hand, to the
,SM A/236 (1992) EHRR 445.
1536 Mr. M artinez, L.F.
1337 Observer and the Guardian v United Kingdom, A/216 (1991) EHRR 15 0 ,2 6  November, 1991.
,Î3Ï Mr. Petiti*
1539 Case 260/89 Elliniki (1991) E C R 1-2925 (18 June 1991).
1540 Expressed also in the case 4/73 Nold v EC Commission (1974) ECR 491.
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European human rights system itself and the effect of international conventions in general, and, 
furthermore, to the constitutional traditions of the Member States of the European Economic 
Community. The argument clearly attempted to establish coherence among all these systems.
This was one of the methods by which the member, unlike the Court, concluded 
that there had in fact been a violation o f Article 10 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights.
In the same case, a member o f the Court1541, in his dissenting opinion, referred to
the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States:
7  firmly believe that "the press must be left free to publish news, what the source, 
without censorship, injunctions, prior restraint”. In a free and democratic society 
there can be no room, in times o f peace, fo r  restrictions o f that kind, and 
particularly not i f  these are resorted to, as they were in the present case, fo r  
'governmental suppression o f  embarrassing information or ideas. (Judges Black. 
J.. Douglas. J.. In the case about the Pentagon papers. New York Times v US and 
US v Washington Post. 403 US 713 (¡971V
On this basis this member (and the joining members) came to the conclusion, 
contrary to the opinion of the Court, that there had been a violation o f Article 10 of the 
Convention during the whole period, not only during a part of the period.
In the same way, another member of the Court1542 justified his dissenting opinion 
with reference to an extensive study of US law:
"The United States case law cited bv Article 19. the International Centre against 
Censorship has consistently held that the principal purpose o f  the First 
amendment's guarantee is to prevent prior restraints. With regard to the national 
security aim the US supreme court declared in Near v Minnesota (285 US 718) 
that: "The fact fo r  approximately ISO years there has been almost an entire 
absence o f attempts to impose previous restraints upon publications relating to the 
malfeasance of public officers is significant and deep-seated conviction that such 
restraints would violate constitutional right.'
The other leading decisions o f  that Court, such as those in NEW  YORK TIMES 
CO. LIMITED V. US (403 US 713 [1971]), LANDMARK COMMUNICATIONS 
INC. V. VIRGINIA (425 US 829 [1978]), NEBRASKA ASSOCIATION V. STUART 
(427 US 593 [1976]) and US v. THE PROGRESSIVE (486 F. Supp. 990 [1979]) 
have consistently required that very strict conditions ('all but totally absolute') 
must be satisfied before prior restraints can be imposed on the publication o f  
information on matters related to national security. In the words o f the 
NEBRASCA judgment, 'the thread running through all these cases is that prior 
restraints on speech or publication are the most serious and least tolerable 
infringement on the First Amendment rights. ... A prior restraint, by contrast and 
by definition, has an immediate and irreversible sanction. I f  it can be said that a 
threat o f  criminal or civil sanctions after publication "chills" speech, prior
1541 Mr de Meyer, joined by Pettiti, Russo, Foighel, Bigi.
1542 Mr. Morenilla.
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restraints "freeze" it, at least fo r  a time. ' Brennan J., concurring with the judg­
ment. stated 'although variously expressed it was evident that even the exception 
was to be construed very, very narrowly: when disclosure "will surely result in 
direct, immediate and irreparable damage to our nation or its people". '
G eneral tendencies and developments; similarities w ith legislations of the  past (case 
Colman). In the case of Colman v United Kingdom1543 the question concerned the restrictions 
upon a medical professional’s advertising by the General Medical Council, and the acceptance by 
the Court of the restriction.
In finding no violation of Article 10, the Commission referred to comparative law 
development, and to general remarks made by the Court o f Appeal in its judgment of which the 
complaint concerned:
"The Commission has regard to the particular fa c ts  o f  the present case: the 
applicant was seeking to attract patients. His concern was therefore one o f  
advertisement of his professional activity, a clearly commercial matter. There was 
not a blanket restriction on doctors' advertising at the material time. He was 
affected only by the prohibition on advertising in newspapers. From 1987 the 
matter was under actual review by the Government, the MMC and subsequently 
the GMCAs the Court o f Appeal observed in this case, the question o f advertising 
in the liberal professions has undergone significant developments recently: Only 
a few years ago any form  o f advertising, even If only informative in content, would 
have been unthinkable. Today it is widely accepted, although still subject to some 
restrictions. Moreover, at the material time, other Hi ah Contracting Parties to the 
Convention maintained similar restrictions over such advertising.
In the light o f these considerations, and having regard to the duties and 
responsibilities attaching to the freedoms guaranteed by Article 10 o f  the 
Convention, the Commission finds that it cannot be said that the advertising 
policy o f  the GMC went beyond the margin o f  appreciation left to national 
authorities. "
T he use of individual state system as an argum ent by an  applicant (Case Chorherr). In the
case of Chorherr v Austria1543 544 the question which arose concerned the fact that the applicant had 
been arrested, placed under police custody, and called to  administrative criminal proceedings 
after he had demonstrated against the purchase of fighter aircrafts by the respondent state during 
a military ceremony. He had not ceased the demonstration after a request to do so.
The Court found that there was breach neither o f Article 10 and Article 5.
Context of justification. In his reasoning, the applicant referred to the practice o f the German 
Constitutional Court to support the idea that the arrest contravened his rights under Article 10
1543 A/258-D (1994) EHRR 119,28 June 1993.
1544 A/266-B (1994) EHRR 358 (25 August 1993).
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of the Convention:
"[The applicant refers] to a judgment o f  the German Federal Administrative 
Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) o f  January 1990 (Entscheidungen des 
Bundeswervaltungsgerichts, Vol. 84, p.297) in which the Federal Administrative 
Court found that a plaintiff who distributed leaflets and held up posters should not 
have been refused access to the Rathausmarkt in Lübeck where a military 
ceremony was taking place. The Court considered that i f  the Army uses a public 
place to obtain maximum publicity fo r  itself it must accept that critics o f  the army 
use the event as an opportunity to express their criticism. "
The Commission did not deal, as such, with the argument put forward by the 
applicant. However, it found that there had been a disproportionate involvement by the 
authorities, and that there had been a violation of Article 10 o f the Convention not based on 
'necessity in a democratic society'.
S im ilar factual situations, differences in laws, no genuine European model, com parable 
experiences, rejection of generality (case Informationsverein Lentìa). In the case of
Informationsverein Lentia vAustria1545 the applicant had been refused broadcasting licences, by 
the competent national authorities for the establishment of radio and television stations. This 
refusal was based on monopolistic legislation. The Court found a violation of Article 10.
Context o f justification. The government had attempted to argue that a monopoly is not, as 
such, incompatible with Article 10. This interpretation was based on the "comparative fact” that 
at the time o f the drafting of the Convention, monopolies were allowed in most of the states. 
Even if the development had been, since then, towards liberalization, no general European 
standard existed.
The Commission declared, in its opinion, that there had been an interference with 
the applicant’s rights. The Commission referred to the Groppera case and the "comparative" 
observations presented therein. It maintained that monopolies still existed in many states. 
However, according to the Commission, the real question was not the permissibility o f the system 
of monopolies, but rather the existing system of licencing. Because Austria had no functioning 
system of licencing, it infringed Article 10 o f the Convention.
However, the question arose whether the state had legitimately infringed the right. 
The Commission made some comparative observations in order to reject the "economic 
difficulties" argument put forward by the Government, by which the government attempted to 
maintain the 'necessity' nature of the restriction:
"The Government has also referred to possible economic difficulties and the
1545 A/276 (1994) EH R R  93, 24 November 1993.
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emergence o f new monopolies. In this respect the Commission is aware o f  the 
different solutions adopted in Convention States with regard to broadcasting in 
general. These solutions include systems whereby private broadcasting licences 
are granted within a system o f public broadcasting, for instance bv limiting them 
to special times. The possibility to obtain licences may also vary as to local, 
regional or nationwide broadcasting The Commission cannot therefore assume 
that private broadcasting would necessarily bring about the difficulties indicated 
by the Government. "
In his dissenting opinion, and although agreeing with the conclusion regarding 
breach of the Convention, one of the members of the Commission1546 explained the change in the 
Commission doctrine. In the present case the Commission, more or less, established a re­
quirement of licencing system contrary to its former opinions:
"That [earlier} view was based in part on the fa c t that systems o f monopolies then 
existed in most Member States. It is true that there has since then been a great in- 
crease in the access o f individuals and organisation in particular o f  commercial 
enterprises to broadcasting facilities this has been achieved in various ways. A 
licensing o f private broadcasters is one. Another is the making o f  contractual 
arrangements for the sake o f  air time to programme makers, who recoup the cost 
by in turn selling space to advertisers Yet another is by conferring a right o f  reply. 
Though this is so. the situation remains that in some states and in some regions, 
monopolies still exist.
The Convention must be applied a pains t the background o f existing conditions. 
but it does not seem to me that the time has yet arrived when it can be held that 
the right to freedom o f expression given by Article 10 requires Member States to 
provide a system under which individuals and organisations can apply fo r  
permission to establish broadcasting stations, or that an individual or body can 
claim that there has been a violation of Article 10 because such a system has not 
been introduced."
This partly dissenting opinion gives an interesting glimpse at the evolution of system 
o f the European Human Rights and its relation to the use o f the comparative method1547.
Justification. The Court referred in its reasoning to the Government's argument, however, not 
being persuaded by it, it made its own comparative observations in maintaining that a breach of 
Article 10 had occurred:
"In opting to keep the present system, the State had in any case merely acted 
within its margin o f  appreciation, which had remained unchanged since the 
adoption o f the Convention; very few o f the Contracting States had different 
systems at the time. In view o f  the diversity o f the structures which now exist in 
their field , it could not seriously be maintained that a genuine European model
1546 Mr. Hall.
,M7 See also case Marckx v Belgium (1979-80)EH RR 2:330. (W ildhaber, Mahoney/Prebensen).
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had come into being in the meantime....
The Court is not persuaded by the Government's argument. Their assertions are 
contradicted by the experience o f several European States o f a comparable size to 
Austria in which the coexistence o f private and public stations, according to rules 
which vary from country to country and accompanied by measures preventing the 
development o f private monopolies, shows the fears expressed to be groundless. "
Similar laws, international measures, liberal and general tendencies a t the international 
level, disparity of rules in states in relation to cultural tradition , The Council o f Europe as 
tertium com parationis (case Casado Coca). In the case o f Casado Coca,54H the Court did not 
find a violation of the freedom of expression. In this case, a lawyer had been advertising his legal 
practice in local newspapers. This had resulted in warnings and notices to him from the 
competent local authorities. His complaints concerning these warnings and notices had been 
unsuccessful at all stages of the legal procedure. The complexity of the case inspired the parties 
to make comparative observations on many levels.
Context of justification. The government party to the dispute relied directly upon comparative 
observations in order to justify the ’necessity' o f  its action in the context of a 'democratic society':
"The Government observes that many o f  the States party to the Convention have 
restrictions on advertising by lawyers similar to those which in Spain led to the 
imposition o f a penalty on the applicant. Moreover, the Deontological Code o f the 
lawyers o f  the European Community adopted on 28 October 1988 in Strasbourg 
by the representatives o f  the 12 Bar Councils o f the European Community and the 
Conference o f European Bar Councils held on 24 May 1991 in Crakow 
maintained the principle o f  prohibiting advertising while introducing more 
flexible rules concerning lawyers' freedom to express themselves in the media to 
make a name for themselves and to participate in public debate. In line with this 
more liberal tendency, the Regional Council o f the Catalonia Bar adopted new 
rules on the question leaving only certain forms o f publicity still prohibited, 
including classified advertisements in the press, advertising on radio and televi­
sion. etc. ”
The Commission itself did not take a standpoint regarding these comparative 
arguments, but maintained that the restrictions were not necessary in a democratic society, and 
that the infringement o f Article 10 had taken place.
In their dissenting opinion, three members of the Commission* 1549 found no violation. 
They referred comparatively to the fact that "m many o f the Contracting states special
1M> A/285 ( 1994) EHRR 1 ,24  February 1994.
,M9 Mr. Danelius, M r Frowein, and Mrs Liddy.
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restrictions have often been applied to the liberal professions, such as the legal profession 
This is why there should be a "wide margin of appreciation" applied. The same idea was 
expressed by five other members1530 who also found that no violation had occuncd. They added 
that these practices were made "with the aim of protecting both lawyers who do not have 
sufficient means to use such methods and the public as a whole".
Justification. The Court looked into, and even accepted, the comparative argumentation made 
by the Government in finding that no violation of Article 10 had occurred:
"... Nevertheless, the rules governing the profession, particularly in the sphere o f 
advertising, vary from one country to another accord in g to cultural tradition. 
Moreover, in most o f the States parties to the Convention, including Spain, there 
has fo r  some time been a tendency to relax rules as a result of the changes in their 
respective societies and in particular the growing role of the media in them. The 
Government cited the examples of the Code of Conduct for Lawyers' in the 
European Community [Strasbourg, 28 October 1988J and the conclusions o f the 
Conference of the European Bars [Cracow, 24 May 1991}; while upholding the 
principle o f banning advertising, these documents authorise members o f the Bar 
to express their views to the media, to make themselves know  and to take part in 
public debate. In accordance with these guidelines, the new rules on advertising 
issued by the Council of the Catalonia Bars allow the publication o f circulars or 
articles, including in the press. More recently, the Government have begun to 
study the draft o f the new Statute of the Spanish Bar, which permits somewhat 
greater freedom in this sphere.
The wide ranse o f regulations and the different rates o f change in the Council o f  
Europe*s Member States indicate the complexity o f the issue. Because o f  their 
direct, continuous contact with their members, the Bar authorities and the 
country’s courts are in a better position than an international court to determine 
how, at a given time, the right balance can be struck between the various interests 
involved, namely the requirements of the proper administration o f justice, the 
dignity o f the profession, the right of everyone to receive information about legal 
assistance and affording members of the Bar the possibility of advertising their 
practices. ”
It is interesting, how the Court fell in with the comparative argumentation produced 
by the Government. On this basis, the Court developed a new doctrine of a margin o f 
appreciation of the Bar authorities. The doctrine of the margin of appreciation was no longer the 
doctrine to be applied only to autonomous national authorities such as courts, but, for that matter 
the lawyers* association as well, and perhaps also other autonomous associations. 150
1550 Mr. Geus, Mr. Jorundson, Mr, Soyer, Mr. Hall, and Mr Baxter.
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General societal experience, general trends a t the national and  international levels, other 
international measures and their travaux préparatoires (case Jersild). In the case of Jersild 
v Denmark/551, the question concerned decisions of Danish courts maintaining restrictions against 
the screening of a television program containing racist remarks. Both the Commission and the 
Court found a violation of freedom o f expression.
Context of justification. The Government argued that there had been no infringement on the 
basis of comparative observations:
"The Government submits in particular that present-day actions against racist 
activities are based on the international community's bitter experience o f  the dire' 
consequences o f such acts which have led to great suffering. This phenomenon is 
not only something which belongs to the past but is a reality o f  today as recent 
trends in various European countries show. This had led to the adoption o f  
declarations within the United Nations and the European Communities against 
racism as well as motions in the Danish Parliament condemning all form s o f  
discrimination. The Government agree that it is desirable to give the media as free  
conditions as possible in order to enable them to report on what is happening in 
society, but this is not tantamount to giving them a free  rein."
In looking over the necessity o f the sentencing of the applicant, the Commission, 
on the other hand, took into account other international convention, which the Government had 
ratified and which it had referred:
"When examining the necessity o f  convicting the applicant fo r  having aided and 
abetted the dissemination o f racist remarks the Commission cannot confine itself 
to considering those remarks alone. As they were not made by the applicant 
himself, there is a particular need to look at these remarks in the light o f the 
context o f  the programme and all the circumstances o f  the case. In this respect the 
Commission has taken into consideration that the Government have ratified the 
International Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Racial 
Discrimination of 1965 whereby they are obliged to "condemn racial 
discrimination and undertake to pursue bv all appropriate means and without 
delay a policy o f eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting 
understanding among all races. ... Nevertheless, although the television 
programme affected the reputation or rights o f others due to its discriminatory 
contents, a fa ir  balance between their rights and the applicant's right to impart 
information must be struck. The limits o f  what can be accepted may vary 
depending on the circumstances o f  the case. "
After analysing the relationship between the proportionality of the measures 
compared to the legitimate aim, the Commission found that they were not ’necessary in a 
democratic society', and concluded that there had been a violation o f Article 10. 51
I5S1 A/298 (1995) EHRR 1.23  September 1994.
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In their dissenting opinion, four of the members1352 stressed comparative 
developments in Europe, analysed the contents of the measures subsequently adopted and 
focussed on developments in relation to other international measures including the European 
Convention:
"There can hardly be much disagreement about the seriousness o f  the threat o f 
racial persecution in Europe. Racially motivated violence poses a constant threat 
to the lives and security o f many groups o f  people in the European countries. At 
an international level. States have found it necessary to act against this threat by 
inter alia introducing the United Nations Convention o f 21 December 1965 on the 
Elimination o f A ll Forms o f Racial Discrimination. In Article 4(a) o f  this 
Convention the States Parties have undertaken to "declare as an offence 
punishable by law all dissemination o f ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, 
incitement to racial discrimination ... against any race or group o f persons o f  
another colour or ethnic origin ...". The Convention was ratified bv Denmark on 
8 September 1971.
They continued with the drafting history of the international measures and the 
European Convention:
"It is interesting to note, that durine the drafting o f this Convention the 
relationship between Article 4 and the fundamental right o f freedom o f speech was 
discussed at length. The opening paragraph o f Article 4 provides that the 
measures the State Parties have to adopt must always have due regard to the 
principles embodied in the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights. This so-called 
"due regard" clause was introduced by the Third Committee in order to meet 
objections o f those who maintained that Article 4 would violate the principles o f 
freedom o f  speech and freedom of association. It was interpreted as giving State 
Parties the right to understand Article 4 as imposing no obligation on any party 
to take measures which were not fully consistent with their constitutional 
guarantees o f freedom, including freedom o f speech and association.
In examining the conflicting interests of freedom o f speech and the security of 
special groups of people, they referred again to other international measures:
"These conflicting interests were first considered during the drafting o f  the 
Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Racial Discrimination and again 
during the preparation o f  Bill introducing the amendment o f the Danish Penal 
Code and later when it was dealt with by the Danish Parliament. "
Furthermore, in the course of the argument of the Danish Courts, where it 
discussed the lack of the balancing statements in the film, the members compared the situation to 
that which prevails under another pertinent international measure:
"This is very much in line with the interpretation indicated in the preparatory 
work o f the Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Racial Discrimination 153
1553 Mr. Gaukur, Jörundsson, Sir Hall, and Geus.
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and o f  the following amendment o f the Danish Penal Code which clearly were not 
intended to restrict scientific or otherwise serious discussion o f problems o f public 
concern."
The comparative development in Europe was ultimately taken, in the end of the 
reasoning, as an argument against the interpretation that the applicants would have been sole 
reasons for anyone experiencing racist actions:
"The assumption that the sole effect o f the programme was to ridicule the persons 
behind the propaganda appears as purely theoretical The fa c t that racism and 
xenophobia are wide-spread in important sections o f the European population 
shows on the contrary that addresses o f  a clearly primitive character may be 
experienced as convincing, despite the lessons o f  the past."
Another member1553 stressed the importance o f the obligation of the state to take
measures:
"Article 4 o f the International Convention on the Elimination o f A ll Denmark 
Forms o f Racial Discrimination, adopted by the General Assembly o f  the United 
Nations on 21 December 1965, makes it obligatory for States party to "declare as 
an offence punishable by law all dissemination o f ideas based on racial 
superiority or hatred". A t international level therefore, there has been for de­
cades a perceived need to provide a grave sanction against dissemination o f racist 
comments, whatever the motivation o f their proponents. The wisdom and  
experience o f the drafters and adopters o f that Convention deserve respect."
However, she came to the conclusion that there had been no violation of Article 10, 
because the act o f the state was proportionate to the aim pursued and it answered a pressing need 
in a democratic society.
In their dissenting opinions four judges1554, on the other hand, considered the value 
of the international convention in the interpretation o f the European Convention in a different 
sense:
"The International Convention on the Elimination o f A ll Forms o f  Racial 
Discrimination probably does not require the punishment o f  journalists 
responsible fo r  a television spot o f this kinds. On the other hand, it supports the 
opinion that the media too can be obliged to take a clear stand in the area o f  
racial discrimination and hatred."
Furthermore, two o f  the judges1555 came to the same conclusion by specifying the 
role of the international convention in relation to the interpretation (independent from the
,M3 Mrs. Liddy.
1554 M r Ryssdal, Bernhardt, Spielman, and Loizou,
,Si5 Mr. GoIcUklii, Russo, Valticos.
national implementation laws):
"... in particular the 1965 Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f  Racial 
Discrimination. That Convention manifestly cannot be ignored when the European 
Convention is being implemented. It is, moreover, binding on Denmark. It must 
also guide the European Court o f Human Rights in its decisions, in particular as 
regards the scope it confers on the terms o f  the European Convention and on the 
exceptions which the Convention lays down in general terms. "
Both groups of judges came to the conclusion that there had not been a violation
of Article 10.
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Justification. The Court remarked upon the applicants* and the Commission's comparative 
reference. Furthermore, it took a standpoint upon the use of these “comparative” analyses, when 
examining the importance of the question of racial discrimination and of acting in “good faith”:
" . . .  Nevertheless, the issue was already then o f  general importance, as is 
illustrated fo r  instance by the fact that the UN Convention dates from 1965. 
Consequently, the object and purpose pursued b \ the UN Convention are o f  great 
weight in determining whether the applicants conviction, which, as the 
Government have stressed, was based on a provision enacted in order to ensure 
Denmark's compliance with the UN Convention, was "necessary" within the 
meaning o f Article 10(2).
In the second place, Denmark's obligations under Article 10 must be interpreted.
, to the extent possible. so as to be reconcilable with its obligations under the UN 
Convention1556. In this respect it is not fo r  the Court to interpret the "due regard" 
clause in Article 4 o f  the UN Convention, which is open to various constructions. 
The Court is however o f  the opinion that its interpretation o f Article 10 o f the 
European Convention in the present case is compatible with Denmark's 
obligations under the UN Convention."
Furthermore, it maintained, in general, that
"Bearing in mind the obligations on States under the UN Convention and other 
international instruments to take effective measures to eliminate all form s o f 
racial discrimination and to prevent and combat racist doctrines and practices, an 
important factor in the Court's evaluation will be whether the item in question, 
when considered as a whole, appeared from an objective point o f view to have had 
as its purpose the propagation o f racist views and ideas."
On this basis, the Court came to the conclusion that there had been a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention. 1356
1356 This is clearly an interpretation of national law  in relation to international law. The phenomenon could be called 
an interpretation of internationalized national law (the interpretation o f  national law  is not allowed, but it can be done, 
when the national law is internationalized).
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3.2.4. Conclusions on the European System of Human rights
Cases law... In the light of the case studies* one can make several observations.
Firstly, the following types o f  arguments related to comparative arguments in the 
work of the European System of Human Rights can be recognized:
- arguments pertaining the general discourse on human rights
- general societal experience.
- general principles
- more general conventions
- as illustrations
- conventions’ travaux préparatoires and context
- tendencies in treaty law
- participation in conventions (in general and in particular)
- comparable experiences
- constitutional comparisons
- tendencies in legislation
- generalities in legislations (or in example systems)
- at the time of the examined act or in the past or in general
- at the time when the act is examined
- general systems
- general norms
- the system of the party to the dispute1557
- case law in general or in a particularly influential country
- comparative studies made by scholars
- comparative studies made by the state
- American case law and scholars
- scientific discussion
- traditions, societal experience, tendencies
- socio-phenomenological observations
- morality and functionality (national judge in better place -argument)
One could claim that the comparative reasoning in the European system o f human 
rights seems to be, in general, an extremely value-based and rather open form of reasoning. The 
main form seems to be the legislative tendency and traditional legislative comparison, and 
observations upon the socio-political discourse. However, the United States case law seems to 
be valuable in problematic cases. It is usually looked into quite thoroughly. However, the 
existence of formal comparative observations does not necessarily indicate that an systematic 
study had been undertaken.
When the United States system is viewed analytically, it seems to support more 
progressive interpretations.
On the other hand, comparative observations do not seem to function as a context
1537 For a  very good illustration of this type o f analytical approach by the C ourt in case Delcourt, see van der 
Meersch, W .J.G., 1980, pp.325-327.
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for any change. On the contrary. Comparative arguments usually support quite conservative 
solutions. However, occasionally, when the comparative generalities seem to “change” (develop, 
i.e. the system become more alike), also the doctrine o f the European institution changes 
(interpretation by “background o f existing conditions”, “stages o f  developm ent155*), at least 
some opinions in the Court and Commission.
Moreover, the degree in the comparative generality seems to be related to the 
degree in the “margin of appreciation” (“wide margin o f  appreciation”, "margin o f  
appreciation”). On the other hand, the extreme divergencies (“m ora/”) usually result in an 
argument “the national judge is in better situation to decide”. In other words, the generality is 
usually the main argument used, though the qualitative generality plays some role. If there are 
differences, and these differences can be accepted, the outcome is that of "no common concept 
in Europe" and the “margin of appreciation”.
The justification of a legal particularity due to economic necessity, related to the 
'margin of appreciation’ or to ’necessity in democratic society', has been breached by introducing 
legal disparity argument combined with argument by similar economic situation with differences 
in methods o f legislating.1559
It seems also that comparative reasoning may be used for and against a particular 
interpretation. In these types of cases, there are differences in the choices of countries (even
,5S* On this latter point, see van der M eersch, W .J.G., 1980, p .3 19.
ISM Some analysis o f the margin o f appreciation, sec van der M eersch, W .J.G ., 1980, pp.330-331. On possible 
changes in this respect (toward a more universalistic approach) via institutional changes and the obligatory nature of 
the jurisdiction, see M artens, K.S., 1998, p.10.
Brem s, E . (1996, p.240 ff.) has analysed well the com m on elem ents and patterns o f the margin of 
appreciation in Court’s case law. She has isolated nine factors relevant for the doctrines application (her table of 
contents):
1. T he ground of limitation (2. Para o f Articles 8-11), a. The protection of m orals/ b . Maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary/ c. National security/ d. The rights and freedoms o f o thers/ e. The prevention of disorder or 
crim e/ f. The economic well-being o f the country, 2.. Importance o f  the rights: a. Freedom o f expression/ b. 
Privatelife/home/ c. Right to fair trial/ d. Freedom o f religion, 3. Field o f policy: a. Special regime (military, prison)/ b. 
National authorities better placed to assess the situation (detention, children in care, change of surname, deprivation of 
p roperty )/ c. Important national policy (cities, alcohol, housing, agriculture, environment, tax, competition), 4. 
Consensus among the member states: a. Framers’ intent/ b. Measuring the proportionality of an interference/ c. Defining 
th e  scope of rights/ d. Consensus and evolution/ e. Isolated position based on moral standards/ f. E xtended  o r 
restric ted  com parison/ g. Evaluation, 5. The reference to other conventions: a. B roader than the Council of Europe/
b . O nly (part of) the m ember states of the Council of Europe, 6. Internal uncertainty of the norm or practice, 7. The 
substance or essence of right (criterion), 8. Particular local situation, 9 . The exceptional character of the situation
She finds some reasons for the doctrine (ibid., p.293 ff.) in 1. E lem ents related to the judicial function 
in general: a. The problem o f the interpretation of vague and general notions/ b. T he limited control o f  policy decisions/
c . T he  issue o f judicial restraint, and 2. The particular position of the Court: a. N ational sovereignty v international 
hum an rights protection (The European Convention in international human rights law )/ b. The European system is 
derivate from and subsidiary to the national system/ c. Elements o f  interpretation in the supranational context 
(autonomous and evolutive interpretation)/ d. Cultural relativism of human rights (generally and cultural differences 
among the contracting states of the European Convention.
We may say that the margin o f appreciation is an extremely effective way of avoiding inter-European
criticism.
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absolutely contrary examples have been used), or a comparison may even be rejected by changing 
the object o f comparison.
The Court seems to rely also on previous comparisons in its case law. Furthermore, 
cooperation between different institutional actors (the Commission, Court, and governments) in 
the matter of comparative studies is visible. However, as we have noted, explicit comparative 
analysis rarely takes place in the Court's justification. And if it does, the reference is highly 
synthetic.1560
Compared, for example, to the European Court o f Justice, the comparative 
discourse in the European Court o f Human Rights is much more pluralistic. It demonstrates1561 
how many different types of comparative interpretations it is possible with regard to the same 
subject matter. This brings some kind of clarity also to the substantive issue discussed, and seems 
to lead to an discursive type of evolution within the case law. However, it has also been claimed 
that the role of comparative law in the work of the Court is systematically less important in the 
work of this Court.
“International comparison” (comparison of international measures) is often made 
as well. A special feature, related to this, can be noted. It looks as if the relationship between 
Human Rights Convention and other international instruments relates to the extension of legal 
sources in interpretation. E contrario argumentation by another international measure has 
supported the inclusion of the travaux préparatoires within the practical legal sources of the 
European human rights system.
From the normative point o f view, one can make following conclusions.
As mentioned, it seems that comparative observations function, in general, quite 
conservatively. Both disparity and generality support usually the existing case law and the 
existing stage of legal development in national systems. The only arguments are breaking this 
feature are the arguments by “European supervision”, some kinds of generality in more liberal 
attitudes, or a liberal tendencies. Furthermore, the balancing of general and individual interests 
may also support a progressive interpretation of human rights. Moreover, observations 
concerning the nonexistence of comparable law , or an observation on some kind of general 
sociological tendency also seem to have less conservative effect.
... Interviews. On the basis of the interviews one can make following remarks.
Basically, the material for the comparative studies may be found in the institutions*
archives.
The legal basis for in depth consultation of comparative material could be found in
lS6° Also, van derMeersch, W.J.G., 1980, p p .3 21 -323 . 
,561 Van derMeersch, W.J.G., 1980, p .3 2 1 .
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the rules 7:3 and 54:3 of the General Rules of Procedure of the system. The obligation to 
explicitly state reasons can be based on the Convention ("judgments shall be pronounced 
publicly").
Usually systematic comparisons are not made, because if the case is in accordance 
with the “pattern” of the Courts case law, it is resolved on this basis. This means, basically, that 
where there are some differences in European practices, or there is no old case law, comparative 
studies are made.
External experts are not really used in this system. Sometimes statements have been 
requested from the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), and 
observations have been made concerning reports of some non-governmental organizations such 
as Amnesty International. They have given sociological and political perspectives to the systems 
studied.
The use of comparative law in the European Commission of Human Rights seems 
to depend on the nature of the case. The basic idea seems to be the finding of the common 
European standard. If there have been similar types of cases, the comparative material may be 
already there. However, in these types of situations the information may be checked again. In a 
“new” case, comparison is usually made.
Comparative observations can arise likewise in a very informal way in the internal 
workings of the Commission (internal consulting). This is connected to the information deriving 
directly from the people in the administration. In some difficult cases, the secretary and the 
members of the Commission can discuss comparative aspects. There is a possibility to make more 
thorough studies.
The comparative aspects referred to in the assembly meetings also arise 
spontaneously and in fragmentary form as members seek to  explain certain characteristics o f a 
system. This is often based on the personal knowledge o f the member.1562
If some studies are made, these are included in the report of the rapporteur, which 
makes it in collaboration with the secretary1563. This is basically confidential material. No official 
reports are published on these studies, unless there is a separate reporting system established. 
However, these latter types of studies are not connected to any particular case in question. They 
are provided by the Legal department of the Council of Europe. They are used mainly to prepare 
recommendations and so on. There is a separate research Unit in the General Secretary. 
Extensive comparative studies by the Secretary have been made only couple of times during 90's.
The rapporteurs and members of the Commission do not usually undertake 
systematic studies themselves. However, sometimes they have made such studies individually. In
1362 See in tis respect, van der Meersch, WJ.G., 1980, p.318.
1563 The rapporteur is one member of the Committee. Linguistic abilities often determine the choice of the rapporteur. 
T he level of cooperation between the secretary and the members varies.
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the discussions in the Commission there might be comparative aspects taken up based on the 
information provided by each member.
The comparative information seems to be restricted to legislation and case law. The 
comparisons are not politically or sociologically oriented. The idea is to find the general legal 
situation in various states. Other information, such as that concerning the circumstances which 
prevail in the country, may be included, especially with regard to difficult case. This, it was 
mentioned, has been the case, for example, in questions dealing with the protection o f private 
property.
The comparative information is usually related to the countries of the Council of 
Europe, but there have been cases, where, for example, aspects of Chinese law have been 
observed. European Community law is not directly consulted, though states may often use it in 
the course o f reasoning.
Basically, there is no rule as to the extension o f the study. The real constraint seems 
to be that of time and resources.1564
It was claimed that parties very rarely present comparative observations in their 
preliminary arguments. There can be references to Courts cases, where comparative information 
is mentioned. However, independent studies are not usually presented. Occasionally, states 
present such studies, claiming mainly the generality of their system.
One could claim that the comparative studies, presented in dissenting opinions, are 
also part of the internal discourse of the Commission and the Court, and that comparative aspects 
have an important role in these internal discussions. On the other hand, the fact that the 
comparative observations are made in dissenting opinions is due to the fact that a member o f a 
Committee is more free to express his opinion1565. The main opinion is usually a compromise, and 
the decisions follow a particular form. It is difficult to produce common comparative statements 
and conclusions.
Sometimes, even if the comparative study is made or comparative material 
discussed, it is not reflected in the justifications1566. It was maintained that sometimes they are re­
vealed, especially when very new interpretations are involved1567. The reasons for the absence of 
comparative analysis in the justifications may be found in the general comparative nature of the 
system. Even if the comparative observations are there always as a background element, they are 
not seen the central to the justification.
As to the use of comparative observations in the justifications there seem to be no 
principled obstacles. The main reasons for the lack of open justification seems to be in the lack
1364 Usually the case is dealt within 4-5 years. T here is a priority system. 11 months is usually the minimum delay.
1565 This seems to apply also to the Court.
1566 eg. Criminal processes against a juvenile, A rticle 6, comparative study m ade, but not reflected in the decision.
1167 Mentioned, case on the negative right to unite, the Article 1.
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of time and in work pressures. Even if extensive studies in depth might be interesting and 
illuminating, there are no resources available to make them. On the other hand, parties could 
produce such a form, if they see in it a possibility for a convincing.
It seems that comparative perspective is necessary. This information reveals the 
practices of the systems, and changes in societies. This way one can achieve a certain "objective' 
standpoint with respect to the changes. Difficult cases are often resolved taking into account 
comparative aspects1568. However, it seems to be difficult for the person working in the system 
to say how the comparative studies determine the results o f the case.
It seems that the Committee's main task is to address arguments to the parties, and 
consequently, states are the audience of the decision. The formulation of the decisions seems to 
be based on consistency. The principles o f interpretation in general derive from the Vienna 
Convention.
It must be also mentioned that there is a possibility for "intervening" (Article 37 of 
the Working procedures). Furthermore, the Secretary of the Council of Europe can request re­
ports from the Parties to the Convention on the situation in their legislation1569.
The Court, on the other hand, seems to follow social and legal development in 
Europe. Comparative research ought to be undertaken but the resources are not available for this 
scale of analysis. The comparative reasoning in the Court seems to be often based on the 
members’ personal knowledge on the legal system, usually with respect to his own system, apart 
from the information provided by the parties and the Committee and its Secretary.1570
It was maintained that comparative aspects come into play when there seems to be 
a need to change the previous case law. This takes place in very rare cases due to the fact that 
case law is extensive and developments are slow1571. The members o f the Court have an occasion 
followed closely development in the United States. However, no systematic studies are produced 
on a continuous basis.
Other Treaties can also provide the context for a comparative study. Usually no 
external systems other than United States system are studied.
The comparative material concerning specific matter would be used if it existed. 
Indeed, some judges have been already expressed the need for comparative information1572.
The Court seems to argue mainly to the parties o f the case, whereas dissenting 
opinions seem to be directed more toward the general public. *1369702
1S6< Case on Article 10 (source of the newspaperman).
1369 Article 57 of the Convention.
1370 See also, van der Meersch, W.J.G., 1980, pp.321-323.
1371 Mentioning a case dealing with the problems o f transsexual persons.
1372 Pekkanen, R., On the evolutive interpretation of the European Human Rights Convention [Euroopan 
ihmisoikeussopimuksen evolutiivisesta tulkinnasta]. In: Lakimies, 1991, p.360.
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3.3. Some general conclusions
General rem arks. It can be observed that comparative studies made in relation to systematic 
preparatory work are strictly legal in all legal orderslS7\  No analysis of sociological or other 
material of this type was used in any of the courts. However, in the Italian Constitutional Court, 
the systematic studies seemed to be also connected to the contemporary political discussion of 
the issue. This was evidently also the case with regard to the “inspirational” consultation of other 
systems. This type of information on the context is based on the individual knowledge possessed 
by the person in the administration.
On the other hand, in national systems, the use o f comparative law information 
seems to be rare. Especially for the Italian and French * 1574 Supreme Courts, the idea of 
comparative studies seemed to be fairly alien.I575In contrast, in Nordic systems comparative law 
was used and studies occasionally made. In the English Appeal Courts the use o f comparative law 
is seen to be quite inspirational. However, due to the characteristics of the English system, the 
comparative observations are provided usually by the parties, and they are considered often 
explicitly by the judges. As mentioned, in the Italian Constitutional Court the study of 
comparative law was quite systematic, though the system was at the developing stage.
Furthermore, the use of comparative law does not seem to be strictly systematic, 
and it is not based on any generalizable characteristics. There seems to be no general "European" 
standard for the use of comparative observations in different national courts. It is highly 
dependant upon the discursive forms internal to each system. In regional organizations, especially 
in the European Court o f Justice, the use o f comparative law is more systematic than in national 
systems.
One can note that comparative information is consulted, where an 'international" or 
more general element is embedded within the case. In this sense, one could claim that national 
courts use comparative law in cases, where there is a practical or legal connection to the regional 
or international organizations. However, this is not necessarily so. The interpretative processes 
build into the regional systems, and the direct applicability o f the decision in these systems, 
seems, on a contrary, to reduce the use o f comparative law information, even if the claim was 
that the internationalization and integration o f law may increase the need for comparative law. 
This does not, however, seem to be the case in the English courts. They tend to compare both 
international and national solutions in the course of their argumentation.
1571 It has been claimed, in the context o f  Community law, that the studies in each case are very concrete (Pescatore, 
P., 1980, p.345).
1574 The Cour Constitutionel was not studied, but from  the information before the Italian constitutional court, one may 
assume that there is som e use of comparative observations also there.
1515 However, it must be noted that the extreme brevity of the justifications can give a misleading impression about 
the intemal considerations. No indications are found either in the French scholarship (See, Interpreting Statutes, 1991).
420
On the other hand, the fact that the use of comparative observations was quite ad 
hoc supports the argument that they are used in situations where there are certain fundamentally 
problematic issues at stake.
It is nearly impossible to make observations on the issue of the extent to which 
comparative material is used inspirationally in order to find arguments for internal or external 
justifications. Furthermore, the true extent of the use of the comparative law in internal 
discussions is also behind the scenes. However, many interviewed persons stressed the fact 
(likewise in the European systems) that those, who have personal experience and knowledge 
from their "external" work, use these comparative observations at times, both within internal 
discourse of the court and in "coffee-table" discussions. This use seems to be connected to their 
studies, visits to conferences, personal reading etc.1576
The fact that the comparative observations were strongly based on the personal 
endeavour of the individual actors is supports the idea that comparative observations are used as 
instruments to find arguments for different types of institutional discourses.
One key difference in terms of personal orientation was found between those judges 
who were professional researches and those who were not. The role o f comparative observations 
was thought of more frequently by the judges who are engaged with academic tasks and have an 
academic interest in the subject. Furthermore, those who worked on the preparatory stages o f the 
case had considered more carefully the role of comparative observations.
In certain systems there are tendencies to look toward certain systems. The judges 
in the major European countries are oriented towards other major European legal systems (eg. 
England toward France and Germany, Germany toward France etc.). The "minor" European legal 
systems do not seem to really appear as sources for the considerations. However, in some cases 
the observation depends on the substance of the matter.1577 This means that there is some a priori 
knowledge of the rules of that system, which has been discussed in public. In regional systems, 
studies seemed, at least formally, to take into account all systems of the Member States. 
However, this idea is not really supported by the analysis of the justifications in these systems. 
Restrictions seem to be ultimately extremely value-based and selective. The orientation may 
depend on many things. One thing their particular cultural point of view1578. Another is the 
systems specific legal-historical connection.
However, the obstacles for the orientation, in national legal systems, do not seem 
to differ greatly from each other. The basic problems were seen to be concerned with linguistic
1576 On this, see Markesinis, B., 1993, p.622 if.
1577 There seem to be some cases, in which abortion cases from the Danish system were considered as a  source of 
inspiration. This seemed to be based on the extensiveness of the discourse on the subject there.
,57* Also Bredimas, A., 1978a, 1978b.
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competencies. The existence o f resources (and time) seemed also to be a major obstacle.1579
There seems to be always some kind of a legal cultural sphere of operation, which 
is not abandoned. No a priori obstacles seemed to exist for the examination of more distant legal 
systems. Still, these systems were not studied. The main concern seemed be related to the legal 
development of in European states and the United States. Japan was mentioned, especially with 
respect to competition law. This may be also due to the extent o f the commercial relationships 
(this sense attempts to justify persuasively those cases involving an interest of a party coming 
from this country).
The premises in English law, most likely because o f its commonwealth connections, 
differs from other European systems considerably.
Some analysis. Different types of formulations of comparative reasoning can be identified. 
There has been argumentation, for instance, concerning "neighbouring states", "leading legal 
systems", "culturally similar" states, "surrounding states", "over a large area", "tendencies" etc., 
and many more listed in the conclusive chapter on the European human rights system.
Different types of restrictions make different approaches possible. A more 
ideological-functional approach makes larger adoptions possible. On the other hand, a more 
historical approach restricts the adoptions only to those features which derive from purely histori­
cal unity1580.
Why is it so that in state systems comparisons are not generally used as arguments?
A major factor could be that national courts try to maintain their internal political 
“formal” integrity. National law is the main feature of this formal political integrity. Another law 
cannot be used openly, for fear it would jeopardise the nature o f the law as a basic element o f this 
political integrity ("constitutionalism", etc.). On the other hand, one could claim that this is simply
1179 There exists, for example, a Convention by the Council of Europe on Information on Foreign law ( 1968, Eur.T.S. 
no. 62, Council of Europe, European Conventions and Agreements II (Strasbourg 1972), Additional Protocol No. 97  
(1978). It is a  convention on the “horizontal" ad hoc information-providing.
The Convention applies to civil and commercial law and to  the law of judicial organization. The 
request can be made by judicial authority, and only where proceedings have been instituted. This is limiting the scope 
o f its application. The Additional Protocol has extented it to apply also to crim inal, criminal procedure, and legal aid 
and advice. The Additional protocol extents the right to request information also  to authority or person acting on behalf 
o f  a person within official systems o f legal aid or advice. Furthermore, the request can be made also where the 
institution o f  proceedings is envisaged.
The application can be extented by the parties. The Convention has been ratified also by other states 
than by European Council states.
Similar types of provisions on information-providing can be found in many European Council 
Conventions in the field of tax law, penal law, public and international law.
Furthermore, the application of the norms in this Convention has possibly changed due to the internet 
and databases. In fact, a convention on the database-keeping would be needed.
Regarding, the idea that these type of Conventions do not have an effective application, David, R., 
1981, p.196, Legeais, R., 1994, p.353. David maintains that basic knowledge have to exist in order to be able to send 
questionnaires, for example (ibid.). On different information sources, ibid. P .197 flf.
,M0 Kisch, I., 1981, pp. 165-166.
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based on the fact that the national discourse, even if sometimes analytically restricted, is 
linguistically the only sensible approach to law.
Consequently, can we say that in those systems where the comparative arguments 
are used, the political integrity of the system is not based on a formality of law? Or, is political 
integrity through law somehow something different, and consequently, the idea of formality thus 
also differs?
In the English system, there seems to be a tradition of using "foreign law" in 
justifications, whereas in many "constitutionalist" systems this type of use does not appear, at 
least not openly. The concept of law, in a functional sense, seems to be different. We could claim, 
for example, that in the English system the institutional and historical interpretation functions in 
guaranteeing legal-political integrity. This is not only based on the positive form of law. This type 
of national system we can call "discursive" and not legally political in a strictly formal sense. The 
argumentation is not necessarily restricted on the basis of some national systematic “legalistic” 
premise. At the same time, it seems to stress the discursively autonomous nature of the 
adjudication (i.e. autonomy from other autonomous institutions within the system). This seems 
to be the feature of the European system of human rights too because of the discursive elements 
in its procedural rules.1381
Finally, we may observe that in systems where comparative law has been defined 
explicitly as a source of law, and its bindingness is a priori defined, this seem to result in its non- 
analytical use. Namely, the fact that the comparative generality has been legally accepted as a 
legal premise makes it possible to approach legal justification by referring directly to the general 
principles without making any contextual analysis in a given situation.
Next we will discuss some “hard cases” within European level systems. These cases 
deal with the forms of political and economic sovereignty from the point o f view of European 
law.
4. "H ard "  cases and  the comparative limits o f European law
Introduction. We have already noted, how traditional horizontal comparisons are related to the 
basic legal constructions and principles at the supra-national level, they are frequently connected 
to the tradition in international and regional systems. However, these comparisons are based on 
some traditional conceptions of legal sources of legal arguments. Traditional comparison includes 
only the traditional structures of the legal systems’ sources such as rules, cases and limited 
interpretations o f that society according to the traditional standards of reasoning.
15,1 This may change, to a certain extent, when the establishment of the new  single Court o f Human Rights is fully 
actualized. Changes discussed in the Human rights information bulletin, N o .4 1, an update on human rights activities 
within the Council of Europe, July-October 1997, Council of Europe, p.76 on the action Plan and the Protocol No. 11 
to the European Convention of Human Rights. These changes came into force at the end o f 1993.
423
The alternative approach, perhaps more profound and more "hard case" related 
comparison is involved when we arrive at on the frontiers of the modem European legal order, 
in social, philosophical, practical, and legal terms. Here the comparative argument extends 
towards concrete sociological, moral and philosophical-practical argumentation, which tends to 
deviate from traditional comparative argument.
The following cases are concerning, it seems, with the internal problems o f 
European law. The question is about the issue o f respective competences between the 
supranational, national, and other types of traditional forms o f organization, as decided on a legal 
basis by a supranational body. The question no longer seem to be about the "easy" case o f  
comparative "construction", a confirmation of the existence o f a traditional legal norm, and the 
need to convince an international, regional, and national legal audience on this fact. The question 
seems to be instead about the competence of an institution and a legal system as such, a choice 
of "law”, or rather a "legal system".
4.1. Value-based comparative reasoning
4.1.1. ‘H a rd  case9’ I: blasphemy, no general conception o f
blasphemy, "no  uniform  conception of m orals", 
morals as tertium comparationis, integrity of th e  
legal system, the argum ent of comparison by 
opposites, acceptance of the "m argin of appre ­
ciation", "com m on supervision", "common 
understanding of images", "no  general 
functionality of religion"
General remarks. The Otto Preminger Institute case1582 in the European system o f human rights 
dealt with freedom of expression. An Austrian association had been announcing a series of public 
showings of a satirical film o f an Austrian artist, with a religious subject matter. Criminal 
proceedings were instituted, and the film was seized and later forfeited. The criminal proceedings 
were, however, ultimately dropped. On the other hand, although the forfeiture and seizure were 
originally effected in the Tyrol area, their application was extended, permanently, to Austria in 
general.
The applicants argued that the seizure and the forfeiture o f the film contravened 
Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention of Human Rights. 158
1581A  295-A  (1995) EHRR 3 4 ,2 0  Septem ber 1994.
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Context of justification. The Commission found a violation of the principle of freedom of 
expression1583 based mainly on the ideas of “artistic” methodology, limited publicity, and the 
general applicability of the restrictions in Austria.
In finding no violation of freedom of expression in relation to the forfeiture (but not 
the seizure of the film) and in defining the scope of the "margin o f appreciation", three members 
of the Commission argued with the words o f the European Court o f Human Rights in the case of 
M uller1584:
"With regard to "morals" the Court noted that there was no uniform European 
conception: the view taken o f  the requirements o f  morals varies from time to time 
and from  place to place, especially in our area, characterized as it is by a far- 
reaching evolution o f opinions on the subject. By the reason o f  their direct and 
continuous contact with the vital forces o f  their countries, State authorities are in 
principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on 
the exact content o f these requirements as well as on the 'necessity* o f a 
'restriction* or *penalty* intended to meet them".
What the Court in Muller and the members of the Commission in Otto Preminger 
analysed was the "common morality o f Europe in comparative terms. However, they found that 
no such uniform concept exists.
This "disparity” o f "European morality" was based on differences in “time and 
place” (geographical and historical perspectives), which, according to the Court, is typical to 
**our area' (socio-philosophical argument).
On the other hand, the "margin o f appreciation * granted to the Austrian Courts 
was based on the idea that the Austrian Court, or rather judges, function or work in that 
particular culture where the ’forces'’ (environment or culture) of the society are seen or 
experienced more "authentically" (phenomenological argument). This seemed to be based on the 
fact that the contact with these ' forces'" was "continuous and direct” unlike the contacts with 
international judges. There was a premiss that the factuality surrounding the normative decision­
making can better be analysed by a person living in direct contact with that cultural sphere. 
The members o f the Commission continued:
"It is out o f any proportion as an attack against religious feelings and the common 
understanding o f  the image o f  Jesus Christ prevailing in countries, where the 
majority o f people belong, at least formally, to the Christian religion, an image 
which has prevailed over centuries in objects o f  art and in the public life o f  the 
society in the Tyrol. The presentation o f the Jesus Christ in the film  as announced 
would have violated the rights o f others who believed in Jesus".
1583 Seizure: nine to five, forfeiture: 13 to  one. Sim ilar suggestions in relation to the announcement were m ade by the 
Austrian Advocate General.
1584 See dissenting opinion o f M r Ercam ora, F., Weitzel, M M A ., Loucaides, L., case Müller and others v 
Switzerland, A/133 ( 1991 ) EHRR 212.
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The following argument was, in other words, based on the comparison of religions 
(comparative religion argument). This was backed up by the idea of the historical continuity of 
religious ideas and historical religious culture. This represented kind of integrity of religion as a 
cultural image, and the role of integrity of religion as a social phenomenon. Furthermore, this was 
backed up by sociological statistical argumentation. Finally, it involved the assertion of the right 
to the inviolability o f the religious sphere.
The same ideas appeared in the "phenomenological” and value-based argument of 
another member of the Commission1585:
"Religion does not plav the same role in every society in Europe. The protection, 
which a State may, or must, grant to a religion therefore varies from  place to 
place. Much should be left to the discretion o f  the national, or even the local 
authorities. "
In both these opinions, the idea of "disparity of morality", and the authority deriving 
from it is connected to the disparities of geography and history, which, on the other hand, is a 
legitimation of the authority of a "social-systemic" national judge to make authoritative decisions.
Surprisingly enough, at the same time, the comparative generality o f religious 
understanding was found in the countries having, "at least formally", a common Christian 
religion. According to them, there was a comparatively common understanding of this matter in 
European institutions, which gave to them the possibility o f granting competences to the national 
judge in this sphere and approve the actions taken by them.
It seems that the value-based phenomenological understanding of this common 
religion, according to the Commission members, made it possible for European institutions to 
understand the affront to religious feelings and to maintain that action by national authorities was 
acceptable. On the other hand, the lack o f any common morality resulted in the "incompetence" 
of the European institutions to make such decisions, and this forced them to leave the decision­
making regarding the collision of various religious, moral and legal ideas to the national judge. 
According to these members of the Commission, the work of the artists and the publisher of the 
work would have disregarded the others religious rights in that area. From this perspective it 
appears as if the members established another right, namely, the right to the protection of 
religious feelings. This collided fundamentally with the freedom of expression.1586
1585 Mr Schermers, H.G.
1586 This become explicit in the dissenting opinion of Mrs. Liddy:
“...led me to the conclusion that the seizure answered a pressing social need fo r  the “prevention of 
disorder’’ in a locality at the relevant time, rather than being necessary fo r  the protection o f the 
“rights o f others““.
Similar ideas can be seen in the dissenting opinion of some judges of the Court (Pekkanen, Palm,
Makaczyk):
"The need fo r repressive action amounting to complete prevention o f the exercise o f  freedom of 
expression can only be accepted i f  the behaviour concerned reaches so high a level o f abuse, and
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On this basis, the members of the Commission thus came to a conclusion to allow 
a "margin o f  appreciation".
The comparison undertaken by the members was quite extensive in sociological and 
philosophical terms. They strived to take into account every possible aspect o f society in their 
decision-making, all the possible ingredients of comparative law. They presented different levels 
of social life in analysing the situation comparatively. However, their analysis was strongly value- 
based. They did not attempt to really analyse the situation in strictly legal terms, but relied, 
instead, on the phenomenological and holistic observations which derived from their own cultural 
background. This way they arrived at the appropriate level o f  restriction upon the freedom of 
expression against religious feelings, and established their "European" authority of the case.
Another type of analysis was related to the analysis presented by one of the same 
members o f the Commission:1387
'7 fin d  it di fficult to accept a general European notion o f blasphemy. Like many 
other words this word should be read in the context o f  the cultural tradition o f the 
community concerned. It may well be that the same expression is blasphemous in 
one community, and not so in the other. I  agree with the majority o f  the 
Commission, that Article 10 is applicable to the case, but in my opinion Article 
10(2) justifies the interference. It was prescribed by law and it served the 
legitimate aim. As to the question whether it was necessary in democratic society 
opinions may differ... In my opinion the circumstances o f this case sufficiently 
justify them to so conclude. "
This type of comparative argument studies only the legal generality of the concept 
of blasphemy, which was seen, consequently, to be differently understood throughout Europe. In 
these circumstances, the competence to decide the case rested on national authorities (a type of 
subsidiarity), and no violation was thus found. This argumentation also remains situational, and 
does not rely on any holistic societal analysis.
Justification. In analysing the forfeiture and seizure of the film and what constitutes a necessary 
restriction in a democratic society, the Court of Human Rights used a comparative argument in 
the following way in determining the content of the principle o f "margin o f appreciation
"As in the case o f  "morals", a concept linked to "rights o f  others”, it is not 
possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform conception o f the significance o f 
religion in society* 1588; even within a single country such conceptions may vary. 
For that reason it is not possible to arrive at a comprehensive definition o f what 
constitutes a permissible interference with the exercise o f the right to freedom o f
comes so close to the denial of the freedom of retie ion o f others, as to forfeit fo r itself the right to be 
tolerated by the society."
1S!7 Mr. Schermers, H.G..
,SM The Court referred to the Muller case (1991) EHRR 212.
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expression, where such expression is directed against the religion o f others. A 
certain margin o f appreciation is therefore to be left to the national authorities in 
assessing the existence and extent o f the necessity o f such interference."
The Court's argumentation was also phenomenological. It took for granted, without 
any real analysis, the idea of the disparity of morals and religious feelings.
However, we may say that the Court, to a certain extent, defined more clearly the 
content o f the idea of “morals”. It maintained that in the case o f morals, we are speaking about 
a relationship of two rights. In other words, in case where morals are involved, the right has to 
be examined in relation to this other right. This supported the idea presented by three of the 
Commission members.
On the other hand, the extension of the "margin o f  appreciation' was to be related 
to the evaluation of the "circumstances". This seemed to relativize strongly the norm underlying 
the decision. It seemed as if the importance of the freedom in question would demand that the 
solution be different.1589 In the end, the substantive solution was based also on the idea that the 
national judge was better position to decide than the international judge”.
According to the Court, the forfeiture and the seizure were legitimate, and no 
violation o f the freedom of expression had taken place.1590
Some fu rther analysis. In this case, the European Institutions argued by reference to 
"circumstantial" arguments (cultural, social, and phenomenological). By introducing these 
circumstantial arguments, the Court confirmed that the "meaning" of the same forms of human 
rights principles may be different throughout Europe.
This case could be analysed in many ways. One could claim that the fact of a 
Catholic "majority" ( “in the Tyrol 87%, in Austria 78%") and the desire to protect the religious 
and social subsystem, with the help of a "right to religion" argument, were simply means of 
maintaining the subsystem as a functionally accepted subsystem in the society. As the Court 
maintained, the question is only a "social need fo r  the preservation o f the religious peace". In 
this way there was an attempt to maintain the general functionality of the social system.1591 In this 
sense, the analysis, at first sight, reveals deep historical, philosophical and social understanding 
of the roots of the cultural conflicts in that particular area.1592
However, one may make another type of legal-functional analysis of the situation. 
It looks as if the criticism o f the artist was directed against a social institution in
tS89This referred, in this regard, to the case of Informationsverein Lentia and others v Austria A/276 (1994) EHRR
1590 The C ourt voted six to three.
1591 Mrs. Uddy.
1592 The statistical argument was, naturally, very persuasive - especially in relation to the Austrian audience.
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general. This critique was not based on any factual (at least not explicit) violation of anyone's 
rights in any concrete sense (whatever had happened in the past). Consequently, we may see the 
critique of the individual as a functionalist critique against the prevailing institutionalized religion 
and the church. As it was claimed in the description of the work in the announcement, religion 
(and the church) may have an oppressive function in society. Concerning the distributor of the 
film, no intentions other than commercial and discursive ones can be discerned.
Because the critique seemed to be directed against this religious "system" in society 
and was not related to any "real" oppression, the artist did not produce any indication or 
examples o f the oppressive functions and acts directed against him or against any other person 
in any concrete sense. If there were some illustrations o f this nature, the examples remained 
unclear. The functionalist critique in the work seems to remain "abstract” as in all artistic 
production. The critique is directed against the social institution rather than any of its concrete 
functions.
The normative idea in the case seemed to be that if the individual does not 
recognize the functionalist traditionally o f the prevailing religion, and if this traditionally seems 
to have a rationale in this society, the functions of this entity are protected in the abstract. 
Furthermore, it looks like as if the national judge sees the function of this religious group as a 
main element in the functioning of the society, as some members seem to view it in the European 
institutions. These types of religious ideas are seen to be essential in maintaining the coherence 
of the society. This is why the integrity o f the person seems to be defendable also in the terms of 
individual religious rights.
However, the abstract nature of the critique could have resulted also in an idea that 
no individuals were really harmed. In this sense, the involvement of individual rights of 
expression, which evidently were at stake, seemed only to constitute a protection of an 
institutionally established religion and a “symbolic” system.
Nor does the idea o f a functionalist abstract critique fit well with the ideas o f the 
European Court, according to which the state judge is in a better position than the national judge 
to evaluate the situation (because being "better placed").1593 Namely, it is likely that national 
judges may be more sensitive to the discursive integrity of the system, but in this case the 
discourse is, in many ways, restricted. The question is not necessarily about any “vital forces” of 
the society in any dynamic and discursive sense.
Furthermore, against this background, it is difficult to understand, why the Austrian 
courts, and some members of the Commission, seem to maintain that the functionalist critique 
oppresses also the religious rights of some individuals in that particular religious society, namely, 
a “right to freedom o f religion and conscience". On the other hand, the “religious feelings” 
argument reduces the question to the subjective level without any societal analytical aspects.
1593 However, the prevailing forces are, in terms o f this idea, connected directly to the legal institution.
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Consequently, it could be maintained that the Court compares two functional 
systems, the Austrian and European human rights one. It recognizes the extension of the religious 
functional system ("in the Tyrol area", and Austria in general), and concludes that religion has a 
function in that particular system. However, the problem is that the basic principle of the 
European Court seems to be the idea that a functionalist critique against a culturally 
institutionalized social group cannot be made in such an abstract way, and nor can it be made 
empirically. In other words, the protection of this form of social grouping and religious feelings 
was granted on a quite abstract basis. There was a strong idea o f this type of religious institution 
as an historical "fact", as some members o f the Commission suggested. The idea comes close to 
the protection of a religion as such, and to the protection o f a social grouping and its functionality 
in general. This functionality of that particular religion was seen to be rational within society. The 
abstract criticism o f this prevailing form of functionality was seen as "weaker".
The decision seems to establish a very obscure religious right based on the 
historical-rational functionality of a grouping in society. This right seems to override the 
individual right of expression. It seems to move in some meta-level of European legal culture.
“Morality”  and procedural polycentrism. In the context of this case, there seems to be some 
kind of moral autonomy of a national legal system. What is remarkable is also the national- 
religious connection established in this case. Reasoning based on legal coherence is not applied, 
but the normative system is contrasted and compared based on the non-comparability of its social 
autonomy. The national system is analysed with respect to highly extensive philosophical and 
quantitative sociological terms. The analyses go through a variety of socio-philosophical ques­
tions. The comparison constructs and maintains, in a way, some static and permanent systemic 
identities based on certain societal functions. It confirms also the cultural particularities.
One o f the central explicit arguments appearing in this case is the idea o f 'societal
peace'.
It is quite extraordinary that societal peace is used as an argument in this case. The 
conflict between societal actions evaluated in the case may cause, according to the European 
judges a breach o f the societal “religious peace”. Furthermore, even if the international judges 
do not seem to be competent to decide the case, they seem to be well aware o f the conditions of 
the society in question.
The claim based upon the disparities which exist between legal and social systems 
based on morality argumentation has certain characteristics.
First o f all, the claim o f moral non-comparability establishes morality as a valid legal 
argument. Secondly, the claim o f "moral" disparity between social systems, as a form of 
"comparison by opposites", is an extremely instrumentalist type of argumentation. The law, in 
this latter sense, is seen as an instrument of morality, which, nevertheless, is divergent. The
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problem is, naturally, who's morality we speaking of ?
The non-comparability of morality is a form o f argumentation, which refers to the 
basic "social life -formative" values of the system, but for that matter also to its recognition. It 
appears as if there is an establishment o f the logic that as no common morals exits, particular 
morals prevail. To a certain extent, the case recognizes a polycentric form of European law, 
where the intensity of the national legal system, in representing certain normative standpoints, 
seems to define the scope of "European law".
In theoretical terms this phenomenon looks interesting. Argumentation is a kind of 
“saving operation” of the state paradigm of law prevailing. Namely, when the supranational 
institutional system is maintaining that the particular state legal system can keep its method of 
regulation without regarding that type o f  regulation universalizable norm (or “Europeanizable” 
norm),1594 it looks as if the Court similarly maintains that the national system is not universalizable 
(or “Europeanizable”) as a legal system. This is, theoretically, a step out from the paradigm of 
(European) law! This would put the constitutional traditions under a heavy pressure.
This problem is solved by the Court (or by the majority o f  judges) by explaining the 
deviance as to be based on particular nature of European morality. Here the question of 
universalizability of a state paradigm is maintained by associating the universalizability of a state 
system to the moral evaluation. The conflict between the state paradigm of law and the particular 
state system, in abstract, is solved by moral argumentation.
Moreover, because this morality seems to be particular in Europe, it does not mean 
that morality as such would be particular. Consequently, here it is European institutional.1595
The strategy of some other judges was to analyse the problem as a question of 
correct interpretation of a legal form, while some others considered it to be a matter of policy. I 
think this gives a quite interesting example o f the difference conceptions of law in Europe.
Finally, one cannot avoid making the observation that the approach by the Court 
appears quite absurd1596. However, it does seem to be adapted well to a polycentric idea of 
international and regional law, where the decision-makers in adjudicative processes seem to be 
the representatives of legal discourses. By this polycentrism any political "burden" o f the 
international, regional, and more particular community is avoided. The international community
,SM This concerns also the dissenting opinions.
15,5 In the context o f legal theory, this operation transfers the question to be about a conflict between the 
universalizability of a legal system and universalizability of morals (in  legal context). In other words, this European 
institution is transforming the legal discussion to be a moral discussion by making the distinction between particularity 
o f the European morals vs. morals in general. This way one maintains the universalizability of the state-paradigm o f law 
and the morality as the basis of this paradigm.
This strategy defines one idea of the state paradigm o f  law.
lS96 A  question may come up concerning the moral disparity within the European system. The problem is, however, 
tha t a  moral disparity arises in a philosophical sense. If  we have to speak about morality in some legal-institutional 
sense, we could perhaps refer to ethics o r custom.
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is institutionally and legally declared disparate. Consequently, with these types of reasoning, any 
criticism from the point of view o f another particular state, for example, is avoided1597.
In legal terms, the question seems to be, in the end, a matter of the recognition of 
the coherence o f the Austrian system. Namely, the fact that three stages o f court procedures 
maintain the solution, where the public authority actions are declared compatible with Austrian 
law seems to suggest that the European Court was influenced by this type of unanimity. This 
looks like an empirical basis for the idea of "a national judge being better placed to make a legal 
d e c is io n The case seems to be based on a functional, legally institutional "will theory" of state 
law. This functionality is related to the fact that the consensus appeared in adjudicative form.
Consequently, what is really the “margin o f appreciation”? In these terms, the 
“margin o f  appreciation” seems based on the fact that several levels of Court procedure agree 
on a certain question. Consequently, one can ask legitimately, what comes first in the European 
Court of Human Rights in a case; the idea o f moral incomparability or the “will o f the state” 
established in the intensity of the national courts in defending the breach of the right? Is the first 
determined by the second, or vice versa? Or, do we speak about absolute disagreement internal 
to the European institution. In the latter case at least, the reference to morality go too far. 
Institutional disagreement does not seem to be a question of morals.
Because the question seems to be about the lack o f general moral standards, as 
expressed by the Court, we may perhaps assume the prevailing idea o f particular morals as being 
determining factors, related to the intent o f national legal solutions. Empirically, the problem 
seems to be related to the idea o f the integrity of the legal system as morality, at least in the 
European Court o f Human Rights.
We may also wonder when looking into the substance of the case, how this type 
o f protection of “religious feelings”, granted in this case is possible at the same time European 
society full of many forms of oppression in many other social sectors. Moreover, we can ask, 
whether, because of the particular nature of the case, the application of this case should be, as has 
been done, restricted only to that particular society. One should refrain from extending any of the 
analysis, presented in the case, to other social systems. In this sense, the cases of “marginal 
appreciation” related to the “national judge being better qualified to adjudicate ” and that fact 
that “no uniform European conception o f  morals exists” seem to take on some kind of
1597 It looks as if it is exactly in this "turn" from the generality to particularity, where the "morals" seems to "be" in 
this case. It seems that morally the generality is seen to be absurd from the point o f view of the particular. W e go from 
the general traditionally  to particular trad itionary  (in human rights).
Politically, this seems very communitarian idea. We can legitimately ask, do we have here a turn, which 
is typical to European Human Rights thinking at the m om ent Furthermore, legal philosophically the idea seems to be 
related to some kind of postmodern polycentrism. As a  normative idea, it is characterized by universal particularity. One 
may wonder how this philosophy suits to the idea o f Human Rights.
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normative (even strongly disintegrative) value in European law.1598
4.1.2. T he “hard case”  II (Bachmann in the European 
Court of Justice): the discrimination on the basis of 
nationality, m aintenance of the disparity of 
national legal systems because of the "cohesion of a 
legal system"
Introduction. This case dealt with the question of the compatibility of the Belgian tax provisions 
with Community law.1599
The basic question, presented by the Belgian Court to the European Court in the 
realm of the Article 177 (the new Article 234, preliminary ruling), was the following:1600
"Are the provisions o f Belgian revenue law relating to income tax pursuant to 
which the deductibility o f  sickness and invalidity insurance contributions or 
pension and life insurance contributions is made conditional upon the 
contributions being paid ’in Belgium' compatible with Articles 48, 59 (in 
particular the first paragraph thereof), 67 and 106 o f the Treaty o f  Rome?"1601
Even if the main task of the Court was not to
"make any declarations as to the compatibility o f  the rules o f national law with 
Community law, ... it may provide the national court with all relevant guidance as 
to the interpretation o f Community law, with the view to enabling that court to 
assess the compatibility o f those rules with the provisions o f Community law men- 
tioned."
The Advocate General based his argument mainly on the previous case law of the 
C ourt1602. However, certain interesting comparative observations were presented, which had a
1598 Some analysis o f the case may be found also in Grabenwarter, C ., 1995, pp. 128-165. He maintains that the Court 
does not discuss in detail the content and the purpose of the film. Furthermore, the emphasis o f the regional circum­
stances by the Court is remarkable, especially in term s of the use o f statistical information. Basically his criticism  is 
related to the extension o f the justification.
ISW Case C-204AX) Hanns-Martin Bachmann v. Belgian State (1992) E C R 1-249, Opinion o f M r Advocate General 
M ischo delivered on 17 September 1991.
1600 As in other cases, I will not go into the details o f the facts o f the case.
1601 Free movement o f persons workers, equal treatment, freedom to provide services, restrictions, deductibility from 
taxable income of certain contributions relating to  the insurance of individuals, deductibility conditional on payment to 
an organization established in the territory where the tax is levied, possible justification of the restriction by reason of 
the need to safeguard the cohesion o f the tax system.
1602 Joined opinions o f Advocate General M ischo delivered on 17 September 1991 on case 204/90 Hans~Martin 
Bachmann v Belgium State (1992) EC R  1-249, and 300/90 Commission v Kingdom o f Belgium (1992) EC R  1-305.
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direct connection to the results of the case. Also some premisses concerning the use of 
comparative law, which had been expressed in the previous case law, were restated1603 1604.
Context of justification. The basic "comparative" starting point for the Advocate General, in his 
opinion, was that the comparative disparity of the laws in question in different legal systems is an 
irrelevant argument in the case. He maintained that the problems in this case relating to free 
movements
"does not arise, strictly speaking, from any disparities between national laws./6W 
The question became a matter of vertical comparison between Community law and
Belgian law.
However, the Advocate General made some comparative remarks, but based his 
observations on the remarks presented by Denmark and the Netherlands in the course of 
proceedings. He maintained that
"... in those countries the tax exemption o f  insurance contributions was 
inextricably linked to the taxation o f the capital created at the time when the 
capital is paid out. That system is regarded in those countries as a carrying over 
o f liability to tax. The insurance companies are obliged to retain the tax at source 
and to pay it over to the state, to which they are liable to make such payments. 
Consequently, the legislation has been brought into force requiring such tax to be 
paid even where the policy-holder no longer resides in the country at the time 
when the capital is paid out'.
and he concluded after this remark that
"There is thus a strong temptation to conclude that the Belgian legislation is 
objectively justified by the need to prevent tax evasion. ”
Furthermore, remarks were made on the fact that
"In the Netherlands, where similar legislation exits, a person finding himself in the 
[similarJ situation would be able to deduct his insurance contributions from  his 
income tax."
This argument was combined with the argument presented by the Belgium 
government on the existence of the bilateral tax treaties between Belgium and some other 
countries, which would make it possible to deduct the contributions in question. Furthermore, the 
relationship between countries with certain types of systems would have resolved the tax evasion 
problem. However, the tax evasion argument by the government was rejected.
Consequently, for the Advocate General, the question seemed to become a question
1503 For example 120/78 Cassis de Dijon( 1979) ECR 649.
1604 This was related to the Cassis de Dijon case.
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of the vertical relationship between this comparative generality and the general provisions of 
Community law. However, the Advocate General found an unconditional violation of the central 
provisions of the Treaty.
Justification. The Court agreed explicitly with the argument, which presented comparative 
information regarding the bilateral tax treaties. Unlike the Advocate General, it found a 
justification for the derogation from the Treaty:
" It is true that bilateral treaties exist between certain Member States, allowing the 
deduction for tax purposes o f  contributions paid in a Contracting state other than 
that in which the advantage is granted, and recognizing o f the power o f a single 
state to tax sums payable by insurers under the contracts concluded with them. 
However, such a solution is possible only by means o f such conventions or by the 
adoptions by the Council o f  the necessary coordination or harmonization 
measures”.
The fact that the bilateral conventions seemed to be aiming at ensuring the cohesion 
o f the tax systems led the Court to observe that the provisions o f the Belgian type
"are justified by the need to ensure the cohesion o f  the tax system o f which they 
form  part, and that such provisions are not, therefore, contrary to the Article 48 
o f the Treaty.”
Som e analysis of the case. Basically, the problem in the case was related to the different 
treatment of Community actors according to their nationality (whether legal or natural persons). 
This may not even be, according to Court case law, indirect1605. The basic rule is that 
discrimination on the basis of nationality is not permissible.
Consequently, the problem in the case was that national provisions examined in the 
case may lead to th ^ "detriment o f  those workers who are, as a general rule, nationals o f  other 
M ember States'. This was related to the idea that usually the persons who move maintain 
insurance which they have had in their country of origin, especially life insurance. On the other 
hand, the Court concluded that provisions of this kind Moperate to deter those seeking insurance 
fro m  approaching insurers established in another Member State, and thus constitute a 
restriction o f the hitter's freedom to provide services." In this sense, the legislation discriminates 
also against legal persons of this type.
The idea of the Belgian government was that there is no "factual discrimination", 
because, first of all, the question is about non-taxable income, and secondly, the idea o f non­
deductibility could be based on the public interest (monitoring interest, cohesion of the system). 
These arguments were not fully accepted by the Advocate General and the Community Court.
The Court maintained, however, that even if the basic rule was non-discrimination, 1603
1603 i.e. "Lead to the samt result", Case 152/73 Sotgui v Deutsche Bundespost [1974] ECR 153.
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in some circumstances the decisions can indirectly discriminate against nationals from different 
countries, especially in the field of tax law1606. However, this type of argument cannot be the basis 
o f the decision as such, but the distinction between different nationals must be related to the 
cohesion of the legal system.1607
The introduction of the idea of the cohesion of the tax system meant, basically, that 
there is "a connection under the Belgian rules between the deductibility o f contributions and the 
liability to tax o f sums payable by insurers pursuant to pension or life insurance contracts'. In 
other words, the payments paid on the basis of the contract are taxable and the tax deductibility 
of the contributions paid on the basis of the contract are balanced by the taxation of the payments 
by the insurer.
Consequently, there is a strict "legal-economic" relationship between these two 
provisions. This "relativity" was confirmed by the idea that the payments, on the basis of these 
contracts, are not taxed, if the contributions on the basis of the contracts have not been tax 
exempted. On the other hand, the main objective is to guarantee the revenue of the state. In 
general, it seems that a legal and logical relationship between two provisions of the legal system 
instituted a basis for an exception from the general rule of the non-discrimination between 
nationals.
On the other hand, the case was established as well on the fact that a state cannot 
tax a company situated in another Member States. This would mean an enforcement of the tax 
law of one state by another state, which may generate problems (for example, the enforcement 
could be contested on the basis of public policy).
On the other hand, even if, or, in fact, because the bilateral conventions exist1608, the 
Community Court considered itself unable to establish the illegality of the provisions of the 
Belgium law. This was likewise based on the absence o f the general Community legislation.
The Court maintained that it cannot guarantee the cohesion of individual tax 
systems, and that the competence remains the matter o f the Member States.
Conclusions. W hat is interesting in this case is that the cohesion of the tax system can be 
interpreted as a feature of the legal system, which enables persons to move freely. The cohesion 
o f the state tax system guarantees, in other words, the effectiveness o f the Community 
provisions. The state provisions complement Community law, to a certain extent. They guarantee 
the free movement o f  natural persons, and their return to their country of origin.
I<06 The Advocate General considered the case "Avoir fiscal” ( case 270/83 Commission v France (1986) ECR 273, 
para 19 (28 January 1986).
1607 In the cases dealing with cohesion, the supranational system relativizes (and compares) itself with a subsystem, 
and gives, consequently, relative autonomy o f regulation for the legal subsystem. In this case, however, the capacity for 
regulation is determined by the ad hoc nature of the situation. Any permanent conclusions are neglected.
1608 i.e. comparison by opposite.
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However, the case also maintains the possibility that life insurance etc. is contract 
with companies of one's home country. It does not encourage the taking of insurance of this kind 
from the country, where the work is done.
In this sense, it also encourages national corporate structures, which are based on 
long -term financing.
To conclude, the comparative argumentation undertaken by both Advocate 
General and the Court, was strongly influenced by the "tax cohesion" argumentation provided by 
the states taking part in the procedure. These arguments were "legal" in the sense that they 
concentrated strongly on the maintenance o f the internal balance between different provisions of 
the revenue laws. The state parties presented both observations on their systems, and, for that 
matter, comparative information.
On the other hand, the Court used, as a direct justification of the "cohesion” 
principle, the system of international bilateral treaties. It seemed to be possible to use a 
comparison of international level treaties in interpreting the extension of Community competence.
4,2. Traditional comparative reasoning: the “hard case” III (H o ech st
in the European Court of Justice): the inviolability of home, 
individual protection?
General rem arks. The material o f the case consisted of one opinion of the Advocate General, 
and the joined cases o f the Court.1609
The (European Community) Commission had used its powers by giving some deci­
sions, based on the Article 14(3) o f Regulation no 17 of the Council o f 6 February 1962, ordering 
various undertakings to submit to investigation, where their possible participation in agreements 
or concerted practices, which fixed prices and quotas or sales objectives for PVC and 
polyethylene in the Community, was investigated.
Five of the undertakings applied to the Court "for a declaration that the decision 
addressed to them was void*. In support o f their application they referred to the infringement of 
the fundamental right to the inviolability of the home, to the lack o f reasons on which decision is 
based, and to formal and procedural defects. The refusal to submit to investigations had caused 
the imposition of fines upon the undertakings.
This complex of cases presented a type of ’hard case*, where the question related 
to the relationship between the economic actors and the legal authority, the latter attempting to
1609 Joined cases of 46/87 and 227/87, Hoechst AG v Commission, (1989) EC R  2859 ,85 /87  Dow Benelux nv v 
Commission (1989) ECR 3137, and 9 7 ,9 8  and 99/87 Dow Iberica sa, Alcudia sa and Empresa Nac el Petro eo sa 
v Commission o f  the European Communities (1989) ECR 3165, and the opinion o f the Advocate General M ischo 
delivered on the 21 February 1989 (1989) ECR 2875.
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find out the premisses of the former's economic activity. The question is fundamental. Economic 
strategic activity is based on relatively closed system of information, and secrecy regarding some 
internal functions. Furthermore, private interests and undertakings’ interests might coincide. The 
actions taken by private actors can be based on premisses, which are not accepted by the 
authority. The task o f the authority is to secure the interest o f the individuals and the economic 
community as a whole. There is a fundamental collision of interests.
The interesting point comes up, in other words, where these interests coincide in 
the form of Commission investigations of the fundamental documents of the economic actor or 
in the order to submit oneself to these investigations. The principles, law, and their interpretation 
concerning this collision are put in a discursive manner, which includes all possible arguments 
supporting the correctness of the decision. From this analysis one can note, how the various 
comparative aspects are taken into account, and how they function in the process of justification.
Furthermore, the difficult nature o f the case derives also from the fact that the case 
is a "first" of a kind, a case on the inviolability of home claimed by a legal person. No analogous 
cases have arisen in the history of the system. For that reason, to be able to establish "doctrine" 
or a "precedent” the Community institutions have to establish reason its decision firmly on the 
basis of strong and general arguments1610.
Context o f justification. The Advocate General started the explanation o f his opinion by 
explaining his comparative approach:
"After establishing on the basis o f a study o f the national laws o f the Member 
States, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Court's case-law that 
undertakings have a fundamental right to the inviolability o f  their premises, I  
shall consider whether that right is infringed by investigations carried out on the 
basis o f  the abovementioned provisions."
The Advocate General explicitly maintained that his approach had to be 
systematically comparative.
The party to the dispute, the company Hoescht, relied on the fact that
"even voluntary submission o f  business documents in order give effect to a 
decision ordering an investigation constitutes a search where the Commission 
knows neither the precise nature nor the detailed contents o f  the documents 
submitted"1611
It claimed that the nature o f the investigation was a "search” rather than an
16,0 One of the striking features connected to this case is the fact that corporations really claim to be subjects to the 
same protection as the individuals. In previous cases, on the same subject (cases concerning such Commission inter­
vention), no such claim  has ever appeared. At the moment it seem s that the corporations seem to employ such 
arguments in European Community Jaw.
1611 Minutes o f the investigation of April 1987, cited a tp .  7 o f the reply in case 46/87 (see supra n 132).
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investigation. This argument of the party was neglected by the Advocate General on the basis of 
a value-based comparative argument:
'7 cannot accept that reasoning because, as the Court will see later, in all the 
national leeal systems there are investigation procedures which presuppose the 
cooperation o f undertakings, in the context o f  which the competent administrative 
authority does not know in advance whether it will find  information which will 
lead to the conclusion that the undertaking has committed an offence and, a 
fortiori, it is not aware o f the nature o f that information. Such operations cannot 
on that ground be regarded as searches."
The comparative argument was overall in generality form. The interpretation of the 
nature of the Commissions action was based on the analogy between the generality of the state 
practices and the Community level.
The use of such an argument was quite natural, because the term, used by the party 
to the dispute, had to be interpreted according to the traditional legal vocabulary or even by the 
"common language" found in the practices of the states. A term "search" in the legal context was 
not seen to be strongly different in the national legal systems than in the "Community language". 
This way the generality of the legal-linguistic practice resulted in an a fortiori form of emphasis 
within the argumentation.
The Advocate General continued by examining the way the characterization of the 
documents was to be made in different systems and in different fields of law. Certain differences 
were recognized:
"The duties of the Commission' s officials are in no wav comparable to those o f  
officials o f the national authorities carrying out an investigation in a tax or 
labour law matter. In regard to taxation, the inspectors consider very specific 
categories o f documents, namely accounting ledgers and invoices fo r  purchases 
or sales whereas, in relation to labour law, it is essentially pay-slips and personal 
files which are relevant ”
This comparison made it possible to consider the differences between the definitions 
connected to the different fields of laws, labour laws, tax laws and competition laws, and to 
discover that the a priori preciseness of the definition is dependent on the type of information one 
is searching for. In the field of competition law, as he explains, the information can be hidden 
within different types of documents and files. An a priori definition is difficult to make. If it 
would be casuistically defined:
"they would probably never be able to f in d  indications o f unlawful agreement. 
Such indications are more likely to be found  on pieces o f paper", often hand­
written, such as notes containing cryptical coded references made at secret 
meetings held outside the undertaking sometimes in a hotel situated in a country 
outside the Community."
It is quite easy to see, why the Advocate General decided to make comparisons
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with the tax and labour law procedures of the Member States. There are no analogous functions 
in the field o f Community law. This is why the comparisons had to be taken from the national 
legal systems.
The wide power of examination, also conferred by the Court in several cases, was 
seen as antecedent even to the principle of confidentiality. This was, on the other hand, explained 
by the Advocate General, on a comparative basis, to be a common principle applying in Member 
States:
"In no circumstances, therefore, it is fo r  the undertaking itself select the 
documents which it is prepared to submit even i f  it considered that certain are 
protected under the general principle o f  confidentiality common to the legal 
systems o f all the Member States.
... it is fo r  the Commission to assess whether or not a particular document 
contains business secrets the confidentiality o f which is protected by a general 
principle which apply during the course o f  the administrative procedure. "i6n
It is not difficult to see why the issue of the "principle o f the inviolability o f home" 
arose in this connection. After a brief description of the manner o f making "secret" deals and to 
document them, the Advocate General explains that this
”... is why I  consider that the Commission's officials were also entitled to look into 
the briefcases of the undertakings' managers and even into their diaries to see if 
they contain documents indications relating to their business activities."
In the beginning of the examination of the possible breach of the fundamental right 
to the inviolability o f home, the Advocate General relied, in general terms, upon the national 
implementation laws. He regarded that
"In any event, no Member State have adopted, on the basis o f article 14(6), 
measures incompatible with its own concept o f  the protection due to the 
fundamental right to the inviolability o f the premises o f undertakings. Therefore, 
in all cases in which the Commission calls upon the national authorities to 
overcome an undertaking's opposition, the protection o f that fundamental right 
will be automatically guaranteed to the fu ll  extent provided fo r  in the national 
legal orders. ”
Therefore the question arose, whether the actions by the Commission, where it 
concerned "merely ... handed files... without themselves searching the cabinets" (including the 
threats of a fine etc.), violates the fundamental right to the protection o f the home. The 
comparative studies formed a basic supporting approach to this inspection:
"In order to decide that question it is necessary to consider the situation existing 
in the national legal systems and the guidance which may be drawn from the
16,2 For the latter part, case 53/85 Akzo chemie v Commission (1986) ECR 1965 (24 June 1986). Some analysis of 
this case, see Schwarze, J ., 1991, p.12 If.
440
European Convention on Human Rights and the case law o f the Court o f Justice."
The inquiry into the Member States' systems. In the realm of the national legal systems, the 
Advocate General went through all the national legal systems in the European Community. Here 
are presented only the essential features of the “traditional” inquiry.
Concerning Belgium, he studied the inviolability of home (Article 10) in the 
Constitution, its interpretation, and in terms of the laws in force. He found it to be disputable as 
to whether the provision refers also to corporate and legal persons. The Constitution itself did 
not give any indication. The laws required, on the other hand, a prior court order for inspections 
and searches of premises used as private dwellings, however, this did not apply in the field o f 
commercial matters. Competition laws provided powers to search without prior orders. Similar 
provisions were in force in the laws implementing Article 87 of the EEC Treaty and Regulation 
no. 17. The latter laws made it possible to even use criminal sanctions in the case of refusal, and 
to use powers through warrants issued by the head of the general economic inspector.
The Danish system was also studied from the point of view of its Constitution, 
laws, and Supreme court practice. The Constitution demanded a prior court order, except 
according to the exceptions provided by a separate law. In the implementation laws, no 
derogations to that basic principle had been permitted. However, consent by the undertaking may 
justify a search without a court order. In the context of the case law, the rule seemed to be that 
the court only scans the existence of the Commission decision without examining the material 
content of it. Furthermore, it was possible, in the case of refusal, according to the case law 
impose fines, even where a court order was not issued.
The German law was studied from the point of view of the constitution, laws, the 
case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, and dogmatics. A priori permission was to be given 
by a court, or, in the case of "urgency", by another body authorized by the law. The dogmatics 
was quite unanimous on the interpretation that business premisses also included within of these 
interpretations.
The study of the case law was more specific. The Federal Constitutional Court had 
made a distinction between the search and the investigation. The Advocate General made an 
explicit reference to these definitions in English and in German. He interpreted the definitions so 
that the main rule was that the "cooperative" investigation was allowed, but that it could be 
"enforced" by periodic penalties or fines based on an "administrative" offence. A steadfast refusal 
demanded a search warrant by the court with in certain restrictions. On the other hand, the 
implementation laws of the EEC regulations authorized the president of the "bundeskartellamt" 
to issue such permission.
Concerning the Greek system, the study was devoted to the inspection o f the 
Constitutional, statutory laws, and Greek Council's opinions. According to the unspecified 
general opinion, the protection applied also to legal persons. However, legislative practice, in
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general, interpreted "home" re strict ively by excluding business premisses. According to opinion 
of the Council of Ministers in the realm o f environmental law and in competition laws a search 
of industrial or undertaking premisses does not constitute a search of the "home" within the 
meaning of the constitution.
According to the Spanish constitution and constitutional practice, business premises 
enjoyed protection. The situation seemed to be quite similar to Denmark. However, the powers 
in the realm of competition laws were related to the tax authorities’ powers, which meant that 
only the consent o f the corresponding state authorities was needed in order to search and enter 
places where economic activity took place. However, a court order was needed for entrance into 
the homes of natural or legal persons1613.
In France, constitutional protection was based on individual liberty and human 
dignity. The degree of legal protection varied. The trend in legislation seemed to be towards 
greater protection of business premises. The analysis of the ordinances by the Advocate General 
was quite thorough and included direct references. The active searches had been made 
conditioned upon court orders, and the substance of the application had to be checked in the 
proceedings. This interpretation was supported also by the recent decision o f the Conseil 
Constitutionnel.
Irish constitutional protection was interpreted textually by the Advocate General. 
It included legal persons and business premises. In the field of taxation and customs, the powers 
for an investigation seemed to be quite extensive and without the need for judicial authorization. 
The same idea applied to competition matters. It is the searched person who has to petition the 
court in order to avoid criminal sanctions in the case o f refusal.
The Italian constitutional protection o f the inviolability of home covered also 
business premisses. According to several laws in different fields, a prior court order was not 
necessary unless the case involved a search rather than "verifications” or "inspections". In 
competition law, it was decreed that the power to investigate does not include opening o f 
suitcases, safes and doors, which are locked and which the "taxpayer refuses to open”. A priori 
judicial authorization is needed if there is to be a use of force.
In the analysis o f the Advocate General, the Luxembourgian system was 
assimilated with the system in Belgium. The powers of inspections were to be determined by 
individual laws. The protection of legal persons was still open in the jurisprudence of the courts. 
Inspections were relatively openly regulated in many fields of administrative law (taxation etc.). 
In the field of competition law, powers were extensive being based on the authorization of the 
Ministry. The laws implementing Community decisions, directives and regulations, in many fields 
of law, granted extensive powers o f access to authorities unless the question concerned private
1613 The idea of the home of a legal person is quite interesting in this connection. This analysis, nevertheless, remain 
unclear.
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dwellings.
The Netherlands Constitution recognized such protection, unless the law decreed 
otherwise. The legislature delegated powers to confer the power of entry upon different 
authorities. The provisions which did not contain the obligation to have a priori judicial control 
did not apply to legal persons or to places other than the dwellings o f natural persons. Further­
more, it presupposed that the occupier had not given his consent.16,4 On the other hand, there 
was a distinction between private dwellings and other places. The entering of private dwellings 
was more strictly regulated. There was a posteriori judicial control for the entry to business 
premises.
Competition law, on the other hand, restricted only dwellings from the scope o f the 
right to unrestricted entry.
Portuguese Constitutional protection was viewed quite strictly. This was based on 
a literal interpretation of the relevant constitutional provision.164 615 However, the situation 
concerning business premises was seen to be unsettled. However, there were ideas expressed in 
Portuguese law that consent authorizes the entry.1616 The implementation of Community compe­
tition law authorized fines in the case of refusal of entry by the company.
The Advocate General tried to interpret the system in United Kingdom in the 
context of the peculiarities of that system. The Advocate General started by referring to the 
principle of the absolute sovereignty o f the Parliament, and to the absence of any positive 
constitutional system of rights. However, the common law courts had a tradition of ensuring 
them. Furthermore, the interpretation of the Advocate General was that there is a similar 
tendency as well in legislative practice.1617
The applicability of the inviolability principle was considered first in the sphere of 
o ther fields of law than in the field of competition law. Prior judicial control was lacking in all 
o ther cases than in a case calling for the use of force. In the field of competition laws, no 
implementation measures of the EEC regulations had been taken. However, entry was to be
1614 This extremely difficult construction has been interpreted weakly by  the Advocate General. The actual argument 
m ade was the following:
"The legislature May therefore leave to the executive the power to determine itself, in the abstract, 
within the framework o f the law. cases in which dwellings May be entered. Furthermore, that 
provision, which contains no obligation o f prior judicial supervision, does not apply to legal 
persons or to places other than the dwellings of natural person and presupposes that the occupier 
has not given his consent. "
1615 This referred in particular to Article 34(2):
"Entry into homes o f citizens against their will may be ordered only the competent court in cases 
provided fo r  by law and in the forms prescribed by law. Under article 34(3), there is a total 
prohibition o f entry during the night. "
1616 Here he referred to the decision o f the Constitutional Court of Portugal.
1617 For discussion and references, see "Commission's powers o f investigation and inspection", House o f Lords, 
session 1983-84, 18th report, Hmso.
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authorized by a High Court order. A continuous refusal could justify for the action by the police 
authorities.
In conclusion, the Advocate General stated that the independent study undertaken 
by him confirms the Commission's argument that the principle is generally applicable in the 
"constitutional traditions o f the Member States". The answer to the question as to whether the 
principle was applicable in the systems of the Member States in the context o f this particular case 
was negative. In context of business premises, there was a disparity in state practices, or, in the 
Advocate General’s words, the "situation was not identical"161*. The Advocate General saw the 
situation in some countries as being indefinite and unclear, and in certain countries negative 
(mentioning especially the Netherlands and Ireland)* 1619. There he found a general trend of 
assimilation of home and business premises, although conditioned by procedural prerequisites.
In the light of this conclusion, there was a difference between the applicability of the 
principle to the private dwellings and business premises:
"In the economic, fiscal and social spheres, there are, in the various national 
legal systems, many measures providing fo r  inspections o f various kinds from a 
mere request for information to a search fo r  documents with the help o f  the police. 
The terms used to describe such measures vary (inspection, check, inquiry, 
search...) and do not correspond in all legal systems.
On the other hand, even in Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Italy Portugal, 
where prior judicial supervision is required by constitutional law, that 
requirement is not absolute. In Denmark, exceptions may provided fo r  by law. In 
Spain and Portugal, by virtue o f  the constitution itself, judicial authorization is 
not required if  the person concerned consents to the search. In Italy, inves­
tigations and inspections particularly fo r  economic and fisca l purposes, are 
governed by special laws.
Finally, in the field o f  competition law, even in Germany and in France, no prior 
court order is required to enter premises or inspect documents which the under­
takings themselves submit. It is only in so fa r  as the inspectors wish to carry out
,Mg This view appears quite strange. W hy should it be identical? Is it not sufficient that the principle could apply, 
to a certain extent, or, that the solution in some systems was more persuasive.
The absence of this type o f  idea seems to be due to the superficial treatment o f the subject. There was 
no normative comparative analysis, where the different solutions were related to each other. On the contrary, the 
comparative aspects were studied with the same source-dogmatical m easure, which seemed to  result in a mechanical 
conclusion concerning the disparity.
Another possibility could have been that different arguments were taken from the different justifications 
(from cases or travaux préparatoires). On those basis, one could have decided, whether the principle had a role in the 
Community system as modified by this analytical study.
The study stressing the "generality"/ disparity" aspects, as a priori method, is somehow 
unconventional. It treats the legal situation as generality (or generally disparate), and is not designed to persuade 
anybody to adopt or not adopt the principle. The comparative study, in a certain sense, produces directly conclusion 
concerning the existence of the principle or non-existence of i t  The intention seem s to be making a comparative study, 
and of deriving from that general-comparative argument, and not to produce a  legal argument (with the help of the 
comparative study).
1619 "In which the concepts o f  "dwelling" and "woning ” are defined in such a way that the legal protection o f the 
home is regarded as applying only to the private dwellings o f persons living there. "
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a search themselves fo r  documents which have not been submitted to them volun­
tarily that such an order is necessary.
It should further be noted that, also in regard to competition laws in Spain and 
Greece, notwithstanding the constitutional requirements, prior court order is re­
quired fo r  inspections in business premises, even i f  they have to be carried out by 
force.
Finally, in the Member States which, like Germany, Denmark and France, make 
the use o f force conditional on the issue o f  a prior court order, undertakings may 
be ordered to submit to inspections and to cooperate in investigations under pain 
o f sanctions such as fines or periodic penalty payments without any prior judicial 
intervention being necessary.
The inquiry into the European system of human rights. In the realm of the European 
Convention, the Advocate General referred to Article 8(1) of the Convention, which stated that
"everyone has the right to respect fo r  his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence "
However, he maintained that
"The European Convention on Human Rights, fo r  its part, expressly provides for  
the right o f the legislature to derogate under certain decisions from  the principle 
o f the inviolability o f the home. Article 8(2) o f that Convention reads as follows
"2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise o f  this right except such as is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests o f national 
security public safety or the economic well-being o f the country, fo r  
the prevention o f disorder or crime, fo r  the protection o f health or 
morals or fo r  the protection o f the rights and freedom o f others". "
A study o f the case law o f this system was absent1620. There was no study of the 
jurisprudence or the interpretation o f the principle in the case-law of the Court in the European 
human rights system. Some dogmatic writings were used, however1621.
1620 The ECJ does not study the dogmatic systematics of another system, and try to develop it. In other words, there 
could be a recognition of the fact that an extensive argumentation, on comparative basis, could "problematize" the 
systems "own” interpretation (of its rules). A "foreign" system could become a source of law o f a  system, which rules 
it is not able to interpret, in principle.
This idea may apply also to the relationship between the state systems and the international systems. 
The study and dogmatics has to be extremely conventional, and open, to a certain extent, if it is to be able to maintain 
the autonomy of the interpreted system. This explains also, why the comparative studies are many times made in the 
realm  of the principle o f the organizational "confidentiality". The "closing" o f the systems interpretations by the 
Community interpreter undermines the complexity and the political nature o f the interpretation o f the rules. We will 
discuss this below.
This way the supra-system has to also remain within an extremely "traditional" sphere o f reasoning.
1621 Reference was made in this regard to the book of Mr Frowein on the European Convention of Human Rights 
("Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, Emrk-kommtntar”, Article 8, no 27, 1985).
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The Advocate General studied the case law of the European Court of Justice1622, 
where the compatibility of the Community competition rules with the European Convention of 
Human Rights had been "implicitly" studied.1623
Conclusions. These comparative studies resulted in the interpretation of principles and the legal 
basis of the Community legal order. The Advocate General concluded that the right to the 
inviolability o f the home is one of the fundamental rights, which the ”institutions o f the 
Community must r e s p e c tOn the other hand, he proposed, agreeing with the Commission, that 
the principle o f the protection o f business premises should be considered to exist at the 
Community level. He also referred to the Court's own case law1624.
1622 Case 136/79 National Panasonic ltd v Commission (1980) ECR 2033 (26 June 1980), and Case 5/85 Akzo 
Chemie v Commission (1986) ECR 2585 (23 Septem ber 1986). A lso, case 155/79 A.M. & S. Europe (1982) ECR 
1575. See analysis of the latter, in Koopmans, T., 1991, p.498-500. In this case companies faced with similar kind o f 
investigation had appealed to the protection o f  the correspondence between client and a lawyer. By asking comparative 
material from the parties, and by using this comparative material (legislation, academic opinion, and case law), the court 
did find common principle o f confidentiality applicable. Because of the differences, it made an autonomous interpreta­
tion.
In the National Panasonic case(it was the applicant, which used the arguments deriving from the 
System of the European Human Rights. The Advocate General W arner analysed, on this basis, the Convention 
(Opinion, 30 April 1980), and the laws o f the M em ber States, comparatively. According to him "in general, but not 
always, the laws o f the Member States required a warrant before the entering to the private premises", M r W arner 
came to the conclusion that a warrant is not part of the system, and that the application should be dismissed.
The Court came to the same conclusion, but not, however, quoting Mr. Warners comparative findings, 
although it did mention the idea, that the Community observance in accordance with the constitutional traditions of the 
Member States (as in 4/73 No Id, Kohlen-, und Baustoffgrosshandlung v Commission o f the European Communities 
(1974) ECR 491, for exam ple).
Mr. Advocate General Roemer had p roduced , in case 31/59 Acciaieria e Tubificio di Brescia v High 
Authority o f the European Coal and Steel Community ((I960) ECR 71 (84)), a comparative study of the powers of 
inspection available under national systems of taxation. This was based on the demand of Article 86 o f the Treaty on 
Coal and Steel Community, where the powers of the High authority officials , to make inspections, were determined 
by reference to the "rights and powers as are granted by the laws o f a Member State to its own revenue officials**. The 
analytical study was devoted to the provisions in the German Adgebenordnung (Code of Taxation) and its commentary 
(Klihn), French Code Général des Impôts’ and the commentaries in its context (Laroque, P.), articles in Italian Law and 
the Netherlands* s's law. The examination of the formal conditions, which should be applied, when requesting infor­
mation (formality), was concluded by quotation o f the German administrative and competition law and its commentar­
ies.
The claim  of the undertaking was held to be well founded and admissible. The Court, on the other 
hand, dismissed the application on a different basis without reference to  the comparative material.
,6ÎÎ "Even though in national Panasonic, it was the absence o f  any communication prior to the
investigation which was the subject o f the dispute, I consider that it May be deduced from that 
judgment that in court1 s view, the powers of investigation provided for in article 14 regulation no 
17fulfilled the conditions laid down in article 8(2) o f  the European Convention on Human Rights.
That conclusion is supported by the case Akzo Chemie v Commission. "
It must be mentioned that the Advocate General, in interpreting the counter arguments, made also an 
analogical statement, internal to the system, introducing safety inspections, the idea existing in the European Atomic 
Energy Community (A rticle 81 of that Treaty).
1624 Cases 136/79 National Panasonic ltd v Commission (1980) ECR 2033 (26 June 1980), 31/59 Acciaier 
Tubificio de Brescia v High Authority ( 1960) ECR 71 , and the opinion o f the Advocate General W arner delivered on 
30 April 1980 in the 136 National Panasonic Ltd v Commission.
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However, the harmony between the European system of human rights and the 
European Community system, already expressed by the Court and the way the business premises 
are generally protected in different Member States, caused the Advocate General to conclude 
that:
"the exercise o f the powers conferred on the Commission by añicle 14(3) o f 
regulation no 17 cannot pose any problem in regard to the principle o f  the 
inviolability o f the home as applied to undeñakings notwithstanding the fa c t that 
those powers are exercised under threat o f  a periodic penalty payment or afine. "
This meant that the principle of inviolability, proposed by the applicants, was not 
applicable to this case as a valid argument. However, he applied a "principle of cooperation” to 
the investigation procedures, and, on this basis, concluded that
"it does not give those officials themselves the right to search cabinets and remove 
the document from them. "
Furthermore, the "legal protection" of the undertaking was found to be sufficient, 
if the applicant is able, as it was in this case, to contest the investigation in the European Court 
of Justice a posteriori. On the other hand, if the refusal, by the undertaking results in the use of 
force in effecting the search, the "national provisions" must be applied, and consequently, prior 
judicial orders can be obtained.
In the application of these principles it was found that Commission decisions 
ordering investigations were not unlawful, and that the claims o f violation of one's home, in 
addition to the claims o f breach o f essential principles o f procedure (the principle of collegiality 
and formality), the use of unlawfully obtained information, the breach of the presumption of 
innocence, the principle of proportionality, the principle o f non-discrimination, the principle of 
non-retroactivity (nulla poena sine lege), and the right to a hearing were dismissed.1623 
Furthermore, the imposition of periodical payment was considered lawful, and the demand for its 
reduction was also dismissed.
In examining the claim that the principle o f proportionality, applied in the Spanish 
system, was infringed, the Advocate General based his dismissal on the rejection o f any 
"reflexivity" of the Community system towards one particular national legal system:
"That submission must also be rejected. On the one hand, the validity o f 
Community measures may be assessed only in regard to Community law not in 
regard to any provision o f national law, even a constitutional provision. Similarly, 
compliance with a general principle o f community cannot be made to depend on 
concepts and rules drawn from national law. "
1623 In the examination, the Advocate General used various "internal" argum ents of the Community system and 
different general conceptual evaluations.
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Justification. In the decision of Hoechst,626, the Court maintained that the Articles (of the 
regulations) in question must be interpret in the light of general principles and the fundamental 
rights of Community law (as part of the generally applicable principles) and that these Articles 
cannot be incompatible with those principles. They are a priori in accordance with the 
"constitutional traditions common to the Member States and the international treaties, on which 
the Member States have collaborated or o f  which they are signatories",627. The European 
Convention of Human Rights was seen as particularly relevant.162 7628 The Court put emphasis on the 
right of defence.1629
Concerning the principle o f the ”inviolability o f home'1, the Court maintained that 
even if it is a fundamental principle in the Community legal order "common to the laws o f the 
Member States in regard to private dwellings o f natural persons", the same was not true with 
regard to undertakings. This is so because (referring directly to the comparative outcomes by 
Advocate General) there were "inconsiderable divergences between the legal systems in regard 
to the nature and degree of protection afforded to business premises against intervention by the 
public authorities".
Similar conclusions were drawn in relation to Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. The Court maintained that
"the protective scope o f that Article is concerned with the development of man's
personal freedom and mav not therefore be extended to business premises.
Furthermore, it should be noted that there is no case-law o f  the European Court
o f Human Rights on that sub ject. "163°
However, there was, in all the systems of the Member States (generality), a 
'minimum protection’. In all the systems, there was a demand for a legal basis for the interference, 
and the intervention was not to be arbitrary and disproportionate. This was considered to be a 
"general principle o f  Community Law". Furthermore, the rights of the undertakings were to be 
ensured by the obligation of the authorities to specify the purpose and the subject-matter of the 
investigation.
These general principles were to be applied in the case. Furthermore, there was also 
an argument to this effect put forward in the case law.1631 Moreover, the idea, expressed in
1626 Case 46/87 and 227/87 Hoechst AG v Commission, (1989) ECR 2859  (21 September 1989).
1627 Referring to case 4/73 Hold v Commission (1974) ECR (Judgment 14 M ay 1974).
1628 Referring to case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable o f the Royal Ulster Constabulary (1986) ECR 1651 
(judgment 15 May 1986). Some analysis, Galmot, Y., 1990, p.257 ff. This case dealt with the equality between men 
and women and the interpretation on the basis o f general principle.
1629 Referring to case 322/81 Michelin v Commission (1983) ECR 3461 (9  November 1983) para 7, and 155/79 5  
v Commission, (1982) ECR 1575 ( 18 may 1982).
,wo The Court thus mentions the non-existence o f the case law.
,6JI Case 136/79 National Panasonic (1980) ECR 2033 (26 June 1980).
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competition provisions, was to ensure competition in the market, to prevent violations of the 
public interest, interests of individual undertakings, and consumers, and the maintenance of the 
general system.
After the examination of the facts and claims, the Court dismissed the applications, 
and found that the Commission had not violated these principles.
Similar observations were made in two other cases, decided on the same day, which 
dealt with the same subject matter.1632
Some analysts; a principle of individual protection vs. protection of business premises? 
Underpinning the argumentation of the Advocate General, there was a systematic study of the 
laws of the Members States and the European human rights system. This was reflected also in the 
Court decision. There was a quite careful and extensive study undertaken of different laws, not 
only in relation to analogies with competition matters. The study was independent
The extension of the explicit analysis was remarkable. Constitut ions were explicitly 
cited, and all countries were studied. Furthermore, the source structure consisted of laws, case 
law, dogmatic observations, and even some systematic connections (eg. to UK). Furthermore, 
some “grouping” was proposed. Furthermore, direct references were taken from certain systems.
On the other hand, no contextual interpretation was applied, and there was a use of 
a fairly "weak" doctrine of legal sources. No travaux préparatoires were used. The quality of the 
analysis was based on the institutional approach. A type of idea of legal sources was applied. In 
this sense, the analysis was traditional.
Consequently, it was not really a surprise that the analysis resulted in a “disparity”
conclusions.
The connection between the comparative observations and the general 
argumentation is, however, interesting.
The argumentation departed from the analysis of the rule and norms existing in the 
regulation by the Council, which explicitly gave authority to the Commission to investigate. Be­
cause there was a dispute as to the extension of this investigating power, the Court had to look 
into the principle and conceptual context of the case. The Court thus studied the conceptual 
context.
The Court seemed to examine the principled context in a following way. First of all, 
it maintained that there is no "common principle of inviolability of the home” which could apply 
also in the case concerning companies within Member States. It is noteworthy that the principle 
was not interpreted to be part of the Community legal system as such. The principle common to
1632 Joined cases 97/87, 98/87 and 99/87 Dow Chemical Iberica SA and Alcudia. Empresa para La Industria 
Quimic and Empresa Nacional dei Petróleo SA v Commission of the European Communities (1989) ECR 3165 (17 
October 1989), and case 85/87 Dow Benelux nv, formerly Dow Chemical (Nederland) bv v Commission o f European 
Communities (1989) ECR 3137 (17 October 1989).
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Member States system was to be respected. It was, in this sense, "external" to the Community 
legal order.
The Court noted that there are no objections to having the principle of inviolability 
of home as part of the Community legal order. However, for the above-mentioned reasons the 
Court found it necessary to limit its applicability in connection to company activities in the 
Community context. Instead, companies receive other types of protection against illegal 
interference.
It is interesting to note that the Court maintains that the inviolability of home be­
longs to the protection of the fundamental rights of the individual within states, and that it refused 
to grant similar protection for companies.1633 If application of the principle could be done, the 
system would arrive at problems concerning the relationship between companies and the 
individuals in future cases and in legal protection in general.
This idea can be backed up also by the idea o f the objectives of competition law as 
whole. Namely, the objectives and aims o f the Community system, by and large, can be 
interpreted as dealing primarily with the protection of the individuals against the misuses of 
different dominances in the market. For this reason, there is no room for the similar protection of 
individuals and companies. This interpretation can be maintained, although the Court argues, on 
a comparative basis, that protection cannot be analogized to companies, because ”there are no 
inconsiderable divergences between the legal systems o f  the Member States in regard to the 
nature and degree o f  protection afforded to business premises against intervention by the public 
authorities" and that the interpretation "is not incompatible with the interpretation o f the Article 
8 o f the Human Rights Convention". These comparative observations seem to support the 
objectives of Community competition law.
Consequently, we could claim that the comparative arguments presented in this case 
support a principle, that a company cannot be given the same protection of information as an 
individual. This seems to be the "rule by comparison", to which the acceptability o f the 
comparative arguments are reflected. This is the implicit principle embedded in the case. One may 
say that, in this case, the comparative observations are interacting with a kind o f a general 
principle of individual protection. This principle is embedded in the argumentation on the aims of 
the European system and competition law. This principle confirms that the individual is 
considered legally to be the basic object of protection by Community law. Corporations cannot 
be interpreted as being in the same situation as the individual in the protection of the private 
sphere. The analogy between the company and the individuals cannot be made because then the 
Community would equalize the individual and the company. That would generate an unbearable
1633 ”jh e protective scope o f that Article is concerned with the development o f  man’s personal freedom and may 
not therefore be extented to business premises. Furthermore, it should be noted that there is no case-law o f the 
European Court o f  Hitman Rights on that subject. **
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conflict between legal interests. It would be impossible to interpret the "protectionist" measures 
with this kind of analogy. There would be a fundamental collision embedded within the situation.
Furthermore, as the Advocate General notes, the protection of individuals by 
reference to basic principles must be respected by the Community. The principles of individual 
protection are superior principles at the Community order. In this sense, the legal protection of 
undertakings must be accomplished by other means.
It appears as if the comparative reasoning, in this case, appears as a kind of 
’contrastive* reasoning. Through comparative observations it was possible to justify the decision 
o f  the "applicability” of the principle of inviolability of home. Legally it would be problematic 
only to refer to the principle o f individual protection and to an abstract "possible conflict" 
between the two spheres of actors in the Community system. This way it was possible to maintain 
the balance between the different spheres of interests, and, at the same time, implicitly the 
superiority o f individual protection in principle. This idea cannot follow solely from the aims of 
competition law, but it must be derived from the general aims o f the Community system as a 
whole, because the interpretation is dealing with very fundamental principles of the Community 
law.
Here we may recognize some kind of a structuration and hierarchization of the 
norms of the Community system1634.The idea that the inviolability o f home does not apply to the 
companies is an indication of “the internal structural principles" o f the Community system.
4.3. Functional comparative reasoning: th e  “hard  case”  IV (Kalanke
in the European Court of Justice):: culture, the use of th ird  law, 
constitutional generality, rejection o f legislative generality, 
comparison by opposites, com parability, substantive equality
G eneral remarks. The Kalanke case dealt with the quota regulation adopted by a German 
federal state (Bundesland) and its compatibility with EC law1635. The question was about the 
possibility for national legislation to give priority to women in recruitment based on a quota
1634 For some remarks on the aims o f European Community competition policy, compared with the United States 
approach, on the social and human demands and, recognition also a non-economic values at stake, see Hawk, P.E., 
U nited States and Common Market anti-trust, A comparative guide, 1990, p .7 ,10.
These are, for example, political and sociological concerns for individual traders, fairness in the market 
p lace , equality o f  opportunity for all commercial operators, legitimate interests o f  users, workers and consumers (in 
general the consequences for national social systems), see Commission ninth report on competition policy (ibid., 1980, 
P -9-11).
1633 Case 450/93 Eckhard Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen (1995) E C R 1-3051, and the opinion o f the Advocate 
general Tesauro delivered on 6 April 1995.
The law applicable was the Bremen Landesgleichstellungsgesetz.
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system1636.
The German Court, when asked for a preliminary ruling was, on the other hand, 
dealing with the fact that a female person (with the same qualifications as the male applicant) had 
been appointed to the post in the administrative department of Bremen City1637.
The interpretation was of the Directive on Equal Treatment, which provided the 
derogation from the strict equality principle in a case "removing existing equalities which affect 
women's opportunities in the areas referred in the Article 1(1)”. Article 1(1), on the other hand, 
refers to employment policy. The problem was, basically, how one should interpret the idea of 
"measures to promote equal opportunities fo r  women"16™.
The Council recommendations1639, concerning affirmative action in equality cases, 
recognized also the Article in question and the need for action where attitudes, behaviour and 
structures in society are oppressing women.
The main legal question was, consequently, what type of derogation the national 
legislator can make from the strict rule o f equality based on the Article 2(4) o f the directive1640.
C om parative law as an  acceptable and  non-acceptable legal basis. The Advocate General 
rejected some comparative law observations in his analysis of the case:
'7 am also conscious that a position different from the one which I regard as the 
correct one would he supported. not only hv the legislation which is the subject o f 
the main proceedings, hut also bv a number o f  measures adopted in Member 
States o f the Community and in non-member countries in order to guarantee, for 
their part too, not equal opportunities hut an equal share o f jobs”
Nevertheless, 1 consider that I  can and 1 must resist the temptation to follow  the 
trend, convinced as 1 am, and firm ly so, that I  would have to follow  it, and propo­
se that the Court should fo llow  it, only i f  1 agree that were the right direction to 
take”.
At the time of the case, these affirmative measures were in force, in one form or 
another, in at least France, Denmark, England, Germany and in its states, and apart from
1636 In case women were underpresented, they w ere to be promoted or appointed instead o f male applicant, if the 
applicants had same qualifications.
1637 The case had been taken to the Arbeitsgericht (the Labour Court), to Landesarbeitsgericht (the State Labour 
Court), and to the Bundesarbeitsgericht (the Federal Labour Court), which asked for a preliminary ruling in realm of 
the Article 177 (the new Article 234) o f the Rome Treaty.
1638 The question was asked because o f  the interpretation of the Equal Treatm ent Directive (Council Directive 
76 /207/E E C  o f  9 February 1976 on the im plementation of the principle o f equal treatment for men and women as 
regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, OJ 1976 L  39/40).
1639 84/635/EEC of 13 December 1984.
1640 There are cases dealing with the question o f equality between men and women. Although in different contexts 
they still include strong comparative reasoning by the parties (case 248/83 Commission v Federal Republic of 
Germany (1985) ECR 1459 (Judgment of the Court o f 21 May 1985)). See also, Galmot, Y„ 1990, analysing Razzouk 
et Beydoun (1984) Rec 1526, F.N. V. (1986) Rec. 3853, Mac Dermott et Cotter (1987) Rec. 1468.
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countries such as Finland, Sweden, Norway. The last three had applied for the membership of the 
European Union, and had an extensive and constitutionally coherent systems of equality laws 
with provisions on positive discrimination1641.
On the other hand, the justification of the Advocate General had, as its basic 
comparative premise, the general constitutional principle o f equality (and the idea of comparative 
constitutional law). He notes:
"... it is also true that it is one which most affects the principle o f equality as 
between individuals, a principle, which is safeguarded constitutionally in most of 
the Member States legal systems. "
Both types of comparisons were extremely superficial and formal, and they were 
supported by subjective arguments.1642 Any deeper analysis was lacking.1643
Now, the quota norm was seen, by the Advocate General, as a positive and 
affirmative action. Consequently, he concentrated on the analysis of the affirmative action by 
taking into account the "country o f  its origin"1644, In comparative terms he explained that
"Affirmative action received its name in the United States from the Democratic 
administrations o f  the 1960*5, which utilized a typical judicial measure (until then 
affirmative action had been imposed by the courts o f employers responsible fo r  
discriminatory conduct) and made it into an administrative instrument....
In fact, quotas and goals are the two systems which have been used in the United 
States since the late 1960‘s to pursue the objective o f eliminating existing 
inequalities.... The case law o f the Supreme Court has consistently been hostile to 
the criterion o f strict quotas (see Regents o f  the University o f California v Bakke 
483 US 265 1978)... must be transitional (see United States Steelworkers o f 
America, AFL-CIO-CLC  v Webster 443 US 193 1979)...
In Europe, positive action has begun to take hold or, at any event, to become the
1641 See, for some recent studies, Schiek, D., Buhr, K., Dieball, H., Fritsche, U., Klein-Schonnefeld, S., M alzahn, M., 
Wankel, S., Frauengleichstellungsgesetze des Bundes und der Länder. Kommentar fur die Praxis zum 
Frauenfördergesetz für den Bundesdienst und zu den Frauenfördergesetzen, Gleichstellungsgesetzen und 
Gleichrechtigunggeselzen der länder, m it Beschäftigtenschutzgesetz, Köln, 1996, McCrudden, C ,  Equality in Law 
between Men and W omen in the European Community, United Kingdom. Commission 1994, Bertelsmann, K., Rust, 
U. L 'égalité juridique entre femmes et hommes dans la Communauté européenne, Allemagne. Commission of the 
European Community, 1994, Callender, R., M eenan, F., Equality in Law between Men and W omen in the European 
Community, Ireland. Commission 1994, Asscher-Vonk, L, Equality in Law between Men and Women in the European 
Community, The Netherlands, Cömmission of the European Community, 1995, Martins de Oliveira, T „  Equality in Law 
between M en and W omen in the European Community, Portugal, Commission of the European Community, 1995, 
N ielsen, R., Equality in Law between M en and W omen in the European Community, Denmark, Commission of the 
European Community, 1995.
In countries like Ireland, Italy, Spain, Greece, the Netherlands (where the discussion has been positive, 
however, and no obstacles has been seen constitutionally), no such provisions existed.
1642 "I am conscious...", MI must resist temptation...", "convinced as I am, and firmly so... ", "..right direction to 
take".
1643 In this sense, he does not consider constitutions from the point o f view o f discursive integrity.
1644 It must be remembered that this analysis seems to have a general importance from the point of view o f social 
policy considerations.
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object o f attention at the very time when affirmative action seems to be a state o f 
crisis in its country o f origin. Indeed, in the United States, recourse is now had to 
the criterion o f strict scrunity, whereby rules affecting a fundamental right can be 
justified only if they satisfy a compelling governmental interest (see, fo r  example 
City o f  Richmond v Croson 488 US 469 1989"
The analysis of the United States relied on the political historical context and 
tendencies in law, in the light of the case law of the United States Supreme Court. The reasoning 
was strongly value-based and teleological, and ironic style o f reasoning is even visible.1645
Furthermore, the Advocate General had an idea of ’perfection' of the formal equality 
principle found in the constitutions of the Member States. This takes place by introducing the 
idea of substantive equality1646.
’’Substantive equality” . In the argumentation of the Advocate General, the basic idea, related 
to the question of equality, seemed to be the idea of “elimination o f existing obstacles”. This way 
one could achieve equal opportunities. Affirmative action was designed to abolish obstacles 
usually by "granting preferential treatment", According to him, here a shift towards a "collective 
vision o f equality" takes place.
Positive action had, according to the Advocate General, several forms. In the first 
type, the conditions o f disadvantages are abolished with positive action. Causes of "less 
employment or opportunities" are abolished. These types of measures can be associated with 
vocational training and guidance. A second model aims more at the effective sharing of 
responsibilities (such as arrangement for working hours, fiscal measures etc).
These two types of approaches strive at achieving equal opportunities, and they 
lead to substantive equality. Substantive equality is not an immediate outcome, but requires a 
period of transition.
A third model analysed by the advocate General is the remedy compensating the 
inequality ("punitive"), which, according to the Advocate General, may be related to preferential 
treatment. This includes the systems of quotas etc. The idea is to achieve equal results. This
IMS "Democratic government...1', "...administrative instrument", "hostile”, "typical", "on the same time... it is .. in 
crisis in the country o f its origin
1M6 This is the doctrine behind the Italian constitution, for example, see Biscaretti di Ruffia, P., 1989, pp.829-834. 
This means that (Second paragraph of the article 3 o f the constitutution “è compito della Repubblica rimuovere gli 
ostacoli di ordine economico e sociale, che, limitando di fatto la libertà e l'eguaglianza dei cittadini, impediscono 
il pieno sviluppo della persona humana e l ’effettiva partecipazione di tutti i lavoratori all ’organizzazione politica, 
economica e sociale del Paese”. This article is meant to guarantee equality o f participation, which would be a 
guarantee for example, a minimum level o f social security. All remarkable social disparity is recognized to mean 
difficulties for the democratic functioning o f state (ibid, p.832).
See also, M arlines, T., 1981, pp.239-240.
It seem s that substantive equality in its Italian form is strongly related to the guaranteeing of an 
abstract “political potentiality” of a person in a pluralistic liberal society (ibid., p.240-241).
Crosa, E., speaks (1951) about this article 3.ii as uguaglianza dì fatto” (p. 158).
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seems to be problematic constitutionally from the point of view of the general principle of 
equality.
In all types of "positive action", as the Advocate General describes them, the 
general principle o f formal equality is affected. The question becomes whether the preferential 
treatment is acceptable from the point of view of the formal equality principle, and, for that 
matter, whether the concrete system of quotas is acceptable according to the directive's 
derogation clause. The Advocate General assumes, in this sense, that the directives’ derogation 
clause is in accordance with the principle o f equality.
The Advocate General departs from the strict formal equality idea, and goes on to 
discuss what is really meant by the concept of “equal opportunities”. The problem is whether "it 
means equality with respect o f  starting points or with respect to points o f arrival". Here the 
constitutional equality question and the positive action itself in its preferential treatment form (the 
third type of positive action in the analysis of the Advocate General) are intertwined.
The Advocate General claims that the idea of equal opportunities means putting 
people in "a position to be able to attain equal results... and restoring the conditions o f equality 
... as regards starting points" (“equal opportunities” means, in this sense, equal starting points). 
This relates, on the other hand, to the removal of existing barriers standing in a way o f the 
attainment of equal opportunities.
The construction presented by the Advocate General appears like the following:
Possible acts
of a person: results?
A
equal opportunities
A
Possible acts of the regulator:
Measures removing ---------> barriers
Assumed context:
preassumptions: barriers
[between groups: existing inequalities]
One notices that a regulative action requires two operations: identification of the 
barriers and their removal with suitable measures. We come later to this question.
On the other hand, the Advocate General refers also to a previous case of the
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C ourt1647 1648» ruled that special rights for women are not allowed because despite the measures 
"discriminatory in appearance they are in point o f fact intended to eliminate or reduce actual 
instances o f inequality, which may exist in reality o f social life". This case ruled out, from the 
scope of the derogation and the Community law,
"shortening o f working hours, advancement o f  the retirement age, obtaining leave 
when the child is ill, granting additional days o f annual leave in respect o f  each 
child, payment o f an allowance to mothers who have meet cost o f nurseries and 
the like and so on"[!?].
Consequently, the Advocate General argued that only those measures, which 
attempt to remove the obstacles from equal opportunities can be complied with. This is the idea 
o f "real and effective substantive equality", and the achievement o f "actual equality",648. Only 
discrimination in "appearance” is allowed
"in so fa r  as it authorizes or requires different treatment in favour o f women and 
in order to protect them with a view to attaining substantive and not formal 
equality, which would in contrast be the negation o f  equality"1649.
Furthermore, the Advocate General defines, in concrete terms, the available mea­
sures. First of all, measures related to eliminating the unfavourable biological conditions are 
allowed1650 *(?). Here the Advocate General confirms the idea that preferential treatment cannot 
be allowed only by considering "to all women as such'\ but only ”specific conditions o f
1647 Case 312/86 Commission v France (1988) ECR 6315.
1648 He remarks that “the ultimate objective is therefore the same: securing equality as between persons".
1M<This idea assumes a kind of a automatic realization o f  the norm. One could ask, why, then, does this m atter seems 
to  be structural, and why such strong measures are produced?
It appears as if  Advocate G eneral does not want to look a t the political development behind all these 
achievements. He concentrates only to the women/men perspective in an  isolated sphere. However, this is not the 
con tex t o f these declarations and provisions o f Community and national law. T he question is also about a  political 
balance and integrity, not about some kind o f a  philosophical balance and coherence. The Advocate General does not 
concentrate on the legal provisions as socio-political norms, but treats them  as cultural norms, which, I think, is not the 
point here.
Furthermore, one could claim that the question cannot be com pared so easily with the question o f the 
general equality o f persons. The general equality question cannot be analogized with the gender question. This 
p roblem atic feature is, as well, connected to  the idea o f using the positive discrimination analogy deriving from the 
U nited States practice.
The considerations of the general principle o f equality is highly problematic. In connecting the gender 
question to general equality one actually politicizes the question again. T he repolitization can be seen rational, but not 
from  the point o f view of the Community system and law.
T he stric t distinction between law and politics presented here by the Advocate General is very
interesting.
léso \y e come t0 the definition of biological conditions. The Advocate General speaks about "pregnancy". That 
rem ains the only definition, the question about results o f the pregnancy in social life is not treated here by the AG. In 
general, his conception of the” biological” allows an extremely restricted scope o f  derogations.
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women"1651. Quotas are seen "irrelevant" from the point o f view o f the "substantive equality". 
Furthermore, the Advocate General maintains, referring to the previous case law, that measures 
o f organizing working hours, structures for small children, and other measures, which enable 
women to reconcile the "family and work commitments... with each other1,1652 are allowed1653.
The Advocate General sees the problems mainly in the fields of historical, cultural 
and social conditions (?), where one identifies disparity in educational and vocational training1654 *. 
Furthermore, the Advocate General considers the types of preferential measures as "com­
pensations fo r  the historical discrimination"
Consequently, the measures allowed in derogation from the directive were those 
which remove actual obstacles. One o f their characters is that they are temporary. The 
assumption in the quota system seems to be a long-term perspective.
The Recommendations of the Council seemed not to be a clear basis for another 
type of interpretation. The Advocate General uses also the doctrine o f "strict interpretation o f  
derogation from an equal right" and the "principle o f  proportionality”. Furthermore, the 
opinions of the Parliament and literature, which would support another type of conclusion, were 
not considered clear enough1656. He referred also to the agreement on social policy1657.
,6S1 Interestingly, "women’s conditions" can be separated from "all women as such”. Is it not so that "women’s 
conditions" are somehow connected to "all women as such"?
AG continues: "The rationale for the preferential treatment given to women lies in the general 
situation of disadvantage caused by past discrimination and the existing difficulties connected with playing a dual 
role". ("A dual role o f women"!!).
1632 This would seem to suggest, wrongly, that men are not doing also. This seem s to  relate to differences in social 
contexts.
1633 "Measures relating to the organization of work, in particular working hours, and structures for small children 
and other measures which will enable family and work commitments to be reconciled with each other”
1654 One interesting question related to education is; could it be possible that these educational measures actually 
reproduce the structural inequalities in the society?
1633 The problem is at this point in terms o f what society reference is made to.
1636 Court's reasoning emphasised the strict interpretation of derogations, which w as only one o f the questions dealt 
with Advocate General's reasoning. However, it is quite difficult to claim that the Advocate General's reasoning did not 
have an impact upon the Court's decision.
Furthermore, the influence is more visible from the discursive point o f view. "European" dogmatics 
has a tendency to look the decisions based on the argumentation by the Advocate General.
The Court does not seem to have a clear idea of the extension of the derogation. The Court's judgment 
is very short It states, basically, that quota regulation treats men and women differently. Consequently, it "involves 
discrimination on grounds o f sex” (Article 2(1) o f the directive). The derogation provided in Article 2(4) of the direc­
tive is "specifically and exclusively designed to allow measures which, although discriminatory in appearance, are 
in point of fact intended to eliminate or etc... actual instances of inequality which may exist in the reality o f social 
life. It thus permits national measures relating to access to employment, including promotion, which give a specific 
advantage to women with a view to improving their ability to compete on the labour market and to pursue a career 
on an equal... with men.”
Consequently, the derogation, according to the Court must be interpreted strictly. National rules which 
guarantee absolute and unconditional priority for appointment or promotion go beyond promoting equal opportunities.
It must be noted that the Court came to the same conclusion as the Advocate General without referring 
to  his analysis. Case Judgment o f the Court o f 17 O ctober 1995. Case C-450/93, EC R  1995 p.I-3051.
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Accordingly, the Advocate General came to the conclusion that the measures 
adopted by the federal state were not in accordance with Community Law.
Some analysis. The Advocate General claims, in this case, that the candidates (the man and the 
woman) had equal opportunities. In fact, the Advocate General claims that the candidates had 
equal opportunities merely because they were qualified explicitly as equal in the employment 
situation1658. On the other hand, he seems to suggest that therefore the measures were designed 
for aiming at an outcome, not to abolish barriers.1659
Here we recognize some problems. The Advocate General claims that, in this case, 
equal opportunities already existed, and that there were no barriers. This may be the reason, why 
he is able to claim that the legislator has thought of men and women as groups and concentrated 
on "numerical terms" to ensure an equal distribution of jobs as an outcome.
It is true that this appears to have occurred, if one starts from the fact that the 
candidates had been qualitatively evaluated as equal and that the decision was backed up by the 
quota requirements also that the result of the case was that the number of women increased in the 
organization. Against this background it is understandable, for example, why the Advocate 
General sees the measures related to education and vocational training more suitable to eliminate 
unequal opportunities.
However, the problem of the case does not lie in the individual case only. We are 
speaking about the acceptability of this types o f measures in general. One can easily fail to see the 
single case in question actually as a consequence of some more general measures of equality law
H ow  strong is the case law on substantive equality? It appears as if the doctrine o f the substantive 
equality has entered permanently to the work o f  the European Court. The doctrine has been referred by the Advocate 
General Tesauro again in the case 13/94 P v S and Cornwall County Council (opinion on 14 Decem ber 1995, ECR 
1996 2143), referring also to the case of (West) German Constitutional Court (BvefG, 11 October 1978, in N JW  1979, 
p.595 et seq.), and in the case 32/93 Carole Louise Webb v Emo Air Cargo (UK) ltd (opinion on 1 June 1994, ECR 
1-3567). Lately, referring directly to the idea of substantive equality defined in the previous cases, 400/95 Handels, og 
Kontorfunklionaeremes Forbund i Denmark, acting on behalf o f Helle Elisabeth Larsson v Dansk Handel & Service, 
acting on behalf o f Fotex Supermarked A/S and opinion o f M r Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 
18 February (Reference for a  preliminary ruling: So- og  Haldelsretten, Equal Treatm ent of men and women, Directive 
76/207/EEC , conditions governing dismissal, Absence due to an illness attributable to pregnancy or confinement, 
Absence during pregnancy and after confinement) (1997) ECR 1-2757.
Moreover, parties (case T-368/94 Pierre Blanchard v Commission (1996) ECR 11-41 ( Judgment of 
the Court of F irst Instance of 9 January 1996)), and Commission (case 132/92 Birds Eye Walls ltd. v Friedel M. 
Roberts (1993) EC R  1-5579 (Judgment of the Court o f  9 November 1993)) have been using it as an argument.
It may have to  be used in the case dealing with the reference for the preliminary ruling (easel 154/96 
Louis Wolfs v Office National des pensions (reference for the preliminary ruling from  the 11th Chamber o f  the Tribunal 
du travail, Brussels) OJ N o C -1 9 7 ,1996-07-06, p.12 (pending).
I6S7 M aastricht Treaty, Protocol No. 14.
1658 The Advocate G eneral states that having the sam e qualifications "implies in fact by definition that the two 
candidates have had and continue to have equal opportunities: they are therefore on an equal footing at the starting
block".
1659 Note the transfer from  the general analysis to the individual case!
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previously enacted to abolish the structural inequalities in society between groups.
One could claim that the analysis should have been, instead, based on the 
assumption that the legislator had in mind the general features o f the relationship between the 
groups and their employment in the design of the general legal measures1660, and that these 
measures had their political and socio-cultural backgrounds. One could claim, for example, that 
if  no preferential treatment provisions (based on attitudes and political conflict resolution) had 
been available, there could have been no consideration, like in the employment situation there 
was, of any right to equal treatment. Then the case would have been only a matter of choosing 
between two candidates. However, in this type of situation, if structural inequalities exist and 
they could prevail, the man would have been chosen.
The Advocate General seems to suggest that the aim of the legislator, in 
establishing quotas and preferential treatment, is only to fulfill the quota, and not to balance the 
structural inequalities ("numerical terms", "punitive measures,r). However, one has to note that 
the quota in this type o f regulatory measure, in general, is not the main aim itself, but a criterion 
o f  evaluating the outcomes of the appointment and promotion policy in an organization and in 
society in general.
Consequently, one could claim also that the Advocate General, consciously or 
unconsciously, interprets the situation himself in numerical terms (which is quite formal 
approach), and fails to see the aim of the legislator in removing, in group terms, existing and 
identified inequalities. On the other hand, he may see that the cultural and contextual structural 
inequalities recognized by the legislator are some kind of an "illusion".
However, the real problem in his reasoning seems to be the fact that he moves the 
individual case to the interpretation of more general legislative measures and their intentions.
However, the Advocate General notes that also the results have to be taken into 
account to a certain extent. The substantive consequences could not always be attained only by 
a "equal footing" approach. The Advocate General finds, in his analysis, that it may be the social 
structure which results in unequal treatment. Relating this to the case he maintains that woman 
could have been set aside because of "social" (informal) reasons, even if she has similar qualifica­
tions. Then he seems to pose the question as to whether this consideration of the results would 
be in accordance with Community law? In other words, the Advocate General seems to ask 
himself whether informal social reasons can be valid in considering the outcome.
Here he seems to make the inductive fallacy again. The Advocate General seems to 
think that the informal reasons are the informal reasons o f the case, not the informal reasons of 
the legislation in general. One could claim, for example, that, in the legislation, the reasons are 
not informal ( as the political discourse in general), but they can be also formal, where, for
1660 It seems that the Advocate General does not consider important the democratic political bargaining processes 
and the contextual thinking of the legislator.
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example, the "travaux preparatoires" may be used as a source of legal reasoning.
In conclusion, from the argumentative point o f view, the recurrence of the idea of 
the "substantive'' in the Advocate General’s argumentation seems to diminish its persuasiveness. 
The constant repetition seems to indicate, and perhaps rightly so, that no real idea o f the subs­
tantive is communicable. On the other hand, the final analysis does not communicate anything on 
the acceptability of the general positive discrimination measures, which idea may, to a certain 
extent, be accepted. However, while the Advocate General seems to refer only to the possibility 
o f "situational" positive actions in the realm o f promotion and appointment, his argumentation 
seems to suggest that no structural inequality "really" or actually exists or that the structural 
inequalities, which exist, can be maintained.
Furthermore, as maintained, the Advocate General seems to have made an inductive 
fallacy in the argumentation. Namely, he does not take into account that the equality of 
opportunities, evidently existing between two applicants in the case, can be a consequence of 
many factual and socio-psychological determinants. This will be analysed below.
Com parative generalities and the paradox. In point o f fact, what we are facing here is 
generality at two levels; some generality of legislation in Member States (legislative)1661, and the 
comparable and general constitutional rule of equality (adjudicative). Now, what the Advocate 
General proposes seems to be a test of generality of laws in relation to the generality of the 
principle of equality. He has two level comparative arguments in use.
Because, according to the Advocate General, they are in conflict, to a certain 
extent, he actually "finds", against all odds, a comparatively general paradox in the legal systems 
o f some Member States. This is why he is forced to extent his argumentation in order to justify 
the rejection of the generality o f laws. Those laws have been made in support of the 
corresponding constitutional principles (democracy, equality).
By this extended argumentation, the Advocate General starts to determine an 
"institutional" principle o f equality as a basis o f the justification (i.e. political dimension)1662. He
,66lWhat we are facing here, in the explicit rejection o f the generality in legal systems, seems to be also a rejection 
o f the political philosophy of the tradition of com parative law. On a philosophical basis, the Court neglects the material 
solutions made by the national parliaments on the promotion of the equality of sexes.
In this case, we are facing the question about a conflict between two levels of community law; the 
national and the Community level. The question becom es ultimate a m atter o f defining the competence, and a matter 
o f subsidiarity, in a  strictly normative sense. In other words, the reliance is not any more in the subsidiary nature of 
"coherence" o f a national system, the national system(s) as legally regulated sources, subsidiarity based on moral 
incomparability, etc, but the analysis is explaining the basic philosophy o f the system as it is attempting to maintain its 
competence in one field o f law, social policy.
1662 There seems to be a  genuine conflict between legislative and adjudicative integrity. The fact that the comparative 
legislative generality is neglected on the basis o f socio-philosophical arguments shows, that the question is about this 
kind o f conflict Here we are now not speaking about a  relationship between normal "legal" interpretation and their 
semantic-normative conflict, but rather a conflict, which evidently has to  do with basic values.
This fact can be explained by the role o f comparative arguments. The comparative value is interpreted
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actually acts as an interpreter of the constitutions, as a kind of a constitutional court. However, 
at the same time he reads something into the idea of this principle and constitutional traditions, 
against the idea of transitivity (i.e. the internal paradox of constitutional systems). He also makes 
use of, in order to support his argument, external (third law) arguments and analysis. He uses the 
a "third law" the US law to support his "institutional interpretation" of the equality principle. 
They are presented by a form of analogical interpretation, and by an enlargening interpretation.
The comparative "generality" arguments and third law arguments, in the Advocate 
General’s justification, reveal the institutionally instrumental thinking concerning constitutional 
law. From the justification one can note, that the normative message in the argumentation is that 
the abolition of this type of positive discrimination is considered necessary, despite any 
circumstances and the legal integrity of any system. It seems to be, according to the Advocate 
General, fundamentally against European law principles1663.
Substantive equality as a cultural argum ent. The Advocate General's strongly principled 
interpretation leads also to a conclusion that it is determined by the cultural background of the 
decision-maker. This conclusion is supported also by some ideas presented by the Advocate 
General.
The Advocate General claims, for example, that discriminatory measures are "as 
unlawful today fo r  the purposes o f  promotion as they were in the past'X?). Furthermore, some 
"normative cultural" premises come up in the following way:1664
"In the final analysis, that which is necessary above all is a substantial change in 
the economic, social and cultural model which will certainly not be brought about 
by numbers and dialectical battles which are now on the defensive"1665.
In this sense, the justification seems to suggest revolutionary tendencies, for 
example, from the point of view o f welfare thinking.
T h e  limits o f law. There is also an explicit reference to the “limits o f  /aw” idea in this case1666. 
On the other hand, one could also claim that because the comparative generality is neglected as
against another value, which is, on the other hand, based on a more philosophical analysis o f the nature o f equality. Here 
the equality does not correspond with the value represented by the legal systems. T he second level analogy between the 
Community system and the general practices o f the States does not “fit” . The value, in this case, seems to be based on 
the "autonomous" philosophical considerations related to the fundamental social context o f the arguer.
1663 There could exist an extensive comparative study that has been made concerning these systems. However, in the 
context o f Court working methods, one can doubt whether any really socially coherent study has really been effected.
1664 One could claim that the Advocate General also attempts to give, in his justifications, some directives for the 
further interpretation o f the Community law.
1665 What is this cultural change? W hat would be then the structure o f  this system ?
,666Advocate General maintains:"Moreover. in this saying this [referring to the acceptability o f the measures, para 
287 /  am not referring only to the limits o f  the law"
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a normative premise, one goes beyond the limits of law in this way as well1667.
This “limits o f  law” reference by the Advocate General is interesting. He seems to 
recognize the value-based nature of the situation, i.e. the fact that there is a choice between two 
general levels (i.e. state and European level). Undoubtedly, the limits of law, in this case, are 
related to the choice between two orders on the basis of cultural and value-based premisses'66®. 
Moreover, one of the main limits in European law seems to be related to the relationship between 
men and women.
In conclusion, the recognition o f the “limit o f law” seems to be related to the 
question of how the modem constitutional (functional) legal system can be seen from the point 
of view of Community law (or in general) and what types of “comparative” alternatives we could 
construct on the basis o f socio-philosophical inspections. This relates to conceptions of European 
comparative constitutional law and to the comparative descriptions o f European legal cultures. 
The question is associated also with fundamental institutional arrangements o f European law 
related to these types o f functional fields of law1669. Furthermore, we could predict that this may 
result in legal, at least functionally legal, subsidiarity. Regulation of this type of relationship might 
be left to the realm o f orders other than the European legal order, though it would be directly 
related to market regulation.
Functional law. We have suggested that the Advocate General departs from the legislative 
(positive) integrity of law, does not keep his distance from constitutional traditions, and ends up
ml One of the problems o f comparative generalities, in the case, is related also to  the instrumental nature o f the law 
in these "social" situations.
We may note that the Advocate General is using a reference to comparative generality. It seems that 
the Advocate General is m aking an over-generalization. This type of argument seems to reflect more his “tertium 
comparationis ", i.e., ideology, than a judgment based on the analytical research. T he idea of substantial equality refers 
to practical idea of equality. T h is practicality is, however, this decision contextualized. In contradiction, every material 
idea of equality requires its construction on the basis o f existing laws and rules of a  legal system. That type of equality 
is generalizable as a  legal rule.
It looks as if every time the legal language refers to concepts like freedom or other extreme abstractions 
("substantive equality"), we are dealing with the philosophical system, which is referring, on the other hand, to the idea 
o f  the stability of a  persons w orld picture and coherent form of life. That is argumentation by authority. O n the other 
hand, we can claim that the argumentation is, however, connected to  something permanent. A t this stage the legal 
research  becomes part o f  the anthropological studies. W e may start to find the explanations from the personal 
backgrounds. (For some analysis, see also, Sacco, R., 1991, p.5., also W eiler, 1998, p.p.44 ff.)
,6M One of the m ain ideas reflected in this case is the "mate" situation in European law. Namely, it looks as if  there 
are problems in regulating m ore specifically the relations and positive discrimination in the Community level, because 
o f political and legal-systematic problems. At the same time, regulation made at the national level seems to  be a priori 
unacceptable. W hat is then the way legally to deal with this?
For the changing situation, however, see below.
I6wln a case o f philosophical autonomy, we are coining to the edge o f legal constitutional culture as such. Here we 
are  faced with really hard cases. Here takes place a  disclosure of a "social theory" of law. Here the European 
Community system comes from  the possibility (via analogy with states) into the field of necessity (claiming not a 
"descriptive" non-comparability, but "normative” one). European law has to interpret here its own prem ises, and where 
the states as a possible source o f law. Here takes place the interpretation o f the European constitution.
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in the field of the functional application of law. This way we end up with different approaches to 
the functionality o f law. We may start to identify, in European legal culture, different forms of 
functional approaches to law.
We may notice that the functionality approach for the Advocate General seems to 
be related to the deregulative approach, which intends to transfer the discourse on structural 
inequality to another level of regulation than the state law, towards “informal” measures.
We may wonder if this is the solution for the structural inequalities in society. Isn’t 
it so that normative involvement occurs anyhow at some functional level? In other words, the 
deregulation of one level encourages regulation at some other level (via some other type of 
regulation).
On the other hand, from the point of view of the positive legal system, we clearly 
recognize the attempt to separate the regulatory relationship between the legal systematic and 
more informal level.
It is evident that there is an attempt, in this case, to reproduce one type of approach 
to the functionality of law. It does not seem to be allowed, legally, to maintain systematic 
arrangements, which create "artificial inequalities in order to "correct" the social relationships" 
(between men and women and perhaps between some other groups of people as well).
This type of idea may lead to a comparative legal culture, where these types of 
positive actions cannot be comparatively identified.1670
A systematic interpretation? One could claim that the idea of substantive equality expressed by 
the Advocate General refers to the reflexive nature of European law. The decision based on the 
doctrine of substantive equality has to be seen as an expression o f a non-generalizable norm. This 
can be explained in the following way.
The recognition of the problem expressed by the German Court, in the realm of 
Article 177 (the new Article 234) of the Community Treaty, seems to be a recognition o f the idea 
that the law of the German “Land” is contrary to the general principles of law. The German 
Court seeks the solution of the European Court in reorder to solve the problem, because the 
internal measures (constitutional provisions and textual and contextual interpretations) cannot 
justify the deviation from a strict interpretation of the law. The answer to the question by the 
Community Court is clearly a recognition of this "problem situation".
s '
One may end up with a "reflexive concept" because, as we will see, in some other 
the Member States at the moment, there is no need to apply the general principle of equality to 
positive discrimination measures, because the laws effected by the Parliaments concerning 
positive discrimination are seen to be "constitutional" within these systems. The laws, in
1670 One may maintain, for example, that according to this kind o f social ideology o f the European law, certain social 
rights do not belong to the constitutional essentials o f the system (Rawls).
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democratic systems, represent the "substantive" and political integrity of the system'671.
Consequently, it seems that the comparatively general constitutional principle of 
equality is an insufficient legal basis, at the European level, for a general prohibition against 
positive discrimination in all the Member States.
In conclusion, it can be suggested that the European Court, in this example, is more 
interested in the particular procedural problem-solving, in the particular legal system asking the 
question, rather than in the general applicability of the European norm.
The decision of the European Court could be, consequently, left, as a substantive 
legal decision, to the realm of the polycentric and reflexive idea o f  European law, where the law 
is relativized on a situational basis167 672.
Epilogue I: S tructural inequality. The reasoning o f the Advocate General establishes the 
grounds for various types of questions. One of the most interesting is the idea o f structural 
inequality and informal reasoning in the society and its regulation.
Equal opportunities for female applicants, in general, could be seen as a result of 
the fact that there have already been, in the promotion processes etc., preferential measures 
taken. In general, preferential treatment may put women in the situation where they have equal 
opportunities available and they are able to show their equal qualifications.
On the other hand, we could claim, from the socio-psychological point o f view, that 
women may see their opportunities in the labour markets more realistically, if there is favourable 
attitude expressed in the legislation, apart from political and socio-cultural spheres. This way, 
they may apply for jobs, which, in the case of non-existence of the preferential treatment, would 
be seen somehow, to be necessarily as “mens jobs”.
Furthermore, the idea that the promotion by "education and training" is the sole 
basis of equality may be contested. Namely, it seems that training etc., is usually undertaken by 
persons in order to realize some of the career plans, consciously or unconsciously. Training that 
does not relate to any plans does not seem to be beneficial training at all. Because of this, women 
may not choose to take part of any training because they do not see any real possibilities for the 
realization of their plans. Any choice of training and must be optimal and in accordance with the 
aim pursued.
In fact, one could even claim that women, not having realistic support from society 
in the form of strict measures of legislative and political processes, for example, may turn instead 
towards men-dominated structures (“men’s society”) and start to treat such structural inequalities
1671 The idea is that women and men, for example, can be substantively equal in different ways. One possibility seems 
to be a 'natural' equality based on a group identity, another perspective stresses more the discursive equality. The latter 
stresses more the processes in achieving the equality.
1677 The problem of any comparatively reflexive system, using the substantive argument, is transformation of the 
political reflexivity into institutional reflexivity based on interpretation by its internal professional principles.
as opportunities as such (self-instrumentalization). In this case, women may begin to determine 
their "life-plans' based on the men’s preferential treatment, and attempt to benefit from this by 
choosing a "life-plan" which can guarantee them the (even very basic) social status which they 
want to have. This may lead to reinforcement of certain types of social structures.
We can develop this idea further. It may be that men also start to orient themselves 
away from this developing "female social structure", like, for example, from emerging female 
"family life" and other "non-organizational" activities. This may take place because their 
opportunities seem to be determined only by their possibilities for participation in organized 
social life.
On the other hand, the "cumulation" effect can be visible. The organizations with 
preferences for men may start to increasingly accentuate this phenomenon with the outcome of 
increasing alienation of men from other activities other than that organization. Here we face a 
development towards a highly organizationally structured society. This type of phenomenon is 
visible for example in post-industrial societies, where strongly alienated forms of organization 
demanding unconditional working hours and the demand for relocation appear. In this way the 
distinction between groups such as men and women, deepens., especially, if no corrective 
measures are available. The cumulative effect is, in this sense, the increasing loss of possibilities 
for both men and women. This is conditioned "externally" and is not based on discursive forms 
of ’life-planning".
On the other hand, "women" (in the strong group identity sense) may organize 
themselves in the "external" sphere of socio-organizational life, whereas men lose their 
possibilities for turning back to the non-organizational forms of social cooperation. On the other 
hand, auto-justification, by both groups, turns out to be about the deviating roles in society. They 
both attempt to justify their role in their own spheres of their social activity. This may destroy all 
possibilities for discursive compromises between these groups, in both the private and political 
spheres, and lead to political and social conflict.
We may also maintain that one of the aims of equality legislation is also to 
guarantee the existence of certain types of female perspectives in public organizations, which 
otherwise could be excluded on the basis of prevailing attitudes.1673 In other words, the question 
may not be only a matter of equality between men and women, but also between different types 
of female perspectives within the public organization. Discrimination may not be exercised only 
by men, but, for that matter, by women preferring those women’s perspectives which maintain 
the structural inequality. It is a fact that the real-value perspectives from women's emancipatory 
movements appear rather from the group of women who are strongly active in the political sense,
1673 On differences between women, Nieminen, L , 1996, pp.30-31.
This is also related to the fact that it is not only women, which may defend women’s rights, but it can 
be also men who do it.
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rather than those organizing their life on the basis of prevailing societal structures1674.
To conclude, it seems that the clear aim of equality legislation of this type, in 
general, is to guarantee the security and predictability of female employment in the labour market 
and in this way to prevent situations of absolute choice (between career and non-career). This 
would be only encouraged, if stressing the importance o f education as a basis for the equal 
opportunities in the labour market1675. On the other hand, it may function also as guaranteeing 
different perspectives in general in public organization.
Epilogue II: a  vertical comparative analysis. The starting point of the "vertical" analysis is the 
observation of made by Finnish constitutional Committee on the relationship between positive 
discrimination and the constitutional principle of equality in the realm of the enactment of the 
"Law on the Equality between Men and Women"1676:
"According to Article 9A. o f  the Law on Equality Between Men and Women, one 
cannot consider as discrimination those plan-based measures, which are aiming 
at a realization of the objectives expressed in this law in practice. The purpose of 
Article 5 o f the Constitution, expressing the general equality norm, has commonly 
been considered to be the prevention o f actions which place citizens or groups o f 
citizens in a relatively better or worse position. The Constitutional Committee has 
on different occasions expressed the opinion that the general equality principle 
does not presume that all citizens should be treated similarly in all respects,
1674 This idea is in accordance with the development of institutionalization and legalization of politics in 
contemporary society.
l67! The interesting fact is, similarly, that the aim of avoiding clear choice situations and guaranteeing the security of 
women in labour markets may also be based on an idea of cohesion of the legal system, provided by stressing the 
importance oflong paid maternity leave, which try to make the return to the labour markets possible even after longer 
periods of absence. M any obligations related to this may be directed to the employees in order to secure this type of 
legislative cohesion. Unfortunately, the liberalization and minimum regulation o f social policy and positive action is 
dim inishing this type o f thinking, and women, to avoid part time employment and insecurity, are obliged, in 
contem porary society, to  choose between career and the family, for example. This is more striking in the situation, 
where the rate o f employment increasing. It seems that, in modem society, these types o f consistencies can be designed 
only in political processes. Their maintenance does not seem to be possible by any premodem forms o f thinking, or by 
strict natural ideas of equality. (Some analysis of the social law coherence, Bogdan, M., 1996, p.5-6, and especially, 
Nieminen, L ,  1996, p.27 ff.).
Similarly, also a male may have to turn to his wife, for example, when he has go t no financial support 
from  private or public funds for finishing his Phd thesis after 4 Vi years. Another possibility is the bank and social 
security, which is used many times. This is one of the problems of strictly formal science policy. It suits to societies, 
where the life-plan realization is determined by overwhelming ambitiousness or maintenance of types of social 
structures.
1676 The Constitutional Committee of the Finnish Parliament, Helsinki, 13 M ay 1986. Statement nro, 1. 1986, p.3.
The Scandinavian constitutional tradition was not taken into account by the European Court. However, 
on interesting question m ay be asked in connection to this statement. Finland and Sweden joined the European Union 
from 1995, and accepted European case law in the form o f  "acquis communataire". Now, when accepting the case law, 
including also the Kalanke decision, did the Finnish government, for example, accept also the substantive equality 
decision unconditionally? O n the other hand, if  we could claim that the prevailing constitutional doctrine was different 
in Finland, was there a internal constitutional conflict already in place at the tim e of the accession? O n the other hand, 
could it be possible to apply a  European doctrine of such a kind "retroactively" in order to claim  the invalidity of the 
Equality law, and the invalidity of the Committee's statement too?
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unless (he relevant circumstances are similar. The Committee considered, in its 
Statement no. 1/1975 vp., that the improvement o f  welfare opportunities o f  a cer­
tain part o f the people, and that way the increasing o f societal equality, was not 
in conflict with equality, even i f  all citizens did not have similar possibilities to 
get, with equal conditions, the rights and benefits described in the statute. Because 
the realization o f  the equality between men and women, in practice, also by 
preferring the sex in weaker position, is based on the aim at increasing equality, 
the proposed statute [the law on the Equality between Men and Women] - in so fa r  
as it aims are concerned - is not problematic from  the point o f view o f Article 5 of 
the Constitution1677 *. The Committee pays attention, however, to the fac t that, on 
the individual level, the preferential treatment based on the plans [proposed in the 
law] may seem to constitute unreasonable discrimination. Because o f this, one has 
to pay  special attention to the absolutely undefinable nature o f  the concept o f 
"plan". This is why one should consider whether there is a need to regulate - sepa­
rately in the corresponding laws - the planned actions by the public institutions, 
and whether other types o f actions - based on the above mentioned plans - should 
require a priori acceptance o f the Equality Authority. "I67s
There is a distinction made between different welfare state cultures in Europe1679. 
This may be related, in turn, to certain questions.
The normative sphere of public “social” action (welfare policies etc.) is strongly 
related, in Western culture, to the questions of charity. This may be due to the fact that the strong 
social bonds, which are the underpinnings of social regulation, seem to be connected to some 
basic systematic normative presumptions1680.
1677 Preferential treatm ent is not, in principle, in conflict with the idea o f general equality.
im  This is the idea that further discussion and more specific compromises are needed in respect o f preferential 
treatment in public institutions.
See, for example, Kosonen.P., 1996, p.16-17, p.150-151, and R okkan.S ., 1981, and N iem inen,L., 1996, p.28 
ff. (referring to Esping-Andersen, G ., Three Worlds o f Welfare Capitalism, 1990 and his distinction between liberal, 
conservative, Latin, and social-democratic types of welfare regimes).
O n legal philosophical development in this century, see Strbmholm, S., 1980.
i6to socia| questions are related, because of the different scope o f pluralism, to different actors in  society. 
Furthermore, the religious systems in general, in western welfare history, have had their organized forms o f  care-taking.
The ideas on solidarity have had also its pre-Christian religious connotations in Europe. T he concept 
of "civilized nations" o f Roman thinking was connected strongly to the similarity o f religion (see W atson, A, 1993).
U se has been made on, Engels, F., Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang dcr Klassischen deutchen 
Philosophic [Ludwig Feuerbach ja  klassisen saksalaisen filosofian loppu, Helsinki, 1976], p.84 ff, Brunner, O., 
Sozialgeschichte Europas im M ittelaltem (Euroopan keskiajan sosiaalihistoria, 1958), pp. 142-143, Turner, P .S., Max 
W eber. F rom  history to modernity, Bo-Chiahsiar, Social discipline in the reformation. Central Europe, Le Goff, J., 
Medieval civilization, Robinson, O.F., Vergush, T.E., Gordon, W.M., An Introduction to European legal history, 1985. 
Sjoholm, E., Sveriges medeltids lagar. Europeisk rettstradition i politisk omvandling (Lund) 1988,, especially, pp.8-20, 
ed. Tiihonen, R., Supremacy. European model [Herruus] (Helsinki) 1994 ,1-II.
The history of trust in England seems to indicate that the changing role of capital had its relation to the 
emerging state based system during the 16th century reformation in England. Similarly in Scandinavia.
Some good examples of the Italian and comparative legal and political philosophy, discussion in the 
beginning of the century, Luzzatti, L , God in Freedom. Studies in the relationship between church and state (N Y ) 1930. 
Annexed with an extremely interesting discussion on the book (ibid., pp.527-560).
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We can maintain that the Nordic tradition of the welfare state has stronger historical 
roots than usually is proposed, at least in Finnish debate1681. The traditional approach to the wel­
fare state is usually connected to 19th century nationalism, which rightly brought it into the 
democratic consciousness in many countries1682. However, the formation of the ideology can be 
traced further behind, to the reformations in the 16th century.1683
We could say that the real differences in Nordic history as compared to the other 
forms of welfare histories is related to the fact that the state took over church functions, and 
these functions were integrated to the functions of the state1684. On the other hand, development 
since was characterized by lesser conflicts between the church and state, which was one of the 
basic issues in many other European countries, and is still (especially in United States and, for
l6*' Similarity between Nordic States, and the concept of Nordic, see Tragard, L., 1997, p .2 6 3 ,282. For the concept 
of Nordic and development, Osterg&rd, U, 1997, pp .29-71. On Nordic ties legally, see Zweigert, FC, K5tz, H., 1987, 
p .2 8 8 ,291,295.
1682 The role of Peasantry etc., TragSrd, L., 1997, p.257. Also Strath, B, Sorensen, 0 . ,  1997, p.7. The Scandinavian 
welfare state in general, see (ed.) Nordstrom, B.J., Dictionary of Scandinavian history, London, 1986, pp.625-627.
For som e considerations on the development in 19th century, see Wieacker, F., 1990, p .61.
It can be claimed that in Southern Europe the democratic duty and liberty have been associated strictly 
with the "intermediation" between religion and the secular power, whereas these concepts, in the northern part of 
Europe, have been part of the internal discourse inside the state or related to nationality. This can be one of the reasons 
why more instrumenlalized forms of social regulation have been accepted in recent history.
This can be associated with the idea that the state had strong economic role, which, moreover, 
increased in the age o f the nationalism. This caused different functional views o f the state to emerge the end of 19th 
century. We could, for example, claim that the liberal separation o f the state and religion resulted in a certain 
overemphasis of the pure liberal economic role of the state during that time. Furthermore, this type of economic-politi­
cal state had a tendency to involve matters o f the religious pluralism by propagandist means by claiming the identifica­
tion of the racial, religious and economic policies, as happened in the post-first world war Europe in many countries. 
The contrastive religious arguments got involved strongly with economic-political questions, both in "internal" and in 
international affairs. This was related to the strong discipline of the international legal-economic structures.
In Northern Europe, economic activity has not been so strongly connected to the religious questions 
internally, but in those states the religious homogeneity has been taken, in political terms, as a self-evident fact. In this 
sense, the functional forms of law have been developing in the realm of political state. This has also made it possible 
to unify many family law questions, whereas the integration in continental Europe has started on the basis of political 
and commercial integration.
1683 Thorkitdsen, D., 1997 (Religious Identity and N ordic identity), Ostergdrd, U ., 1997 (The geopolitics of Nordic 
identity, from composite states to nation-states. Political and religious characteristics), and Aronsson, P., 1997 (Local 
Politics, The invisible Political Culture, p.173 ff) .
This idea could explain, why the changes and deregulations seem  to be difficult for the Swedish so­
ciety, for example. In Finnish society the deregulation in political sphere seems to be easier, because the Finnish system 
was in 19th and 20th m ore or less a result o f the m odelling according to Swedish system. This type o f change in the 
reflexivity seems to be easier in a situation, where integration is strongly geared towards general European integration.
On the development in Scandinavia since 17th century, see Glendon, M.A., Gordon, M .W ., Osakwe, 
C., Nutshell, 1982, p.28. In general, Gallo, P. Grandi sistemi Giuridici, Torino, 1997, p.219 ff.
On the division in European economic and social structures since 1500, Sziics, J., 1996, p.15.
!6M Trag$rd, L, 1997, p.260. Also Nieminen, L., 1996, p.32.
R easonable distinctions are made according to the state, not on the basis o f  the religion. See also, 
Zweigert, K., Kotz, H.t A n Introduction to com parative law, n  ed., V ol n , Oxford, 1987, p.295. On the formations of 
states in general, see W ieacker, F., Foundations o f the European legal culture, p.49, in: European legal culture.
In England, and the catholic conception, see Jones, G., History o f the law o f  Charity 1532-1827, 
Cambridge. 1969, p.3-10
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example, in Italy)1685.
In general, what we can recognize here is that charity types of thinking in the field 
of social policy are more typical in the United States and in South European systems, whereas in 
the highly centralized state system in Northern Europe, political openness and efficiency thinking 
is more visible.1686 The Northern European systems can be seen as outcomes of particular type of 
political integrity and the concept of centralized political forces, which was not disturbed by the 
division between different conceptions o f ’’sovereignty’', the more democratic one, and the other 
more religious one, the latter stressing the importance o f liberal principle of non-involvement of 
the state to "social" and ethical affairs (the principle o f subsidiarity)1687.
These modem Nordic ideas can be, for that matter, related also to the gender 
questions prevailing in these countries1688.
The deregulation o f the welfare state is, consequently, not purely an economic or 
legal-political phenomenon in Nordic countries. We may say that It touches deeply upon the 
concept and idea o f a democratic state, if not even the sovereignty o f the democratic 
parliament1689. The deregulation o f the welfare state seems to be more easily achieved in strongly 
political or more liberal systems, where the forms o f welfare thinking are not so strongly 
anchored to the concept of state, or in the social-capitalist traditions. One could claim that in the 
United States, for example, the idea o f strong welfare policies has not been taken extremely
l6*s Trag&rd, L , 1997, p.260.
Concerning the reformation and law England, see M occia, L., 1981, p. 160-161. On the resistance to
“Reception” , ibid., p.164.
1686 See, Kosonen, P., 1996. On 19th century policy ideas related to charity in Sweden, see TrSgSrd, L , 1997, p.258. 
Centrality and functionality approach, idem.. No tested assistance idea ( ibid., p.254). Pragmatism in general, StrAth, 
B., Sorensen, 0 ., 1997, p.16. See as well, Zweigert, K., K6tz, H., 1987, p.288.
1687 For the idea o f social integrity in the Swedish context, see T ragird, L., 1997, p.273.
It is not difficult to see, why the basic rights did not achieve such an importance in the modern Nordic 
states as they did in France, or in contemporary Germany. They seemed to be the third dimension in the tense 
relationship between church and state, between the European "powers”.
One could also associate this, historically, with the early existence o f the agreements between the land- 
nobility and king. In fact, Northern European development lacks this type o f tension in any politically visible way.
,6W TragSrd, L , 1997, p .274 ,278
From the point of political history one make also the observations that, whether we are speaking about 
social movements in general or in particular gender movements, the northern countries have a more vivid history. The 
gender movements have been and are strong political movements. The questions o f equality and certain preferences are 
as well part o f the politically integrity o f  the system, which is not the case in southern countries (Gender and Politics in 
Finland (ed. Keranen, M., Aldershot) 1992). This is kind of a basis o f a  democratic political peace.
I6M Centrality o f State, Tragird, L., 1997, p .283, StrJth, B., Sprensen, 0 . ,  1997, p.6, also Zweigert, K., Kotz, H., 
1987, p.288, no formation analysis, though. N either in David, R., Brierley, J.E .C ., 1978, p .l 13.
On the post Maastricht welfare state, Bislev, S., European W elfare states: Mechanisms o f Convergence 
and divergence, EUI working papers 97/24, European University Institute, R obert Schuman Centre, 1997, p.2-. p .l 1, 
and democracy, p.26. Welfare state and European development, Rhodes, M., Globalization, Labour markets and welfare 
states: a future of 'competitive corporativism ', EU I working papers 97/36, European University Institute, Robert 
Schuman Centre, 1997.
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seriously because of the polycentric nature of the concept of the "political" itself1690.
The importance of the strongly established secularized state in Northern Europe is 
a phenomenon which importance is not stressed sufficiently when planning integrative actions in 
the European sphere1691. The parliamentary state as a socioeconomic actor, owing much its 
previous religious homogeneity and democratic development has generated forms of regulation 
incomparable to rest of the Europe. The idea of cultural homogeneity separated from the demo­
cratic state, prevailing idea in continental Europe, does not seem to have a strong role in tradi­
tional Northern thinking.
Against this background, one may see many problems in understanding the aims o f 
the European integration and deregulation. Namely, European integration stresses the importance 
of political, religious and even racial questions in economic integration. This must be seen in the 
context of continental history. The idea is the enforcement of equal opportunities in spite of these 
features. We could claim that these are the features which in a homogeneous Northern European 
context are recognized irrelevant because of the pragmatism of the political discourse, even if it 
is recognized that these distinctions are important for the European integration. However, social 
regulation deriving from the diverse historical context of the Northern European countries 
definitely has already given space to the continental type o f liberalization entering into the 
traditional forms o f Northern systems. As biproducts, we see artificial importance being placed 
upon the questions of race, religion and ethnic background.
To conclude, one can wonder whether the Nordic countries must give up their 
traditional forms o f welfare regulation and its integrity, or whether this type of comparative 
aspect will be taken into the European level discussion so as to maintain the idea. The latter alter­
native would be the best solution in order to maintain the coherence and discursive integrity o f  
European law in general1692.
1690 The United States can be seen as a constitutionally pluralistic society. Religion is not a reasonable distinction. 
Many questions in U SA  have been related, however, to the racial questions. These questions have enabled the legal 
actors to consider and reevaluate the question of social opportunities, when the pluralism has made obstacles to more 
"holistic" social regulation by the state (Brown case and the subsequent case law).
The United States’ system is an example of a system where the function of the liberal state is to secure 
the pluralistic society. It may be exactly due to this why unable to regulate welfare matters so profoundly. The "care* 
taking" systems seem to be part of the function of the liberal societal actors ("charity").
1691 Problems in European Union, see T ragird, L., 1997, p.284 ff., StrSth, B., Sorensen, 0 . ,  1997, p.23
1693 An exam ple o f  the analysis of the positive social political actions related to the nature of the social relations 
between men and women in Sweden and Finland, see Tyrkko, A, Anpassning mellan arbetsliv och familjeliv i Sverige 
och Finland, In: Dilemmaet arbetsliv, familieliv i Norden (ed. Bonke, J.) N ordisk Ministerr&d, TemaNord 1997:534, 
Socialforskningsinstituttet 97:5. The article represents the differences in Sweden and in Finland in relation to, for 
example, the working hours regulation, and the economic insecurity and opportunities for public employment, which 
result in more asymmetric relationships between m en and women in both family and working life (ibid., pp.142-143).
In the field of social regulation, one could also speak o f a "capacity" approach adopted in these 
countries (On the capacity approach, see Sen, A., Inequality reexamined, 1996).
The current discussion on the welfare state, in both political and legal spheres , seems to be contrary 
to its main idea. The idea of the welfare state is used as a justification for a more liberal approach, and the introduction
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Conclusions. What does the substantive equality really mean?1693
of the "social law" seems to diminish its role in the political processes as a practical phenomenon. The question seems 
to be either about the securing o f the some acquired benefits, or about their deregulation. The welfare state, however, 
seems to be a  politically functional phenomenon deriving its nature from democratic compromises and balancing. Any 
normative idea o f the welfare state seem s to be strange. The welfare stale is a political process, which does not get 
attached easily to any ideas of principles and construction type of legitimacy.
A curious phenomenon in the contemporary European development is that there seems to be a 
tendency to deregulate exactly those forms of regulation, which have proved to be the most successful in constructing 
a socially sensitive democratic national state. The tendency seems to be towards forms of regulation, which have proved 
to be problematic from the democratic point o f view.
In this connection, attention has been paid also to  the Judgment o f the Privy Council o f  The United 
Kingdom, case Mataleen v. Pointu (P.C.) 1997 Nov. 26,27; Dec. I; 1998 Fed., 18, W.L.R. 19, June 1998, p.18- 
(Appeal from the Suprem e Court o f Mauritius). The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Lord Hoffman. In 
this case, there is an extensive analysis o f the principle of equality, and its relationship to democracy. See especially, 
p.26-27.
1693 The idea o f substantive equality is a philosophical problem. The analysis of substance has a  long history 
(Leibnitz, Locke and Kant, see Abraham, W.E. Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 1992, pp.358-359, also Dizionario 
Enciclopedia EGH, 1931). Substance (substantive equality?) seems to something extremely resistant to change. In this 
sense, equality  would be a basic norm. However, the questions can be asked; equality of what? Any discussion on 
substantive equality without a criteria for its relevance other than “human nature" (substance or ratio) seems to 
instrum entalize, contrary to the ‘idea’ of substantive equality, human beings as a ‘thing’ to be discussed without a 
genuine relational attitude. Ultimately we are dealing with an idea extremely ideal in nature, perhaps about thye ultimate 
form of ideality and determinism. The question is about something which has content and meaning (and equality of 
that).
Etymologically history is interesting both from the Latin and Greek perspective.
Before the religious and scholastic interpretations were made, the substance was dealt by Aristotle. He 
saw it as something basic, essence and natural, divided into material and real (ens quod per se subsistit et sustinet 
accidentia). Justice is to treat alikes alike and unalikes unalike, according to their essential difference. This applies to 
people and things, and situations. The essentially is the problem. For example, the distinction between men and women 
was seen as essential in theory, as well in practice. We may say that, in this sense, there was a  ‘thing’ character of 
human beings.
This idea was later connected to the sholastic dotrine, based on many "spiritual" arguments on the basis 
o f the hierarchy. Scholastic interpretation saw it as something other than material (Giovanni Scoto Eriugena: "quod 
semper id ipsum est vera substantia dicitur", De div. Nat. vol I, p.65). For D escartes in the Principia philosophiae "Per 
sostanza non possiamo intendere altro che una cosa la quale esiste in modo da no aver bisognio di nessui altra cosa 
per esistere. E la sostanza che non ha proprio bisognio dialcuna cosa sipu'o intendere solo come unica, il che 'e 
Dio". If we make a distinction between the material and "thinking" type o f substance (spirito), we can ask, who's 
substance is it ( "res quae solo Dei concursu egent ad existendum ").
Spinoza described it as "per substantiam intelligo id quod in se est et per se concipitus (Ethics, Vol 
I, prop. Ill), because ”gacies infinitis modis variet tamen semper aedem " (Spinoza, Epistola, p.64).
Kant, by following the schotastic interpretation, discussed substance as an ultimate centre o f  force used 
in grounding change-producing actions and causalities. One could also make a  distinction between material substances 
and spiritual substances.
It has been also maintained that we may speak about physical arithmetic, something-I-know-not-what
(Locke).
M odern substance may be defined as the the "real nature” and "essence” o f the things. The idea 
prevailed through the centuries in the continental political, religious and legal thinking.
However, one may pose a question, or formulate it in another way, as to substantive equality. Could 
we say that the question is not about equality at all, but about inequality? In other words, the modem legal systems, in 
point of fact, create inequalities too, and also balances them (or, by it the inequalities, as its creation, are balanced in 
the political discourse). There are no modem legal system which would create equality (Olaus Petri: "the biggest justice 
is the biggest injustice"). The law is not relating to equality, but rather, to inequality and to the balancing inequalities 
in a politically integrative way. If we would have a principle of substantive equality, we would only have to wait for a 
“fire from heaven".
T o  see the balancing as historically "punitive" is too logical. The question is about the discursive
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It appears as if support for this type of principle cannot be found in the comparative 
political and legal sphere. There seem to be problems of the comparability of socio-cultural 
policies. It looks like the idea of substantive equality is related to a non-discursive and quite 
instrumentalist approach to law. The application of such principle seems to be related to a strict 
and logical principle of equality. The generality of this type of principle and its application are 
conditioned by the phenomenological idea o f law* 1694, which does not seem to comply with more 
reasonable applications of law.
On the other hand, the idea in Kaianke could be interpreted against the 
contemporary development towards governmental legislation in Europe. If this development is 
combined with the more political concept of gender equality, it could be true that this political 
type of equality could threaten and render unpredictable the whole idea of equality. In this sense, 
some protection of men could be preferable in the way the Advocate General suggested. Then the 
question is no longer about the discursive form of political equality, but a governmental and non- 
discursive form.
Furthermore, it has to be remembered that the political type of equality we have 
preferred is also combined with many other forms of legal regulation (coherence of legal system). 
If these types of regulations are increasingly deregulated, the basis of the political and discursive 
equality in national states is difficult to maintain.
In conclusion, the fact that more “procedural”, discursive, and reasonable 
approaches seem to be preferable also in Community law may be related to the recent “change” 
in the Kaianke/’doctrine” by the European Court of Justice. The Court explained the 
acceptability of the quota-system in relation to same legal measures as in the Kaianke case, in the 
following terms:1695
substance as a modem substance. Any informal and substantive equality which prevails societally, must be balanced 
w ith public and social considerations in order to avoid structural inequalities. This generates possibilities for a 
liberating approach to the instrumentalization of human beings.
1694 Responsa prudentum.
mi Case 409/95 Hellmut Marschall v Land Nordrhein- Westfalen (Reference for a preliminary ruling: 
V erwaltungsgericht Gelsenlichen, Germany, equal treatment of men and women, equally qualified male and female 
candidates, Priority for female candidates, Saving clause) (not published) (Judgment of the Court of 11 November 
1997).
Also O pinion of Mr Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 15 May 1997. By going through the 
previous case law, Advocate General Jacobs concluded, however, that the directive precludes such a priority provision 
of national law. He saw the case as being similar to the Kaianke case, contrary to  the argument presented by Austrian, 
Finnish, Norwegian, Spanish and Swedish governments, according to which in this case there was no absolute priority. 
He also referred to  the opinion of Mr. Tesauro, regarding the analysis o f ‘equal opportunity’.
A n interesting point was raised by  the French government. It claimed that the question is about 
preciseness o f the national provision. It maintained that the national provision seems to be against the legal certainty. 
This idea seems to be quite formal.
The Advocate General Jacobs recognizes the ‘com petence’ problem  in European policy formulations 
betw een the legislature and adjudication, and even proposes some kind o f a “margin of discretion" for the Member 
States. The idea remains, however, unclear.
N o com parative observations, like Kaianke, were presented. However, the parties referred
M“In paragraph 16 o f its judgment in Kalanke, the Court held that the national rule 
which provides that, where equally qualified men and women are candidates fo r  
the same promotion in fields where there are fewer women than men at the level 
o f the relevant post, women are automatically to be given priority, involves 
discrimination on grounds o f  sex.
However. unlike the provisions in question in Kalanke. the provision in question 
in this case contains a clause ( 'Offnungsklauselhereinafter 'saving clause') to 
the effect that women are not to be given priority in promotion if reasons specific 
to an individual male candidate tilt the balance in his favour.
It is therefore necessary to consider whether a national rule containing such a 
clause is designed to promote equality o f  opportunity between men and women 
within the meaning o f  Article 2(4) o f the directive”
and it continued after examining the Kalanke case and arguments put forward by 
several parties as follows:
“Unlike the rules at issue in Kalanke. a national rule which, as in the case in 
point in the main proceedings, contains a saving clause does not exceed those 
limits if, in each individual case, it provides fo r  male candidates who are equally 
as qualified as fem ale candidates a guarantee that the candidatures will be a 
subject of  an objective assessment which will take account o f all criteria specific 
to the individual candidates and will override the priority accorded to fem ale  
candidates when one or more o f those criteria tilts the balance in favour o f  the 
male candidate. In this respect, however, it should be remembered that those 
criteria must not be such as to discriminate against fem ale candidates. ”
It is for national court to determine whether those conditions are fulfilled on the 
basis o f  an examination o f  the scope of the provisions in question as it has been 
applied by the Land. ”
This type of argumentation does not refer to any legislative integrity of the national 
legal systems. However, it refers to the idea of the adjudicative integrity of a legal order by 
proposing a more dynamic interpretation of equality. It contains some observations of the 
“societal” aspects, which may provide arguments for future cases.1696 On the other hand, it
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continuously to international arrangements, where there are provisions on the acceptability of quotas. In a separate 
analysis, Advocate General Jacobs considered the relevance of these international arguments for the interpretation. He 
saw  them as being extremely vague (?) and unhelpful. Furthermore, they were m ore permissive than mandatory.
,M6 The considerations of the integrity o f legal systems could be related to the argumentation o f some parties by 
international treaties.
It is remarkable how one may arrive to such a different solution in a simitar situation. The Court and 
nor the Advocate General in Kalanke gave indication that the situation would have been different if such a procedural 
rule existed.
See some analysis of the “societal” aspects, see Ellis, E ., 1998, pp.404-406. Holtmaat, K. (The Pow er 
o f Legal Concepts: The development of a  Feminist Theory o f Law, In: International Journal of Sociology o f Law, 1989, 
p .499) maintains too:
“The concept of legal equality and that of equal rights cannot serve as a leading substantive 
principle and/or strategic concept for the role which law could play in breaking open power 
relations between men and women.”
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“creates” some kind of comparability between the legal systems in realm of European order, 
because it solves the problem between basic premises by referring to procedural norms.1697
Finally, in the renewed Rome Treaty (Article 2: basic principles) the equality 
between men and women has been taken explicitly as an objective of Community policies. 
However, unanimity is required from the Council in taking measures dealing with sexual 
discrimination (new Article 13). Nevertheless, the new Article 13 (and especially the new Article 
141.4) may encourage affirmative action. Article 141.4 provides that
“ With a view to ensuring fu ll  equality in practice between men and women in 
working life, the principle o f  equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State 
from maintaining or adopting measures providing fo r  specific advantages in order 
fo r  the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or 
compensate fo r  disadvantages in professional careers”.
Consequently, it seems that Kalanke remained as a “side-step" in the history of 
European law.
4.4. Conclusions on the “hard cases”
Before the “hard case" studies we asserted that the question concerned the internal 
problems of European law and the relative competences of supranational, national organizations, 
decided on legal basis by a supranational body. The question was not, evidently, about "easy" 
cases of comparative "construction", but about a choice o f "law", or, we should say, a choice of 
the preferences of “institutional facts” in European law.
What kind of choices we are talking about?
We may summarize the analysis with the following indicators: Case (Case), Type 
o f Comparative Rationality (CompRat), Norms Compared (NorComp), Result of Comparison 
(ResComp), Legal Fictions Compared (LFicComp), Preference (Pref), Field of the Subject- 
Matter (FieSubjM), Legal Principle in question (LePrin). Special remarks (Rem) are made in the 
end to stress the instability of this idea.
1697 For the idea that the comparison between formal procedural norms is easier in comparative law, see Kulla, H. 
(Referring to various authors (Schwarze, Stark, M adeira, SiedentopO)-
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Third law- Example)
Home Economy Individual 
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(Posts equality rea- 
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What can we say on the basis of such results? Many conclusions could be made. 
Here, only some remarks are presented.
We could claim that the legal ideological structure or the European institutional 
legal identity is represented by this diagram. The picture shows how, with a comparison of 
different types o f norm sets, one has been able to confirm a solution in a conflict between 
different types of institutional legal fictions.
In the hard core of traditional European law there seems to be the economic sphere, 
which is regulated by the principles of individual protection and state sovereignty. In both cases, 
Community law, for example, has been refraining from touching them by maintaining the 
consistency of the state system, or by stating that it respects the legal principle in state systems 
(the principle of the inviolability o f home). Other type of organization (the European Community 
itself or an economic community) is not able to claim the same type o f competence. The 
Community has confirmed its autonomy also in this “negative” sense.
The margins (or limits) of European level law come up also when approaching the 
political sphere, where the disparity of state law is confirmed by the principles o f substantive or 
more material equality, and the protection of religious feelings. Here the limits o f political action 
were confirmed in attempts to secure some administrative power by political means, and in 
attacking the main form of religion in a particular society. In both case, the idea was to change
4 7 5
any formal idea of equality towards non-politically determined formal equality.
It seems that where we enter the economic “hard core” of European level law 
towards a more political sphere of action, we arrive at a more institutional type o f law not 
supported by any generality in positive law of the states, or by supported by extremely 
instrumental type of comparative reasoning. Here we recognize also a strong “federalist" attack, 
based on some kind o f “informal” idea of equality, against those state polities which are still 
based on strict formalism and institutionalized discourses. Nevertheless, religious protection 
(Otto-Preminger) came under heavy criticism, also by the judges themselves in the dissenting 
opinions. Furthermore, the rule in Kalanke case has been changed to a certain extent. On the 
other hand, we may say that the current discussions on federalism may touch upon the 
consistency and sovereignty principle of taxation. These tendencies reveal the current instability 
of these types of discussions.
These observations have been made in the realm of European level institutional law. 
The hard core of the relationship between state supremacy and individual protection should be 
studied in the realm of the national legal systems.1698
,W8 However, the recent Pinotchet case in the House of Lords (see, analysis above) is definitely such as case. It deals 
exactly with the relationship between individual protection and the state autonomy, immunity, and supremacy. It seems 
to  make clear that the hard case in international law are not resolved by international law comparison only, but the 
sovereignty o f parliam entary states can be the basis for judging also the relationship between the sovereign and the 
individual in the political sense. We may note, that the Pinochet case was decided by a  comparison of various measures 
o f international law, and, on the other hand, by referring to the sovereignty of Parliament.
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5. Com parative European law and European comparative law
Basically, there seems to be two dimensions to the European comparative interpretative practice 
in an institutional sense. The first dimension is the reasonable orientation of legal actors, in legal 
institutions, and in one form or another, towards other legal systems in an intellectual sense and 
the use of these observations in legal reasoning, argumentation and justification. The second 
dimension is related to the “importation" of domestic legal actors to the supranational institutions.
In the first type, the role o f comparative law, as a legal source, is depends on the 
material and intellectual resources of the institution and its actors. Moreover, the adaptation of 
comparative arguments to the justification requires certain characteristics of the system, and the 
philosophy from the point of view of the legal-cultural ideology and theory of law.
In the second type of situation, the lawyers, as such, function as “comparative” 
dimensions of the system. The persuasiveness of this type o f comparative system depends 
strongly on the characteristics and qualities of its personnel1699. Consequently, we may say that 
the quality of a lawyer, as a domestic and culturally attached lawyer, influences "comparatively" 
the work o f the institution. In this sense, one could claim, that the more the lawyer (a judge or 
administrator) is attached to the basic cultural values and "customs" of his/her national context, 
the more influential he/she is in the institution, "comparatively". On the other hand, the more 
susceptible the lawyer is to foreign ideas, or more he/she is relying on the institutional and 
organizational authority, the weaker the "comparative” influence is.
5.1. The intellectual dimension: forms o f  interactions of argum ents
and  legal systems
G eneral rem arks. As we have seen, the comparative arguments can emerge in the form of 
generality, diversity, or exemplification1700. All these forms appear in the work of the adjudicative 
institutions.
1699 On the legal traditions and domestic training in the Community system, see Bengoetxea, J., 1993, p.123.
1700 It has been claimed that Courts comparative considerations do  not lead to  real imitation (Bredimas, A ., 1978b, 
p.322., analysing case 7 and 9/54 Steel industries in Luxemburg (1955-56) ECR 175, and Advocate General Roemers 
analysis, opinion on 8 February 1956, p. 210 ff. (“for all these reasons 1 therefore consider that comparisons with 
related features of national law cannot be decisive with regard to the question with which we are concerned ibid., 
213).
This may be so in explicit comparative reasoning. However, the reality seems to  be different.
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The descriptive analysis of the comparison usually consists of the description of the 
tertium comparationis and statements on comparability or non-comparability. The prescriptive 
part may include the recognition of this generality, disparity, or the example as a legally relevant 
idea. This is attached to the statement o f its acceptability.1701 The norm of the case results from 
these premises in different ways in interaction with other arguments.
The method of comparative law can be traditional1702. Then the legal sources’ 
doctrine, on the basis of the comparison, includes laws and precedents, and scholarly opinions1703. 
However, in European level institutions, traditional comparative reasoning seems to be based on 
restricted idea of sources of law (for example, no travaux préparatoires are usually used)1704. On 
the other hand, one may observe that in English systems the analysis of case law is the main 
method of comparative reasoning.
Comparative arguments usually interacts with socio-philosophical and principled 
legal arguments. They are combined with legal principles, some kind of coherence (consistency) 
argumentation, moral arguments, and also with other types o f legal instruments deriving from the 
international legal community (such as international law arguments and “third countries” 
analysis). Furthermore, one may recognize some kind o f altemateness between comparative 
argumentation and the intention of the national legislator. In this sense, they are alternative also 
in relation to the travaux préparatoires. As we have also indicated, comparative reasoning seems 
to be related to a quite strict literal interpretation. Tendencies and social contexts are seen 
extremely holistically in connection to comparative observations.
Even if there is an interaction between comparative arguments and other types o f 
arguments, it appears as if comparative argument has often quite decisive role. However, when 
comparative arguments are used, the basic normative statements are usually justified, in the end, 
by strong principles or practical arguments. In this sense, interpretation seems to be determined
1701 Pescatore speaks about the "transpassabilty" (transpassable) o f  legal systems or their rules (1980, p.358).
1702 Bredimas A., claims ( 1978b, p.323) that comparative law is not traditional because of a lack of common highest 
o r lowest denominator. However, in the tradition o f comparative law  this could be claimed to be a "rule" also. Furt­
hermore, a certain "creativity" is part of the tradition. (About this creativity, see ibid., p.324.)
Now, as well as in the international Court, also in the European system the acceptability is considered 
in relation to the institutional or European institutionally dogmatic opinion.
1705 Bredimas, A., 1978b, p.325. At the theoretical level, we can make a  distinction between ought, should, may, and 
m ay not sources (Bengoetxea, J., 1993, p .225).
1704 The lack of travaux preparatoires can be explained by the fact that they belongs to another type o f political 
discourse, and they appears too functional from  the point o f view of the European legal level.
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basically by principles and practical arguments1705. This is what the legal sciences also emphasize.
As we noted, the use of comparative law, in the European legal orders, at least, 
assumes a vertical comparison. The comparative interpretation o f Community norms, for 
example, means analogizing and comparing the outcomes of the comparative studies in relation 
to the systematic premises at the Community level1706. In this sense, it is quite evident that where 
the interpretation o f the principles of the European level systems is supported by comparative 
considerations, these legal principles, in the context o f European law, are different from the 
principles related to the national discourses1707. This may be observed, for example, in the 
Hoescht case at the European Community level In this case the principle was recognized, but 
because it was considered to be something outside the aims o f the Community system, and, 
consequently, a matter for national legal systems, it was only “respected”, but not seen as part of 
Community law. This view supported by traditional comparative studies.
Consequently, many of the comparative principles do not have the necessarily 
common features with the principles supported by the open national dogmatic legal discourse. In 
an extreme case, in the European human rights system and in the realm of the "margin o f  
appreciation" idea, these institutional principles remind us more of an evaluation o f the 
constitutional and national legal systematic principles as such1708.
Consequently, one could claim that the institutionally principled approach is 
determines the qualitative adoption of the comparative examples and references. We may say, 
contrary to the “constructivist” idea, that these institutionalist principles are, in the end, the
1705 Internal principles, limiting principles, and substantial principles (Koopmans, T., 1991, p.56 ff.).
1706 Lando O. explains how the system examines the "fitness" of the Community system with regard to the laws of 
Member States (1977, p.656).
1707 In comparative reasoning the disassociation o f legal arguments takes place. It happens in the transferring of an 
legal concept, rule of principle, or decision from the national systems to the European systems, from another European 
system to another European system etc. These different types of legal arguments do  reappear, consequently, in another 
context where they are designed as we have explained before.
1708 Furthermore, the common constitutional traditions, and some principles related to that, must be distinguished 
from the basic principles of Community law (Pescatore, P., 1980, p.353). These are, for example, the principles concer­
ning structure of the Community law, freedom of movements, and non-discrimination principles. W hat is meant here by 
institutional principles are the "common core" principles (good faith, judicial security, proportionality) deriving from 
national experience (ibid., p.352).
It has been suggested that there are three major reasons for the great expansion of judicial review in
Europe today:
- the emerge o f a new form of government
- the new importance o f Human rights
- transnational pluralism
Sound governance is not considered any longer from the view point o f the "separation de pouvoires", 
but rather from  the point of view o f “checks and balances”. It is claimed to be  a safeguards against abuses by the 
political branches (Capelletti, M., 1990b, p.431 ff.).
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decisive part of prior comparative evaluations and selection in the European level legal 
interpretation.
Furthermore, we may note that an intellectually oriented European institutional 
comparative lawyer is not trying to achieve the support o f a very extensive legal audience.
The analytical quality of the com parative argum ents, the "stages of coherence", and the 
legal integrity of systems. When the courts, at the European level, take a step towards analysis 
of different legal systems, the more coherent, a priori, the European law can seem. On the other 
hand, where the legal systems appear analytically irrelevant, we may speak of a weak idea o f 
coherence at the European level.
Furthermore, where the comparative studies play only a contextual role, there 
seems to be, at the European level, evidently an attempt to avoid the problems within this weak 
idea of coherence (or even possible incoherence?). At the same time, one attempts to maintain the 
idea of European level adjudicative integrity. If the national legal systems (principles) and their 
legislation are extensively analyzed, the idea of legislative integrity seems to prevail. In these 
cases, the European level is determined strictly by the idea o f generality, and the national legal 
level maintains its relative “authority”.1709 As we have noted, this is not usually the case.
Furthermore, in the case o f comparison by opposites, where the comparative 
analysis and some generalities are explicitly rejected, the idea seems concerned solely with the 
integrity (functional autonomy) of the European level-orders'710. Where this type o f "adjudicative 
principle of integrity" is prevailing, the European level institution is making a strong value-based 
judgment despite the legislative integrity. Here we may recognize a general conflict inside the 
general idea of the integrity of European law1711. Here we usually speak about an ultimate form 
of non-discursive and instrumentalist approach to European adjudication.17,2
1709 See, for example, the examination o f the case on the inviolability of home.
1710 In the “cohesion of the legal system”,argument is embedded the idea o f incomparability. This is related to the 
cases which demonstrate the limits of legal systems. The cohesion explains the system as a complete system, both 
formally and functionally.
In cases of coherence argument, the legal systems, or legal orders, are chosen in the realm of the 
political integrity.
17.1 The problem o f comparatively reflexive legal systems is the turning o f  the political reflexivity into professional 
institutional reflexivity based on the internal autonomous institutional interpretation.
17.2 Judge Pescatore, P . (1980, p.359) speaks about this phenomenon, albeit, in different terms, as follows:
“Mais nous avons vu, que la méthode comparative peut également servir de manière toute 
differente: ¡orque l'analyse comparative révèle les disparités et les contradictions irréductibles, sur
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5.2. Motives for comparative reasoning in European law
General rem arks. In this connection we will concentrate on the use of comparative law in 
European level institutions. The analysis o f the possible uses in national legal systems is discussed 
in the last chapter of this work.
In the European level orders, as we have seen, comparative law has different types 
of functions in legal reasoning. The European “systems” are comparative systems. The nature of 
these European systems, as comparative systems, is related to the fact that they have been 
practically “constructing” themselves on the basis of national systems, and they reflect directly the 
traditions of the national conceptualizations.* 1713 On the other hand, it clearly makes it possible for 
them to make “legal choices”. We have noted, on the other hand, that comparative law is used 
mainly in order to arrive to an interpretative method rather than to a substantive solution as such.
It has been maintained that the function of comparative law in the European orders 
is to make the interpretation fit within the laws of the states, supply material for the "right” 
decision, establish the common core o f the systems.1714 There is thus "pressure to compare the 
elements o f  national and EC law"1715.
However, we may ask how important these national legal systems really are as a 
source of law for the European-level orders? Namely, even if we recognize that comparative 
observations function as some kind of basis of solutions for the European systems, we note that 
European orders do not have, necessarily, to reflect their aims and objectives and previous
certain point, entre les droit des Etats membres, la Cour s en sert comme d'un “reduction à 
l'absurde“ pour justifier le choix de solutions communes, destinées à dépasser les contradictions des 
ordres juridiques nationaux. Les amateurs de philosphie pourraient y trouver une application du 
schéma de pensée dialectique, en ce sens que les contradictions entre thèse et anti-thèse se résolvent 
ici dans une synthèse réellement nouvelle.
L'auteur de ces lignes espère avoir pu montrer combien la méthode comparative, 
qui a déjà montré une extraordinaire fécondité scientifique, se révèle également utile lors gu 'elle est 
appliquée dans le contexte, très concret, des travaux d une jurisdiction de caractère multinational 
qui, par sa constitution même et par sa vocation, doit être riche diversité des droits nationaux dont 
elle tire son inspiration. "
17,3 On the interactivity, see Koopmans, T., 1991, p.53. Pescatore, P., speaks about justificatory, apologetic, and 
constructive approaches (1980, p.357). Furthermore, he makes a distinction between contrastive (“repoussoir”) and 
adoptive (“réception”) ideas.
1714 Lando, O., 1977, p.657, Bredimas, A., 1978a, p.121.
1713 This concerns many fields of law, for example, environmental protection, and social policy, connected especially 
to  the "exemptions" such as Article 30  and 59 o f the Treaty (see, Dehousse, R., 1994, p.7).
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interpretations within national legal systems1716. Furthermore, it is generally known that when one 
uses many arguments (systems), it is many times a sign that no real confidence is attached to any 
one of them. Even if, at first glance, and in quantitative terms, it seems that the confidence of the 
European orders is on the national state systems, in the so-called “hard cases” we have 
recognized a different version of the story.
One may say, in general, that the state systems serve as an analogy as long as they 
can be instrumentalized according to the basic principles o f the European system1717. Still, is it 
possible to identify some characteristic motives for these “instrumentalizations”?
T he  forms of trad itional "self-construction", control of compliance, and integrative 
interpretation. As maintained, one of the motives appear in the traditional claim that 
comparative law can be used either to the fill up lacunae or to construct some principles for 
interpretation. Comparative argument, in its open form, seems to be a constitutive argument.
This type of constructive use can be divided into the use of pre-implementation 
material and the use o f post-implementation material.1718
In the use of pre-implementation material, the Community institutions, for example, 
attempt to cover legal provisions, on which basis one could be able to justify an interpretation of 
a general principle in the European system. As we have noted, however, this type of “self- 
construction” is only a justificatory operation. No real resemblance can be found between the 
principles at the national and regional levels.
In the case of post-implementation comparison, on the other hand, the law of the 
Member States is usually considered from the point of view of the effectiveness of the
1716 As we have noted, comparative justifications do, on the other hand, reproduce the state paradigmatic thinking of 
law. On the other hand, the fact that the decisions reached do have a direct impact to the law of the national legal 
systems does "«substantialize" these systems.
See Shapiro, M., 1980, pp.541-542.
17,7 The external and instrumental point of view to the national systems can be seen, for example, in the idea that the 
national systems function, to a certain extent, as "laboratories fo r  the legal solutions" (Lando, O., 1977, p.645). 
Interestingly enough, the persuasiveness and the great role of comparative law, at the European level and in the inter­
national systems is based on the fact that it functions in finding out "tested" forms of law.
The main features of instrumentality are embedded within the idea that the systems (and its institutions) 
actions are backed up by an examination of different possibilities and choices of the norm. This means choices, in the 
European context, between different systems, their norms and their interpretations etc. (Mossner, J.M., 1974, p.220).
,7,s In the practice of the Court, the use of post-implementation material seems to contain analysis of the national 
jurisprudence including elements of Community law. In fact, it has been claimed that the special emphasis in the 
institutional study is on the cases decided after a preliminary ruling has been given (Note d'information..., p.3).
Such traditional self-construction has been identified in questions of legislation, administration, and 
fundamental rights (Pescatore, P., 1980, p.357).
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Community measures, or the correctness of the implementation1719 *.
However, it looks like the Community Court, for example, has to take into account 
the post-implementation measures as well, if it is to interpret the national legal systems in an 
integrative way.
The ultimate means of self-construction seems to be the justification of European- 
level competencies by identifying comparative tendencies in the sociological and “scientific” 
sense. This helps the institution to justify its function in the European sphere (for example, by 
defining the “enemy”, which can be tackled only on that level).
M aintenance of “ reasonable autonom y”, and the role of comparative considerations 
substitu ting  the " travaux p r é p a r a to ir e s The question of the non-existence of the travaux 
préparatoires brings up the problem of sensible interpretation. This may be related to the motives 
for the use o f comparative law.
We have noted, in the Community system, for example, that the non-existence of 
travaux préparatoires and any interpretation by the intention o f the legislator guarantees the 
exclusive and practical competence and possibility for the European Court of Justice to interpret 
Community law. There are restricted possibilities for traditional dogmatics (based on ideas 
concerning sources o f law) to interpret Community law, whether we are speaking about lawyers 
o f different institutions in general or in national courts. As we have seen, this is not exactly the 
case in human rights system. There the travaux préparatoires play a role. However, also in that 
system, the role o f this material and the “intention” of the Parties is diminished where the 
situation has changed, and where comparative observations come into play.
1719 This is, however, not very easy to determine. To a certain extent, every post-implementation practice must be 
effecting on the interpretation of Community law, or European Law in general, if the states have some autonomy to 
maintain the coherence or the margin of appreciation of its own legal system (according to European level systems), and 
even without them.
How should one take this into account the implementation material? Could it be used as material in a 
comparative interpretation?
Basically it is quite impossible to consider post-implementation practices as a source of law, in terms 
of the traditional theories. Namely, the implementation material is conditioned by how the supranational bodies consider 
the validity of that law and those legal norms. Furthermore, while most of the rules in the Community system, for 
example, are teleological. This it means that the states do not really have any exact idea as to the correct imple­
mentation. The States cannot claim, according to the system, any correct implementation. If comparative observations 
are made, it is only for practical purposes.
In the Member States implementation laws comparisons can be made, even if their legal function is 
quite problematic. Studies could be made to map some alternatives for implementation.
The Commission has some times presented post-implementation material as an argument in a case, 
relating mainly to the question, whether the Member States have sought to utilize derogation clauses (Directive Article 
2(2) of the Directive No 76/207).
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The “comparative travaux préparatoires", on the other hand, make a reasonable yet 
autonomous justification possible. The Court may justify the decision in difficult cases by the 
examination of the comparative pre-implementation material. On the other hand, the parties to the 
disputes may refer to comparative observations in order to support their main arguments. The use 
and evaluation of the comparative material o f this kind transfers the question o f sovereignty and 
autonomy to a question of the autonomy of the comparing institution.
It is clear that the reflexive relationship between the regional systems, such as 
European Community, and state systems would not function in legal terms if the travaux 
préparatoires were too extensive. Namely, the possibility for a reinterpretation of European law 
would endanger the usefulness of the European norms in the internal regulation within states. On 
the other hand, the European system would be not able to control this interpretation (on the basis 
of the Article 177 (the new Article 234), for example). The interpretative competence would be 
automatically, to a certain extent, transferred to the national level. This possibility of "formative” 
directing by the Court of Justice by the preliminary ruling process would be endangered.1720
Consequently, we may say that, for example, the Court o f Justice constructs its own 
"travaux préparatoires" autonomously by means of comparative observations. Comparative law 
substitutes the travaux préparatoires, but in an extremely dynamic way and without any need to 
have an idea of the legislative intent.1721 This fact underlines - additionally - its autonomy as a 
legal institution and as an actor of the Community legal system.1722 Furthermore, it maintains the 
teleological premises of the system in general. This "reconstructive" approach to the sources of 
law (i.e. kind of a "functional source of law") leads to a politically and legally dynamic and 
functional system. The legal "traditionalization" is in the hands of the process in the Court of 
Justice1723. As observed before, this leads to institutionalist traditionalization o f the comparative 
law in general.
This feature is related also to another benefit of “comparative travaux
1730 Millett, T. (1988, p.163 flf.) Also maintains that the methods of interpretation of the Court of Justice are 
conditioned by characteristics of European legislation. If this construction is lost, it would be a risk to the “system".
1731 This may be associated also with the avoidance of national conceptualizations. As we have seen, one of the basic 
ideas behind the choices of comparative reasons for the argumentation in the Community system seems to be the avoid­
ance of nationally-loaded expressions. By finding disparity, the Community institution, in a reasonable way, can depart 
from any particular influences and is able to construct an autonomous European conceptualization.
1723 Concerning the autonomy functions, see Pescatore, P., 1980, p.356.
1723 Comparative law as a source of law seems to move on the same level as the precedents in international and 
regional legal systems. They seem to be a source of arguments, which complement and balance the institutional self- 
referentiality of using only case law as a source of law.
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préparatoires”. By the comparative observations the Community Court deconstructs the legal 
language o f the national legal systems, and they become "invaded" by the instrumentalist 
Community conceptualization.1724
The question of autonomy can be approached also from another perspective. 
Namely, the use and making o f comparative observations in the justification and even in the 
dissenting opinions indicates the fact, that comparative observations have been considered. This, 
on the other hand, gives indication to the national level that comparative considerations have 
already been made, and that they are not necessary in the implementation of the “supra” national 
norms. This gives further autonomy to the European-level legal orders.
T he im plem entation of changes in a  persuasive way; the strength of the normative 
solution. The idea o f comparative law theory 1725 that comparative arguments are used usually in 
a situation where changes are needed, applies likewise to the European legal orders1726. A good 
example o f this was seen in the “double comparison” undertaken by the Advocate General in 
Kalanke case, who used the law of the United States to determine the direction o f the change, 
contrary to the "internal comparison" between the Member States of the European 
Community1727. By the institutionally qualitative approach the Community institution can direct 
the change and even propose quite "new” ideas concerning the allowed and prohibited types of 
legislation in the Community system. One could claim that comparative surveys make feasible 
teleological justification and formulation o f norms and decisions1728.
The ultimate “change” in the comparative “directing” is naturally the “self­
construction” or maintenance o f the European institutional framework or the re-definition of 
competencies in the European sphere. In this sense, comparative argumentation does not have to
1724 On the other hand, because the legal argumentation of the national courts is determined more and more by the 
Community (and in general, the European) conceptualization, this guarantees the interpretative autonomy of both orders 
in relations to legal dogmatics. From the discursive point of view, this abolishes the interpretative possibilities of the 
lower level actors in the Community system.
1725 This is contrary to the regulative ideas concerning normal analogy.
1726 The fact that internal working methods change and that the styles of discourse in the courts change can hardly be 
attributed to comparative law as such (Like Bredimas, A., 1978b, p.322).
1727 This particular feature proves how the European system is reflexive also in the "externa]” legal sense and not only 
in the "internal" legal sense.
mt It gives the European judges perspectives upon a legal problem (Pescatore, P., 1980).
Comparative law is a source of unwritten Community law. It also functions in restricting elements of 
the case (Bredimas, A.. 1978b, p.332).
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be, in itself, extremely “radical”. The disparity in the comparative situation, on the other hand, 
seems to be related to substantial “conservativeness”.
Also the non-justificatory use of comparative considerations makes possible a 
teleological formulation of the justification, and a possible change. When one knows the features 
of the existing systems and one knows the dominant arguments used in the systems, one is able 
to formulate a radical justification, which is more easy to fall in with. It is possible to think that 
the judges need to observe the context into which the interpretation is "transplanted". This way 
there is a possibility to take into account the particular features of each legal system, and 
formulate the justification and the interpretation so that the norm is easier to place within a na­
tional system. This often gives the impression that the European Court functions as a forum o f 
" legal innovation”1729 (which, is turn, associated with the “precedential” thinking of the 
European Court1730).
These ideas also seem to have a relationship to the “contextual” (socio- 
phenomenological) tendency argumentation.
The stability function: the strength of th e  argum ent, relative stability and  the judicial self- 
re s tra in t1731, and  the  relative dynamism. Comparative considerations, in connection to an 
interpretation of a legal norm in the European level institutional context, is a way to evaluate the 
legal "strength" o f the (interpreted) norm in the realm o f European law.1732 In reasoning, on the
1729 Pescatore speaks even about linguistic reformulations in order to find a persuasive formulation (1980, p.356).
This can be the process of creating also an artificial language (see Sacco, 1991, p.l 8). That is to say, 
the role of the interpreter is becoming extremely central, even linguistically.
1730 See, Pescatore, P., 1980, pp.356-357.
1731 See also, Doetring, K., 1987, p.58. Wiklund, O. (EG-domstolens tolkningsutrymme, Stockholm, 1997) has made 
a study on the judicial discretion of the European Court of Justice and its limits. He starts from “realistic approach“, 
which takes into account the structure of norms and the division of powers between states and EEC as the basic 
determinants of the limits of this discretion. The study is "institutionally realistic” (“political" and “moral” ) rejecting 
a “positivist” approach.
Wiklund emphasizes the (institutional) problem of division of powers as the basic problem. He notices 
the strong role of the European institutions in the integration process, but rejects the doctrine of supremacy of European 
law. He claims that the extensive use of discretion (pragmatism and effective protection of private individuals) by 
European Court has led to restrictions of the procedural and constitutional autonomy of the Member States. He claims 
that the critical legal scholarship should be activated in relation to the law-making activity of the European Court in 
order to secure the legitimacy of the European Court
It looks like Wiklund, quite formally, underestimates the “coordinative” function of the European 
institutions, and “equalizes" the functions of national and European levels. He does not seem to accept any distinction 
between the issues of regulation. He also considers the concept of norm and the constitutionality in quite “holistic” way 
in the European legal discourse. Furthermore, he seems to emphasize the maintenance of the legitimacy of the European 
Court as an objective in itself.
1732 Pescatore, P., 1980, pp.355-366.
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other hand, it seems to strengthen the legal argument, but can be also some kind of a sign of 
judicial self-restraint. This latter feature is visible especially in the European human rights system.
In this sense, the use of comparative law can be, to a certain extent, associated with 
the recognition o f the “intentions” of the states, at least formally. Every time one deviates from 
the “autonomy” o f the supranational European system, the question is about recognition of the 
states as legal actors1733. In this sense, comparative reasoning seems to be used, where the aim of 
the system is to "translate" the normative idea into the language of the traditional national lawyer 
in order to persuade that audience. This traditional audience is persuaded (although superficially) 
by this establishing of an relationship and identification of the state legal systems. In this sense, 
comparative law at least looks like an argument for the maintenance of the integrity o f the state 
legal systems.1734
This idea can be associated with another phenomenon.
There seems to be, in some fields of law, a strong priority given to the national legal 
systems. This may have to do with the regulated use o f comparative law in certain fields of law. 
As we have seen, comparative law is a  legally-regulated source in the field of international law in 
general1735, and in the European Community system in the fields of responsibility questions 
(Article 215). On the other hand, Community law recognizes the possibility of using comparative 
observations in certain cases relating to constitutional traditions (Article F, the new Article 6, and 
the case law). What does this tell us about comparative law in this legal order or such legal orders 
in general?1736
One could claim that the source nature o f comparative law is legally recognized in 
the fields of law where the system should, basically, be convinced not only of the particular
mï The European comparative argument is extremely conservative (as are comparative legal studies in general). All 
substantive questions seem to be beyond the comparative legal research. The comparative argumentation is strictly 
positively oriented. This “equality of legal systems"oriented research cannot go beyond the "diplomatic" recognition of 
states, cannot be analytically open, and cannot sometimes even express studies openly.
,7M This takes place, for example, by revealing fundamental differences between the legal systems (Pescatore, P., 
1980, p.359).
This is the idea of the relative stability for the European order in relation to the national legal systems.
It is quite clear why the use of comparative law concentrates on the European States. This is 
determined by the legal and political integrity and equilibrium demands. It is, as well, rhetorically persuasive. The use 
of comparative law is not determined by the interest to information and new models.
On the other hand, the fact that United States appears a model, in many decisions, seems to be the 
outcome of the earlier adaptations of law. Furthermore, it is used settling problems of strong value conflicts.
,7M Comparative law can be associated with the recognition of the intentions of the states. Every time one deviates 
from the autonomy of the supranational European system, the question is about recognition of the states as legal actors.
1736 Some analysis of the question already in 1944, see Gutteridge, H.C., 1944, p.8.
(
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correctness of the solution, but, for that matter, on the general correctness o f the solution too. In 
other words, these fields of laws are the most sensitive areas o f law. They seem to be the most 
universal fields of the contemporary modem legal system, close to the fundamental legal 
identity.1737
On the other hand, the idea of including comparative law within the regulated 
sources seems to also introduce some dynamics into the system. This dynamism is designed to 
guarantee the idea that the system takes into account the general development of law 
(comparative law opinion), and constantly corrects itself in relation to these developments o r 
undevelopments. In other words, this regulation is the normative functional arrangement in the 
realm of functional legal systems. It introduces an idea o f relative dynamics in these fields of law.
In reality, however, the legal basis approach does not necessarily function in this 
manner. The legal basis seems to be only an a priori recognition of the generality. In fact, it may 
generate more institutionalized instrumentalization of law.
On the other hand, in those fields of law, where the use of comparative law seems 
to be only practical, the interest seems to be only to guarantee the effective justification of the 
solution, or to design the context of implementation or to persuade the parts of the audience 
(such as like parties) as maintained before.
The fact that the European courts do not so openly interpret national systems may 
be also related to this idea of relative functionality. Because comparative observations are mainly 
a matter of the institutional context of justification, and the relative dynamics-approach does not 
seem to function, it is possible to claim that the relationship between national and European-level 
orders is increasingly determined by an idea of legal institutional balancing.1738
The com parative reasoning directing future in terpretations in national and  European 
systems. One of the functions o f the use of comparative observations may be seen in the attempt 
of the European courts to direct, "contextually", future interpretations of the national courts1739.
1737 See also, Galmot, Y., 1990, p.259.
1731 This occurs in the same way as the national courts balance the national legislature by relying on comparative 
observations, as explained before.
1739 For some indications of this type of strategy, see Pescatore, P., 1980, p.354. This type of function is seen by 
Pescatore as “rationalization”.
In this connection, the idea is about the intentionally strategic argumentation by the European courts. 
Here I do not mean the evolutive aspects, which may be identified in relation to the dissenting, partly dissenting or 
Advocate Generals’ opinions.
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Namely, the explicit reference to some national systems, or to the conceptualization deriving from 
them, may direct the national judges (or even legislatures) to look to these systems in the future 
interpretations (in legislation, for example).1740 This can be recognized also from the tendency 
type arguments appearing in connection to the comparative legal (and socio-phenomenological) 
arguments1741.
This type of rationale may apply also to the discourse between the political and the 
legal at the European level. As has been noted, the European Court of Justice, for example, has 
had a fruitful discourse with the European legislature in cases, where legislative measures were 
needed.1742 The Court can, by comparative perspectives, indicate the direction for the legislation 
without having to adopt an "external” interpretation as such or to function as a legislature.1743
1740 Comparative law is 'legal cooperation”. It makes the cooperation between courts much easier, for example, in the 
realm of the Article 177 (the new Article 234) in The European Treaty (Pescatore, P., 1980, p.359).
It has been even suggested that national courts should look the comparative studies presented by the 
European Court of Justice on several issues in considering the interpretation o f law. The national courts should benefit 
for the stock of comparative studies in European context (Galmot, Y ., 1990, p.261).
It is a lso  interesting to  ask, what role could the interpretations of the state legal systems have in the 
dogmatic interpretation o f the particular systems o f  Member States’ rules and norm s in national legal discourses. Could 
the description of the European Court be used as an argument in the national dogmatics as a  legal argument? As we 
have seen, this has been done by the English Courts. The question is also about the role of institutional comparative 
legal studies in the national legal discourses.
1741 In fact, we could claim that the tendency types o f institutional, phenomenological and professional arguments are 
the ultimate forms o f comparative arguments. The question always remains: are there really tendencies? Can tendencies 
be imposed? Tendency type arguments seem to be narratives of the contemporary European world (or about the past?).
It is also another question as to what purposes this tendency information is p u t Does one really attempt 
to really maintain the integrity of ¿he legal systems, or is the "tendency" information based on attempt to find out more 
persuasive forms o f argumentation and more "adaptable" and "attractive" solutions.
However, there is also a  possibility that 'tendencies”  actually represent and define the basic values to 
be taken into account in the future. With these types o f arguments the decision-maker defines its basic distinction. In this 
sense, the tendency functions also in teleological perspective, and makes one able to structure the reasoning in the 
future, without making it necessary to refer to any historical considerations. Furthermore, the legal sovereign may actual 
define its basis and scope and function, an even its fundamental meaning (the institutional existence) as such, on these 
basis.
1742 See, Berlin, D., Interactions between the law maker and the judiciary within the EC. In: Legal Issues of European 
Integration. 1992(17-48).
1741 This seems to apply also to the Pinochet case.
As we have seen, the comparative argument does not have to  play always a direct and decisive role. 
The comparative argument may be a  form o f a  legal soft rule.
It seems also to be quite clear that the comparative reasoning cannot have a  great role in a  situation, 
where the law - which should be compared -  seems to be instrumental itself. The forms o f law, which are designed 
either to correct or change etc. unwanted situation (social engineering) - or to  delegate competences • are problematic. 
These types o f rules are related to rules containing general clauses etc. In these cases, it is problematic to identify any 
general - or even particular - features o f law. O ne has to identify the system as a whole.
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5.3. The institutional dimension: some analysis of the function of
institutional comparative law in European law
Institutional reasoning in European law. Comparative reasoning in the European Community 
institutions - and this applies, to some extent, to the European human rights system and national 
legal systems as well - seems to be based on the "common legal cultural tradition" assumption1744. 
This can be noted from the fact that, in relation to comparative studies, no general sociological, 
cultural, or political studies (and neither examinations of travaux préparatoires) are made. These 
types of comparative observations often relate to the phenomenological observations o f law by 
the persons in organizations and decision-making institutions. European comparative reasoning 
is the "institutional professionalistic" and value-based comparative reasoning1745.
The value-based and institutional-phenomenological nature of European compara­
tive reasoning may be related to certain communicative problems. First of all, the argumentation, 
in institutions by institutional actors, may be based on an incomplete understanding o f the integri­
ties of the overlooked systems. This may be a result o f the lack o f information on the relevant 
elements in legal systems. On the other hand, the incompleteness of the information may be 
accepted intentionally. This may be due to the effectiveness demands of the legal order, but also 
a result of the pathological tendencies in the organization (“attempt to avoid problems”). Thirdly, 
the value approach may come into a play because of the exclusion of the comparative information 
as relevant information as such.1746
In these types of cases the justifications become extremely affective.
1744 The effectiveness of this argument derives exactly from this fact. It assumes, and its addressees (audience) 
assume, a holistic understanding of the different dimensions of European discourses.
1745 Also Koopmans, T. on "institutional specialism" (1996, p.546). Concerning the “phenomenology^’ of 
comparative law, see Pescatore, P., 1980, p.338 ff. On the “pre-institutionalized” form of this type o f  “comparative 
law", see Gutteridge, H .C ., 1944, p.9.
A s we have claimed, value-based decisions can be  seen especially in cases, where the comparative 
generality is neglected as a legal basis. This is so because then the question concerning a particular problem is 
generalized being connected to all legal systems of the Member States. Here the whole orientation o f the tendency is 
declared unacceptable, and not only the rules of the particular system as such. Here the comparative influences are 
strongly determined by the traditional orientation o f certain systems.
1746 If vertical com parability is neglected, it m eans, in a way, that the systems regulated are not seen as equal any 
longer. Because of som e traditional context, the models must arrive from one context, which remains, in this sense, 
superior to others.
This explain for example the fact, why the US system is taken as a comparable and referential system 
in the cases where the vertical comparability is neglected. The US system hides the fact that one o f the internal systems, 
where the model is com ing from, is the contextual basis of justification (see Kalanke case).
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The structu re  o f the European level institutional com parative law. To explain the 
phenomenon of institutional comparative law, one could make a distinction between different 
arguer-audience relationships internal to the European level legal institutions. We can consider 
these auditories as parts of the formation of the institutional opinion.
First of all, it looks as if the judges are the audience for determining the correctness 
of the expertise (internal-institutional or external institutional) comparative studies (including 
Advocate Generals' comparative opinions). Furthermore, all comparative reasoning presented by 
the parties is directed to the judges.
This means, for example, that, in the European institutions, the final discourse on 
the acceptability of the relevance of the comparative information takes place in the internal 
discourses among the Court members.1747 The European Court o f Justice in particular restricts 
clearly and effectively the use o f comparative observations, even if it sometimes expresses the 
influences explicitly in a shortened and rather embellished way. As we have seen, the Advocates 
General and members presenting the dissenting or partly dissenting opinions are able to make 
more open statements1748.
The transitivity relationship between national dogmatics and the institutional 
(external or internal) experts is indirect. This is exactly one of the reasons why we cannot speak 
of a direct communicative relationship between national and institutional actors. However, the 
information still flows from the national dogmatics to the expertise institutions. The specialized 
expertise-institutions function as an institutional expertise opinion. The experts regulate what is 
considered to be correct, acceptable and relevant information for argumentative purposes internal 
to the institution.
IW7 It can be claimed that the principle o f confidentiality, some courts, concerning the availability of the comparative 
information makes it quite impossible to evaluate the influences deriving from different systems (the "diffusions of 
law"). However, what one may do is to evaluate influences based on other arguments related to comparative legal evalu­
ations.
One may assume also that the idea o f restricting the publication o f  comparative material is based on the 
interest of limiting the possibility of an impression that a system is a  direct source o f  the solution.
Also questions about different cumulative effects, in the interpretations, seems to be hidden. For 
example, it seems to  be impossible to  know about the further implications o f  the comparative observations in 
subsequent case law. This is related to the problem s of interpreting decisions in general, and their aims. Consequently, 
the "best argument" remain unknown.
On the other hand, the role of the institutional relationships is difficult to grasp.
It might be exactly the consequence of the informal and instrumental use of the comparative 
observations, why the relationship between the Community law and national legal systems is difficult to establish in 
legal research (On this difficulty, Bredimas, A., 1978a, p.103).
,M* It seems, however, that in the earlier days o f  the Community order, for exam ple, the practice of autonomous use 
of comparative material seemed to be m ore casual and common.
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Where the European level courts rely on either the expert studies (whether internal 
or external), or on the relatively contingent observations by the judges themselves, it means that 
the relationship between the Court and the national dogmatics is not systematically direct either. 
Courts are not the direct audience of the national dogmatics.
Institutionalistic comparative law guarantees the efficiency of such studies. On the 
other hand, the information is under the institutional control. This way the court, for example, 
goes beyond the criticism of misinterpretation of national or comparative discourses. This is a 
form of the reflexivity between these two levels o f legal orders. Furthermore, in having the 
comparative discourse institutionalized, the choices o f the persuasive way o f reasoning can be 
selected more efficiently. One is able settle on the type o f argumentation which is most suitable 
for the interested audience.
Now, some special remarks have to be made concerning the relationship between 
the Advocates General and the Court of the European Communities and on the European system 
of human rights.
As we have noted, more "qualitative" generality and divergency arguments can be 
found in the justifications by the Advocates General. However, it is not self-evident that these 
analyses have a normative value for the Court. They can be adopted or not. In point of fact, it 
looks as if some o f the reasons, and especially the comparative observations presented by the 
Advocates General, do not appear in any form in the justification of the Court, even if the 
normative conclusion is the same. Clearly, the reasoning of the Court seems to be extremely 
formal.1749
This does not, however, mean that the comparative observations would not have 
any impact on the normative conclusions o f the Court, or that they have not been used in the 
internal discussions. On the contrary. It seems that the comparative observations are relevant 
arguments and that the Court has different types of principles and sees the functions of the 
reasoning differently.
However, it is quite difficult to find any general features of the influences of the 
contextual comparative law upon the justifications of the European Court of Justice. It seems that 
the success of the comparative analysis is related to its concordance with the accepted 'internal'
1749 For som e analysis o f this relationship, see Pescatore, P., 1980, p.346.
492
principles more than to the idea o f “direct derivation”1750. It seems clear that the Court attempts 
to maintain the autonomy of the order by interpreting the comparative observations in accordance 
o f the principles o f Community law (its aims etc.).
In this sense, the relationship between the Advocate General and the Court appears 
also normatively transitive. In cases, where the solutions are the same, the comparative 
observations by the Advocates General, are likely to be agreed with. However, if the Advocates 
General enter too strongly into the comparatively based observations, the Court may neglect the 
comparative analysis as irrelevant or unacceptable. This rejection could be based, one could 
imagine, on too much emphasis on the "one-country-as-a-source" idea. Too much significance 
attached to one country in the comparative analysis can be contrary to the principles of the Court. 
These types of analyses may be taken into account, but they are not, as such, seen in the 
reasoning as an explicit reference to one legal system.
On the other hand, one could claim that, in some cases, the material norms referred 
to just do not seem to be suitable to the European context. The restrictions, based on this 
substantial inacceptability, are usually made in the context o f the institutional framework (the 
internal discourse), or in the consideration o f the relevancy by the Advocate Generals. However, 
it is interesting to note, that also the Court, in a substantial sense, may reject the proposals of the 
Advocates General based on comparative studies.
In the European Court of Human Rights the situation seems to be slightly different 
from the European Court. It seems that the comparative observations by the Commission and 
parties have generally a great impact upon the justification of the Court. This has evidently to do 
with the “balancing” role of the Court. On the other hand, the comparative analysis, in the dis­
senting opinions, seems to represent reasoning, which has been presented already in the "internal" 
discourses. In the dissenting opinions, judges are more free to take examples from different na­
tional systems. They tend to represent the alternative possibilities in legally reasonable way, which 
may be contrary to the general case law or against the interpretation of the Court in that 
particular case. This seems to indicate that also in the internal discourse of the European Court 
o f Human Rights, comparative analyses are discussed, but that the Court does not wish to bring 
these observations to light as a matter o f principle.
1750 One interesting subject, in Community legal research, would be the idea o f how the opinions of the Advocate 
Generals are used, as legal formants, in different decisions over a certain period of time. In general, this would be a 
study of the rote o f different institutional sources. These types o f studies do not appear in the traditional dogmatic 
approach to the Community law. The role oriented studies do not reveal anything on the argumentative strategies.
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On the other hand, the fact that these observations appear many times in the 
dissenting opinions seems to suggest that the comparative observations are presented exactly in 
the situations, where there is strong disagreement. This can be supported as well by the fact that 
the parallel justifications agreeing with the main justification and solution do not seem to include 
extensive comparative observations. It seems to be clear that by comparative observations the 
judges, having separate opinions, seek the adherence o f the traditional national audience or the 
comparative opinion as an alternative to the institutional opinion. This way these types of 
comparative law observations may give dynamism to the system in an evolutive sense.
The relationship between the Advocates General and the European Court of Justice 
is especially interesting from the point o f view of argumentative functionality. One could see 
different types of discursive principles behind their justifications, or even two types of discourses. 
The Court is stressing clearly the efficiency and the autonomy of the European legal order. On 
the other hand, Advocates General tend to be more oriented towards the Member States and 
represent the Member States in the Community level.
Even if the function of the Advocate General is to give an advisory opinion to the 
Court, his opinions are public, and one can hardly overestimate their function also as justifications 
o f the cases, as we have maintained. However, they have also the function of achieving the 
adherence o f the general legal and general public audiences, and they do not function only in 
convincing the Court as to the acceptability o f some solutions1751. Here we come to an interesting 
point.
To a certain extent, the role of the Advocates General, in arguing to the 
comparative, and even national audiences, can be seen as a way of avoiding the criticism against 
the Court itself in another way. It seems to persuade the audience by explaining that the compa­
rative observations have been made, and that the decision is not based solely on institutional 
principles. Furthermore, it is quite evident that the effectiveness of the Court’s argumentation is 
related to its shortness in relation to the justifications made by the Advocates General. As we 
have seen, the relationship between Advocate General argumentation, in relation Courts 
argumentation, is also less persuasive because of the breaks and jumps in the analysis. Its 
shortness and reduced analytical nature make Court argumentation seem more compact. The fact 
that the Court is making value-based limitations upon the argumentation, and that seems to
1751 In this sense, it seem s to be acceptable to study o f the role o f these opinions in the justificatory processes, and to 
examine the functions o f  the differences and similarities o f these opinions and the Court’s judgm ents.
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analytically examine the Advocate General's statements and evaluate them normalively, increases 
the authoritative force of the Court's argumentation. It then looks like the outcome of more 
careful consideration rather than a mechanical adaptation of reasons. This can be seen exactly in 
the cases o f the comparative reasoning in the European Court (likewise in the Court of Human 
Rights)1752.
In conclusion, however, we may say that Advocates General do seem to have in 
mind a larger audience. The Court, on the other hand, seems to be institutionally and procedurally 
(formally) closed, and it attempts to maintain the authority and integrity of the system. If the 
Court does discuss the question on a comparative basis, it does so restrictively. However, the 
combination and interaction of these two institutional actors produce a reasoning related to same 
large audience as in the case of the Advocates General.
5.4. Conclusions
T h e  function of comparative law in the evolution o f European law. As we may notice, 
European level systems seem to have an idea of "evolutive" interpretation. The systems tend to 
keep open changes by identifying, on a situational basis, the disparity and generality existing in 
the systems. This is part of the "legal functionality". This means that the "stages" of European 
legal development are examined all over again by comparative means. The idea is to establish well 
functioning norms in each stage of the evolution. The comparative observations function in 
checking the "evolutionary" stage of European law1753.
Furthermore, comparative law is an extremely important factor in the legal drafting 
o f  situationally determined European rules. Moreover, one could see similar functions in the 
dissenting opinions, and Human Rights Commission and Advocates General argumentation, 
which may be used as a store of alternative arguments.
Comparative law seems to function as a means of coupling of a system to another 
system. This coupling takes place in a process where the terms and the solutions of some "trans­
1752 The analysis of the comparative observations can be rich, but not that rich. As is well known, the persuasiveness 
can be diminished where the analysis is too long. This is related to the restriction o f the analysis o f the legal systems to 
the traditional basic legal sources.
,75i See also, S chem ers, H.G., 1979, p. 169 ff., and Galmot, Y„ 1992, p.258.
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ferring" systems are translated into the language of the "receiving” systems.1754 This is true 
especially in a situation where the comparative examination is contextual, and where the 
comparative examinations are followed by a norm selection. In an extreme form, comparative law 
functions as a means for the construction o f the European-level system architecture. This way 
institutions transfer the different traditions o f the European state paradigm to the European level. 
On the other hand, the European systems function as a kind of nonnative "implanters" of various 
solutions in national systems to different systems1755, at least in a formal sense. As we have seen, 
different reflections transform the European legal systems in different way, and different national 
legal systems have an influence in different fields of law etc. This depends upon the general 
orientation of the institutional actors too, as we have mentioned.
On the other hand, where the changes in European law, through the comparative 
law of the Member States, can be seen as less "integrative” and the argumentation less 
"persuasive", so-called “third law” comparisons may appear relevant in justifying the drastic 
changes to the European legal systems1756.
Problem s o f evolution? As we have seen, the function o f the comparative interpretation, in a 
positive sense, is to reveal the heterogeneity o f the European legal language, and in this way to 
provide a context for the justification of the normative choices. However, as the study of the 
European-level adjudication indicates, the comparative studies are not often revealed.1757 This 
leads to the observation that it is quite impossible to understand the normative choices of the 
courts. The courts' decisions have to be interpreted "autopoietically", in relation to the 
jurisprudence found in its own case law.
In this sense, the European legal jurisprudence seems to be discursively oppressive. 
It determines the "traditional" use o f language by imposing its "legal language" upon the national, 
comparative and general legal discourses in general, but maintains the understanding o f the "real”
1754 On the use of receiving and transferring, see Kamba, E.J., 1974, p.23.
1755 Cbnceming the spill-over effects, see Schwarze, J., 1991, p. 15 f f ,  Gordon, A., 1998, p.255-256. Also, Galmot, 
Y ., 1990, p.261.
W hat we have to remember is that the question is not only about implanting some positive 
formulations, but also implanting new approaches to  law (some methods o f interpretation, for example, teleology) and 
certain type o f  institutionalism and division o f pow ers, and, in the ultimate sense, the ideas on social justice.
1736 It seems to be clear, in relation to the Kalanke case, for example, that when the "internal" comparison does not 
result in a principally accepted form of legal basis, reso t is then to external comparison. This may be associated with the 
idea that a legal order seems to  be obliged, in  European law, to make decisions and to reproduce itself as a  superior or­
der.
1757 Pescatore, P., only the “ iceberg” (1980, p .358).
496
normative choices in its internal sphere. In this context, we are discussing the normative choices 
of the models on which the Court builds up its interpretation.
Why would this be important? Why would it be important to know, which 
comparative choices the Court has made in the institutional context?
The idea behind this interest is that the European jurisprudence is extremely 
dynamic. To a certain extent, the decisions, in many cases, are not "permanent". The preliminary 
material consists o f possible premises for system-understanding. The study of these internal 
comparative explanations and descriptions would be important, because they have a tendency to 
remain and to become “ontologized”. This is why the context o f the explanations behind the 
normative decisions must be revealed so that there remains a possibility to reconstruct also other 
types of comparative explanations, and to reveal the possible misunderstanding internal to the 
institution1758.
On the other hand, the validity of the use o f comparative legal observations in the 
European Courts is related also to the interpretative status o f the judge. The basic idea is, as we 
know, that the European judges should not normatively interpret the legal systems of the Member 
States. In fact, however, this type of interpretation is unavoidable. Furthermore, we know that 
the judges have a tendency to interpret comparative material based on their phenomenological 
understanding and also quite “politically”.1759 Here the question o f the nature of the comparative 
studies becomes relevant, if we have to examine the ability of the administration to really present 
correct interpretations of the national systems, even with regard to their own national systems. 
There is always the possibility of a "wrong" interpretation, especially, if we think about the 
"tendency" analysis, which seems to be part of the socio-political comparative observations 
also1760.
To conclude, there seems to be, in general, a reluctance to have the comparative 
discourse within the European legal institutions. One could even claim that the idea is to avoid 
scientific discussion of the issue. At least, the European institutions do not encourage the 
development of the comparative legal discourse in Europe. This seems to be strange, especially
1751 If it is so that the comparative argument is related to the inventive side o f law , and, as we have seen, the or­
ganization uses it in the internal discourse rather than in the external justificatory discourse, it is a  case in point of 
autopoietic organization. It changes and develops the law by closing itself normatively.
1759 See also the discussion of Weiler, J.H.H., 1998.
1760 For some aspects, see Hunnings, 1996, p .171. For an indication o f  the strong value-based method of comparative 
interpretation in general by European judges, see Mancini, G.F., 1998 (especially the comparative observations on 
pages 33-39).
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because the issues o f comparative law, which are many times instrumentalized, are usually 
somehow "unclear" from the legal scientific point of view.1761 Consequently, no critical and 
analytical perspectives are usually available in everyday discussion. This means, on the other 
hand, the disappearance of a genuine attempt at a scientific comparative discourse. At the same 
time, one is not able to take comparative law seriously as an argument. The lack of internal and 
analytical comparative law discourse causes a lack of persuasiveness of these arguments. This, in 
turn, generates a lack o f an essential dimension for the development o f the national legal systems.
8. Conclusions on European law
General remarks: toward a “reflexive”  theory of European law. One could easily come to the 
conclusion that the only way to have genuine "European legal studies” would be to undertake 
sociological studies on the institutionalized forms of legal decision-making in Europe. However, 
the legal system(atization) approach is preferred, in this connection, and some remarks can be 
made on the legal dimension of institutionalized comparative law in general, from the point of 
view of the legal discourse theory.
The identity of European law may be seen in the “comparative formations”, as we 
have maintained. This identity is not necessarily related only to the normative outcomes of the 
comparisons, but, for that matter, to the types o f comparative processes and comparative formu­
lations themselves attached to these "substantializations". This kind of concept of European legal 
identity deviates from the traditional "paradigmatic", ideological, dogmatic, and political ideas of 
identity. It is based on the idea of the discursive identity. Consequently, when we speak about the 
European legal orders, we seem to speak about relatively autonomous orders and legal cultures.
This comparative relationship between different European legal orders can be, 
moreover, characterized as reflexive. In the realm of this comparative reflexivity, there seems to 
be linguistically (performatively) formalist systems, which, on the one hand, are flexible in their 
historical interpretation of law. At the same time, there seem to be systems where the linguistic 
formalism refers rather to the weak role of “common language” as a legal measure, and, similarly,
1761 The idea of ad hoc requests for comparative studies from different scientific institutions indicates that some 
scientific "correctness" is wanted.
However, one has to remember that the comparative observations are still made in the organizations, 
and these studies are not necessarily revealed to the public or to researchers.
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sticks strongly to the legal-historical and dogmatically defined conceptualism (and 
“substantialism”).
To make it possible to merge these types of systems into one “European” 
perspective requires the idea of discursive reflexivity. This way we end up with the idea of 
comparative discursive reflexivitv o f legal systems. This comparatively discursive reflexivity can 
be analyzed in the following way.1762
First o f  all, the systems seem to identify each other mainly via their institutional 
margins of law. This seems to be due to the fact that legal institutions are, at the same time, 
liberative (opening) and deliberative (closing). They interpret their “own” rules and formulate 
norms, but are open also to “external legal information” in quite a “genuine” sense (unlike 
independent or dogmatic academic comparative law studies). On the other hand, when 
institutions are using comparative law as a source of law, they are not always able to be open in 
relation to public discourse (Le. to be discursively liberative). In general, as we have stressed, in 
the using of comparative observations, the discursively liberative aspect gets diminished. In fact, 
any use of comparative observations seems to lead to institutional legal conducting mechanisms, 
even if, from a purely formalist legal point of view, the use o f comparative law seems to be 
important for the continuity of the legal system as such. This idea is also related to the fact that 
comparative observations are strongly directed only to the institutional legal audience. The 
problem is that there seems to be a gap between legal professionalism and other types of 
audiences.
If we would maintain this institutional centrality, we would have to centralize this 
type of discursive reflexivity also. Consequently, we would have to also give preference to legally 
professionalist and instrumental institutional systems. However, it is argued that European law 
cannot be (in a democratic sense) institutionally centred, and the gap between the general public 
(legal) discourse and the institutional professionalist discourse has to be avoided. We must take 
the European comparatively reflexive discourse to the margin o f law. This can done in the 
following way.
It is maintained, firstly, that it seems that comparative law may be used only in hard
1762 Some suggesting a strictly normative theory on the relationship have used concepts of “parallel" and “exclusive” 
powers, see, Bieber, R ., O n the M utual Completion of Overlapping legal Systems: The Case o f the European 
Communities and National legal Orders. In: European Law Review, 1988 (147 ff.). It seems that in this theory, the 
distinction between order and system is not analytically relevant. It also assumes strong “commonness” in relations to 
concepts and norms.
For the problem of "com m onness", see Legrand, P.t 1996, p.54 (especially p.56).
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cases, if parties accept and demand the use of comparative analytical observations and the 
decision-maker chooses to do so or, as in European Community law, there are institutional forms 
for this use. When this use is not demanded (i.e. the argumentation by parties is based mainly on 
extremely “common sense” reasoning by practical-teleological arguments), the decision-maker 
may not use them. On the other hand, when the comparative analysis is considered a sensible and 
reasonable approach to the situation, it may be included within any justification. The use of 
comparative law seems to be, in this sense, an alternative and a marginal phenomenon.
Secondly, we may also challenge the centrality o f the hard cases of law (related to 
these comparative observations) from the point of view o f an idea o f legal culture in the following 
way.
Now, in “normal” legal decision-making, judges decide cases by making 
interpretations based on usually quite well-justified, albeit conflicting, opinions of the parties of 
the case. However, if one is not able to find, on the basis of the parties reasoning, the essential 
elements for an interpretation and there is a problem in the reasonability of interpretation, one 
may take up, in the absence of other “new” material, comparative observations. However, at the 
same time one steps out of the hard core of the positive formal legal culture, as we have 
maintained. Moreover, if comparative argument is taken up as a best argument, the decision­
maker clearly moves in the margins of any legal cultural perspective at least in a formal way.
When we have an “easy case”, to be decided on a conventional (legal traditional) 
basis, the parties are usually not discursive in any traditional sense. On the contrary, in these types 
o f cases the parties seem to be extremely instrumental in their legal argumentation. The 
established forms o f reasoning and doctrines are maintained as best arguments. In fact, then the 
cultural (institutional) contextuality is more decisive, and we may even claim that the societal 
structures o f authority are decisive for the “substance”. In this sense, it seems interesting that a 
certain degree of political instrumentality seems to be a phenomenon on the hard core of the legal 
culture. In this sense, we could identify legal culture as politically contextualized social 
phenomenon. We actually could speak about an instrumental game of law as a hard core of a 
legal culture. However, this does not seem to be correct. Namely, we easily come back, in this 
type of institutionalist legal theory, to the margins of law.
However, in the realm of the discursive theory of law, we could instead replace the 
idea of the “political” with the idea o f finding finer meaningful distinctions. In this sense, the hard 
core of the legal culture seems to be a search for the distinctions relevant to the interpretation of 
law. The extent to which this can be done is determined by the discursive sensitivity of the
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parties and judges, but also on their idea of discursive integrity. We come to this later on. 
Nonetheless, in this connection we may say that if we really try to grasp the idea o f how the 
coherence o f law, legal systems, or cultures seem to be maintained, we may adhere to the idea 
that this process takes place within the discourses in a equal and integrative way. Within this type 
of maintenance, the “legal” parties justify analytically their opinion (in a reasonable way). In fact, 
the task of the judge, in these types of cases, may be determined by the task to “guard” that the 
legal discourse deals also, and mainly, with the hard core of the traditional legal opinions 
prevailing. In the traditional legal sciences, this seems to be the role o f legal dogmatics and also 
legal theory.
The idea in this kind o f integrative and equal discourse seems to be, consequently, 
to interpret legal culture as a discourse. The institutional discourse may, in this sense, show itself 
only as an institutional hard core o f the legal culture. In this type o f institutionally “marginal” 
interpretation, however, one may move towards the hard core o f the legal culture as such. The 
institutional discourse may be instrumentalized as such.
Now, in this type o f institutional discourse, comparative arguments may have an 
open role. However, these institutional discourses are still at the “margins” of the legal culture 
in any substantive sense. They are marginal from the point o f view o f the general legal discourse, 
and their role is to be decided on the basis of further development, discourse in dogmatics and 
legal theory etc.. Furthermore, from the point of view of the traditional theory of legal discourse 
this should be so. One does not aim to speak to a more general audience than to the quite* 
restricted legal audience.
In this sense, we may remain in the realm of the comparatively discursive reflexivity
o f law.
How could we then see the hard core of European law from this point of view?
Because European-level norms are more or less comparatively (and institutionally) 
constructed, no real “hard core” seems to exist. In the realm of the European norms, one seems 
to be unable to reach any self-sufficient clarity. European level law is reflexive law as such. Also 
the institutionally determined comparative interpretation seems to indicate this. The process is not 
an analytical discourse based on comparative analysis, but institutionally and, at most, 
traditionally determined comparative justification. It is very difficult to reach the traditional 
sphere of law in general. The comparative observations do not seem to go towards any finer 
sensitivity of the legal situation analysed in an equal and integrative discourse. On a contrary, the 
comparative analysis shows itself in many ways as an superficial confirmation of the homogenized
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legal past, which is intrumentalized by means o f institutional authority. In this sense, it moves in 
the margins o f law.
Could we claim, however, that the European legal principles could be some kind of 
central (cultural) “structurants” of European-level law?
We know that the scope of European legal principles is not dear. Their use seems 
to represent a hard case, as we may see also from the extensive but, nevertheless, traditional use 
o f comparative law in their interpretation. The “discursive game“ seems not to be about finer 
distinctions, but usually about the European self-construction or the “balance“ between these 
spheres as an aim as such. The political game seems to be also seen as a game of statal and 
governmental self-recognition. The change o f the “spheres“ from national to European takes 
place many times in this interest (one is able to see the state systems holistically, and to avoid 
genuine discourses). However, this type of legal-political game is not, in any way, linguistically 
or culturally contextualized in the traditional discursive sense.1763 It is institutional-professionally 
determined. The institutional self-reproduction seems to be exactly the hard core of the European 
law. The European level fills up the “lacunae” o f the national legal systems and their hard cases 
by its institutional appearance. One discusses, on these bases, something, which has not been 
taken up in national legal systems as a relevant subject.
Consequently, in many ways, European level law moves in the margins of 
discursively conditioned games of legal interpretations. Its principles are in the margins of law. In 
a best situation, when dealing with comparative aspects in these processes, we may come to a 
value-based discursive legal process. Nevertheless, these institutionally conducted processes do 
not seem to strive towards the hard core of law or traditional legal culture in this sense. They are 
not discourses on the hard core of value-based language.
The hard core of European law and legal culture is in its institutionalist 
possibility.1764 Comparative law is a legal source in European principled institutional decision­
making, because it is considered a balancing element in the very strong institutional performances 
in the case there is no hard core linguistic or any other type o f sources for the discourse. The use 
o f comparative law attempts to balance the principled institutional decision-making, but many 
times fails to do so because of its incomplete understanding of comparative law (seeing it not as 
a discourse, but a form of conceptual framework).
1763 Pescatore, for exam ple (1980, p.358) speaks about discursivity, but seems to refer only to the institutional 
discourse as a discursive approach.
17M This is m aintained, for example, by Weiler, 1998, analyzing M ancini, G.F., 1998.
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On the other hand, where the European institutional law is directed to the national 
legal systems, it is redefined in the terms of the national legal conceptualization and interpretation 
o f the national legal institutions and dogmatic discourses.1765 The arguments deriving from the 
European regional discourses interact with the arguments in the legal-political discourse of rule 
creation and legal discourse of rule application, the results of which depend on the internal 
discursive culture o f the adapting system. However, in the factuality o f a system or systems, the 
"descriptions", cannot be genuine arguments, for they do not represent a basis of a consensus as 
an immanent form, but rather, as mentioned before, they are quite contingent adaptions. If the 
factuality o f legal systems enters into the legal discourse of another system, it has to be 
rerationalized in its own discourse. This is the other side o f this reflexivity.1766
Could there be any justification for the (institutional) non-discursive reflexivity? We may
ask whether the closed comparative reflexivity of European legal institutions could be justified in 
legal terms?
We have already found some reasons for it at the European level. For example, one 
may emphasize the idea that the European level orders close themselves mainly because there is 
an attempt at its reproduction as the only legitimate authority (the argument of institutional 
integration). The clear references to state legal systems and, moreover, the analysis o f particular
,76S Reflexivity is a simple result of the fact that all norms at one level (intemalional-EC, EC-national etc, national- 
national) have to be transformed in the formal and substantial level o f the system concerned 
(domestication/intemationalization).
See the concept of domestication, de Boer, Th.M., 1994, p.18. T his is kind of a "logical process” .
Some discussion on the influences of European Community law  to national legal systems, see 
Koopmans, T., 1991, pp.505-507.
1766 In this sense, one may understand, for example, why the European Court speaks about the autonomy o f the 
E uropean legal order, and not about the autonomy o f the European legal system. Even if  the European legal order 
(Community law) can be normatively considered to be as an autonomous order, it is not so conceptually, procedurally, 
organizationally, and, in addition, jurisdictionally. The idea o f "legal order” seems to  be an explanation for the fact that 
the legal "system” is unsystematic in nature, and that the systematization itself takes place in genuine legal discourses. 
T he  Community order uses these discourses instnimentally. This way the autonomy can be defined as instrumental 
autonomy. This idea suits well to the idea of the nature o f European legislation as instrumental and teleological legisla­
tion. For the nature o f interpretation in Community order and legal system, see Daig, H-W ., 1981, p .402 ff.. There has 
been also use o f the expression “Le système juridique communalaire” , see for exam ple, Wilmars de, J.M ., 1991). For 
the autonomy, see Mortelmans, K., Community Law: M ore than a functional area o f  law, less than a legal system. In: 
L egal Issues o f European Integration, 1996/1 (23-49) maintaining that the national legal systems do not fulfil all the 
criteria set by legal theoreticians (referring to Bengoetxea, J., who sees, on the other hand, the Community system not 
fulfilling the criterion of a  legal system). Also, Schilling, T ., The Autonomy of the Comm unity legal Order: An Analysis 
o f  Possible Foundations. In: Harvard International Law Journal, 1996 (389-409), who studies the autonomy o f the 
Community law on the basis o f the original Treaties, its further development, its natural law status, its international law 
sta tus, and com es to the conclusion that international law functions as the only basis justifying the autonomy o f the 
Community legal order from the national legal systems, which also seem  to function as the Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
instances of this melée.
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legal social systems, would drop off the force of its interpretation to the extent that the system 
would lose its reproductive status in the social system. In other words, the “legal sovereignty“ 
idea may serve the purposes of integration. Non-referentiality at the national level may also be 
based on this idea, but in an extremely formal sense.
In the case of European Union law, this is particularly visible. The only way to 
establish a "new" legitimate order is to maintain some degree of closeness in the situation, where 
the social system seems to be, in many ways, disintegrated. In this way it is possible to weight up 
effectively (in political discourse) the conflicts internal to the European systems, and to maintain 
relatively acceptable solutions and argumentation. The disparity of discourses and the non­
existence of the general European discourse can function as a legitimation of this instrumental 
closeness.
On the other hand, one justification could be derived from the idea of the internal 
problems o f the balance o f power in the national legal systems, as we have maintained. The 
national adjudication has to, increasingly, follow the globalized legislature to that same sphere of 
rationality. We could say that any method o f balancing this development is justified. In national 
legal institutions, the idea may be related also to the “internal” balances. Namely, by the closed 
use of comparative material one tries to reproduce the idea o f the traditional “material” 
supremacy of parliament.
Another justification is related to the nature o f legal justification as such. This will 
be dealt in the last chapter more thoroughly.
However, it is exactly these features which speak also for a relatively open 
comparative reasoning. Firstly, one could say that the general legal discourse is the only way to 
harmoniously develop the European legal systems. If the substantial comparative reasons and 
analysis are exposed to the light, the discourse on them creates the dynamics essential for the 
development of the European legal sphere. Secondly, re-founding the traditional forms of legal 
sources, the states and perhaps the normative social subsystems, functions to stabilize the legal 
framework o f Europe before it becomes heavily overloaded by instrumental and ideological 
afflictions1761. Here we could claim that even if the reflexive relationship between systems would 
seem only to maintain the autonomy of the legal systems and orders, and even if the relationship 
would be legally indirect, it still would be based on the principle o f the adjudicative integrity of 176
1767 It can be noted how comparative observations are sometimes related to the legal "sub-systems’* too. In some 
cases, there has been a comparison between the rules o f the lawyers associations. These sub-systems maintain a relative 
autonomy in deciding on their internal rules.
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In the end, we may claim, from the point of view of legal theory, that “European 
institutional” law is, in relation to its comparative approach, deliberative in general. The general 
discursive coherence is not, and does not seem to be able to be, the main aim and principle o f 
European adjudication.1768 The legal theoretical perspective is in many ways restricted. There is 
no attempt to create a  more discursively extensive analysis o f the system in general. The 
adjudication o f this kind, apart from the English approach, does not aim to relate itself to the 
“total” system. This type of legal theoretical idea leads to the fact that no liberative perspective 
exists. At the European level, this, on the other hand, results in a non-discursive approach to legal 
adjudication and has its influence also within national systems oriented to a formal use o f 
European-level decisions.
In teg ra tive  reflexivity and European comparative rules. We have seen that even if the 
coherence of a legal discourse is the basic theoretical normative premise of European law, the 
evolution of law and legal systems is a continuing process, and the idea of coherent closeness of 
legal systems and the law, as a discourse, does not exclude the possibility that the perlocutionary 
sphere of social normativity (“results of law”) is taken up to be a question for the legal discourse. 
These normative "perlocutions" o f legal systems can be adapted also to the political discourse 
and, in the global sphere, to the discourse o f international and regional systems. These latter 
systems, in particular, create their immanent propositions in relation to genuine legal discourses 
a posteriori.
The basis of this rationalization of the “factuality” o f another legal system takes 
place, as we have seen, in the realm o f the comparative legal discourse. The comparative law 
discourse is an attempt to rationalize the adopted arguments, and even their choice and 
reformulation, and generality conclusions. This way there seems to be a creation o f a 
“hypothetical comparative rule” for the use o f the regional or domestic legal discourse, which 
can, consequently, function as a basis of a consensus.
One could claim that the basic ideas behind the application o f the comparative rule, 
as a hypothetical legal rule, which can enter into a legal system as a rational legal argument, are 
constructed in a process based on the principle of discursive integrity of the particular legal- 
political community. The social and legal consensus is on this principle. On the other hand, the
law.
1764 In relation to the English system one may have, however, a contrary opinion.
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study of the application of this legal principle of discursive integrity, and the comparative legal 
discourse, explains, how the legal normative principle of integrity can be seen in different legal 
systems of regional or international communities. The legal discourse may “socialize” the 
integrity principle by explaining the normative nature of this integrity in legal terms (the nature of 
the comparative rule), and by explaining the intentional forms o f integrity as a teleological aim of 
a system. In this sense, it looks like the comparative discourse aims at a common legal under­
standing of the legal and social nature o f integrity as a comparative law principle.
On the other hand, in the realm of the legal discourse, one finds also the limits and 
nature of the consensus on this integrity. The legal discourse rationalizes the comparative rule of 
integrity and the comparative legal rule so that it can be seen to be rationally adaptable (or non- 
adaptable) in different regional and domestic discourses o f law as argument of law.
Consequently, there is the possibility to arrive at an immanent form of law as the 
premises for an interpretational process. The legal discourse brings to the light the existence of 
an integrative rule of law, which can serve as a legal basis in a particular legal system. This way 
the comparative legal integrity could be used even as an argument in the practical legal discourse 
o f application as such1769.
Consequently, we could maintain that the idea o f  the European comparative 
dogmatics, founded on the examination o f the European legal integrity, consists in the 
identification of hard cases, and marginalities as the basis o f the decisions, and identifications of 
the fallacies of the problems of comparative reasoning in legal decisions-making1770. This is 
discussed more thoroughly below.
There is also another factor. In the field of legislation, the transfer of sovereign 
powers from national systems to the European Union creates obstacles for national parliamentary 
systems to regulate certain fields of law. However, the fact that comparative law is embedded in 
the instrumental work of the European Court, and to the work of European institutions has 
certain consequences.
The legal and customary basis o f the use o f comparative law, in European law, 
gives the states the possibility to exercise their own "option" policy in a legal sense, and even to 
have an effect at the European level, based on the respect the principle for legal integrity in its
1769 One could say that where the aims of a  general system starts to determine the aims of the sub-systems, rationality 
is not the basic determining factor in the relationships o f  the sub-systems o f general system.
1770 We will discuss this m ore thoroughly in the end o f the work, but here we can say that the comparative dogmatics 
o f this type seems not to have possibilities to  really propose legal solutions as such.
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legislative form* If the states are able to regulate, for example, the constitutional way their own 
normative system, they can have an impact upon the marginal observations o f the European 
Union system (by, for example, introducing aspects deriving from the "traditions of the Member 
States"). On the other hand, many other unofficial aspects may have an impact upon the 
European system. By regulating the margins of their own system, they are able to regulate the 
European system too. This can be seen already, and especially, in these countries with special 
constitutional controls strong enough to regulate the law. In other words, because the legal 
orders at the European level seem to be relatively dependent on states and their legislative 
integrity in comparative terms, it means that states may shape the European level only by shaping 
their own legislative and adjudicative systems. It is not only the constitutional traditions, which 
are on the basis o f the possible influences, but other types of regulations may become relevant for 
comparative law as well.
This means that the only way to regulate the European system is not by external 
(political) regulation but also the internal (comparatively legal) one.1771
The two spheres of systems, national and European, function, in other words, in a 
relationship of a mutual co-variation based on the principle o f legal integrity.
In conclusion, as we have maintained, these ideas o f comparative reflexivity and 
legal integrity lead to certain scientific pressures for comparative research, and some rethinking 
of the role of comparative legal research. One could maintain that the comparative discourse has 
to be found again as a scientific discipline. Traditional comparative law is needed. The 
instrumentalization of comparative law in the European institutional architecture is, to a certain 
extent, a supportable element o f modem comparative law. However, one has to maintain the 
traditional concept of European law, where the different socio-cultural and systematic aspects are 
taken into account. As it has been maintained, this approach can be called critical comparative 
law. This type o f idea is strongly related to the comparison of social policies, to the 
"instrumentalist" sphere of modem law.
On the other hand, one could propose that different legal institutions should 
increase the use o f consultative forms o f scientific research external to their internal institutional 
arrangements, and, in other ways, create an impact upon the comparative legal discourse in 
Europe. This should take place especially in the realm of the forms of social law. Another possi-
1771 O ne could claim  that the main idea in the future European discourse will be based on the new coming of the 
parliamentary democracy.
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biiity is that comparative research is taken more seriously in the internal work of the institution.
European com parative dogmatics and the vertical com parisons. Questions of “comparative 
dogmatics”, described above, are strongly related to the idea of "vertical comparison". The idea 
(presented, for example, in the Community legal order) that comparability does not have to be 
quantitative but qualitative1772, liinctions already as a premise for vertical comparison.1773 Namely, 
one may ask, how could it be possible to have a dogmatic and theoretical discourse on European 
law and its function if vertical comparisons are ruled out and considered unacceptable, at the 
same time the European institutions and legal decision-makers do utilize comparative legal 
observations in defining different vertical relationships?
I contend that it is not possible to exclude vertical comparative research from 
contemporary European comparative legal research. It seems that vertical comparisons have to 
be included within the comparative law framework in order to produce some useful knowledge 
on the functioning o f European law, and to be able to critically look over law in its contemporary 
form as a comparative legal discourse. This is so in its educative, legislative and adjudicative form 
of legal discourse.1774
How could this be done?
Now, the restrictions, in comparative law studies, are restrictions upon the relevant 
and essential legal systems (or orders), and the conclusion o f the comparative argument is the 
choice of a doctrine. From that choice the legal order derives the legal solution. Even if, from the 
point of view of comparative law, the legal systems cannot be chosen (there are binding legal 
systems, and non-binding legal systems), legal systems (and their rules and interpretations) may 
be chosen as arguments against some other systems, or in order to establish a critical relationship 
internal to a (European) legal order.1775
1772 As, for instance, w as maintained in case 5/55 Assider (1954-56) ECR 135 per Advocate General Lagrange. A 
general principle is not necessarily the solution accepted in the highest number o f states (very detailed analysis of some 
national and international orders, pp .147-149, some analysis, Bredimas, A., 1978a, p.120). The idea is to avoid 
imitation and mechanical observations, and even evaluate and shape systems (idem).
The question is claimed to be a matter of fundamental and technical differences (Bredimas, A., 1978a,
p.121).
1773 On the problems o f comparability, see Dehousse, R.,1994, p.17. For some theoretical remarks, see Sacco, R., 
1991, p.7.
1774 See some analysis on the interpretation o f ECHR precedents on national systems, Martens, S.K., 1998, p.13.
1775 As we notice, comparative argument in itself is a form o f establishing the authority of its user. As in all 
arguments, the arguer uses the authority o f the legal systems in justifying its decision and convincing the recipient of the 
acceptability o f  his decision and his authority. However, unlike in any other type of legal argument, the legitimacy of
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Where the dogmatics would not comply with the type of comparative coexistence 
chosen by the court, it may have to examine the harmony all over again. This is the basis of 
European legal dogmatics, the comparative dogmatics o f European law. Furthermore, the 
comparative dogmatics can suggest "hard core" norms based on "generality" or disparity. On the 
other hand, the European courts may either accept or neglect these arguments.
The task of this comparative dogmatics seems to be examination of the legal quality 
of decisions in relation to the use o f traditional legal sources. On the other hand, in case the 
justification is restricted to the internal use of the institution, the only possibility is to examine the 
acceptability o f this restriction, and to take a more system oriented approach. This way the 
dogmatics may orient itself to a more critical examination o f the philosophical, sociological or 
political premises of the courts. Only this way can the dogmatics establish its opinion on the hard 
core o f European law.
This serves also national decision-making, legislation, and dogmatics. By knowing 
the discursive quality of the hard core standpoints made by the European level institutions, 
national dogmatics, legislation and legal decision-making can establish its opinion on the issue, 
evaluate those aspects in discourses on that level, and use the outcomes of this discourse critically 
as the basis o f its interpretative function in a coherent way. In this way there is a discursive 
maintenance of the coherence of the whole European law1776.
As we can see, the transformation o f the rules from one level to the other takes 
place after a comparative discourse. This is to say that the comparative discourse is a legal 
transformative discourse, which seems to be a neutral (descriptive) discourse on the 
comparability and the substance of the general norm, without an idea of direct applicability of all 
general norms at the international level. The comparative discourse is a discourse where the 
integrity of all the legal orders is taken into account.1777
these legal systems is related to their binding character in particular. In generalizing this binding character of some 
systems via itself, the system establishes a  tw o pole system o f bindingness, where it is itself binding as a  adjudicative 
system, and the other systems as legislative systems.
T his feature creates a polycentric system of European law in the long run. Certain rules are binding 
both in national legal systems, and also in the European level. Furthermore, they are a priori identical in both systems. 
In other words, this establishes also the European system as a  two level system. In these fields o f law, there are no 
conflicts between the different levels o f law. These fields of law are, in fact, the hard core o f the European law.
1776 It is clear that because this relationship between these systems is reflexively regulated (European law), the use 
of these interactive elements o f comparative law is difficult to analyse. The reflexive relationship, between these 
systems, is sometimes instrumental, sometimes traditional, etc.
1777 Future comparitivist are claimed to b e  economists, sociologists, statistician, etc, in order to find the relationship 
between law and existing social needs. See Lando, O., 1977, p.651.
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We have drawn, and could draw, moreover, many conclusions on the basis of this 
work relating to the incomplete nature of the European concept o f law, to the teleological nature 
o f European law in general, to functional subsidiarity and liberal equality, to the nature of 
individual protection, to the European legislative and adjudicative integrity, to the "autopoetics" 
of the European institutional discourses, to polycentrism, to the tendency of minimum regulation 
visible in European law, to the distortions o f communication in the European legal discourse, and 
basically, to different political philosophies and concepts of democracy. These topics will become 
more important in the realm o f the possible deepening and enlargening o f the integration in 
Europe, European Monetary Union and expected institutional changes1778. However, real 
suggestions are not made, even if there has been criticism and prospects for a change, which may 
set a scene for various proposals.
Nevertheless, we may briefly summarize the main concrete problem.
We could maintain that the problem of modem European law is not solved by the 
"reluctance" of the European Courts, by the fear of judicial activism and an attempt to guarantee 
the position of the European institutions on a “federal” basis.1779 European law needs "radicalized 
processes", which are beyond seemingly radical, but basically conservative, political ideas in 
contemporary European law. The problems of functional law and its role in "comparative 
systems" like European law must be resolved by functional means if the political sphere does not 
do so. Moreover, because we are moving in the realm of institutionalized comparison, the 
functionality has to be connected to the institutional functionality. This may be, however, too 
much to ask.
Related to this, it is generally agreed that the current problem of the legitimacy of 
the European Union system is dependent on its ability to take into account any social rights in its 
decision-making. Furthermore, the basic problem of the system is the increasing democratic 
deficit of the stale systems in the Union, which is reflected also in the European level democratic 
deficit. This is due to the fact that governmental legislation is gaining a central role and the na­
tional parliaments are becoming administrators of Union law .1780 Furthermore, Union law is inc-
,77B For som e analysis o f the post M aastricht crisis, see Weiler, 1995.
1779 See, for example, Mancini, G.F., 1998, and commentary, W eiler, J.H.H, 1998.
1710 In general, Cirdell, K., 1991, p .718. See also, Mancini/Weiler discussion 1998,
We m ay claim that the constant normative tension between two spheres o f regulation, state and 
Community, waters down many progressive developments in the field of social rights. This tension causes the inability 
to take seriously social improvements, and may, in the long run, lead to frustrations.
The following analysis is based on the idea, that the implementation of European law has to be
ÉM HM IlitÙÙ«;
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rcasingly, especially in the case of monetary Union1781, thus Europeanizing national legislation.17*2 
Monetary Union is also likely to lead to some kind of federal structures.
From the point of view of the welfare system, this question is apparently central. 
Liberalization and deregulation are not checked from the point of view of the legislative integrity 
and continuity of the system, but the governmental proposals can break drastically new ground 
for the national systems in relation to the implementation. On the other hand, it is difficult for the 
parliament to look over the nature o f the expert governmental proposals connected to the imple­
mentation o f the laws. The validity o f these proposals is based on the implementation of Euro­
pean law, control over which is not within competence of the Parliament.
Further analysis of these aspects is not provided in this work. The final remarks are 
related only to comparative law.
Conclusions: contemporary comparative law. As we have seen, comparative law has to do, on 
many levels, with constituting elements of law. Historically one can see how comparative law had 
an extremely important role in the construction of the identities o f the state legal systems and a 
stabilizing function in the legal consensus-creation on the question of the nature of legal systems. 
We have seen that contemporary comparative law moves in the realm of this structure of the state 
paradigm of law. This state paradigm of law, at the moment, consists of both states as a legal 
system and o f the international systems as legal orders. These legal orders are the marginal 
subsystems in the state paradigm of law.
On the other hand, the disparities and generalities in the realm of comparative law 
have been made normatively relevant by reflecting them within the a priori institutionalized 
general principles and common traditions, and to concepts like coherence, morality and
considered as legal administration. The ideas on administration can be applied to the analysis of the phenomenon.
The powers of government do not increase only in the field o f the traditional legislation. They do also, 
by “semi-comparative" considerations and arguments, define, in the European Courts, the idea of national legal systems 
(as we have seen in the Bachmann case in the European Court o f  Justice). This is related to the system o f intervening 
in the legal processes. Governments are the ones which “systematize” national legal systems in these European legal 
institutions by explaining what is, and what is not, relevant in that particular connection.
,7gl The following ideas are based also upon assumption that European Union law becomes increasingly central 
because o f M onetary Union.
im It is problematic to evaluate the "increasing" Europeanization of the national laws. There are always the qualita­
tive and the quantitative aspect to this. However, if 80% of the volume of the national legislation is based on European 
regulation, there m ust be something c o n e d  in the Europeanization thesis. (See, Mancini/Weiler discussion 1998).
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substantive equality or by just practically accepting them by institutional actors1783. The 
comparative approach has shown its alternative nature in relation to any “sovereignty” ideas 
(“will”, “intention”, etc.).
The uses of comparative observations have resulted in definitions and the 
establishment of institutional arrangements, but, for that matter, also the maintenance of the 
relative autonomy of the state legal systems as relevant systems in determining the questions o f  
economic, social, human rights policies at the European level. Furthermore, by comparative 
reflections one has been able to solve different competence questions.
The internationalization and the Europeanization of law seems to increase the 
relevance of comparative law. This is due to the fact that increasingly one arrives at "system- 
selection" situations, where several "competent" systems exist, and where the competencies have 
to be defined. We have already made some remarks on this the chapter above.
Comparative reasoning has, as we have seen, a kind of mediating function between 
systems. Comparative law within legal reasoning makes it rationally,, i.e. reasonably, possible to  
make legal choices in cases where the systematic legal arguments (deductive-logical measures) do 
not provide answers to the particular legal question. Comparative aspects determine, in 
contemporary Europe, for example, the basic procedural, conceptual and jurisdictional ideas. The 
constitutional ideas in Europe are based on comparative aspects, and they are dynamically inter­
preted this way. Comparative law has a function in defining the hard cases of the contemporary 
legal systems, cases dealing with basic problems of the society. The normative results, however, 
appear quite conservative.
On the other hand, states in many ways confirm their international identity legal 
systems (and their own limits of sovereignty) on a comparative legal basis. This concerns 
likewise the relationship between systems such as the European Union and the United States.
Comparative law is, consequently, functioning in the constant rejustification of the 
law on the basis o f foreign experience.
There are, in other words, several "cases" of comparative law1784. In a legal case, 
comparative law functions as a source o f law. In a "new case" comparative law is a practical 
argument. In an "existential case" comparative law is the basis of the creation of the identity o f 
the system as a procedural entity and a linguistic system. In an "authority" case the subsidiarity
m j For common traditions determined by the Roman law origins of a  common tradition, for exam ple, case 23/68 
Klomp v inspectie (1969) ECR 43.
,7M These can be called the "hard cases" of European law.
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and "substantive" issues are examined.
The basic premise of the use of comparative law in substantive norm construction 
is difficult to define because of the closed nature o f its use. It is» in many ways» a subjective and 
institutional method of reasoning. Furthermore, the increasing flow of information, also in the 
field o f comparative law, has resulted in a tendency toward the sketchy use o f comparative 
information. As we have seen, because of the increasing possibility for quick transmission and 
receiving information the traditional seekers of legal and legally related information, including 
comparative law, have come to be replaced by institutional self-sufficiency. The doctrinal analyses 
are left out, and the legal decision-making institutions collect and analyse the information them­
selves. The law in these institutions becomes a professional enterprise, and the institutions close 
themselves normatively. The discursive analyses disappear. This is one o f the basic problems of 
comparative law at the moment. The comparative information gets instrumentalized more easily. 
The comparative information becomes merely practical information.1785
On the other hand, one could claim that different legal subsystems are also entering 
into the sphere of comparative law. This means that comparative law will be opened up, and may 
become more than traditional comparative contract law or comparative constitutional law. It 
would consist of various forms o f national and international processes1786. This is a real 
breakthrough for comparative law. Comparative law can be understood also to be comparative 
research of differentiated legal procedures in a certain global area.1787
Moreover, what we have seen, in the case o f institutional comparative law, is the 
phenomenon o f the institutional systematization of legal systems.
17M This is also connected to the "data processing" of the comparative information. For traditional approach, see 
Cottin, S., 1996, p.403. The Recommendation No. R (92) 15 and the explanatory memorandum (Council o f Europe. 
1994) does not really discuss the legal problems of data-processing, but only the technical aspects. The legal aspects 
should be taken more seriously.
In general, because of the speed o f different information channels, one seems to be able to reproduce, 
as an historical entity, all kinds o f systems. In this process, however, one emphasizes particular and simple systems, the 
role o f the pure normative systems. This is so, because they are the only systems, which do not cause frustrating 
analysis, or "unpractical" historical reproductions. When this is realized in the "formal" modern institutions, which are 
oriented to maintain themselves and which are not able to maintain the rationality of particular actors and systems, 
decisions become irrational and impulsive, a kind of "system movements" (mass movements).
1786 This is so, because constitutional adjudication is more related to the deliberation on general aspects o f law than 
a normal application o f legal statutes and legislative propositions. Hence, it is natural that comparative law has a more 
important role in the constitutional adjudication.
1717 On the other hand, the normative closeness of modem law functions in a  rather strange way. M odem  law is its 
own critic. The generalizations o f norms (principles) and generalizations o f legal systems (general principles) are the 
internal critics of legal norms and legal systems. On these bases, the modem law self-observes and self-regulates. In this 
sense, comparative law has a particularly important role. It produces generalizations and disparities in order to balance 
this internal dialectic o f modem positive law.
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Consequently, one could maintain that contemporary comparative law is 
institutionally controlled. Comparative receptions are controlled and reflected with regard to  
functionality of the supranational systems. The supranational institutions define and redefine 
comparative generalities and divergences. The comparative adaptions take place according to the 
conditions established by the supranational legal institutions. Generalities are adaptable and 
acceptable, and the divergences maintain comparative divergency. Comparative law has com e 
from autonomous , institutionalized and academic comparative law towards institutionally- 
controlled comparative law.
Comparative law, in the more "post-modem" form in differentiated discourses, 
might have an extremely important role in the legal discourse when differentiated particular 
discourses start to assert their identity and essential features in a more analytical way. In th is  
process, the state law and particular legal "sub-systems" in society might become closer to each  
other. However, the main condition o f this is that one comes clean with change in the idea o f  
comparative law, i.e. that comparative law corresponds more to the general development o f  
differentiation of functional systems, and does not stay as a system of national legal systems only.
This idea is devoid o f empirical data. “Comparative international law”, comparison 
of international treaties and their provisions, seems to be a useful method in resubstantiation o f  
national law at the moment. By collecting comparative evidence from the international and its  
implementing legal orders one seems to be able to arrive to kind of an idea of international legal 
community. This development is still in an evolutive stage, but one can notice that p u re  
comparison of national systems in interpreting national or international rules seems not to be less  
popular in cases, particularly where new cases come into question. Traditional comparative law , 
based on state-paradigmatic assumptions, seems to be a conservative way of attempting to  
maintain the traditional structures and doctrines in the internationalized law. Comparative 
international law provides a effective means to justify, for example, the deviation from the stric t 
doctrine of state sovereignty. In this sense one could maintain that we are living in a transitional 
period. This idea needs, however, further development, which is not made here. What one could  
say is that it seems to be based on an extremely strict internationalized positivistic approach. It 
assumes a very common sense interpretation of international treaties and conventions. On the 
other hand, it seems to be able to react to societal needs and changes taking place in the  
international sphere and internationalized legal thinking.
What we can say, in the end, is that comparative law has to find its relative 
autonomy from the contemporary international, national and supranational discourses by starting
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to consider itself as a part o f the legal discourse as a legal argument and as a legal source. This 
takes place by newly establishing connections with the legal philosophical, legal sociological and 
legal historical discourses and reasoning, as I have tried to do. Only in this way can law maintain 
its character as a possibility in the contemporary "Europeanization" and "internationalization" of 
law. If this is not done, the internationalization, related to the closing up of the institutional 
considerations in the realm o f increasing flow of information, closes the national legal systems 
from each other as forms of discourse. We may call this some kind of a “blocking effect”.
* A concrete aspect o f this is the inclusion o f "vertical” studies in the realm of
comparative law concerning the principle of discursive integrity, as we have suggested. This 
would mean critical examination of comparative law, not only in scientific sense and national legal 
discourses, but also in international and regional legal systems.
Finally, it seems that the question of “highmodem” comparative law is no longer 
about the Germanic, Latin, Anglo-Saxon, or Scandinavian traditional distinctions or about a 
common European legal culture based on these classifications, but that something else is essential 
in this respect1788. It seems that the key distinction goes somewhere in the sphere of the discursive 
concept of law. As we have identified, there are different types of these discourses used 
differently in legal systems1789.
On the other hand, the second integral criterion for comparative law is evidently 
related to the distinction between the systems, which stress liberal aspects and make a clear 
distinction between informal and formal regulation and those systems where these characteristics 
are not so much emphasized. As we have indicated, the differences may be associated with the 
differences in historical development. In some systems, there is no "homogeneity” idea. They 
consist of different levels o f regulation, as the all-encomposing principle of subsidiary 
indicates1790. On the other hand, the Nordic legal culture, at least, seems to be related to the idea 
o f a legally homogeneous state, which, on the other hand, is related to the strong legalistic 
tradition and social functionality of law (some kind o f legal “realism”). In spite of the continuing 
liberalization taking place in the Nordic society, I do believe that this idea o f law is still prevailing.
I7M On the "Kulturvergleichung", see Hâberle, P., 1994, p.16.
1789 It looks like the socio-tegal discourse can, in some states and political systems, consist also of discussions about duties, and 
not only about the liberties. The explanatory style seems to be different when duties are discussed in connection with freedoms.
Because of this difference, the discussion on the inequality cannot take place, in the European legal context, only 
on the basis o f  the liberal conception of law. Furthermore, because o f the differences in tradition, the duties cannot be only a m atter 
for liberal actors. The state has to play a role in the European law in these spheres of law.
1790 For the lack o f religious hierarchy idea in the Nordic system, see Strâth, B„ S0rensen, 0 . ,  1997, p.12
515
The only problem is how to define it in the future» instrument ally or in a value based way.
Furthermore» the idea that certain types of policies are possible only in certain types 
of social systems and in the realm of certain type of constitutional though, is not very far from th e  
consideration o f this last idea in general. It seems that Nordic constitutional thinking may entail 
more functional constitutional thought concerning political integrity than in most o f the European 
states.
IV. EPILOGUE: W hat kind o f institutional justification is comparative legal
justification?
In the end, we try to formulate some regulative ideas for the comparative 
justification in institutional law. Here we come to some ideas on the relationship between 
comparative discourse and the institutional procedures in general. However, it may be not so  
difficult to find some empirical “comparative” evidence relating to these remarks. Some systems 
may function like this, as we have suggested.
The inclusion of comparative law to the sources of law (regulated by standards o f  
reasoning) has been considered in the theoretical chapter on comparative legal reasoning. 
However, one question remains: what kind of legal justification can comparative justification? 
Namely, where the source of law doctrine and the standards o f reasoning speak, basically, about 
the acceptability o f comparative argumentation and its role in legal justification on traditional 
basis (i.e. traditional legal discourse theory and comparative law), the analysis of its justificatory 
aspect refers, we may say, to its basic conditions in relation to discourse ethics as such. In other 
words, where the traditional theory of legal justification replaces it in relation to the traditional 
method o f legal justification, the value-based theory speaks about the relationship between 
comparative justification and general “discourse” ethics.
However, I still think that this latter “value” analysis is possible only in the context 
of empirical data, and not on the basis of philosophy and phenomenology as such. This is why this 
analysis is replaced after the empirical survey and analysis of the functionality of comparative law 
in contemporary legal orders. Only in this way is one able to confirm and augment this theory o f 
comparative legal justification in a critical way.
In practice, as we can note from the empirical survey and from the traditional 
approach to comparative law, the reasons for the use of comparative law as a source of legal
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argument has been related to many types of “integrations”, to plain “utility”, or to substantial or 
formal authority. However, these justifications for the use o f comparative law have not yet, one 
may say, told us anything about the reason why comparative law really should be used as a reason 
in justification. The idea of integration and utility seem to be extremely situational, practical, and 
functional justifications for its use, as we have maintained. In fact, on that basis one could still 
easily claim that comparative law does not, whatsoever, nature o f a real legal source.
However, the use of comparative law in institutional legal justification seems to 
indicate that the user o f these types o f arguments has moved towards a theoretical level of the 
legal phenomenon and also towards a general legal discursive sphere. In this sense, for example, 
a traditional comparative listing of legal systems and their description in rather mechanical ways, 
by using exclusive generalizations, seems to be based more on the “contextual” premises of the 
comparativist. The comparativist seems to reproduce his “natural” and traditional (cultural) 
context. Here his context is the value-based premise of the classification and selection, and other 
systems are only instruments in this type of value-based classification and systematization. As 
maintained, one does not really take part in the legal discourse, but actually tries to avoid any 
legal analysis. This seems to apply also to the sketchy use o f comparative observations in legal 
decision-making. Also in this sense we may ask, whether comparative law could have any real 
role in legal decision-making.
Any institutional and instrumental (non-discursive) use of comparative law, on the 
other hand, does not seem to guarantee the rationality of the legal order. On the contrary, it, in 
many ways, leads to irrationality at least from the point of view of the legal discourse, because it 
means effective exclusion of, for example, national legal discourses, and results in, and is based 
on, strict hierarchical forms o f institutional organization. The institutional forms of the use of 
comparative law do not prove anything about the flexibility, informational openness, 
susceptibility, and sensitivity o f the institutional legal order. In fact, it seems that more 
unsystematic and inspirational forms o f the use of comparative law in a legal organization seem 
to indicate more discursive flexibility o f an order.
The use of analytical comparative exemplifications seems, nevertheless, to relate 
more to the discursively “jurisprudential” and legal theoretical perspective. Namely, in this type 
of use there is an attempt to theoretical understanding of the legal phenomenon in question (vs. 
A specific national dogmatic contextualization) and, furthermore, the legal phenomenon is related
517
to the “total system’* of theoretical perspectives.1791 Moreover, we may say that in an analytical 
exemplification by comparative arguments, the decision-maker approaches the “common sense”  
analysis, and explains more clearly the value-based issues involved in his thinking.
Now, we can make attempt to formulate an analysis in the context of the question 
asked. First we do this in the light of some rules of value-based theory o f legal justification1792, 
secondly from the point of view o f the idea o f utility, and thirdly, in relation to the philosophical 
analysis of the institutional discourse as such.
From the legal theoretical point of view (regulative dimension! it has b een  
maintained that “every speaker may only assert what he or she believes*\ In this sense, in u sing  
comparative legal arguments, one has to believe firmly that one sincerely understands the idea o f  
the foreign norms. This can be related also to generalizability. One has to be ready to ap p ly  
generally the comparative rules achieved. Problems may be noted, however, if we ask th e  
question “to what audience is one really arguing?**.
On the other hand, the fact that comparative arguments strive to a more ’theoretical 
level” or are plain linguistic-analytical arguments is also justified according to rules o f  
justification. This can be the case at any point of the legal discourse. Naturally, one could a lso  
challenge the legal source nature o f the comparative law in any form of an argument.
On the other hand, because everyone taking part in the discourse should also “g iv e  
reasons... when asked to do so, unless she can cite reasons which justify a refusal to do so '\ th e  
claim of not really knowing the content of foreign norms can be a justification for a refusal to  
carry on in the analysis of the foreign system.
Comparative observations may also be problematised at any point o f the discourse. 
They are not any “final** arguments. If the justification is carried on by comparative arguments 
and their use is challenged, a full statement o f reasons must be given in order to justify the use o f  
comparative law as a legal source. This is related to the nature of comparative law arguments a s  
“special” arguments1793. However, as we may understand, this may result in unbearable problems 
to the rationality o f the discourse (efficiency etc.).
Because the question, in the introduction o f comparative premises, seems to lead to  
unequal treatment of persons, justifications for their use has to be presented also on these bases.
1791 W e have spoken about this "‘total” system idea in the beginning o f this work, see footnote 14.
,7W Alexy, R., 1989, pp.297-302.
1793 “Special legal argument forms must have the reasons fo r them stated in full, that is, must achieve saturation** 
(Alexy, A., 1989,p.302).
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This relates to the use of comparative observations in general. They are not really the (norm) 
topics under discussion in a process o f discourse. In general, it seems that, in a legal discourse, 
the maker of comparative observations has an extremely strong burden of proof.
The use of comparative arguments may be justified also by the fact that at least 
“one universal norm must be adduced in the justification o f a legal judgment'*. This seems to be 
the case o f with “hard cases” lacking sensible reasons in traditional sources of law. In another 
context, we have already spoken about the exhaustion of other sources before comparative 
observations may be used. This seems to be a firm rule for comparative justification.1794
Foreign precedents seem to be at the heart o f the exemplified comparative 
justification. Consequently, from the point of view o f some rules on the use of precedents, the 
question can be asked, whether foreign precedents should be used, if one’s “own” precedents do 
not exist?1795 Firstly, we do not assert that a deviation from a foreign precedent should be 
justified. The burden of proof is on the other side, on the one explaining the content of the 
precedent. However, we could claim that a general rule that “precedents should be cited" does 
not seem to apply as such. Nevertheless, we could produce some justification for the use of 
foreign precedents. For example, it must be maintained that the analytical quality of the reasoning 
may be better achieved by an analysis based on precedents. This is especially the case, if no 
precedents or doctrinal analysis exist in the one’s “own” legal context.
We may relate our analysis also to the question of “why are comparative 
observations utilizable?” (utility dimension!.
As we already indicated in the study of the analogical argument in general, 
comparative observations, according to our opinion, seem to help the decision-maker to 
“structure” his legal reasoning (schemes).1796 Comparative arguments function as some kind of 
“beginnings” for the reasoning and provide starting points for the structuring of reasoning. We 
may say that they help the decision-maker to conceptualize the legal situation. This takes place in 
relation to analytical comparative considerations, and may be based on some historical or other 
reasons which associate comparative observations “rationally” with systematic reasoning. Then 
also the legal audience may understand, what one is speaking about. However, this is a strongly *79
XT* “Whenever dogmatic arguments are possible they should be used " , even if  Mevery dogmatic proposition must 
be able to stand up to systematic testing in both the narrower and the wider sense“ (Alexy, R., 1989, p.301 ).
I79i Alexy, R., maintains that “if  a precedent can be cited in favour o f or against a decision it should be so cited“, 
and that “whoever departs from precedent carries a burden o f argument* (Alexy, R., 1989, p.302).
17,6 V ans, M , 1998, p.101 fit
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value-based situation.1797
This type of “structuralist” utility has to do usually with the fact that other legal 
systems and orders may be the only legal instances, where such a legal question (a new question) 
has been asked and resolved. In this sense, comparative observations function as a source o f  
information in a case where the “orthodox” sources o f the system do not explicitly give any 
answer. This may be the case where no statutory law has been enacted, for example.1798 Secondly, 
the utility may be related to the fact that the comparable decision-maker, which is considered, 
may be a authority on the question for some reason. This could be a case, for example, even if the 
dogmatic o f legal scientific authorities have been dealing with the problem.
In general, we could say that the rules of legal justification do not seem to give any 
satisfactory results in relation to comparative reasoning in the process legal justification. The 
utility idea may, however, function as some kind of a basis for the justification. However, it seems 
to lead to extremely subjective standards.
It seems that in the comparative justificatory processes one may easily get into a 
separate comparative law discourse in the realm of the legal process, which cannot be prohibited 
as such, but may easily be rejected on the basis of procedural economic premises. On the other 
hand, if such a separate discourse is effected, the task o f the procedural leader (the judge) seems 
to be only to maintain the centrality of the “internal” premises, and ask, for example, questions 
like “can we not find these types o f ideas also in our own legal system (or in our own legal 
discourse)?”
Now, we may try to perceive the idea of comparative legal justification exactly in 
this type of discursive context (discursive dimension). Namely, we can start to analyse the legal 
justification process (the legal institutional process) from the point of view of the use o f 
comparative observations. The empirical observations we have made may give us valuable 
indications.
Let us imagine two persons come to a court with their conflicting claims. We may 
say that the more intense the conflict is,, i.e. more interests and values are involved, the less the
1797 This is not disproved by our remarks that comparative observations appear usually in dissenting or similar types 
of argumentation. In fact, we may claim that the dissenting opinions have an evolutively structuring role in the evolution 
of the case law. The dissenting opinions may help the decision-making institutions to start their line o f argumentation 
in a next case based on observations by the dissenting judge, for example. Furthermore, i f  he has been arguing 
analytically by com parative remarks, the decision-making institutions has in fact already a “stock of arguments'* for its 
use. Furthermore, the parties may start also from these premises.
l79'  It could be claim ed that comparative law has, and actually can have, a  role in systems where no travaux 
preparatoires are available o r in general use.
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other party may be ready to try to find the “correct traditional interpretation of law” on the basis 
of a complete collection of traditional legal sources. This is so, because, even if he recognizes the 
line and the logic of the traditional interpretation, he may feel that the traditional interpretation is 
not satisfactory for him. His aim is to win the case.
In this type of strong value conflict, one may try to claim a special character of the 
case, and that something deviating exists in relation to former cases and traditional interpretation 
of traditional legal sources. On the other hand, usually, in this type of case, the other party to the 
dispute argues strongly for the traditional sources and for a traditional interpretation.
We could actually identify this situation as a kind o f  a strong a priori inequality in 
front of the law. Namely, the first party may recognize a priori the traditional line of 
interpretation, but he feels that the case is important and his interests are immense and that there 
is a difference in situation from the existing “similar” cases. However, at the same time, he tmsts 
the intellectual institutional legal system and its ability to recognize the difference between his 
situation and other previous cases.1799
Consequently, the need for an analytical approach is stressed by the first party. In 
this situation, he may take up examples from comparative law to prove his point. He wants, in 
order to feel as if treated in an integrative way, an analytical approach to the largest possible 
extent.1800 In this type of situation, the claim is that the legal situation should be “changed” 
analytically, because it is felt that the traditional forms of interpretation (and sources: statutes, 
cases, doctrinal analysis) do not bring the “correct” solution in that particular case.
This brings us to  another idea, which may relate the to interests of analysis in 
general. Namely, it is possible that intellectually-oriented lawyers, for example, may recognize an 
idea of “reasonable equality** as a main principle of procedure. This means that they may accept
1799 This seems to indicate, for example, that a  strongly normative, value-based- theory of legal justification assumes
a strong institutional attachment.
1800 In fact, the idea of inequality o f this type corresponds quite well with the situation, where we are dealing with any 
accusatorial cases (for example criminal cases). Procedurallv. the defendant o r the accused is more or less required to 
establish a justification for the act he is alleged to  have committed, and that the accusation is unfounded. This is, for 
example, the reason, why in criminal law  the principle of the presumption o f innocence exits as a  premise imposed by 
m ost civilized legal systems. It tries to  diminish the influences o f an oppressive situation (individual against a legal 
system as a whole) and bring the defendant to a  more or less equal situation w ith the accusatorial system (o r with the 
public sphere).
In other words, in our case the inequality before the law arises on the basis of established case law or 
prevailing interpretation (legally intellectual situation). In criminal law cases, usually, the law is strongly established 
(m oreover, even defined by restricting principles like nulla poena sine lege o r the principle o f legality). This means 
that, in criminal cases, the justification o f the case is legally quite simple (and also that the emphasis is usually in the 
proving of facts). The legal justification, the findings of law, are usually accepted to  be quite straight forward. Even the 
loser o f the case usually accepts the authority o f the positive law a priori
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the idea of discursive law, and more than that, the idea of discursive integrity of law. In this type 
of situation, the parties are willing to analyse the traditional sources of law, and - in addition to 
that - other types of sources, if they provide better or more reasons and more analytical 
approaches for the deciding of the case. This, in fact, means that they are willing to discuss the 
case analytically, and not to rely only on traditional sources, which, with a method of analogy o r 
enlarging method, may bring a result to a question. However, they want a discussion on the 
subject related exactly to the subject, and they want to have the case reasonably justified in order 
to be able to, firstly, accept the solution as rational, and secondly, in order to maintain the 
discursive integrity o f law.
We may ask, in what type o f  situations would one start to think these two last 
premises? We may say that in these types o f situations, the parties take some kind of a risk in 
trusting the institutional system and its value-based analytical capacity (institutional law). On the 
other hand, they also trust in their ability to provide material for the discussion. It means also that 
these premises may come up in extremely difficult and unclear situations. However, the essential 
idea is that, in these types of cases, the parties are, to a large extent, transferring the authority to  
the institutional decision-maker, letting it ultimately speak about its values. However, they trust 
it because it takes into account any arguments put forward by the parties, and is not institutionally 
instrumental.
Now, as we have seen, those cases where comparative observations appear more 
than relevant, are the “hard cases” of equality questions and those pertaining to fundamental 
values. Furthermore, they are often cases, where, procedurally, the parties' and all represented 
interests' (for example, in a form of intervention) integrity is attempted to maintain. This seems 
to indicate that, in the use of comparative observations, we are faced with integratively discursive 
cases.
In these types of cases, one demands an intensely reasonable approach from the 
decision-maker, and consequently, a clear expression of the value-based premises. It seems that 
this type o f process is based on some kind of discursive saturation rather than only upon 
systematic saturation. On the other hand, in these discursively equal and integrative processes, the 
demand for reasoning may be satisfied only by going beyond all the exhausted traditional sources. 
There has been already some kind o f systematic “saturation”.1801 When reasonableness is
ti0' As we know, in European-level legal orders this exhaustion takes place quite quickly because o f the strong 
formality.
522
demanded from the decision-maker, he has to make comparative observations in order to 
maintain the integrity of the loser of the case, but also the discursive quality of the decision and 
justification in general (institutional opinion).
In fact, if the comparative observations would be accepted by the parties in their 
argumentation, and the decision-maker, in his justification, would not consider them, it would be 
likely that the decision-maker did not convince the parties in a reasonably way. In order to avoid 
this type of situation, when parties take up comparative observations, one should make at least a 
reference to the national discourse on the subject and to the differences related to the compared 
systems on some essential point, when rejecting them as relevant arguments. Where even the 
loser of the case seems to know the law and its line of reasoning, it is extremely difficult to 
convince him on the basis of an unanalytical (perhaps domestic analogical) approach. Only in this 
way may one maintain the intellectual and substantial authority in a case.
Consequently, we may note, how, in some cases, and in some types of systems, the 
“saturation” in legal justification may be achieved only by including comparative legal 
observations in the justification (or argumentation). In order to maintain the discursive integrity 
o f the party, but also the legal order, one may be obliged to go beyond the traditional sources, 
and use arguments which structure and reflect the essential question to be considered. As we may 
also notice, these types of comparative considerations may be taken up in cases where we are 
dealing with a hard question but, moreover, also with parties willing and obliged to discuss the 
situation in a reasonable way (also with comparative observations). This explains why we are 
usually looking into a legal discourse between professional lawyers or, more commonly, into a 
discourse in realm of a scientific-analytical philosophy of legal dogmatics.
This means, basically, that even in a systematic approach to law there may be a 
place for comparative law arguments, and a kind of a priority of foreign precedents, especially in 
cases where domestic precedents do not exist.
In conclusion, we may say that the situations where comparative law may be used 
or even should be used as arguments of justification are those situations of discursive processes 
o f hard cases where the integrity (and equality) of law is attempted to maintain on many levels. 
In these types of discourses, one attempts, reasonably, to balance systematic, coherent, logical, 
and extremely well-justified points of views. Furthermore, the parties taking part in these kinds 
o f cases have a discursive attitude. In these types of hard cases, where parties seem to agree 
about the need for a reasonable solution - for example, by bringing the comparative observations 
into the discourse themselves - the decision-maker may have even a weak obligation to use
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comparative law in justification.
This is why we may say that comparative law, as a method of justification, seems to 
be a kind o f an “optional”, “consensual” and “discursive” method of legal justification - apart 
from being a special case of allowed legal sources. Furthermore, if we have a discursive point o f  
view upon the law, we may also consider it as an “institutional” source of law. However, this 
does not mean that it is an institutional source in a sense o f discursively closed systems.1802
Nevertheless, we have to stress the fact that the source and justificatory value o f 
comparative law cannot be considered - as many comparative lawyers seem to do - on the basis 
o f balancing, integrating, or choosing legal systems etc. This is why we have to also emphasize 
the idea that if the situation is not “consensual” in the way we have just described it, i.e. the need 
to make comparative observations does not arise from the discursive quality o f the process itself 
(in the way explained above), the decision-maker, using comparative observations must at least 
justify the use of these types of methods o f justification by considering, at a minimum, the 
standards of reasoning developed in this work.1803 This is due to the unsystematic nature o f this 
type of source.
Finally, we could ask, does one even have to go to comparative law as a source o f  
law. One could discuss the issue on the basis of moral or other types of practical arguments? 
These two types of reasoning (justifications) seem to be, to a certain extent, alternatives. The 
answer to the question seems to be that the former leads to a discourse on law. The use o f  
comparative law seeks to give an answer to the question of “what is the law?”, and not to the 
question “what is moral and practical?”.
Accordingly, the basic answer to the question “To whom one justifies the decision 
in order to maintain the integrity o f  law“ could be the following one:
‘7  always think that the most important person is the person who is going to lose
the case. 1 feel I ought to explain to one who has lost, why a judge, who has never
met these parties before, has come down on his opponents side.
This is the person who wonders, why he got the judgment wrong”* 1 *04
1802 This idea seem s to relate to legal formalism in a strongly linguistic and procedural sense, and not to legal 
formalism as legal systematic terminology.
i *03 fh is  seems to correspond to the Alexian rule regarding special justification of the changes in the method o f
justification.
im  Lord Justice Schiemann, Court o f Appeal, 25.3.1997.
Summary of the thesis
“THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMPARATIVE LEGAL REASONING. 
FROM INSPIRATION TO RATIONAL LEGAL JUSTIFICATION”
The thesis is an examination of the nature o f comparative legal reasoning within the 
contemporary theoretical and practical debate. The first argument of the thesis is that 
comparative law can be classified as a relatively autonomous legal source. The second argument 
relates to its qualitative nature as a legal source. Namely, the argument is that comparative law 
should be used consulting all legal audiences (ideal rule), and that its analysis should be based on 
a rule of transitivity (material rule). The analysis of these rules is presented in the thesis, and the 
practical implications of these rules are related to the contemporary discussion on legal sources 
and legal justification. Moreover, these observations in theory are reflected upon in the 
contemporary practice of the legal orders in Europe.
The first point o f departure is the theory of legal discourse. Thus, the thesis is 
commencing with a brief analysis of the role of legal sources within this theory. A principle of 
“discursive integrity” is recommended as the basic principle for a rational legal discourse. This 
principle is, in this connection, briefly analysed. However, its basic idea is that this principle is to 
be explained in the course of the study relating to various issues in the legal discourse.
Secondly, the idea o f comparison is examined in a light of certain linguistic aspects. 
Here the idea o f comparison is analysed from the point of view of some theories from the 
etymological and rhetorical tradition.
The third part o f the study is an historical analysis of comparative law. Here the 
focus is on some classical writers (Aristotle, Cicero, Machiavelli, Bodin, Montesquieu), and an 
analysis is made o f the characteristics o f these periods (ancient, medieval, early modem, and 
modem legal thought). At the end, some conclusions are drawn as to the role of comparative law 
in the 19th and 20th centuries and on the nature of the history o f  comparative law in general. 
Ultimately, it is claimed that 20th century comparative law is a period o f institutionalized 
comparative law.
The fourth part o f the thesis consists o f the analysis o f the 20th century discussion 
concerning the theory of comparative law within the context of institutionalized comparative law. 
Here the focus is on the traditional discussion of the nature of comparative law, its methodology, 
its relationship to various other forms o f social-scientific disciplines, its basic distinctions, its 
function in general, and on contemporary critical comparative law. Special attention is paid to the 
theories of legal transplants and to the theory of legal formants.
Consequently, the analysis moves towards the ideas of comparative law as a 
discourse within the general legal discourse concerning the nature of comparative legal 
arguments, and comparative law as a legal source (as explained previously).
The second part of the thesis provides empirical analysis of the functions of 
comparative law in various legal institutions. After a brief discussion of the role of comparative 
law in the legislature, analysis is made o f the usage of comparative observations in the context of 
discovery, context of justification, and the ultimate justification o f legal decisions in the course of 
legal adjudication. This discussion is based on the case law material deriving from the supreme 
courts of various European countries (England, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and Sweden). 
Some other state legal systems are also shortly considered (such as the Netherlands and the 
United States). However, the main text-critical analysis focuses on comparative argumentation 
within the European legal institutions (such as the European Court of Human Rights and the
uEuropean Court of Justice). The conclusions of this chapter are connected to the analysis of some 
interviews, which were made in these courts in the course of this research project.
The final analysis concentrates on particular questions such as the freedom o f 
expression, taxation, the inviolability o f home, and the equality between men and women. This 
material derives from the European-level institutions. Consequently, some conclusions are drawn 
concerning the “substantive” character o f European law in general.
At the end of this chapter, there are some considerations as to the role o f  
comparative law in European law. Questions such as “what is the meaning o f comparative law for 
the relationship between state legal systems and European level legal orders” and “what is the 
role of comparative law in European legal evolution?” are asked and answered. Ultimately, these 
conclusions are set forth by means of a model of European law. Some questions are also asked 
regarding the future perspectives upon European law.
The final remarks relate to the problem o f whether comparative law can have a role 
in the legal institutional processes and justifications o f legal solutions. The overall answer is 
associated with the idea of the discursive integrity of law.
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